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At least 361 records · Page 20

AUTOMATIC GENERATION OF EVENT TREES AND FAULT TREES: A MODEL-BASED APPROACH

In the past few decades, increasing complexity in modern engineering systems has been driven by the integration of a large number of components and by the fact that the system operations involve many disciplines (e.g., thermal-hydraulics, plant operations, cyber-security). Current safety/reliability modeling approaches to such systems are labor intensive, difficult to learn, and rely heavily on simplistic Boolean logic to depict failure propagation and accident progression. While these methods serve well for simple systems (i.e., linear causal systems with limited small inter- and intra-system interactions), their results are difficult to verify when modeling complex systems (typically performed through the extensive use of modeling assumptions). The development of new methods is addressed to meet these challenges through a model-based system engineering (MBSE) lens. Under MBSE philosophy, every aspect of the system (form or function) is represented by a model that completely characterizes its architecture or behavior. MBSE approach greatly improves the management of design, analysis and verification of complex systems. An integration of Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA) methods with MBSE models is proposed to perform safety/reliability analyses of engineering systems. In particular, MBSE representation of the system (performed using Systems Modeling Language [SysML]) is coupled with DPRA methods to automatically generate event trees and fault trees.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

AN OVERVIEW OF REDUCED ORDER MODELING TECHNIQUES FOR SAFETY APPLICATIONS

The RISMC project is developing new advanced simulation-based tools to perform Computational Risk Analysis (CRA) for the existing fleet of U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs). These tools numerically model not only the thermal-hydraulic behavior of the reactors primary and secondary systems, but also external event temporal evolution and component/system ageing. Thus, this is not only a multi-physics problem being addressed, but also a multi-scale problem (both spatial, µm-mm-m, and temporal, seconds-hours-years). As part of the RISMC CRA approach, a large amount of computationally-expensive simulation runs may be required. An important aspect is that even though computational power is growing, the overall computational cost of a RISMC analysis using brute-force methods may be not viable for certain cases. A solution that is being evaluated to assist the computational issue is the use of reduced order modeling techniques. During the FY2015, we investigated and applied reduced order modeling techniques to decrease the RISMC analysis computational cost by decreasing the number of simulation runs; for this analysis improvement we used surrogate models instead of the actual simulation codes. This article focuses on the use of reduced order modeling techniques that can be applied to RISMC analyses in order to generate, analyze, and visualize data. In particular, we focus on surrogate models that approximate the simulation results but in a much faster time (microseconds instead of hours/days).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

ADAPT

The purpose of the ADAPT code is to generate Dynamic Event Trees (DET) using a user specified set of simulators. ADAPT can utilize any simulation tool which meets a minimal set of requirements. ADAPT is based on the concept of DET which uses explicit modeling of the deterministic dynamic processes that take place during a nuclear reactor plant system (or other complex system) evolution along with stochastic modeling. When DET are used to model various aspects of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), all accident progression scenarios starting from an initiating event are considered simultaneously. The DET branching occurs at user specified times and/or when an action is required by the system and/or the operator. These outcomes then decide how the dynamic system variables will evolve in time for each DET branch. Since two different outcomes at a DET branching may lead to completely different paths for system evolution, the next branching for these paths may occur not only at separate times, but can be based on different branching criteria. The computational infrastructure allows for flexibility in ADAPT to link with different system simulation codes, parallel processing of the scenarios under consideration, on-line scenario management (initiation as well as termination), analysis of results, and user friendly graphical capabilities. The ADAPT system is designed for a distributed computing environment; the scheduler can track multiple concurrent branches simultaneously. The scheduler is modularized so that the DET branching strategy can be modified (e.g. biasing towards the worst-case scenario/event). Independent database systems store data from the simulation tasks and the DET structure so that the event tree can be constructed and analyzed later. ADAPT is provided with a user-friendly client which can easily sort through and display the results of an experiment, precluding the need for the user to manually inspect individual simulator runs.

Reynolds, John↗

Construction of a Cyber Attack Model for Nuclear Power Plants

The consideration of how one compromised digital equipment can impact neighboring equipment is critical to understanding the progression of cyber attacks. The degree of influence that one component may have on another depends on a variety of factors, including the sharing of resources such as network bandwidth or processing power, the level of trust between components, and the inclusion of segmentation devices such as firewalls. The interactions among components via mechanisms that are unique to the digital world are not usually considered in traditional PRA. This means potential sequences of events that may occur during an attack may be missed if one were to only look at conventional accident sequences. This paper presents a method where, starting from the initial attack vector, the progression of a cyber attack can be modeled. The propagation of the attack is modeled by considering certain attributes of the digital components in the system. These attributes determine the potential vulnerability of a component to a class of attack and the capability gained by the attackers once they are in control of the equipment. The use of attributes allows similar components (components with the same set of attributes) to be modeled in the same way, thereby reducing the computing resources required for analysis of large systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Limitations imposed on fire PRA methods as the result of incomplete and uncertain fire event data.

Fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods utilize data and insights gained from actual fire events in a variety of ways. For example, fire occurrence frequencies, manual fire fighting effectiveness and timing, and the distribution of fire events by fire source and plant location are all based directly on the historical experience base. Other factors are either derived indirectly or supported qualitatively based on insights from the event data. These factors include the general nature and intensity of plant fires, insights into operator performance, and insights into fire growth and damage behaviors. This paper will discuss the potential methodology improvements that could be realized if more complete fire event reporting information were available. Areas that could benefit from more complete event reporting that will be discussed in the paper include fire event frequency analysis, analysis of fire detection and suppression system performance including incipient detection systems, analysis of manual fire fighting performance, treatment of fire growth from incipient stages to fully-involved fires, operator response to fire events, the impact of smoke on plant operations and equipment, and the impact of fire-induced cable failures on plant electrical circuits.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Bayesian Inference for Time Trends in Parameter Values: Case Study for the Ageing PSA Network of the European Commission

There is a nearly ubiquitous assumption in PSA that parameter values are at least piecewise-constant in time. As a result, Bayesian inference tends to incorporate many years of plant operation, over which there have been significant changes in plant operational and maintenance practices, plant management, etc. These changes can cause significant changes in parameter values over time; however, failure to perform Bayesian inference in the proper time-dependent framework can mask these changes. Failure to question the assumption of constant parameter values, and failure to perform Bayesian inference in the proper time-dependent framework were noted as important issues in NUREG/CR-6813, performed for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in 2003. That report noted that “industry lacks tools to perform time-trend analysis with Bayesian updating.” This paper describes an application of time-dependent Bayesian inference methods developed for the European Commission Ageing PSA Network. These methods utilize open-source software, implementing Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling. The paper also illustrates the development of a generic prior distribution, which incorporates multiple sources of generic data via weighting factors that address differences in key influences, such as vendor, component boundaries, conditions of the operating environment, etc.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Mechanistic Reliability Assessment of RVACS and Metal Fuel Inherent Reactivity Feedbacks

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) and Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) participated in a two year collaboration to modernize and update the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for the PRISM sodium fast reactor. At a high level, the primary outcome of the project was the development of a next-generation PRA that is intended to enable risk-informed prioritization of safety- and reliability-focused research and development. A central Argonne task during this project was a reliability assessment of passive safety systems, which included the Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) and the inherent reactivity feedbacks of the metal fuel core. Both systems were examined utilizing a methodology derived from the Reliability Method for Passive Safety Functions (RMPS), with an emphasis on developing success criteria based on mechanistic system modeling while also maintaining consistency with the Fuel Damage Categories (FDCs) of the mechanistic source term assessment. This paper provides an overview of the reliability analyses of both systems, including highlights of the FMEAs, the construction of best-estimate models, uncertain parameter screening and propagation, and the quantification of system failure probability. In particular, special focus is given to the methodologies to perform the analysis of uncertainty propagation and the determination of the likelihood of violating FDC limits. Additionally, important lessons learned are also reviewed, such as optimal sampling methodologies for the discovery of low likelihood failure events and strategies for the combined treatment of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties.

Grabaskas, David↗

Pruning of Discrete Dynamic Event Trees Using Density Peaks and Dynamic Time Warping

Discrete Dynamic Event Trees (DDETs) are used in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to determine the risk associated with complex systems, such as nuclear power plants, where accident scenarios need to be realistically modeled. One of the most challenging aspects of the DDET method is that a large number of branches are produced for each initiating event. This can result in data that is difficult to organize and time consuming to analyze. As the number of uncertain parameters increases, so does the complexity of the event tree. An event tree often has nodes that do not contribute to the overall results and predictive capabilities; therefore, we suggest a pre-pruning algorithm that can work to remove these nodes, and consequently, reduce the complexity of the tree. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is currently working on a two year dynamic cyber-risk informed project to assess cyber failure in a nuclear power plant. This will be achieved by coupling SNL's dynamic scheduler known as Analysis of Dynamic Accident Progression Trees (ADAPT) with MELCOR, a reactor accident simulator, and a System for Circuit Evaluation and Prediction of Transient Radiation Effects (SCEPTRE), a cyber Emulytics code. This paper will discuss the preliminary results of a feasibility study for using density peaks (DP) clustering with dynamic time warping (DTW) to prune branches that are formed from large DDETs, like the ones that will be produced throughout SNL's project. Papers from the project that are submitted to this conference discuss the following: - The MELCOR model for a Pressurized Water Reactor that uses a digital instrumentation and control system. - Proposed generic cyber exploits for the above reactor. - Modifications to ADAPT to extend the framework for multiple simulators, incorporate importance measures into DDET analysis, as well as sort and reduce DDETs based on inputs to or outputs from the tree. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Feasibility Study of Developing Alternative Common-Cause Failure Model for Event Assessment

