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NASA NTRS2010

Analysis of Possible Explosions at Kennedy Space Center Due to Spontaneous Ignition of Hypergolic Propellants

NASA's Constellation Program plan currently calls for the replacement of the Space Shuttle with the ARES I & V spacecraft and booster vehicles to send astronauts to the moon and beyond. Part of the ARES spacecraft is the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), which includes the Crew Module (CM) and Service Module (SM). The Orion CM's main propulsion system and supplies are provided by the SM. The SM is to be processed off line and moved to the Vehicle Assembly Building (V AB) for stacking to the first stage booster motors prior to ARES move to the launch pad. The new Constellation Program philosophy to process in this manner has created a major task for the KSC infrastructure in that conventional QD calculations are no longer viable because of the location of surrounding facilities near the VAB and the Multi Purpose Processing Facility (MPPF), where the SM will be serviced with nearly 18,000 pounds of hypergolic propellants. The Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) complex, constructed by NASA in 1994, is located just off E Avenue south of the Operations and Checkout (O&C) building in the Kennedy Space Center industrial area. The MPPF includes a high bay and a low bay. The MPPF high bay is 40.2 m (132 ft) long x 18.9 m (60 ft) wide with a ceiling height of 18.9 m (62 ft). The low bay is a 10.4 m (34 ft) long x 10.4 m (34 ft) wide processing area and has a ceiling height of6.1 m (20 ft). The MPPF is currently used to process non-hazardous payloads. Engineering Analysis Inc. (EAI), under contract with ASRC Aerospace, Inc. in conjunction with the Explosive Safety Office, NASA, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), has carried out an analysis of the effects of explosions at KSC in or near various facilities produced by the spontaneous ignition ofhypergolic fuel stored in the CEV SM. The facilities considered included (1) Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) (2) Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) (3) Canister Rotation Facility (CRF) Subsequent discussion deals with the MPPF analysis. Figure 1 provides a view of the MPPF from the northwest. An interior view ofthe facility is shown in Figure 2. The study was concerned with both blast hazards and hazardous fragments which exceed existing safety standards, as described in Section 2.0. The analysis included both blast and fragmentation effects and was divided into three parts as follows: (1) blast (2) primary fragmentation (3) secondary fragmentation Blast effects are summarized in Section 3.0, primary fragmentation in Section 4.0, and secondary fragmentation (internal and external) in Section 5.0. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.0, while references cited are included in Section 7.0. A more detailed description of the entire study is available in a separate document.

Brown, Stephen↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation function present in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

IASMS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation functionspresent in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

In-time Aviation Safety Management System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulation of A Hazardous Gas Purge System in an EUS Aft Adapter Umbilical Plate Concept

The Fluid Dynamics Branch at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center actively supports flight programs through a variety of in-line analyses. One area of expertise is the mitigation of hazardous gas mixtures that may form during nominal vehicle fueling operation. After the successful Artemis I launch, design cycles for future iterations of the vehicle are in progress. The subject of this work concerns the analysis of a hazardous gas mitigation system concept for a future upper stage.

Riley D Bridges↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulation of A Hazardous Gas Purge System in an EUS Aft Adapter Umbilical Plate Concept

Riley Bridges↗

NASA NTRS1972

Statistical analysis of several terminal area traffic collision hazard factors.

An 11 hr sample of air traffic, comprising 584 tracks recorded at Atlanta during peak periods of August 1967, is analyzed to examine the statistical characteristics of range-guard intrusions and airspace conflicts in a terminal area. The number of intrusions (of an imaginary 3-naut mile, 500-ft range guard surrounding each aircraft) and number of conflicts (of the projected airspace for two aircraft) for a track exhibit Poisson variations with track duration. The hourly rate of intrusions follows the gas model square-law variation with traffic density, but the hourly conflict rate, contrary to the gas model, decreases with greater traffic density.

Ruetenik, J. R.↗

DOE OSTI2020

CalWave Open Water Demo - FMEA Update Budget Period 2

The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a qualitative reliability technique for systematically analyzing each possible failure mode within a hardware system, and identifying the resulting effect on that system, the mission, and the personnel. This submission includes an updated FMEA summary for CalWave's open water demonstration including pre- and post-mitigation results, hazard identification (HAZID) analysis, and component/function rooted FMEA.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗

NASA NTRS1971

Application of system safety to rail transit systems

Management emphasis on system safety in the rapid transit industry includes the granting and use of funds by the Federal Government according to systematic analysis of safety hazards in advance. Likelihood predictions that those hazards will be activated by exposure of the system to a system failure, a human error, external conditions, or combinations of these aspects determine alternatives to the assumption of risk and recommend corrections before the system is operational. Rigorous safety analyses are projected to assure operational safety for prolonged periods under varied maintenance conditions; these analysis encompass station accident possibilities as well as train-person collisions, car equipment and design, traffic control systems, and tunnel design problems.

