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DOE OSTI2024

RANGERS: Methodology Report on Design and Performance Assessment of Engineered Barrier Systems in a Salt Repository for HLW/SNF

Salt formations are one of the potential host rocks for the final disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in deep geological repositories, both in Germany and the United States. The safe isolation of radioactive waste in these repositories relies on a multi-barrier system, combining engineered and natural barriers. The natural barrier is provided by the salt rock itself, known for its self-sealing properties and long-term stability. The engineered barrier, on the other hand, comprises sealing components strategically placed within the repository to enhance its containment capabilities. In both Germany and the United States, long-term safety assessments require demonstrating the integrity of the natural barrier for a period of up to 1 million years. Concurrently, the engineered barrier system (EBS) must maintain its structural and functional integrity until the long-term sealing, such as the granular salt backfill material, has re-consolidated to its final low porosity and permeability. Based on extensive expertise and experience with engineered barriers in salt formations, BGE TECHNOLOGY GmbH and Sandia National Laboratories have partnered to develop a robust methodology for the integrity and performance assessment of EBS in HLW repositories through the RANGERS project. This collaborative effort aims to establish a unified approach to geotechnical engineering, repository design, integrity and performance evaluation of EBS in salt repositories.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Long-length Scintillating Fibers for Nuclear Geological Repositories

This research focuses on the usage of plastic scintillating fibers as ruggedized detectors in long-length sections coupled to long-length standard optical fiber segments for the purpose of radiation detection and monitoring. This technology addresses a need for monitoring radiation in difficult-to-access or inaccessible areas, such as monitoring: radioactive waste within geological repositories, nuclear material storage facilities, spent fuel dry storage areas, inaccessible areas within nuclear facilities including reactors and reprocessing facilities, decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and other similar areas. The fiber can be placed along the tunnels of a geological repository to monitor the radiation field along its length. This can detect an increase of radiation due to movement, leakage, or unexpected opening of the containers, as well as decrease in the radiation due to removal of material. These capabilities have been demonstrated at INL’s Radioactive Scrap Waste Facility by successfully detecting the removal of an interim storage containers from the storage area. The poster focuses on explaining the technology and its capability in monitoring deep geological repositories (DGRs), especially in the domain of safety and international safeguards. As more countries consider the development of DGRs, technologies such as the one being presented can help establish continuity of knowledge of the material, maintain public confidence, and ensure safe operation of the facility. Furthermore, the poster looks at the future steps of the technology and its potential role in the international safeguards regime.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2024