This report is a revision of the original report, INL/LTD-14-33376. The original report, which was a limited distribution to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) only and not available to the public, was revised as this report for public distribution. The report presents the feasibility study of alternative common-cause failure (CCF) models that could be used for event assessment in the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models. The current CCF model used by the SPAR models is the alpha factor model. The proposed alternative CCF models are the partial alpha factor model and general dependency model. These alternative CCF models are reviewed and compared to the current alpha factor model, with the partial alpha factor model being identified as the preferred CCF model that could be used for event assessment in the SPAR models.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Component Repair Times Obtained from MSPI Data

Information concerning times to repair or restore equipment to service given a failure is valuable to probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs). Examples of such uses in modern PRAs include estimation of the probability of failing to restore a failed component within a specified time period (typically tied to recovering a mitigating system before core damage occurs at nuclear power plants) and the determination of mission times for support system initiating event (SSIE) fault tree models. Information on equipment repair or restoration times applicable to PRA modeling is limited and dated for U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. However, the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) program covering all U.S. commercial nuclear power plants provides up-to-date information on restoration times for a limited set of component types. This paper describes the MSPI program data available and analyzes the data to obtain median and mean component restoration times as well as non-restoration cumulative probability curves. The MSPI program provides guidance for monitoring both planned and unplanned outages of trains of selected mitigating systems deemed important to safety. For systems included within the MSPI program, plants monitor both train UA and component unreliability (UR) against baseline values. If the combined system UA and UR increases sufficiently above established baseline results (converted to an estimated change in core damage frequency or CDF), a “white” (or worse) indicator is generated for that system. That in turn results in increased oversight by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and can impact a plant’s insurance rating. Therefore, there is pressure to return MSPI program components to service as soon as possible after a failure occurs. Three sets of unplanned outages might be used to determine the component repair durations desired in this article: all unplanned outages for the train type that includes the component of interest, only unplanned outages associated with failures of the component of interest, and only unplanned outages associated with PRA failures of the component of interest. The paper will describe how component repair times can be generated from each set and which approach is most applicable. Repair time information will be summarized for MSPI pumps and diesel generators using data over 2003 – 2007. Also, trend information over 2003 – 2012 will be presented to indicate whether the 2003 – 2007 repair time information is still considered applicable. For certain types of pumps, mean repair times are significantly higher than the typically assumed 24 h duration.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

RAVEN Beta Release

This documents the release of the Risk Analysis Virtual Environment (RAVEN) code. A description of the RAVEN code is provided, and discussion of the release process for the M2LW-16IN0704045 milestone. The RAVEN code is a generic software framework to perform parametric and probabilistic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. RAVEN is capable of investigating the system response as well as the input space using Monte Carlo, Grid, or Latin Hyper Cube sampling schemes, but its strength is focused toward system feature discovery, such as limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, using dynamic supervised learning techniques. RAVEN has now increased in maturity enough for the Beta 1.0 release.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Support and Modeling for the Boiling Water Reactor Station Black Out Case Study Using RELAP and RAVEN

The existing fleet of nuclear power plants is in the process of extending its lifetime and increasing the power generated. In order to evaluate the impact of these two factors on the safety of the plant, the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) project aims to provide insight to decision makers through a series of simulations of the plant dynamics for different initial conditions (e.g., probabilistic analysis and uncertainty quantification). This report focuses, in particular, on the impact of power uprate on the safety of a boiled water reactor system. The case study considered is a loss of off-site power followed by the loss of diesel generators, i.e., a station black out (SBO) event. Analysis is performed by using a thermo-hydraulic code, i.e. RELAP-5, and a stochastic analysis tool currently under development at INL, i.e. RAVEN. Starting from the event tree models contained in SAPHIRE, we built the input file for RELAP-5 that models in great detail system dynamics under SBO conditions. We also interfaced RAVEN with RELAP-5 so that it would be possible to run multiple RELAP-5 simulation runs by changing specific keywords of the input file. We both employed classical statistical tools, i.e. Monte-Carlo, and more advanced machine learning based algorithms to perform uncertainty quantification in order to quantify changes in system performance and limitations as a consequence of power uprate. We also employed advanced data analysis and visualization tools that helped us to correlate simulation outcome such as maximum core temperature with a set of input uncertain parameters. Results obtained gave a detailed overview of the issues associated to power uprate for a SBO accident scenario. We were able to quantify how timing of safety related events were impacted by a higher reactor core power. Such insights can provide useful material to the decision makers to perform risk-infomed safety margins management.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana↗

