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At least 361 records · Page 20
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

SU-CD-PinS Room/Hall E-01

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two-year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sandia Nuclear Cartridge Concept

Nuclear power offers the promise of long-term electrical power for remote areas. Recent advances in passive safety and long-life cores make a reactor that can be operated autonomously for 20 years or more a real possibility. This white paper discusses a reactor concept that offers the potential for further development, resulting in a permanently hermetically-sealed "nuclear cartridge." The term "nuclear cartridge" is meant to imply a nuclear energy source that can be inserted into a site and operated autonomously until its energy has been depleted, then withdrawn and replaced by another cartridge. The concept can be scaled for various sizes, ranging from about 1 megawatt-electric (MWe) to about 100 MWe. The paper also discusses the concept of Integrated Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) by design as it applies to this reactor design. Finally, a discussion of smart grids and how they can benefit the transfer of power to the end user is included. The Nuclear Cartridge concept has been developed with the following characteristics in mind: highly reliable autonomous operation coupled with international monitoring, requiring minimal on-site operations personnel; walkaway passively safe design; cartridge replacement cycle on the order of 20 years; load following capability; physical security by design requiring minimal security personnel during operations; and proliferation resistance by design. As illustrated in figure 1, integrating the reactor with advanced power conversion, smart grids, and other sources of energy results in a resilient and sustainable energy source.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may lead to more proliferation resistant and physically secure design features for SMRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Security in the CernVM File System and the Frontier Distributed Database Caching System

Both the CernVM File System (CVMFS) and the Frontier Distributed Database Caching System (Frontier) distribute centrally updated data worldwide for LHC experiments using http proxy caches. Neither system provides privacy or access control on reading the data, but both control access to updates of the data and can guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the data transferred to clients over the internet. CVMFS has since its early days required digital signatures and secure hashes on all distributed data, and recently Frontier has added X.509-based authenticity and integrity checking. In this paper we detail and compare the security models of CVMFS and Frontier.

Dykstra, D.↗
DOE OSTI2017

The role of bioenergy in a climate-changing world

Bioenergy has been under intense scrutiny over the last ten years with significant research efforts in many countries taking place to define and measure sustainable practices. We describe here the main challenges and policy issues and provide policy recommendations for scaling up sustainable bioenergy approaches globally. The 2016 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs defined under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21) will not reach global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission targets of 2 °C. Sustainable biomass production can make a significant contribution. Substantive evidence exists that many bioenergy cropping systems can bring multiple benefits and off-set environmental problems associated with fossil fuels usage as well as intensive food production and urbanization. We provide evidence that there are many approaches to land use for bioenergy expansion that do not lead to competition for food or other needs. We should focus on how to manage these approaches on a synergistic basis and how to reduce tradeoffs at landscape scales. Priorities include successful synergies between bioenergy and food security (integrated resource management designed to improve both food security and access to bioenergy), investments in technology, rural extension, and innovations that build capacity and infrastructure, promotion of stable prices to incentivize local production and use of double cropping and flex crops (plants grown for both food and non-food markets) that provide food and energy as well as other services. The sustainable production of biomass requires appropriate policies to secure long-term support to improve crop productivity and also to ensure environmental as well as economic and social benefits of bioenergy cropping systems. Continuous support for cropping, infrastructure, agricultural management and related policies is needed to foster positive synergies between food crops and bioenergy production. In comparison to fossil fuels, biofuels have many positive environmental benefits. Potential negative effects caused by land-use change and agriculture intensification can be mitigated by agroecological zoning, best management practices, the use of eco-hydrology and biodiversity-friendly concepts at field, watershed and landscape scales. Global climate and environmental changes related to the use of fossil fuels and inequitable development make it unethical not to pursue more equitable energy development that includes bioenergy. Here, to achieve sustainable development, competitiveness and costs of bioenergy production need to be addressed in a manner that considers not only economic gains but also development of local knowledge and social and environmental benefits.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Fall Protection Procedures for Sealing Bulk Waste Shipments by Rail Cars at Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Sites - 13509

Rail-cars loaded with radioactive materials must be closed and fastened to comply with United States Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements before they shipped. Securing waste shipments in a manner that meets these regulations typically results in the use of a sealable rail-car liner. Workers accessing the tops of the 2.74 m high rail-cars to seal and inspect liners for compliance prior to shipment may be exposed to a fall hazard. Relatively recent revisions to the Fall Protection requirements in the Safety and Health Requirements Manual (EM385-1-1, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) have necessitated modifications to the fall protection systems previously employed for rail-car loading at Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) sites. In response these projects have developed site-specific procedures to protect workers and maintain compliance with the improved fall protection regulations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Development of a versatile electrochemical cell for in situ grazing-incidence X-ray diffraction during non-aqueous electrochemical nitrogen reduction

