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WildFire Ignition Resistance Estimator (WildFIRE) Wizard Software Development Report

This report describes the development of a software tool, entitled “WildFire Ignition Resistance Estimator Wizard” (WildFIRE Wizard, Version 2.10). This software was developed within the Wildfire Ignition Resistant Home Design (WIRHD) program, sponsored by the U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Infrastructure Protection & Disaster Management Division. WildFIRE Wizard is a tool that enables homeowners to take preventive actions that will reduce their home’s vulnerability to wildfire ignition sources (i.e., embers, radiant heat, and direct flame impingement) well in advance of a wildfire event. This report describes the development of the software, its operation, its technical basis and calculations, and steps taken to verify its performance.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Recent Developments in X-ray Imaging Technology

A review of recent developments in the technology of x-ray imaging hardware has been completed. Based on this review, we believe that the following items merit more detailed scrutiny in regards to their applications to US Homeland Security interests: • Fujifilm’s 17” x 17” flat panel detectors which are part of the company’s FDR AcSelerate x-ray imaging systems, • GE Healthcare’s Gemstone™ scintillators for their use in CT units, • CZT baggage scanning units under development by either Endicott Interconnect Technologies or Redlen Technologies and which employ a new “XENA™” IC with NEXIS™ protocols, and • Dual Energy Line- Scanning devices from either Hamamatsu Photonics (C10800 series) or from the X-Scan Imaging Corporation (XD8800 and XDR8800 Series Line-Scan Camera). The bases for these recommendations, as well as other not highlighted above, are noted below. The footnotes document company contact information. Beyond the text highlighting the recommendations, a number of appendices have been added which document the research conducted for this review.

42 ENGINEERING↗

My Experience at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Before applying for an internship through Department of Homeland Security, I had never heard of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. I knew of a few national labs, and had a vague idea of what they were developing. Within my first week at LLNL, I was awestruck by the amazing technology that they have, and what they are currently developing to support the goals of DHS. My internship at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was a learning experience on many different levels. Whether it was working on our project or attending seminars, I learned many useful applications of computer science and developed future research interests. To give a summary of my internship experience, I will begin by describing my project under Dr. Labov. Next, I will go over how my project and other parts of the internship have shaped my future research interests. Finally, I will present some areas of research that I think should be considered to help DHS accomplish its mission.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Guided Text Search Using Adaptive Visual Analytics (Final Report)

This research demonstrates the promise of augmenting interactive visualizations with semi- supervised machine learning techniques to improve the discovery of significant associations and insights in the search and analysis of textual information. More specifically, we have developed a system called Gryffin that hosts a unique collection of techniques that facilitate individualized investigative search pertaining to an ever-changing set of analytical questions over an indexed collection of open-source documents related to critical national infrastructure. The Gryffin client hosts dynamic displays of the search results via focus+context record listings, temporal timelines, term-frequency views, and multiple coordinate views. Furthermore, as the analyst interacts with the display, the interactions are recorded and used to label the search records. These labeled records are then used to drive semi-supervised machine learning algorithms that re-rank the unlabeled search records such that potentially relevant records are moved to the top of the record listing. Gryffin is described in the context of the daily tasks encountered at the US Department of Homeland Security s Fusion Center, with whom we are collaborating in its development. The resulting system is capable of addressing the analysts information overload that can be directly attributed to the deluge of information that must be addressed in the search and investigative analysis of textual information.

machine learning↗

Microfabricated nitrogen-phosphorus detector: chemically mediated thermionic emission

The chemical structures of many chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) contain nitrogen (N) or phosphorus (P) atoms. Detection of these compounds is of great importance to the defense, homeland security, and emergency response communities. Commercially available benchtop thermionic nitrogen phosphorus detectors (NPDs) are capable of phosphorus over carbon molar selectivities of 10 5 which make them particularly attractive for use in GC-based detection systems. In these laboratory instruments thermionic electron emission is provided by a resistively heated glass or ceramic bead suspended above a hydrogen-air flame. Despite nearly 60 years of laboratory use the detailed detection mechanism is poorly understood. A goal of this project was to further our understanding of why these thermionic detectors are highly selective for P and N containing compounds.

