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At least 361 records · Page 20

Estimating Am-241 activity in the body: comparison of direct measurements and radiochemical analyses

The assessment of dose and ultimately the health risk from intakes of radioactive materials begins with estimating the amount actually taken into the body. An accurate estimate provides the basis to best assess the distribution in the body, the resulting dose, and ultimately the health risk. This study continues the time-honored practice of evaluating the accuracy of results obtained using in vivo measurement methods and techniques. Results from the radiochemical analyses of the 241Am activity content of tissues and organs from four donors to the United States Transuranium and Uranium Registries were compared to the results from direct measurements of radioactive material in the body performed in vivo and post mortem. Two were whole body donations and two were partial body donations The skeleton was the organ with the highest deposition of 241Am activity in all four cases. The activities ranged from 30 Bq to 300 Bq. The skeletal estimates obtained from measurements over the forehead were within 20% of the radiochemistry results in three cases and differed by 78% in one case. The 241Am lung activity estimates ranged from 1 Bq to 30 Bq in the four cases. The results from the direct measurements were within 40% of the radiochemistry results in 3 cases and within a factor of 3 for the other case. The direct measurement estimates of liver activity ranged from 2 Bq to 60 Bq and were generally lower than the radiochemistry results. The results from this study suggest that the measurement methods and calibration techniques used at the In Vivo Radiobioassay and Research Facility to quantify the activity in the lungs, skeleton and liver are reasonable under the most challenging conditions where there is 241Am activity in multiple organs. These methods and techniques are comparable to those used at other Department of Energy sites. This suggests that the current in vivo methods and calibration techniques provide reasonable estimates of radioactive material in the body. Not unexpectedly, there can be significant uncertainty in the estimates especially when activity is also present in other organs.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Risk Based Security Management at Research Reactors

This presentation provides a background of what led to the international emphasis on nuclear security and describes how nuclear security is effectively implemented so as to preserve the societal benefits of nuclear and radioactive materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ONSITE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORIZATION CHALLENGES AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

Prior to 2008, transfers of radioactive material within the Savannah River Site (SRS) boundary, referred to as onsite transfers, were authorized by Transportation Safety Basis (TSB) documents that only required approval by the SRS contractor. This practice was in accordance with the existing SRS Transportation Safety Document (TSD). In 2008 the Department of Energy Savannah River Field Office (DOE-SR) requested that the SRS TSD be revised to require DOE-SR approval of all Transportation Safety Basis (TSB) documents. As a result, the primary SRS contractor embarked on a multi-year campaign to consolidate old or generate new TSB documents and obtain DOE-SR approval for each. This paper focuses on the challenges incurred during the rewriting or writing of and obtaining DOE-SR approval of all Savannah River Site Onsite Transportation Safety Basis documents.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radioactive waste repository when contacted by water provides borates that absorb neutrons

A container holds radioactive material. A sub-criticality controller protects the radioactive material from reaching a criticality from contact with the water. The sub-criticality controller includes a metallic composition having at least one metal component and at least one borate component bonded to the at least one metal component. The metallic composition forms borates when the metallic composition contacts the water.

Xiong, Yongliang↗

Lessons Learned: Tribal Community Engagement, Remediation and Restoration of a Uranium Mine Tailings Site, Navajo Nation - 12484

In May, 2011 New World Environmental Inc. was awarded a contract by the Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency to remediate an illegal radioactive waste disposal site located in the Navajo Nation. The initial scope included the excavation and shipment of an estimated 3,000 cubic yards of Uranium mine tailings and associated industrial waste. In this instance Stakeholders were supportive of the project, remediation and restoration, yet the movement of residual radioactive materials through tribal communities was a controversial issue. Other Stakeholder issues included site security, water sources for remediation activities, local residents' temporary re-location and care of livestock, right of way permissions and local workforce development. This presentation recaps the technical and non-technical issues encountered in the remediation and restoration the seven acre site and the outreach to surrounding communities. Cultural and equity issues resulting from historical problems associated with this and other sites in the immediate area and education and training. (authors)