Thomas DeW. Styles↗

NASA NTRS2018

FUELEAP Model-Based System Safety Analysis

NASA researchers, in a partnership with Boeing, are investigating a fuel-cell powered variant of the X-57 “Maxwell” Mod-II electric propulsion aircraft, which is itself derived from a stock Tecnam P2006T. The “Fostering Ultra-Efficient Low-Emitting Aviation Power” (FUELEAP) project will replace the X-57 power subsystem with a hybrid Solid-Oxide Fuel Cell (SOFC) system to increase the potential range of the electric-propulsion aircraft while dramatically improving efficiency and emissions over stock internal-combustion engines. Our FUELEAP safety analysis faces two primary challenges. First, the Part 23 certificated Tecnam P2006T is undergoing significant modifications to host the hybrid electric-propulsion system, and the challenge is to assure that the safety inherent in the stock aircraft (and subsequently in X-57 Mod-II) is not compromised by changes in avionics, aircraft structural loading, weight and balance, or other considerations. Secondly, because the SOFC power system has little (if any) relevant in-service precedent, our challenge is to assure that we identify and mitigate all reasonably plausible hazards introduced by unique FUELEAP equipage. We are investigating and utilizing Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA) methods to help us address these FUELEAP safety challenges. We captured aircraft-level system hazard conditions using instances of a SysML hazard block via aircraft-level Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA). Then, using SysML models of the FUELEAP architecture, we related the hazard conditions to initiating system events and possible mitigations, such as design architecture modifications or operational constraints. We are continuing to define our approach to MBSA by developing a component-by-component inventory of local failure modes and tracing their possible contribution to hazard conditions. Finally, we are applying an argument-based approach to FUELEAP assurance. Through a FUELEAP “safety case,” we are providing an explicit argument for FUELEAP safety by associating assurance evidence with overarching safety claims through a structured argument.

Woodham, Kurt P.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Hazard Detection Software for Lunar Landing

The Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project is developing a system for safe and precise manned lunar landing that involves novel sensors, but also specific algorithms. ALHAT has selected imaging LIDAR (light detection and ranging) as the sensing modality for onboard hazard detection because imaging LIDARs can rapidly generate direct measurements of the lunar surface elevation from high altitude. Then, starting with the LIDAR-based Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) algorithm developed for Mars Landing, JPL has developed a mature set of HDA software for the manned lunar landing problem. Landing hazards exist everywhere on the Moon, and many of the more desirable landing sites are near the most hazardous terrain, so HDA is needed to autonomously and safely land payloads over much of the lunar surface. The HDA requirements used in the ALHAT project are to detect hazards that are 0.3 m tall or higher and slopes that are 5 or greater. Steep slopes, rocks, cliffs, and gullies are all hazards for landing and, by computing the local slope and roughness in an elevation map, all of these hazards can be detected. The algorithm in this innovation is used to measure slope and roughness hazards. In addition to detecting these hazards, the HDA capability also is able to find a safe landing site free of these hazards for a lunar lander with diameter .15 m over most of the lunar surface. This software includes an implementation of the HDA algorithm, software for generating simulated lunar terrain maps for testing, hazard detection performance analysis tools, and associated documentation. The HDA software has been deployed to Langley Research Center and integrated into the POST II Monte Carlo simulation environment. The high-fidelity Monte Carlo simulations determine the required ground spacing between LIDAR samples (ground sample distances) and the noise on the LIDAR range measurement. This simulation has also been used to determine the effect of viewing on hazard detection performance. The software has also been deployed to Johnson Space Center and integrated into the ALHAT real-time Hardware-in-the-Loop testbed.

Huertas, Andres↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRS1987

Atmospheric reentry of the in-core thermionic SP-100 reactor system

Presumed end-of-life atmospheric reentry of the GA SP-100 system was studied to assess dispersal feasibility and associated hazards. Reentry was studied by sequential use of an orbital trajectory and a heat analysis computer program. Two heating models were used. The first model assumed a thermal equilibrium condition between the stagnation point aerodynamic heating and the radiative cooling of the skin material surface. The second model allowed for infinite conductivity of the skin material. Four reentering configurations were studied representing stages of increased SP-100 breakup: (1) radiator, shield and reactor, (2) shield and reactor, (3) reactor with control drums, and (4) reactor without control drums. Each reentering configuration was started from a circular orbit at 116 km having an inertial velocity near Mach 25. The assumed failing criterion was the attainment of melting temperature of a critical system component. The reentry analysis revealed breakup of the vessel in the neighborhood of 61 km altitude and scattering of the fuel elements. Subsequent breakup of the fuel elements was not predicted. Oxidation of the niobium skin material was calculated to cause an increase in surface temperature of less than ten percent. The concept of thermite analogs for enhancing reactor reentry dispersal was assessed and found to be feasible in principle. A conservative worst-case hazards analysis was performed for radioactive and nonradioactive toxic SP-100 materials assumed to be dispersed during end-of-life reentry. The hazards associated with this phase of the SP-100 mission were calculated to be insignificant.