In situ techniques are essential to understanding the behavior of electrocatalysts under operating conditions. When employed, in situ synchrotron grazing-incidence X-ray diffraction (GI-XRD) can provide time-resolved structural information of materials formed at the electrode surface. In situ cells, however, often require epoxy resins to secure electrodes, do not enable electrolyte flow, or exhibit limited chemical compatibility, hindering the study of non-aqueous electrochemical systems. Here, a versatile electrochemical cell for air-free in situ synchrotron GI-XRD during non-aqueous Li-mediated electrochemical N 2 reduction (Li-N 2 R) has been designed. This cell not only fulfills the stringent material requirements necessary to study this system but is also readily extendable to other electrochemical systems. Under conditions relevant to non-aqueous Li-N 2 R, the formation of Li metal, LiOH and Li 2 O as well as a peak consistent with the α-phase of Li 3 N was observed, thus demonstrating the functionality of this cell toward developing a mechanistic understanding of complicated electrochemical systems.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Corn stover cannot simultaneously meet both the volume and GHG reduction requirements of the renewable fuel standard

Corn stover is expected to supply much of the cellulosic biomass required to meet the 61 billion liters per year target under the US Energy Independence and Security Act. The Act also requires that cellulosic biofuels achieve a greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction of 60% compared to gasoline. If corn stover is harvested for biofuels, it can no longer help replenish soil organic matter, and net soil carbon emissions increase. So meeting the GHG reduction target is a concern. We studied the effect of stover removal on overall GHG emissions of corn stover ethanol systems in the 12-state Corn Belt region. Even at a stover removal rate of 66%, no more than 20 billion liters can be annually produced while simultaneously satisfying the 60% GHG reduction. Moreover, no GHG reduction relative to gasoline occurs in short time periods. The GHG benefits of corn stover ethanol only appear after longer time periods.

cellulosic biofuel, corn stover, ethanol, geospati↗
DOE OSTI2013

Advancing the Adoption of High Performance Computing for Time Domain Simulation

Time domain transient stability simulation of large interconnected power systems is becoming increasingly computationally intensive. With the addition of high levels of variable generation that can aggregately ramp over many hours, both the complexity and time horizon for which power system simulations will need to be conducted are increasing. Additionally, extended-term time domain simulation is required to analyze power system security when cascading events across the system span minutes or even hours. Analysis of these occurrences requires modeling power system dynamics over tens of minutes to many hours rather than tens of seconds. Because of the required high computational intensity, there are presently no stability modeling/simulation platforms that combine the needed computational capabilities with the required power system models relevant for representing and analyzing the potential reliability implications of phenomena that occurs over both short- and extended-term dynamic timeframes.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Development of the technological process for the IGR reactor's highly-enriched irradiated uranium-graphite fuel immobilization

The immobilization of irradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel is a critical component of nuclear waste management and non-proliferation efforts. In Kazakhstan, at National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan special attention is given to managing legacy HEU fuel from research reactors. One such case involves the IGR research reactor, whose first core containing irradiated HEU uranium-graphite fuel was operated from 1961 to 1966 and removed following reactor modernization. This fuel now requires a reliable and secure immobilization strategy. Here, this paper presents the development of a technological process for immobilizing this fuel to reduce its enrichment to below 20 % in terms of 235U content. The proposed method involves down-blending irradiated HEU fuel with depleted uranium, followed by encapsulation in a Portland cement matrix. Full-scale experiments were conducted to assess the uniformity of uranium distribution within the matrix. The results confirm the effectiveness of this approach, ensuring reliable immobilization of fuel in accordance with international requirements, including IAEA standards and Kazakhstan's regulatory framework. These findings contribute to the broader effort of adapting immobilization strategies for the safe management of spent fuel from research reactors.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗
DOE OSTI2012

Disposition of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Currently Located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 12232

Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) awarded SEC Federal Services Corporation (SEC) a 34-building demolition and disposal (D and D) project at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) that included the disposition of six Strontium (Sr-90) powered Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) stored outside of ORNL Building 3517. Disposition of the RTGs is very complex both in terms of complying with disposal facility waste acceptance criteria (WAC) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for packaging and transportation in commerce. Two of the RTGs contain elemental mercury which requires them to be Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) compliant prior to disposal. In addition, all of the RTGs exceed the Class C waste concentration limits under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Waste Classification Guidelines. In order to meet the LDR requirements and Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) WAC, a site specific treatability variance for mercury was submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to allow macro-encapsulation to be an acceptable treatment standard for elemental mercury. By identifying and confirming the design configuration of the mercury containing RTGs, the SEC team proved that the current configuration met the macro-encapsulation standard of 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 268.45. The SEC Team also worked with NNSS to demonstrate that all radioisotope considerations are compliant with the NNSS low-level waste (LLW) disposal facility performance assessment and WAC. Lastly, the SEC team determined that the GE2000 Type B cask met the necessary size, weight, and thermal loading requirements for five of the six RTGs. The sixth RTG (BUP-500) required a one-time DOT shipment exemption request due to the RTG's large size. The DOT exemption justification for the BUP-500 relies on the inherent robust construction and material make-up of the BUP- 500 RTG. DOE-ORO, SEC, and the entire SEC RTG team are nearing the conclusion of the Sr-90 RTG disposition challenge - a legacy now 50 years in the making. Over 600,000 Ci of Sr-90 waste await disposal and its removal from ORNL will mark an historical moment in the clean-up of the cold-war legacy in the ORNL central industrial area. Elimination (i.e., removal) of the RTGs will reduce security risks at ORNL and disposal will permanently eliminate security risks. The RTGs will eventually decay to benign levels within a reasonable timeframe relative to radiological risks posed by long-lived isotopes. The safety authorization basis at ORNL Building 3517 will be reduced enabling greater operational flexibility in future clean-out and D and D campaigns. Upon disposition the Department of Energy will realize reduced direct and indirect surveillance and maintenance costs that can be reapplied to accelerated and enhanced clean-up of the Oak Ridge Reservation. At present, waste profiles for the RTGs are developed and under review by NNSS RWAP staff and approval authorities. Disposition schedule is driven by the availability of compliant shipping casks necessary to safely transport the RTGs from ORNL to NNSS. The first disposal of the RCA RTG is expected in April 2012 and the remaining RTGs disposed in 2012 and 2013. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2021

Sample Return Container Opening Process Concept for Potential Mars Sample Return

Proposed Mars Sample Return (MSR) missions would require a pristine and secure opening method to ensure sample Contamination Control and backward Planetary Protection. In order to reach the samples, a series of five containers would need to be opened inside of a Mars Returned Sample Handling (MRSH) facility. The process would include opening the Containment Assurance Module (CAM) aboard the Earth Entry Vehicle (EEV), the Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV), Primary Containment Vessel (PCV), and the Orbiting Sample (OS) container, and finally removing and opening the Returned Sample Tube Assemblies (RSTA). Some of these containers can be opened by reversing the mechanical assembly process while others would require destructive means. Several containers are still in a conceptual design phase while others are en route to Mars aboard the M2020 rover. In order to inform the design of the containers that are still in the conceptual stages, a study was performed at each level of the containment assembly. The studies were used to determine the least destructive and most robust methods to disassemble and open the containers while minimizing risk to the samples or the personnel. In addition to the envisioned disassembly and breaching method, contingency plans were made for completing the disassembly if damage to the vehicle and containment system occurred.

Liu, Yang↗
DOE OSTI2012

2011 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC, 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs), with the results submitted annually to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan (DOE, 1999a; 2000).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Numerical Simulation of Inter-basin Groundwater Flow into Northern Yucca Flat, Nevada National Security Site, Using the Death Valley Regional Flow System Model

Models of groundwater flow for the Yucca Flat area of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) are under development by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for corrective action investigations of the Yucca Flat-Climax Mine Corrective Action Unit (CAU). One important aspect of these models is the quantity of inter-basin groundwater flow from regional systems to the north. This component of flow, together with its uncertainty, must be properly accounted for in the CAU flow models to provide a defensible regional framework for calculations of radionuclide transport that will support determinations of the Yucca Flat-Climax Mine contaminant boundary. Because characterizing flow boundary conditions in northern Yucca Flat requires evaluation to a higher level of detail than the scale of the Yucca Flat-Climax Mine CAU model can efficiently provide, a study more focused on this aspect of the model was required.