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Physical Protection of Spent Fuel Shipments: Resolution of Stakeholder Concerns Through Rulemaking - 12284

In 1999, the State of Nevada brought its concerns about physical protection of current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments, and future SNF shipments to a federal repository, before the NRC in a 1999 petition for rulemaking (PRM-73-10). In October 2010, the NRC published a rulemaking decision which would significantly strengthen physical protection of SNF in transit. The newest articulation of the rule (10 CFR 73.37) incorporates regulatory clarifications and security enhancements requested in Nevada's 1999 petition for rulemaking, codifies the findings of the Nuclear NRC and DOE consequence analyses into policy guidance documents and brings forward into regulations the agency and licensee experience gained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although at present DOE SNF shipments would continue to be exempt from these NRC regulations, Nevada considers the rule to constitute a largely satisfactory resolution to stakeholder concerns raised in the original petition and in subsequent comments submitted to the NRC. This paper reviews the process of regulatory changes, assesses the specific improvements contained in the new rules and briefly describes the significance of the new rule in the context of a future national nuclear waste management program. Nevada's petition for rulemaking led to a generally satisfactory resolution of the State's concerns. The decade plus timeframe from petition to rulemaking conclusion saw a sea change in many aspects of the relevant issues - perhaps most importantly the attacks on 9/11 led to the recognition by regulatory bodies that a new threat environment exists wherein shipments of SNF and HLW pose a viable target for human initiated events. The State of Nevada has always considered security a critical concern for the transport of these highly radioactive materials. This was one of the primary reasons for the original rulemaking petition and subsequent advocacy by Nevada on related issues. NRC decisions on the majority of the concerns expressed in the petition, additional developments by other regulatory bodies and the change in how the United States sees threats to the homeland - all of these produced a satisfactory resolution through the rulemaking process. While not all of the concerns expressed by Nevada were addressed in the proposed rule and significant challenges face any programmatic shipment campaign in the future, the lesson learned on this occasion is that stakeholder concerns can be resolved through rulemaking. If DOE would engage with stakeholders on its role in transport of SNF and HLW under the NWPA, these concerns would be better addressed. Specifically the attempts by DOE to resist transportation and security regulations now considered necessary by the NRC for the adequate protection of the shipments of highly radioactive materials, these DOE efforts seem ill advised. One clear lesson learned from this successful rulemaking petition process is that the system of stakeholder input can work to better the regulatory environment. (authors)

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Breakdown-prone volume in terahertz wave beams

This study was motivated by the recently proposed concept of remote detection of concealed radioactive materials by a focused terahertz (THz) radiation [V. L. Granatstein and G. S. Nusinovich, J. Appl. Phys. 108, 063304 (2010)]. According to this concept, a high-power THz radiation should be focused in a small spot where the field intensity exceeds the breakdown threshold. In the presence of free electrons in such a breakdown-prone volume, a THz discharge will occur there. However, this volume should be so small that in the absence of ionizing sources in its vicinity the probability to have there any free electrons is low. Then, the increased breakdown rate in a series of THz pulses would indicate the presence of hidden radioactive materials in the vicinity of the focused spot. For this concept, it is important to accurately determine the breakdown-prone volume created by a focused THz radiation. This problem is analyzed in this paper, first, for the case of a single wave beam and, then, for the case of crossing wave beams of different polarizations. The problem is studied first ignoring the diffraction spread of wave beams in the vicinity of the focal plane and, then, with the account for the diffraction spreading. Then, relations between the THz wave power, the range of such a system and the breakdown-prone volume are analyzed. Finally, the effect of the atmospheric turbulence on propagation and focusing of THz wave beams in air is considered.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