DECOVALEX-2023: Task F1 Final Report

DECOVALEX-2023 Task F is a comparison of models and methods for post-closure performance assessment (PA) of a deep geologic repository for radioactive waste. The general aims of Task F are to build confidence in the models, methods, and software used for PA and to stimulate additional research and development in PA methodologies. The task objectives are to motivate development of PA modelling skills and capabilities, to examine the influence of model choices on calculated repository performance, and to compare the uncertainties introduced by model choices to other sources of uncertainty. Task F involves no actual experiment or site. It is a PA modelling exercise that requires the conceptual development of hypothetical repository designs and geologic settings. Because three of the teams were interested in salt and the rest of the teams were interested in crystalline rock, Task F was split into two branches: Task F1 for crystalline rock and Task F2 for salt. This report is for Task F1, crystalline rock. Teams from seven countries (Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and United States) participated in Task F1. The teams worked together to define the features, events, and processes of the reference case repository and established a set of performance measures. In addition, they defined a set of benchmark problems designed to test and compare modelling capabilities for fracture flow and transport at different scales. The repository design and benchmark problems are documented in a Task Specification that evolved over time as the group honed the specifications. The benchmark problems verified that each team can aptly model flow and transport in fractured media in 1-, 2-, and 3-dimensions. Two general approaches were used for the 3-dimensional benchmarks: discrete fracture network (DFN) and equivalent continuous porous medium (ECPM). DFN modelling involves explicit meshing of each fracture while ECPM modelling aims to capture the effective porosity and directional permeability of each cell in a space-filling mesh as affected by intersecting fractures. In some models, a combination of the two is used, i.e., DFN for large known fractures and ECPM for the rest of the domain. Transport is solved by using either the advection-dispersion equation or particle tracking. Although some variation is observed among model breakthrough curves in the benchmark problems, there is strong agreement in breakthrough behaviour up to at least the 75 th percentile for all benchmarks. At the 90 th percentile, breakthrough results show larger differences, suggesting several models retain substantially higher fractions of tracer in regions of slower moving water. In addition to the flow and transport benchmarks, several teams completed the source term benchmark, verifying capabilities for modelling radionuclide decay and ingrowth, waste package breach, instant release fractions, fuel matrix degradation rates, and radionuclide solubility limitations. The reference case is conceptualized as a generic spent fuel repository at a depth of 450 m in fractured crystalline rock. The repository has 50 parallel backfilled drifts, each with 50 deposition holes 6 m apart. Each deposition hole contains a 4-PWR waste package and bentonite buffer. The rock domain is 5 km in length, 2 km in width, and 1 km in depth. It has 6 deterministic fractured deformation zones and a multitude of stochastic fractures. Teams generally used the ECPM approach for the entire rock or a hybrid approach in which the deterministic fracture zones are modelled with a DFN and the rest of the rock is modelled by ECPM. Of the reference case problems specified, only the results of the initial reference case problem are compared in this report. The initial problem focuses on transport from the deposition holes to the surface, i.e., it neglects waste package performance. Tracers are released at all waste package locations at time zero and tracked for their releases to the near field and ground surface. The water fluxes calculated at the ground surface entry and exit regions of the domain are similar for all models except for two that have considerably lower fluxes. For tracer transport, large differences are observed among models in the magnitude of tracer transported. Much of the difference appears to be due to how the repository is implemented and hence the different degrees of repository simplification. Models that exclude the drifts, buffer, and backfill from the domain tend to show greater release of tracers and radionuclides from the repository. The initial study presented here indicates that major differences in modelling important processes within the repository (e.g., diffusion through buffer and backfill) can produce broadly different release and transport results, especially when those processes are excluded. Even for the models that included all specified features, events, and processes, the results show significant differences and demonstrate the importance of examining multiple modelling approaches in performance assessment. The differences in results observed in this study are expected to motivate teams to either increase complexity in future versions of the reference case models or to improve methods to account for the effects of simplified features and processes. Either way, future improvements in these models are expected to produce results that more closely agree.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Remote Dismantling and Packaging of the RPV and Thermal Shield at the Obrigheim NPP - 16073