(CAU).↗
DOE OSTI2024

Quantifying Energy Justice Goals in the Power Sector: Developing and Using Metrics

New policy goals are explicitly guiding the future grid toward greater energy equity. At the same time, policy goals also guide the grid toward decarbonization and resilience, while maintaining cost, security, and reliability cornerstone requirements. In conclusion, these pressures create a dilemma: moving urgently to address climate change and respond to energy disruptions, but also slowly to engage communities on the climate frontlines in earnest.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2015

Los Alamos National Laboratory Ten-Year Site Plan FY 2016

The Los Alamos National Laboratory will continue to face a significant challenge over the next 25 years in balancing near-term needs while transforming the infrastructure to ensure long-term viability. The 2014 Los Alamos National Laboratory Strategic Plan emphasized that infrastructure must be modernized and maintained to fulfill diverse, complex, and evolving missions in a period of fl at or decreasing budgets. The large number of existing facilities will continue to age while safety, security, sustainability and compliance requirements will likely increase. The Laboratory must also continue to act as an environmental steward, reduce environmental risk, and improve sustainability. This plan identifies strategies that will enable the Laboratory to provide a flexible, responsive infrastructure within available resources. At the end of the 25 year period, the Laboratory will have achieved the following: New facilities construction and enduring facilities reinvestment to support critical capabilities; Improved energy efficiency and long-term sustainability practices; Modernized utility infrastructure to support future programmatic needs; Legacy cleanup and long-term environmental stewardship goals; Footprint reduction and nuclear infrastructure consolidation. Even in the face of new and significant pressures, the Laboratory will continue to take substantial steps to streamline operations, modernize the infrastructure, and fulfill its vision of being the premier national security science laboratory. The fiscal year (FY) 2016 Ten-Year Site Plan (TYSP) is consistent with previous TYSPs and incorporates updated information in accordance with National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) guidance. The TYSP is a vital planning component to meet the NNSA commitment to ensure the U.S. has a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The Laboratory also uses the TYSP as an integrated planning tool to guide development of an efficient and responsive infrastructure that effectively supports the Laboratory’s missions and workforce. Emphasizing the Laboratory’s core capabilities, this TYSP reflects the Laboratory’s role as a prominent contributor to NNSA missions through its programs and campaigns.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Signal Decomposition for Intrusion Detection in Reliability Assessment in Cyber Resilience (Summary Report)

The complexity of assuring cyber resilience for physical process interactions in connected systems such as energy grids increases dramatically as the coupling between processes becomes more direct and responsive. An example of this growing complexity is provided by Integrated Energy Systems (IES), in which various processes such as nuclear heat generation and commodity production are being directly coupled for increased responsiveness to highly variable signals such as market pricing or electricity demand. As such, the potential attack surface of the coupled processes is larger than the two processes independently. Securing these complex systems requires two-fold monitoring: cybersecure monitoring for potential malicious incursion, and physics monitoring for system tampering. Physics monitoring includes analyzing the behavior of the signals within the system for anomalous behavior. This analysis has been shown to be insufficient if approached by only data-driven machine learning and artificial intelligence (MLAI) techniques or only low-level model comparison. Previous efforts at Purdue University suggested combining high-fidelity models with MLAI algorithms as a basis for a software tool for detecting anomalies in physical processes. This work built on that suggestion, developing an advanced library for signal decomposition and analysis using both MLAI and high-fidelity physics algorithms for greatly improved anomaly detection, especially false data injection. This software can be used as part of a secure imbedded intelligence (SEI) system designed under Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) for complex coupled systems. This library established a foundation for online and posteriori analysis of digital signals for the purpose of detecting potential malicious tampering in digital signals representing physical processes. Demonstrations carried out throughout the development highlight the effective use of characterization algorithms to detect signal perturbations, particularly triangle attack-style perturbations, in three wide-ranging applications: seismic monitoring, nuclear thermal hydraulics system simulation, and custom manufacturing.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2020

Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Land Data Assimilation System (LDAS) and Other Assimilated Hydrological Data at NASA GES DISC

The NASA Goddard Earth Sciences Data and Information Services Center (GES DISC) provides science support for several data sets relevant to agriculture and food security, including the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Land Data Assimilation System (LDAS), or FLDAS data set. The GES DISC is one of twelve NASA Earth Observing System (EOS) data centers that process, archive, document, and distribute data from Earth science missions and related projects. The GES DISC hosts a wide range of remote sensing and model data, and provides reliable and robust data access and other services to users worldwide. Beyond data archive and access, the GES DISC offers many services to visualize and analyze the data. This presentation provides a summary of the hydrological data available at the GES DISC, along with an overview of related data services. Specifically, the FLDAS data set has been adapted to work with domains, data streams, and monitoring and forecast requirements associated with food security assessment in data-sparse, developing country settings. The FLDAS global monthly data have a 0.1 x 0.1 degree spatial resolution covering the period from January 1982 to present. Global FLDAS monthly anomaly and monthly climatology data are also available at the GES DISC to evaluate how current conditions compare to averages over the FLDAS 35-year period. Several case studies using the FLDAS soil moisture, evapotranspiration, rainfall, runoff, and surface temperature data will be presented.

Loeser, Carlee↗