BALLISTICS TESTING OF THE 9977 SHIPPING PACKAGE FOR STORAGE APPLICATIONS

Radioactive materials are stored in a variety of locations throughout the DOE complex. At the Savannah River Site (SRS), materials are stored within dedicated facilities. Each of those facilities has a documented safety analysis (DSA) that describes accidents that the facility and the materials within it may encounter. Facilities at the SRS are planning on utilizing the certified Model 9977 Shipping Package as a long term storage package and one of these facilities required ballistics testing. Specifically, in order to meet the facility DSA, the radioactive materials (RAM) must be contained within the storage package after impact by a .223 caliber round. In order to qualify the Model 9977 Shipping Package for storage in this location, the package had to be tested under these conditions. Over the past two years, the Model 9977 Shipping Package has been subjected to a series of ballistics tests. The purpose of the testing was to determine if the 9977 would be suitable for use as a storage package at a Savannah River Site facility. The facility requirements are that the package must not release any of its contents following the impact in its most vulnerable location by a .223 caliber round. A package, assembled to meet all of the design requirements for a certified 9977 shipping configuration and using simulated contents, was tested at the Savannah River Site in March of 2011. The testing was completed and the package was examined. The results of the testing and examination are presented in this paper.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Karlsruhe Database for Radioactive Wastes (KADABRA) - Accounting and Management System for Radioactive Waste Treatment - 12275

The data management system KADABRA was designed according to the purposes of the Cen-tral Decontamination Department (HDB) of the Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage Karlsruhe Rueckbau- und Entsorgungs-GmbH (WAK GmbH), which is specialized in the treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste. The layout considers the major treatment processes of the HDB as well as regulatory and legal requirements. KADABRA is designed as an SAG ADABAS application on IBM system Z mainframe. The main function of the system is the data management of all processes related to treatment, transfer and storage of radioactive material within HDB. KADABRA records the relevant data concerning radioactive residues, interim products and waste products as well as the production parameters relevant for final disposal. Analytical data from the laboratory and non destructive assay systems, that describe the chemical and radiological properties of residues, production batches, interim products as well as final waste products, can be linked to the respective dataset for documentation and declaration. The system enables the operator to trace the radioactive material through processing and storage. Information on the actual sta-tus of the material as well as radiological data and storage position can be gained immediately on request. A variety of programs accessed to the database allow the generation of individual reports on periodic or special request. KADABRA offers a high security standard and is constantly adapted to the recent requirements of the organization. (authors)

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Maximum Inner Container Dose Rate That Will Ensure Meeting Regulatory Limit at Package Surface - 19206

Often, the shipper of radioactive material does not know the exact radioactive isotopic composition of the materials that need to be shipped. This is especially important for legacy materials that need to be removed from a site that is in the process of being decommissioned. A method of determining the acceptability of such material for shipment before it is placed in into the shipping package will allow more flexibility in planning for decommissioning activities. A series of Monte-Carlo calculations were performed to calculate the dose rate at the surface of a convenience container or a shielding pig separately and then at the surface of a new shipping package being designed by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The purpose of these calculations is to determine the maximum dose rate at the surface of the convenience container or the shielded pig that will ensure the dose rate at the outer surface the shipping package is less that the regulatory limit of 2 mSv/h. The calculations also considered the effect of shape of the radioactive material and its possible movement inside the convenience container along with movement of the convenience container inside the confinement vessel of the shipping package. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

PRECEDENTS FOR AUTHORIZATION OF CONTENTS USING DOSE RATE MEASUREMENTS

For the transportation of Radioactive Material (RAM) packages, the requirements for the maximum allowed dose rate at the package surface and in its vicinity are given in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 71.47. The regulations are based on the acceptable dose rates to which the public, workers, and the environment may be exposed. As such, the regulations specify dose rates, rather than quantity of radioactive isotopes and require monitoring to confirm the requirements are met. 10CFR71.47 requires that each package of radioactive materials offered for transportation must be designed and prepared for shipment so that under conditions normally incident to transportation the radiation level does not exceed 2 mSv/h (200 mrem/h) at any point on the external Surface of the package, and the transport index does not exceed 10. Before shipment, the dose rate of the package is determined by measurement, ensuring that it conforms to the regulatory limits, regardless of any analyses. This is the requirement for all certified packagings. This paper discusses the requirements for establishing the dose rates when shipping RAM packages and the precedents for meeting these requirements by measurement.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PAGs, DRLs, AALs and Other Alphabet Soup MQOs for Laboratory Analyses