Simonson, Robert Joseph↗

The Evolution of the Federal Monitoring and Assessment Center

The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is a federal emergency response asset whose assistance may be requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and state and local agencies to respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. It is an interagency organization with representation from the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other federal agencies. FRMAC, in its present form, was created in 1987 when the radiological support mission was assigned to the DOE’s Nevada Operations Office by DOE Headquarters. The FRMAC asset, including its predecessor entities, was created, grew, and evolved to function as a response to radiological incidents. Radiological emergency response exercises showed the need for a coordinated approach to managing federal emergency monitoring and assessment activities. The mission of FRMAC is to coordinate and manage all federal radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities during a nuclear or radiological incident within the United States in support of state ,local, tribal governments, DHS, and the federal coordinating agency. Radiological emergency response professionals with the DOE’s national laboratories support the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), the Aerial Measuring System (AMS), and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS). These teams support the FRMAC to provide: Atmospheric transport modeling; Radiation monitoring; Radiological analysis and data assessments; and Medical advice for radiation injuries In support of field operations, the FRMAC provides geographic information systems, communications, mechanical, electrical, logistics, and administrative support. The size of the FRMAC is tailored to the incident and is comprised of emergency response professionals drawn from across the federal government. State and local emergency response teams may also integrate their operations with FRMAC, but are not required to.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis for Detecting Explosives-related Threats

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are interested in developing a standardized testing procedure for determining the performance of candidate detection systems. This document outlines a potential method for judging detection system performance as well as determining if combining the information from a legacy system with a new system can significantly improve performance. In this document, performance corresponds to the Neyman-Pearson criterion applied to the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves of the detection systems in question. A simulation was developed to investigate how the amount of data provided by the vendor in the form of the ROC curve effects the performance of the combined detection system. Furthermore, the simulation also takes into account the potential effects of correlation and how this information can also impact the performance of the combined system.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Healthcare Impact Simulation Using HCSim [Slides]

HCSim is an agent-based healthcare impact simulation code developed for the Department of Homeland Security and written in Java. It is intended to model the impact of unusual patient demand on the surge capacity of healthcare infrastructure. HCSim operates at urban-to-regional scales, and can produce static or dynamic results. This presentation describes the HCSim code’s capabilities and architecture at a relatively high level appropriate for general, open discussion, and offers examples of its applicability in analyses.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

BioWatch SMS Supervisor Guide

The BioWatch Sample Management System is software developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory to support the Department of Homeland Security BioWatch program. Field Operations Supervisors use the software to record, track, and manage data for the BioWatch sample collection process. This includes installing the software, creating and updating databases, assigning user IDs and passwords, editing and customizing reports, correcting data errors, recovering lost data, and troubleshooting. The BioWatch SMS Field Operations Supervisor Guide provides procedures for each task a Field Operations Supervisor performs. The reference information in this guide includes appendices of error messages and solutions, terms used interchangeably, and safety warnings along with a glossary, an index, and a list of suggested reference documents.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

BioWatch Sample Management System (SMS) Field Operator Guide

The BioWatch Sample Management System is software developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory to support the Department of Homeland Security BioWatch program. Field Operators use the software to keep track of samples and to provide information on the sample management process to other users and software programs within BioWatch. The information tracked about a sample includes the date and time the filter media is assembled in a filter holder, deployed to the field, placed in and removed from a collector, and received from the field, and identifies who performs each task. Field Operators can also use the software to prepare and print forms to document the chain-of-custody transfer of the samples. The BioWatch SMS Field Operator Guide provides easy-to-understand procedures for each task a Field Operator performs. This guide gives basic information about using the computer and other equipment, instructions about checking and editing data, and provides reference information, including appendices of error messages and solutions, words used interchangeably, and safety warnings plus a glossary and an index.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Development of A Self Biased High Efficiency Solid-State Neutron Detector for MPACT Applications

Neutron detection is an important aspect of materials protection, accounting, and control for transmutation (MPACT). Currently He-3 filled thermal neutron detectors are utilized in many applications; these detectors require high-voltage bias for operation, which complicates the system when multiple detectors are used. In addition, due to recent increase in homeland security activity and the nuclear renaissance, there is a shortage of He-3, and these detectors become more expensive. Instead, cheap solid-state detectors that can be mass produced like any other computer chips will be developed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

BioCat 2.0

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) was established in 2008 with a primary mission to “(1) enhance the capability of the Federal Government to (A) rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological event of national concern by integrating and analyzing data relating to human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems (both national and international); and (B) disseminate alerts and other information to Member Agencies and, in coordination with (and where possible through) Member Agencies, to agencies of State, local, and tribal governments, as appropriate, to enhance the ability of such agencies to respond to a biological event of national concern; and (2) oversee development and operation of the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS).” Inherent in its mission then and the broader NBIS, NBIC is concerned with the identification, understanding, and use of a variety of biosurveillance models and systems. The goal of this project is to characterize, evaluate, classify, and catalog existing disease forecast and prediction models that could provide operational decision support for recognizing a biological event having a potentially significant impact. Additionally, gaps should be identified and recommendations made on using disease models in an operational environment to support real-time decision making.