The Obrigheim Nuclear Power Plant (KWO) is located in the Federal State of Baden- Wuerttemberg in Germany and was operated by the EnKK-KWO. The Nuclear Power Plant - a light water pressurized water reactor with 357 MW of electrical power - was operated from 1968 to 2005. In June 2009 the Energiewerke Nord GmbH (EWN) was charged with the dismantling planning and dismantling of the reactor. According to the German nuclear and radiation protection law, several licenses will be required for the realisation of this task. This also applies to the disposal of the waste produced by dismantling, which must finally be stored in the German final repository for low and medium-radioactive waste (underground repository 'Konrad'). In spring 2010 EWN completed all application documents for the dismantling of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the RPV internals and EnKK-KWO delivered them to the responsible Environmental Ministry of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Since then it has been worked intensively on the design, construction and manufacturing of the facilities for dismantling. With a separate notification of amendment, it was applied for the license to install and commission the facilities for the dismantling of the RPV and the RPV internals at the Environmental Ministry of Baden-Wuerttemberg in October 2010. This notification of amendment was confirmed in summer 2012. In September 2011 the work process and test plan and the technical information about the campaign for the removal of the radioactive waste resulting from the RPV with internals, peripheral components and secondary waste with the aim of final disposal in the Federal Repository 'Konrad' was submitted to the Federal Office for Radiation Protection. The evaluation and assessment of the work process and test plan was concluded in August 2013, when it was audited by TUV Nord EnSys without any further measures and indications. On September 10 the work process and test plan was released by the Federal Office for radiation protection. The dismantling of the RPV internals upper core and lower core structure started in September 2013 in the wet cutting area in room 01.106/306 and were finished in October 2014. In the presentation 'Dismantling of the Obrigheim NPP Reactor and Waste Management' held on the WM Symposia in Phoenix, 2014, an overview about the remote cutting and packaging of the upper and lower core structure was given. In today's presentation the subsequent dismantling activities will be outlined and evaluated. The presentation will start with the short description of the basic frame conditions for the nuclear licensing procedure, important procedural principles, and necessary plant-specific conditions. After the remote cutting and packing of the reactor internals of the upper and lower core structure was completed, the wet cutting area 'reactor room 01.106/306' was cleaned and the reactor room rebuilt into a cutting area for peripheral components. After the peripheral components were dismantled, all preconditions were set to lift the RPV from its mounting position and to arrange it in the upper reactor room 01.306. After these activities were completed, the lifting of the RPV was prepared and the cutting area 'Dismantling of the RPV insulation in the reactor room 01.106/306' was set up. To carry out this task, a strand jack unit with connection block was installed on the bridge of the reactor building crane. The opening created by the dismantling of the pool plate was closed with a flap door. The manipulators used for the wet cutting of the RPV internals were also used for the remote dismantling of the RPV insulation and mounted in the cutting area. The remote facilities were handled from a control centre and/or control stand. The air-technical housing which has already been used for the remote dismantling of the RPV internals was designed for the dismantling of the RPV insulation and was extended for this dismantling scope with appropriate ventilation systems. A special feature is the fixation of the RPV insulation at the RPV corpus. The RPV insulation consists of insulation wool, wire mesh and metal-sheet insulation. This 'Sandwich Construction' is detached with a steel corset at the RPV corpus and partly tightened. The insulation of the RPV bottom dome is tightened at the supporting frame. Due to the activation of the material in the core area and the resulting high ambient dose rate the RPV insulation can only be dismantled remotely. Additionally, as asbestos fibers are expected to be found in the insulation the dismantling has to be performed according to the Technical Rules for hazardous substances. The demolition, restoration or maintenance works have to be performed remotely according to the Technical Rules for hazardous substances when the RPV is located in the cutting area. But in case of dismantling of a power reactor no such experience can be found. Beginning with the explanation of the technical, radiological and substantial boundary conditions this presentation will not only impart knowledge about the dismantling of the RPV insulation but also about the remote controlled packaging of the metal sheet insulation and the manual conditioning of the RPV insulation. Subsequently, reports on the remotely controlled cutting and packaging of the RDB are given. Here is particularly interesting that cutting methods have been used and how the activity determination of the segments was carried out. On the basis of the evaluation of the realisation the subsequent dismantling activities will be lined out. In parallel to the dismantling tasks, the waste package documentation for the final repository was issued, checked and confirmed for the containers loaded with parts of the RDB internals. The most important stages are exemplified in this presentation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Potential for Salt Repositories - 18693

Progress toward nuclear waste disposal in the US has been badly corrupted. Since passing and amending the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the US is further away from geologic disposal than it was in 1987, which was 30 years ago. The waste inventory, liability costs, and elements for dealing with the burgeoning problem continue to increase in complexity - largely because of inaction. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, remains the national law in the US. Even if a repository at Yucca Mountain can be licensed, constructed, operated, and closed, the national nuclear waste imperative will not be solved by these actions. Our national challenge includes broad technical problems that are exacerbated by national procrastination, while other countries suffer similarly. This paper discusses several roadblocks that deny progress in our nuclear waste-disposal program, many of which are shared internationally. Recommendations for moving this seemingly overwhelming problem toward solutions are also included. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Guiding Principles for Geochemical/Thermodynamic Model Development and Validation in Nuclear Waste Disposal: A Close Examination of Recent Thermodynamic Models for H + —Nd 3+ —NO 3 - (—Oxalate) Systems