During an incident of national significance involving radioactive materials protective action guides (PAGs) are established to protect workers and the public from harmful exposure levels of radioactive materials. The PAGs are stated in terms of dose and must be converted to measurable quantities in various media (DRLs). This workshop will present the current PAGs, methods for converting the PAGs to DRLs, and using the Data Quality Objectives process in the Multi-agency Radiological Laboratory Analytical Protocols Manual (MARLAP), derive measurement quality objectives (MQOs) for the laboratories. Examples from the Empire 09 exercise will be used in this presentation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Thermal analysis to determine acceptable package loading and spatial configurations of high-heat-generating wastes - 15411

The inventory of radioactive materials planned for geological disposal in the UK is diverse. This inventory includes a range of high-heat-generating wastes and other radioactive materials not currently declared as waste including some spent nuclear fuel and separated uranium and plutonium. To ensure that safe disposal solutions can be developed, it will be necessary to understand the influence of this heat on engineered barrier systems for the range of generic disposal concepts being considered in the UK. For these reasons, Radioactive Waste Management Limited has established a dedicated project to enhance understanding of the factors affecting geological disposal of high-heat-generating wastes with a view to supporting future decision making and concept selection. One of the priority areas to be addressed within the High-heat-generating Waste Project (Project Ankhiale) concerns the effect of heat on the engineered barrier systems. The core focus of the work is to identify the thermal constraints on specific outline conceptual designs, building upon the findings of other work activities aimed at understanding the influence of heat on buffer materials. The constraints on the design relate to important features of the engineered barrier system and parameters such as waste package loading, package dimensions and package spacing. Work is underway to identify an acceptable range of designs and parameters for waste package disposal concepts and layout of the GDF. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Comparison of RESRAD and GoldSim Models for Assessing Radiological Dose for a RCRA Landfill - 20418

US Ecology Idaho (USEI) operates a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C, Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal (TSD) Facility on a 640-acre property in Owyhee County, Idaho. USEI accepts a wide variety of RCRA-exempt low activity radioactive wastes, including naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and technologically enhanced NORM (TENORM) (USEI 2009). The performance of the landfill with regard to radiological operating permit requirements was previously assessed using a model constructed with the residual radioactivity (RESRAD) computer program, developed by Argonne National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). RESRAD supports the evaluation of several environmental transport pathways related to a radionuclide-contaminated soil source term, but it was not conceived as a model for the evaluation of landfill radiological performance. A more comprehensive and realistic model is desired in order to better support submissions to both the State of Idaho's Department of Environmental Quality as well as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A Performance Assessment (PA) computer model was developed using GoldSim software for the USEI RCRA Subtitle C landfill. The RESRAD computer model was specifically developed for calculating soil cleanup criteria and radiological dose and cancer risk from residual radioactive material in soil. To evaluate site-specific conditions, users may select from among a number of available environmental transport and exposure pathways and modify 'default' parameter values. In GoldSim, a user must construct the model 'from scratch.' However, this modeling is facilitated by a number of specialized elements available in GoldSim to support a radiological mass transport model. These include elements for defining radiological decay and ingrowth, container failure and radiological release, advective and diffusive transport, and other processes. Advantages afforded by the use of RESRAD for modeling radiological dose for a RCRA Subtitle C landfill include ease of use and reasonable flexibility in specifying site-specific conditions. GoldSim allows for considerably more flexibility and site-specificity than RESRAD, including evaluation of potentially relevant environmental transport processes not supported in RESRAD. The probabilistic modeling capabilities of GoldSim also far exceed those of RESRAD. The pros and cons of RESRAD and GoldSim for this modeling problem are explored with a focus on identifying approaches and critical factors in identifying the appropriate platform. The capabilities of RESRAD and GoldSim for mathematically modeling the disposal system will be contrasted and compared. For example, the existing RESRAD radiological safety assessment evaluated potentially complete exposure pathways related to infiltration to groundwater and upwards diffusion of radon. Additional transport pathways identified in the USEI Idaho facility Conceptual Site Model include deposition of radon decay products in cover material, root uptake of radionuclides in disposed wastes by native plants, and mixing of cover material by burrowing animals. Results of the two models and how the different transport and dose pathways affect results will be discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Packaging and Transportation Regulatory Inconsistencies and Challenges - 20485

