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At least 361 records · Page 20

Field Testing of Safeguards Technologies in the Hot Fuel Examination Facility

Recent developments in nuclear fuel reprocessing techniques have yielded more efficient processes and fuel cycle options that strengthen the nuclear industry and production of clean energy. One such area of interest is pyroprocessing of used oxide fuel. However, with these advances in the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, advances in safeguards instrumentation, measurements, and approaches are needed to ensure special nuclear material (SNM) is accounted for according to regulatory requirements. As a high-level overview of a nominal pyroprocessing approach, used oxide fuel from commercial light water reactors (LWR) is mechanically removed from the metallic cladding. Then the fuel is crushed and randomized representative samples are taken and sent to an analytical lab for analysis. The analytical results of the feed material are used for input accountancy into the rest of the process. The crushed oxide fuel is then moved to the oxide reduction (OR) furnace where it is reduced from an oxide to metallic form. The OR product is distilled to remove salt and then moved to an electrorefiner (ER), where it is immersed in a eutectic mixture of lithium chloride potassium chloride (LiCl-KCl) that typically ranges between 450-550 ?. Within the ER, the usable uranium is electrochemically transported through the molten salt from the anode to the cathode, and then subsequently removed as a relatively pure U product.. A simplified model of pyroprocessing techniques with added emphasis on the safeguards can be seen below in Fig. 1

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

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The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics

The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls.

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An Assessment of the Attractiveness of Material Associated with a MOX Fuel Cycle from a Safeguards Perspective

This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, coextraction, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant State and sub-national group capabilities. This study also considers those materials that will be recycled and burned, possibly multiple times, in LWRs [e.g., plutonium in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel]. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a State and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.

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Using Highly Interactive Virtual Environments for Safeguards Activities

Highly interactive virtual environment (HIVE) is a term that refers to interactive educational simulations, serious games and virtual worlds. Studies indicate that learning with the aid of interactive environments produces better retention and depth of knowledge by promoting improved trainee engagement and understanding. Virtual reality or three dimensional (3D) visualization is often used to promote the understanding of something when personal observation, photographs, drawings, and/or sketches are not possible or available. Subjects and situations, either real or hypothetical, can be developed using a 3D model. Models can be tailored to the audience allowing safeguards and security features to be demonstrated for educational purposes in addition to engineering evaluation and performance analysis. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has begun evaluating the feasibility of HIVEs for improving safeguards activities such as training, mission planning, and evaluating worker task performance. This paper will discuss the development workflow of HIVEs and present some recent examples.

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Advanced Safeguards Technology Demonstration at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time frame. Currently, methods to verify that the facilities are operating under adequate safeguard-declared conditions require time consuming sampling and expensive, destructive analysis. The time delay between sampling and subsequent analysis provides a potential opportunity to divert the material out of the appropriate chemical stream. One way to avoid this problem is to use process monitoring equipment that is capable of on-line and in near-real time monitoring of the flowsheet radiochemical streams to rapidly identify deviations from normal operating conditions. Three integrated systems for flowsheet monitoring are currently being developed at PNNL including: 1) Multi-Isotope Process Monitor (MIP), 2) a spectroscopy-based monitor utilizing UV-Vis-NIR (Ultra Violet-Visible-Near Infrared) and Raman spectrometers, and 3) Electrochemically Modulated Separations (EMS). MIP uses gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The UV-Vis-NIR and Raman spectroscopic monitoring continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals. EMS provides an on-line means for pre-separating and preconcentrating elements of interest out of complex matrices prior to detection via non-destructive assay by gamma spectroscopy or destructive analysis with mass spectrometry. PNNL previously reported some of its initial modeling work as proof of principle. Here we will provide a general overview of the technologies and the ongoing demonstrations that utilize actual spent fuel.

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Working Toward Robust Process Monitoring for Safeguards Applications

New safeguards technologies allow continuous monitoring of plant processes. Efforts to deploy these technologies, as described in a preponderance of literature, typically have consisted of case studies attempting to prove their efficacy in proof-of-principle installations. While the enhanced safeguards capabilities of continuous monitoring have been established, studies thus far have not addressed such challenges as manipulation of a system by a host nation. To prevent this and other such vulnerabilities, one technology, continuous load cell monitoring, was reviewed. This paper will present vulnerabilities as well as mitigation strategies that were identified.

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Incorporating delayed neutrons into the point-model equations routinely used for neutron coincidence counting in nuclear safeguards

Here, we extend the familiar Bӧhnel point-model equations, which are routinely used to interpret neutron coincidence counting rates, by including the contribution of delayed neutrons. After developing the necessary equations we use them to show, by providing some numerical results, what the quantitative impact of neglecting delayed neutrons is across the full range of practical nuclear safeguards applications. The influence of delayed neutrons is predicted to be small for the types of deeply sub-critical assay problems which concern the nuclear safeguards community, smaller than uncertainties arising from other factors. This is most clearly demonstrated by considering the change in the effective (α,n)-to-spontaneous fission prompt-neutron ratio that the inclusion of delayed neutrons gives rise to. That the influence of delayed neutrons is small is fortunate, and our results justify the long standing practice of simply neglecting them in the analysis of field measurements.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Proof of Concept Simulations of the Multi-Isotope Process Monitor: An Online, Nondestructive, Near-Real-Time Safeguards Monitor for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facilities

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will require the development of advanced technologies to effectively safeguard nuclear material at increasingly large-scale nuclear recycling facilities. Ideally, the envisioned technologies would be capable of nondestructive, near-real-time, autonomous process monitoring. This paper describes recent results from model simulations designed to test the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) monitor, a novel approach to safeguarding reprocessing plants. The MIP monitor combines the detection of intrinsic gamma ray signatures emitted from process solutions with multivariate analysis to detect off-normal conditions in process streams nondestructively and in near-real-time. Three computer models including ORIGEN-ARP, AMUSE, and SYNTH were used in series to predict spent nuclear fuel composition, estimate element partitioning during separation, and simulate spectra from product and raffinate streams using a variety of gamma detectors, respectively. Simulations were generated for fuel with various irradiation histories and under a variety of plant operating conditions. Principal component analysis (PCA) was applied to the simulated gamma spectra to investigate pattern variations as a function of acid concentration, burnup, and cooling time. Hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) and partial least squares (PLS) were also used in the analysis. The MIP monitor was found to be sensitive to induced variations of several operating parameters including distinguishing ±2.5% variation from normal process acid concentrations. The ability of PLS to predict burnup levels from simulated spectra was also demonstrated to be within 3.5% of measured values.