Development of a defensible source-term model (STM), usually a thermodynamical model for radionuclide solubility calculations, is critical to a performance assessment (PA) of a geologic repository for nuclear waste disposal. Such a model is generally subjected to rigorous regulatory scrutiny. In this article, we highlight key guiding principles for STM model development and validation in nuclear waste management. We illustrate these principles by closely examining three recently developed thermodynamic models with the Pitzer formulism for aqueous H + —Nd 3+ —NO 3 - (—oxalate) systems in a reverse alphabetical order of the authors: the XW model developed by Xiong and Wang, the OWC model developed by Oakes et al., and the GLC model developed by Guignot et al., among which the XW model deals with trace activity coefficients for Nd(III), while the OWC and GLC models are for concentrated Nd(NO 3 ) 3 electrolyte solutions. The principles highlighted include the following: (1) Principle 1. Validation against independent experimental data: A model should be validated against experimental data or field observations that have not been used in the original model parameterization. We tested the XW model against multiple independent experimental data sets including electromotive force (EMF), solubility, water vapor, and water activity measurements. The results show that the XW model is accurate and valid for its intended use for predicting trace activity coefficients and therefore Nd solubility in repository environments. (2) Principle 2. Testing for relevant and sensitive variables: Solution pH is such a variable for an STM and easily acquirable. All three models are checked for their ability to predict pH conditions in Nd(NO 3 ) 3 electrolyte solutions. The OWC model fails to provide a reasonable estimate for solution pH conditions, thus casting serious doubt on its validity for a source-term calculation. In contrast, both the XW and GLC models predict close-to-neutral pH values, in agreement with experimental measurements. (3) Principle 3. Honoring physical constraints: Upon close examination, it is found that the Nd(III)-NO 3 association schema in the OWC model suffers from two shortcomings. Firstly, its second stepwise stability constant for Nd(NO 3 ) 2+ (log K 2 ) is much higher than the first stepwise stability constant for NdNO 3 2+ (log K 1 ), thus violating the general rule of (log K 2 –log K 1 ) < 0, or $\frac{K1}{K2}$>1. Secondly, the OWC model predicts abnormally high activity coefficients for Nd(NO 3 ) 2 + (up to ~900) as the concentration increases. (4) Principle 4. Minimizing degrees of freedom for model fitting: The OWC model with nine fitted parameters is compared with the GLC model with five fitted parameters, as both models apply to the concentrated region for Nd(NO 3 ) 3 electrolyte solutions. The latter appears superior to the former because the latter can fit osmotic coefficient data equally well with fewer model parameters. The work presented here thus illustrates the salient points of geochemical model development, selection, and validation in nuclear waste management.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Cold Crucible Induction Melter (CCIM) Testing on Glass Ceramic and Ceramic Waste Forms

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCR&D) program is developing advanced high level waste (HLW) forms for the immobilization of the long-lived radionuclides resulting from future potential reprocessing of the used nuclear fuel from commercial reactors. One of the program’s goals is to have orders of magnitude improvements in durability (compared to the reference borosilicate glass waste form for HLW), to facilitate lower costs including less expensive and complex processing, to lower storage costs and to provide for final disposal of the waste in a deep geological repository. Both glass ceramic and ceramic waste forms are being developed and evaluated as possible improvements to borosilicate glass to achieve these objectives.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Technical Basis for the Removal of Unremediated Nitrate Salt Sampling (UNS) to Support LANL Treatment Studies

The sampling of unremediated nitrate salts (UNS) was originally proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) (collectively, the Permittees) as a means to ensure adequate understanding and characterization of the problematic waste stream created when the Permittees remediated these nitrate salts-bearing waste with an organic absorbent. The proposal to sample the UNS was driven by a lack of understanding with respect to the radioactive contamination release that occurred within the underground repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in February 14, 2014, as well as recommendations made by a Peer Review Team. As discussed, the Permittees believe that current knowledge and understanding of the waste has sufficiently matured such that this additional sampling is not required. Perhaps more importantly, the risk of both chemical and radiological exposure to the workers sampling the UNS drum material is unwarranted. This memo provides the technical justification and rationale for excluding the UNS sampling from the treatment studies.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2014