This paper presents regulatory inconsistencies within and between various regulatory agencies. These inconsistencies relate to the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials typically encountered during decommissioning including mixed wastes that are required to be compliant with more than one regulatory agency during shipment. At least one possible solution is presented for consideration. The following four examples are presented: - Packaging discrepancies for radioactive material meeting the DOT definition of Radioactive LSA-I that also contain lead may be compliant when shipped unpackaged per Department of Transportation (DOT) rules in 173.427 paragraph C. However, since they contain lead, they are required to be shipped in a package per the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Hazardous Waste Manifest (HWM) instructions. - The difference between the units of measure used in 49 CFR Part 172.101 Appendix A and 40 CFR, Part 355, Appendices A and B. - The requirement for outer packaging for radioactive gauges meeting all other requirements of 49 CFR 173.424 and 173.425. - E-Manifesting EPA system difficult for waste materials containing both radioactive class 7 and PCBs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A CONCEPT FOR NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSIC LIBRARIES

The interpretation of data from the nuclear forensic analysis of illicit nuclear material of unknown origin requires comparative data from samples of known origin. One way to provide such comparative data is to create a system of national nuclear forensics libraries, in which each participating country stores information about nuclear or other radioactive material that either resides in or was manufactured by that country. Such national libraries could provide an authoritative record of the material located in or produced by a particular country, and thus forms an essential prerequisite for a government to investigate illicit uses of nuclear or other radioactive material within its borders. We describe the concept of the national nuclear forensic library, recommendations for content and structure, and suggested querying methods for utilizing the information for addressing nuclear smuggling.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Monte Carlo Simulations for Homeland Security Using Anthropomorphic Phantoms

A radiological dispersion device (RDD) is a device which deliberately releases radioactive material for the purpose of causing terror or harm. In the event that a dirty bomb is detonated, there may be airborne radioactive material that can be inhaled as well as settle on an individuals leading to external contamination.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Plant security during decommissioning; challenges and lessons learned from German phase out decision

Purpose of this paper is to point out the security challenges that may occur during the decommissioning, based on the issues and lessons learned from the German phase out decision. Though national regulations may be different in other countries the basic problems and issues will be the same. Therefore presented solutions will be applicable in other countries as well. The radioactive material remaining at the NPP during decommissioning has the most influence on how the security measures have to be designed. The radioactive material defines the risk potential of the plant and this determines the needed security level. The following aspects have been challenging in Germany: - Scenarios varying from those, used for plants in operation, due to changed operating conditions - Spent fuel will stay in the spent fuel pool for a quite long period before it can be removed from the plant. Risk potential of the plant stays high and requires a high level of security measures - Security measures according to the existing operating license have to stay in place as they are, unless the first license for decommissioning is given respective the spent fuel is removed from the plant site. This even led to the question if improvements of security measures, planned and announced with focus on a plant remaining in operation for another couple of years, need to be done although they will not be required after removing the spent fuel from the plant. A further important aspect for the security design is the fact that a plant under decommissioning has completely different and strongly varying operating procedures, compared to the stable ones of an operating plant. This leads to different needs concerning workspace, infrastructure on plant site, access to buildings etc. An optimized and highly flexible security concept is needed to ensure an adequate level of security as well as an efficient decommissioning. A deep analysis of the vital plant functions, depending on the different decommissioning stages, is required to determine the vital equipment, its location and its need for protection. (authors)

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