Stamatelatos, M. G.↗

DOE OSTI2021

ASMT-783246, Assessment Report for Department 635 Analysis of Fiscal Year 2021 ES&H Events

This assessment analyzes Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) occurrences and Non-Occurrence Trackable Events (NOTEs) from fiscal year (FY) 2021. For this report, assessors used three primary methods for categorizing occurrence and NOTE data: issue categorization, DOE reporting criteria groups, and DOE cause codes. The FY 2021 Q1 occurrence and NOTE total was the lowest since this type of analysis began in FY 2018 Q4, following a downward trend from the FY 2019 Q3 high point. The FY 2021 Q2 occurrence and NOTE total was nearly double the FY 2021 Q1 total; occurrence totals declined slightly in Q3 and Q4, while NOTE totals remained the same. NOTEs in each of the final three quarters were more than double the amount from Q1. This assessment resulted in one observation. As COVID-19 vaccination rates increase and COVID 19 impacts on operations decrease, the number of workers on-site and the amount of activity-level work will increase. With these changes, focused attention on the following areas related to work planning and controls may reduce the probability of future events, hazard identification and analysis, compliance with standards, formality of operations, and job scoping.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Root Cause Correlation Analysis of Software Failures via Orthogonal Defect Classification and Natural Language Processing

Systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) is becoming an increasingly popular technique to assess how complex digital software systems can fail. Rather than defining failures by their observable failure events, which may be sparse especially for safety rated nuclear digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C), failures are defined as postulated unsafe actions under specific contextual conditions. This permits a top-down analysis of system hazards and identifies whether imposed constraints and requirements can sufficiently address undesirable hazards. However, STPA is a qualitative approach at identifying inadequacies in the development process and cannot currently be used to quantify unsafe action likelihoods for probabilistic risk assessment. Therefore, in this work, we examine the root causes of software failure and explore whether a consistent correlation can be linked to specific unsafe action classes. We implement Lbl2Vec, an unsupervised document classification and retrieval algorithm, on a database of 4,096 software defect reports acquired from various open-source software systems. By analyzing sentence structure, embedded labels, and word vectors, we show that certain defect types positively correlate to specific unsafe action classes over others. The correlations developed can be used to estimate the failure probability of safety intended DI&C systems which provides a licensing basis for nuclear plant modernization efforts.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Root Cause Correlation Analysis of Software Failures via Orthogonal Defect Classification and Natural Language Processing

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

Updated Application of Frequency of Detection Methods for the INL Site Ambient Air Monitoring Network

This report presents a quantitative assessment of the current INL Site air monitoring network using frequency of detection (FD) methods. The first assessment of the INL network was performed in 2015 and made recommendations for improving the network. As a result of changes made in response to the recommendations and the addition of new source locations, the network was modified and reassessed in 2017. Since 2017, administration of the air sampling program has been consolidated under one contractor, which resulted in additional changes to the network (sampler numbers and locations) and changes in radionuclide detection levels. As a result of these changes and others, an updated assessment of the INL Site ambient air monitoring network was performed. The same two exposure scenarios used in previous assessments were used for this assessment: a resident scenario and a shepherd/rancher scenario. The resident was assumed to be continuously present at their residence/business/farm operation outside the INL Site boundary while the shepherd/rancher was assumed to be present 24-hours at the nearest INL grazing allotment boundary in each of the 22.5-degree sectors along the sector centerline from each source. Updates to both the resident and shepherd/rancher receptor locations were included. Other changes include updates to flow rates for stack sources, expansion of the list of important radionuclides based on the most recent National Emission Standards for Hazardous Pollutants (NESHAPs) analysis, and updated dose coefficients. The assessment was conducted to determine whether the current INL monitoring network is capable of detecting releases of important radionuclides from INL Site sources that have the potential to exceed a conservative dose threshold for the two exposure scenarios. The assessment revealed that for the resident scenario, the current network meets the desired performance objective (FD = 95%) for all radionuclides and sources except for Cl-36 from the TRA-770 stack (94.4%). For the shepherd/rancher scenario, the FD performance objective is met for all radionuclides and sources except tritium from MFC-774 and TAN 679 (91% for both). An investigation of reported emissions for the past three years revealed that Cl 36 is not emitted from TRA-770, and routine tritium emissions from MFC-774 and TAN-679 are very small and the sources are likely incapable of emitting enough tritium to cause a release that should be detectable by the monitoring network. This assessment is based on a conservative dose threshold. This coupled with fact that the FD for Cl 36 is only slightly less than the performance objective and Cl-36 is not emitted from TRA-770, modifying the network (i.e. adding another sampler, increasing sampler flow rate, moving samplers) to meet the 95% performance objective for this radionuclide/source/receptor scenario is not warranted. Similarly, because tritium emissions from MFC-774 and TAN-679 are very small and these two sources are likely incapable of causing a dose due to tritium release that should be detectable by the network, modifications to increase tritium detection for these sources is also unwarranted at this time. However, if it is required to meet the performance objective for tritium for all sources and receptor scenarios, additional analysis determined the FD could be raised from 91% to > 99% for both sources by adding two tritium samplers to the network.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