Scientific Solutions to Nuclear Waste Environmental Challenges

The Hidden Cost of Nuclear Weapons The Cold War arms race drove an intense plutonium production program in the U.S. This campaign produced approximately 100 tons of plutonium over 40 years. The epicenter of plutonium production in the United States was the Hanford site, a 586 square mile reservation owned by the Department of Energy and located on the Colombia River in Southeastern Washington. Plutonium synthesis relied on nuclear reactors to convert uranium to plutonium within the reactor fuel rods. After a sufficient amount of conversion occurred, the rods were removed from the reactor and allowed to cool. They were then dissolved in an acid bath and chemically processed to separate and purify plutonium from the rest of the constituents in the used reactor fuel. The acidic waste was then neutralized using sodium hydroxide and the resulting mixture of liquids and precipitates (small insoluble particles) was stored in huge underground waste tanks. The byproducts of the U.S. plutonium production campaign include over 53 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste stored in 177 large underground tanks at Hanford and another 34 million gallons stored at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. This legacy nuclear waste represents one of the largest environmental clean-up challenges facing the world today. The nuclear waste in the Hanford tanks is a mixture of liquids and precipitates that have settled into sludge. Some of these tanks are now over 60 years old and a small number of them are leaking radioactive waste into the ground and contaminating the environment. The solution to this nuclear waste challenge is to convert the mixture of solids and liquids into a durable material that won't disperse into the environment and create hazards to the biosphere. What makes this difficult is the fact that the radioactive half-lives of some of the radionuclides in the waste are thousands to millions of years long. (The half-life of a radioactive substance is the amount of time it takes for one-half of the material to undergo radioactive decay.) In general, the ideal material would need to be durable for approximately 10 half-lives to allow the activity to decay to negligible levels. However, the potential health effects of each radionuclide vary depending on what type of radiation is emitted, the energy of that emission, and the susceptibility for the human body to accumulate and concentrate that particular element. Consequently, actual standards tend to be based on limiting the dose (energy deposited per unit mass) that is introduced into the environment. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the responsibility to establish standards for nuclear waste disposal to protect the health and safety of the public. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed the EPA to establish radiation protection standards for the Yucca Mountain geologic repository for nuclear wastes. The standards for Yucca Mountain were promulgated in 2008, and limit the dose to 15 millirem per year for the first 10,000 years, and 100 milirem per year between 10,000 years and 1 million years (40 CFR Part 197; http://www.epa.gov/radiation/yucca/2008factsheet.html). So, the challenge is two-fold: (1) develop a material (a waste form) that is capable of immobilizing the waste over geologic time scales, and (2) develop a process to convert the radioactive sludge in the tanks into this durable waste form material. Glass: Hard, durable, inert, and with infinite chemical versatility Molten glass is a powerful solvent liquid, which can be designed to dissolve almost anything. When solidified, it can be one of the most chemically inert substances known to man. Nature's most famous analogue to glass is obsidian, a vitreous product of volcanic activity; formations over 17 million years old have been found. Archaeologists have found man-made glass specimens that are five thousand years old.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2014

On the physico-chemical evolution of low-pH and CEM I cement pastes interacting with Callovo-Oxfordian pore water under its in situ CO{sub 2} partial pressure

Within the framework of geological repositories for radioactive waste, structural concretes must be adapted to the underground chemical conditions. CEM I cement-based materials are characterised by high pH that may produce an alkaline plume in the near-field of the repository. In order to avoid this problem, low-pH cements have been designed. This study compares the physico-chemical behaviour of a low-pH material with a CEM I cement paste, both being subjected to leaching by an aqueous solution. An original experimental setup was designed to reproduce the underground conditions using a specific CO{sub 2} regulation device. Under these conditions, the low-pH material was strongly degraded, which results in coarser porosity, whereas thickness degradation of the CEM I cement paste is limited by the precipitation of a magnesium-calcite crust over the surface, which reduces the exchange of soluble species. This paper also presents a new approach for microstructure characterisation based on high-resolution X-ray microtomography.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2016

Durability and degradation of HT9 based alloy waste forms with variable Ni and Cr content