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana L.↗

October 2019 SAPHIRE 8 Software Quality Assurance Oversight Status Report

The software quality assurance oversight consists of updating and maintaining revision control of the System Analysis Program for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Version 8 quality assurance program documentation and of monitoring revision control of the SAPHIRE Version 8 source code. This report summarizes the oversight efforts through description of the revision control system (RCS) setup, operation and contents. Documents maintained under revision control include the Acceptance Test Plan (ATP), Configuration Management Plan, Quality Assurance Plan, Software Project Plan, Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM), System Test Plan, Significance Determination Process (SDP) Interface Training Manual, and the SAPHIRE 8 “New Features and Capabilities Overview.” These documents are referred to and can be transmitted upon request of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Risk-Informed Applications and Science – Past, Present, & Future

This is a presentation to be made at the University of Tokyo. The Idaho National Laboratory is creating the next-generation reliability- and risk-assessment methods and tools that support risk-informed decision-making by combining physics-based models with probabilistic quantification approaches. Integrating these two worlds of physics and probability using a simulation framework leads us to predictions based upon an approach called “computational risk assessment” which will serve as the technical basis for the future of reliability and risk approaches. The driving factors for this new approach includes: temporal (timing issues), spatial (location issues), mechanistic (physics issues), and topological (complexity issues). By combining phenomenology directly with stochastic quantification, we are able to perform advanced uncertainty analysis directly on both parameters and models. In addition, new tools allow for the creation of reduced order models that mimic high-fidelity engineering models while still permitting the realization of thousands of simulation iterations in short run-times on current workstation-class computers. While these advanced methods and tools can provide increased realism in our engineering safety and risk approaches, their greater benefit is to provide a risk-informed engineering framework for design and operation. This talk will briefly review the history of risk assessment and risk-informed applications, describe some of the current research and development found at the Idaho National Laboratory, and discuss potential future applications and approaches for advanced methods and tools.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Based Response Surface Approach for FLEX and Accident Tolerant Fuels for Medium Break LOCA Spectrum

After the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, the safety features such as accident tolerant fuel (ATF) and diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) for existing nuclear fleets are being investigated by the US Department of Energy under the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program. This research is being conducted to quantify the risk-benefit of these safety features. Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA)-based response-surface approach has been presented to quantify the FLEX and ATF benefits by estimating the risk associated with each option. ATFs with multilayered silicon carbide (SiC), iron-chromium-aluminum, and chromium-coated zirconium cladding were considered in this study. While these ATF candidates perform better than the current zirconium cladding (Zr), they may introduce additional failure modes in some operating conditions. The fuel failure analysis modules (FAMs) were developed to investigate ATF performance. The dynamic risk assessments were performed using RAVEN, a DPRA tool, coupled with RELAP5 and FAMs. A cumulative distribution function-based index provided a mean of comparing the benefits of safety enhancements. For medium break loss of coolant accidents, FLEX operational timing window for each fuel type was estimated. Among these ATF candidates, SiC-type ATF was the most beneficial candidate for an increased safety margin than Zr-based fuel and was found to complement FLEX strategies in terms of risk and coping time.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Modeling of a Flooding Induced Station Blackout for a Pressurized Water Reactor Using the RISMC Toolkit

In the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) approach we want to understand not just the frequency of an event like core damage, but how close we are (or are not) to key safety-related events and how might we increase our safety margins. The RISMC Pathway uses the probabilistic margin approach to quantify impacts to reliability and safety by coupling both probabilistic (via stochastic simulation) and mechanistic (via physics models) approaches. This coupling takes place through the interchange of physical parameters and operational or accident scenarios. In this paper we apply the RISMC approach to evaluate the impact of a power uprate on a pressurized water reactor (PWR) for a tsunami-induced flooding test case. This analysis is performed using the RISMC toolkit: RELAP-7 and RAVEN codes. RELAP-7 is the new generation of system analysis codes that is responsible for simulating the thermal-hydraulic dynamics of PWR and boiling water reactor systems. RAVEN has two capabilities: to act as a controller of the RELAP-7 simulation (e.g., system activation) and to perform statistical analyses (e.g., run multiple RELAP-7 simulations where sequencing/timing of events have been changed according to a set of stochastic distributions). By using the RISMC toolkit, we can evaluate how power uprate affects the system recovery measures needed to avoid core damage after the PWR lost all available AC power by a tsunami induced flooding. The simulation of the actual flooding is performed by using a smooth particle hydrodynamics code: NEUTRINO.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