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A safeguards approach for molten salt reactors: Direct gamma-spectrometry of 233 U

Multidimensional gamma-spectrometry is a potential solution for safeguarding future thorium-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs). A high-sensitivity system developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), the Advanced Radionuclide Gamma spectrOmeter (ARGO), has demonstrated direct 233 U assay in freshly irradiated fuel salt samples using a dual-detector configuration and the 97.1 keV gamma-emission. These measurements were made using 1.4 x 10 6 Bq of 233 U activity (at 1.4 x 10 8 fissions), at relatively high dead times (10.4%), and using short count durations of ~800 s. Other major emissions were also evaluated (42.5 keV, 54.7 keV, 146.4 keV), in additional to limited (1.96%) Compton suppression, but provided less consistent determination of the 233 U activity. Accurate 233 U measurement was also demonstrated using its four coincidence gamma-emissions (42.5 keV, 54.7 keV; 42.5 keV, 278.1 keV; 146.4 keV, 174.2 keV; 146.4 keV, 219 keV). Further improvements in coincidence measurements may be achievable with improvements in the detector configuration and nuclear data. Whilst this demonstration utilized the ARGO laboratory system, a similar dual-detector configuration could be utilized for online safeguards measurements.

Gamma-spectrometry↗

252 Cf yield calibration method for nuclear material accountancy and safeguards practitioners

Californium-252 is an isotope commonly encapsulated as a physically small but strong spontaneous fission neutron source for applications in industry, academia, and research. Within the nuclear safeguards community, a well-characterized 252 Cf source is often used as an accessible alternative for plutonium in calibrations measurements, which require the absolute source strength. Current methods of source strength quantification can provide an accurate estimate, approximately 1% uncertainty under optimal conditions, but are typically costly and time consuming. An alternative method was developed to determine 252 Cf source strength using passive neutron correlation counting (PNCC). The PNCC method enables institutions and facilities to perform 252 Cf source calibration measurements in-house using detection systems that are common within the nuclear safeguards community. This novel method was previously successfully demonstrated using neutron multiplicity well counters. However, the previous evaluation utilized detection systems with high neutron detection efficiencies, greater than 60%. The purpose of the current study is to extend the previous evaluation and demonstrate the feasibility of the PNCC 252 Cf calibration method for suite of coincidence counters with lower neutron detection efficiencies, between 15% and 35%, which are more commonly encountered in the field, as well as to provide a step-by-step guide to using the method. The neutron source used in this evaluation was previously certified by the National Institutes of Science and Technology (NIST), which provides a reference for the accuracy of the PNCC method. In conclusion, the present source yield calculations demonstrate excellent agreement with a NIST calibration technique and achieve a standard uncertainty below the target 1%.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Separations and safeguards model integration.

Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

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Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring.

Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.

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Report on the NGS3 Working Group on Safeguards by Design For Aqueous Reprocessing Plants

The objective of the Working Group on SBD for Aqueous Reprocessing Facilities was to provide recommendations, for facility operators and designers, which would aid in the coordination and integration of nuclear material accountancy and the safeguards requirements of all concerned parties - operators, state/regional authorities, and the IAEA. The recommendations, which are to be provided to the IAEA, are intended to assist in optimizing facility design and operating parameters to ensure the safeguardability of the facility while minimizing impact on the operations. The one day Working Group session addressed a wide range of design and operating topics.

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Summary of Project on Design and Development of a Safeguards Coincidence Counter Based on Boron-lined Proportional Detector Technology - High Level Neutron counter Boron (HLNB)

During the past several years, the demand for 3 He gas has far exceeded the gas supply. This shortage of 3 He gas is projected to continue into the foreseeable future. To continue to develop and deploy safeguards neutron detection systems, a viable, near-term, safeguards-specific, alternative to 3 He-based measurement technology must be found.

Nuclear Disarmament, Safeguards, & Physical Protec↗

Next Gen Safeguards Professional Network (Final Report 2014)

This report summarizes the 2014 Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN) meeting held at Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories. The meeting comprised two days at each laboratory and included facility tours, technology demonstrations, presentations, and networking opportunities to strengthen expertise in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation.

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Safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: Why is Iran a Threat? [Slides]

GCEPS safeguards (Desire to close gaps on undeclared feed) - Timely detection of the misuse of the facility to produce HEU - Timely detection of the diversion of declared UF6 - Timely detection of the misuse of the facility to produce undeclared LEU – Operator “no one would ever divert undeclared LEU product” – Breakout vs. Clandestine Ops (CSA and AP safeguards options) • Tightened coverage of GCEPs – declared operations (SNRI,C/S) • Unattended monitoring system – in development for GCEPs – Load Cells – Monitoring cylinders / weight – On-Line Enrichment Monitoring – Cylinder Verification Station – NDA, Weight,… – UF6 Cylinder Tracking - UID • Sensitive technology! Khan network and undeclared facilities

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Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, an experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium disposition treaty.

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