Short-term electrochemical and long-term hybrid electrochemical corrosion tests were performed on alloy waste forms in reference aqueous solutions that bound postulated repository conditions. The alloy waste forms investigated represent candidate formulations that can be produced with advanced electrochemical treatment of used nuclear fuel. The studies helped to better understand the alloy waste form durability with differing concentrations of nickel and chromium, species that can be added to alloy waste forms to potentially increase their durability and decrease radionuclide release into the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Spatiotemporal Distribution of {sup 241}Am in the Vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - 19543

Environmental monitoring around nuclear facilities is essential for characterizing the baseline conditions that are critical for identifying releases and quantifying their effects, should they occur, and for assessing post-closure performance. The spatiotemporal distribution and transport behavior of {sup 241}Am in the vicinity of a deep geologic repository for transuranic waste were assessed using data spanning the pre-operational phase to the present, including an accidental radionuclide release in 2014. The {sup 241}Am background values of 0.027±0.109 μBq/m{sup 3} (aerosols), and 0.061±0.065 Bq/kg (soil), as well as the {sup 241}Am/{sup 239+240}Pu ratios of 0.41±0.06 (aerosols) and 0.38±0.04 (soil), are similar to global fallout values. Pre-operations concentrations of {sup 241}Am show a strong seasonal dependence, attributed to resuspension of soils contaminated by global fallout, with no contribution from the upwind Project Gnome site ({sup 241}Am/{sup 239+240}Pu =0.24±0.08). During the 2014 accidental release, aerosol concentrations of {sup 241}Am briefly increased to 115.2 μBq/m{sup 3} at an onsite monitoring station, and 81.4 μBq/m{sup 3} at a station ∼1 km downwind of the exhaust shaft, changing the {sup 241}Am/{sup 239+240}Pu from ∼0.37 to ∼10. However, some four years later, conditions have returned to background. Almost 90% of the {sup 241}Am inventory is the 0-5 cm soil layer and there is no evidence of concentrations above regulatory standards, or that can be attributed to waste disposal operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Examining Autonomous Inspection of Geologic Repositories

Geological repositories for nuclear waste, including spent nuclear fuel, present a significant challenge for traditional International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards tools due to their inaccessibility and demanding operational conditions. The IAEA has been working closely with Member State organizations currently involved in repository construction and planning including Euratom, the Finnish and Swedish regulatory authorities, and relevant facility operators. However, the verification challenge remains unsolved, and there persists an out-standing need for tools and approaches that will help the IAEA verify that no nuclear material is diverted from a repository environment. The challenge is also not static as activities must encompass verification of the design prior to and during the construction/operation phase, and post backfill. Throughout these various phases, it is imperative that the IAEA maintains a continuity of knowledge (CoK) of all material, including information on material inventory and flow. This paper highlights these challenges and outlines how they might be addressed by using remote or autonomous vehicles. Specifically, it discusses the current state of the art in robotic autonomy for known or partially known environment mapping and patrolling, as well as shared autonomy, where humans collaborate with closed loop autonomation to complete tasks. The feasibility of using rovers for these verification tasks is explored, along with the challenges associated with system implementation. Hardware and software suggestions are provided based on the adoption of similar technologies in other comparable areas and ability to close technical gaps. Finally, human-robotic interactions are considered based on the challenges of the environment of the repository and effective deployment and continued operation of the robot system

autonomous monitoring↗
DOE OSTI2020

Autonomous Monitoring of Nuclear Repositories: Current State of the Art and Future Directions

Geological repositories for nuclear waste, including spent nuclear fuel, present a significant challenge for traditional International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards tools due to their inaccessibility and demanding operational conditions. The IAEA has been working closely with Member State organizations currently involved in repository construction and planning, including Euratom, the Finnish and Swedish regulatory authorities, and relevant facility operators. However, the verification challenge remains unsolved, and there persists an out- standing need for tools and approaches that will help the IAEA verify that no nuclear material is diverted from a repository environment. The challenge is also not static. Activities must encompass verification of the design, prior to and during the construction/operation phase, and post backfill. Throughout these various phases, it is imperative that the IAEA maintains a continuity of knowledge (CoK) of all material including information on material inventory and flow. This paper highlights these challenges and outlines how they might be addressed by using remote or autonomous vehicles. Specifically, we discuss the current state of the art in robotic autonomy for known or partially known environment mapping and patrolling, as well as shared autonomy, where humans collaborate with closed-loop autonomation to complete tasks. We explore the feasibility of using rovers for these verification tasks, along with the challenges associated with system implementation. Hardware and software suggestions are provided based on the adoption of similar technologies in other comparable areas and ability to close technical gaps. Lastly, human-robotic interactions are considered based on the challenges of the environment of the repository and effective deployment and continued operation of the robot system.