biosurveillance↗

Isotopes and Applications Working Group: Report update October 2013

No significant changes are proposed for the scientific program. The standard mode of operation at FRIB will be to produce a rare isotope beam for a primary user, for example 60 Ca from a 82 Se beam. At the same time, the fragmentation or fission of the production beam will produce up to 1000 other isotopes that could be collected (harvested) and used for other experiments or applications. The potential applications of these harvested isotopes range from the determination of neutron cross sections for homeland security to kinetic studies of radionuclide uptake in biological processes. Longer-lived samples of the unused isotopes could be collected and used in an ion source for accelerated beam experiments at ReA3, ReA12 or other accelerator facilities outside FRIB.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Evolution of an interfacial crack on the concrete-embankment boundary

Failure of a dam can have subtle beginnings. A small crack or dislocation at the interface of the concrete dam and the surrounding embankment soil initiated by, for example, a seismic or an explosive event can lead to a catastrophic failure of the dam. The dam may ‘self-rehabilitate’ if a properly designed granular filter is engineered around the embankment. Currently, the design criteria for such filters have only been based on experimental studies. We demonstrate the numerical prediction of filter effectiveness at the soil grain scale. This joint LLNL-ERDC basic research project, funded by the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), consists of validating advanced high performance computer simulations of soil erosion and transport of grain- and dam-scale models to detailed centrifuge and soil erosion tests. Validated computer predictions highlight that a resilient filter is consistent with the current design specifications for dam filters. These predictive simulations, unlike the design specifications, can be used to assess filter success or failure under different soil or loading conditions and can lead to meaningful estimates of the timing and nature of full-scale dam failure.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Semiconductor detectors with proximity signal readout

Semiconductor-based radiation detectors are routinely used for the detection, imaging, and spectroscopy of x-rays, gamma rays, and charged particles for applications in the areas of nuclear and medical physics, astrophysics, environmental remediation, nuclear nonproliferation, and homeland security. Detectors used for imaging and particle tracking are more complex in that they typically must also measure the location of the radiation interaction in addition to the deposited energy. In such detectors, the position measurement is often achieved by dividing or segmenting the electrodes into many strips or pixels and then reading out the signals from all of the electrode segments. Fine electrode segmentation is problematic for many of the standard semiconductor detector technologies. Clearly there is a need for a semiconductor-based radiation detector technology that can achieve fine position resolution while maintaining the excellent energy resolution intrinsic to semiconductor detectors, can be fabricated through simple processes, does not require complex electrical interconnections to the detector, and can reduce the number of required channels of readout electronics. Proximity electrode signal readout (PESR), in which the electrodes are not in physical contact with the detector surface, satisfies this need.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Summary of the Seattle Urban Area Consequence Management Guidance for a Wide-Area Biological Attack

A terrorist attack involving a release of biological warfare agent in the Seattle urban area would require decision-makers to make a host of important, and sometimes untested, choices concerning how best to respond and recover. This technical supplement supports the Puget Sound Regional Biological Attack Recovery Plan Annex to the Regional Catastrophic Plan, which structures the region’s response and recovery approach, by providing technical details on how to conduct a biological remediation. More specifically, the technical supplement identifies the principal issues that must be addressed following a wide-area release of aerosolized Bacillus anthracis (B. anthracis) spores; explains the resources that are available to address the release; sets forth strategies to reduce the time required for consequence management; and focuses on remediation options, procedures, and tools that can be implemented today should such an incident occur. The content is intended to be used with the Interim Consequence Management Guidance for a Wide-Area Biological Attack (LLNL 2009). A second and related purpose of this technical supplement is to serve as a detailed guide for other geographical regions interested in formulating their own consequence management plans. This technical supplement is funded by, and was developed as part of, the Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) program—a collaborative effort among Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and numerous other Federal, state, and local agencies—to improve the nation’s ability to respond to and recover from a wide-area biological incident. Content of the technical supplement follows the six-phase diagram for responding to and recovering from a biological contamination incident (see Figure 1 on the next page), which represents a consensus scheme developed after multi-agency review and approval. Whereas the focus of the document is on remediation/cleanup activities, the topics of response and recovery structure (Section 2), notification (Section 3), and initial response (also known as first response, Section 4) are discussed relatively briefly because some early decisions related to those three topics can affect subsequent decisions pertaining to remediation and potentially affect timelines and overall effectiveness.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