geologic repository, safeguards, IAEA, Robotics↗
DOE OSTI2015

Planning large-scale excavation and construction activities within an aerially constrained site for construction of a repository for low and short-lived intermediate level radioactive waste at the Bulgarian national disposal facility - 15372

The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is planning the construction of a near-surface repository for low and short-lived intermediate level radioactive waste, the National Disposal Facility (NDF), at the Radiana Site adjacent to the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). The Site, a rectangular area approximately 1.2 km east-west by 0.4 north-south, is located on a slopping area between the second and sixth loess terraces above the River Danube with elevations ranging from approximately +40 m to elevation +95 m. Construction of the NDF will be divided into three phases separated by approximately 20 years each. The first phase will see the construction of the primary support facilities, referred to as the Auxiliary Buildings and including the Waste Reception and Buffer Storage (WRBS) Building, and the first set of 22 reinforced concrete disposal cells and supporting infrastructure, including a network of subsurface observation galleries, the Infiltration Network Control (ICN) Galleries. Each disposal cell will be 20.15 m long by 17.05 m wide by 9.45 m in height. The disposal cells will be arranged in two parallel rows. Disposal activities will be conducted using overhead cranes installed inside of track mounted mobile roofs. Each row of disposal cells will be serviced by one mobile roof. The mobile roofs will be supported by massive concrete foundations. Construction at the site will present several logistical challenges that will need to be overcome to fully realize the NDF. First in order to begin construction of these facilities nearly 1 million 3 of soil will require excavation and handling. Consistent with requirements to minimize potential environmental impacts identified in the site Environmental Safety Assessment (EIA) excavated soil will, to the extent possible, remain onsite. Approximately three quarters of the soil can be accommodated within the site boundaries. Another challenge results from requirements imposed by the ground conditions. The sub-grade at the site, which consists primarily of loess, will require considerable improvement. To this end a 5 m thick loess-cement cushion will be constructed across much of the site. Specifically, the cushion will be required beneath the disposal cells and the WRBS Building. Construction of the loess-cement cushion in the disposal area will require detailed planning and coordination, particularly as the cushion beneath the disposal cells also contains embedded structures, including the ICN Galleries as well as massive concrete foundation beams required for the two mobile roofs. Construction of these structures will require planned interruptions in the construction of the loess-cement cushion. Specific cement types and strict quality requirements will be required for completion of the loess-cement cushion as well as for completion of the ICN Galleries. The construction planning will need to account for the large volumes of soil to be excavated as well as ensuring sufficient material supplies in terms of both quality as well as quantity. Large quantities of materials including both dry cement for mixing with the loess, and wet concrete for pouring of the mobile roof foundations are accounted for by the plan. However, even after completion of these activities additional challenges are addressed by the plan related to the contemporaneous construction management of the auxiliary buildings and the disposal cells. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Thermal–hydraulic–mechanical modeling of a large-scale heater test to investigate rock salt and crushed salt behavior under repository conditions for heat-generating nuclear waste

The Thermal Simulation for Drift Emplacement heater test is modeled with two simulators for coupled thermal-hydraulic-mechanical processes. Results from the two simulators are in very good agreement. The comparison between measurements and numerical results is also very satisfactory, regarding temperature, drift closure and rock deformation. Concerning backfill compaction, a parameter calibration through inverse modeling was performed due to insufficient data on crushed salt reconsolidation, particularly at high temperatures. We conclude that the two simulators investigated have the capabilities to reproduce the data available, which increases confidence in their use to reliably investigate disposal of heat-generating nuclear waste in saliferous geosystems.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