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At least 361 records · Page 20

Validation and demonstration of the AEFC as a practical safeguards tool for inventory verification

The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) instrument designed to determine the residual fissile mass in irradiated fuel assemblies for safeguards verification purposes. This is done by actively interrogating an assembly with a neutron source and measuring the total (Singles) and correlated (Doubles) neutron count rates resulting from induced fissions in the irradiated nuclear fuel and relating those rates to the residual fissile mass using calibration curves. Comprehensive NDA measurements of the irradiated fuel inventory at Israeli Research Reactor 1 (IRR-1) were taken with the AEFC to validate a set of previously developed calibration curves. During the campaign, measurements were acquired of 32 standard fuel assemblies and three control assemblies in just nine days. This is a significant majority of the research reactor's irradiated fuel inventory and the largest data set gathered by the AEFC to date. Many of the fuel assemblies measured during the campaign had much shorter cooling times than those assemblies previously measured with the instrument. Calibration curves developed from previous AEFC deployments were used to determine the residual 235 U mass in the measured standard fuel assemblies. The results of the campaign demonstrated that the AEFC can be used to estimate the 235 U mass remaining in a large number of irradiated fuel assemblies with 1%–5% uncertainty in a reasonable amount of time despite operating in a high dose environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Detection of anomalous reactor activity using antineutrino count evolution over the course of a reactor cycle

This paper analyzes the sensitivity of antineutrino count rate measurements to changes in the fissile content of civil power reactors. Such measurements may be useful in IAEA reactor safeguards applications. We introduce a hypothesis testing procedure to identify statistically significant differences between the antineutrino count rate evolution of a standard 'baseline' fuel cycle and that of an anomalous cycle, in which plutonium is removed and replaced with an equivalent fissile worth of uranium. The test would allow an inspector to detect anomalous reactor activity, or to positively confirm that the reactor is operating in a manner consistent with its declared fuel inventory and power level. We show that with a reasonable choice of detector parameters, the test can detect replacement of 82 kg of plutonium in 90 days with 95% probability, while controlling the false positive rate at 5%. We show that some improvement on this level of sensitivity may be obtained by various means, including use of the method in conjunction with existing reactor safeguards methods. We also identify a necessary and sufficient minimum daily antineutrino count rate and a maximum tolerable background rate to achieve the quoted sensitivity, and list examples of detectors in which such rates have been attained.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Simulation on reactor TRIGA Puspati core kinetics fueled with thorium (Th) based fuel element

In confronting global energy requirement and the search for better technologies, there is a real case for widening the range of potential variations in the design of nuclear power plants. Smaller and simpler reactors are attractive, provided they can meet safety and security standards and non-proliferation issues. On fuel cycle aspect, thorium fuel cycles produce much less plutonium and other radioactive transuranic elements than uranium fuel cycles. Although not fissile itself, Th-232 will absorb slow neutrons to produce uranium-233 ({sup 233}U), which is fissile. By introducing Thorium, the numbers of highly enriched uranium fuel element can be reduced while maintaining the core neutronic performance. This paper describes the core kinetic of a small research reactor core like TRIGA fueled with a Th filled fuel element matrix using a general purpose Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Detection of special nuclear material from delayed neutron emission induced by a dual-particle monoenergetic source

Detection of unique signatures of special nuclear materials is critical for their interdiction in a variety of nuclear security and nonproliferation scenarios. We report on the observation of delayed neutrons from fission of uranium induced in dual-particle active interrogation based on the {sup 11}B(d,n γ){sup 12}C nuclear reaction. Majority of the fissions are attributed to fast fission induced by the incident quasi-monoenergetic neutrons. A Li-doped glass–polymer composite scintillation neutron detector, which displays excellent neutron/γ discrimination at low energies, was used in the measurements, along with a recoil-based liquid scintillation detector. Time-dependent buildup and decay of delayed neutron emission from {sup 238}U were measured between the interrogating beam pulses and after the interrogating beam was turned off, respectively. Characteristic buildup and decay time profiles were compared to the common parametrization into six delayed neutron groups, finding a good agreement between the measurement and nuclear data. This method is promising for detecting fissile and fissionable materials in cargo scanning applications and can be readily integrated with transmission radiography using low-energy nuclear reaction sources.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Technoeconomic Design Optimization for Fast Reactors. Part II: Impact of Technoeconomic Constraints on Optimal Design

There is a current drive toward optimizing reactors, particularly small/micro reactors to minimize cost and maximize performance. Previous work has investigated the development of technoeconomic workflows for the design optimization of pool-type fast reactors that aim to deploy into district energy grids. Initial scoping studies verified that the workflow was capable of capturing design trends throughout a variety of design configurations and problem formulations while remaining sufficiently flexible. In this paper, this methodology is applied to understand how cost functions and technoeconomic constraints can drive optimal reactor design. Specifically, the UPu10Zr-fueled fast reactor model from Part I is adapted to include changes in the fissile content limits, control rod worth limits, control rod drive cost, and assumed fuel form. In the case of constraint relaxation at fixed power (fissile content and control rod worth limits), cost sensitivities of 5% to 10% were uncovered. Multi-objective optimization at varying reactor power levels with individualized control rod drives for each assembly (as opposed to one operational and one safety drive) increased cost by $\$10$ to $\$25$ million and substantially altered the optimal core geometry, favoring geometries with substantially fewer control rod placements relative to baseline optimization. Finally, a multi-objective optimization was performed at varying power levels with the fuel form overhauled to metallic, high-assay low-enriched uranium–based U10Zr with more refined fuel cost models. In the case of uranium fueling, the costs increased by at least $50 million relative to the baseline case. Furthermore, economic fuel zoning and lower reactivity swing cores were recovered. Each case serves to demonstrate the value of applying technoeconomic workflows to initial reactor design scoping studies to better understand the trade-off for a proposed concept between different design options.

Argonne Reactor Computation (ARC) codes↗

Simulated Performance of the Micro-Pocket Fission Detector in the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility

The Micro-Pocket Fission Detector (MPFD) is a small-form–factor real-time fission chamber. MPFD performance has been simulated in the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility (ATRC), located at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Here, the neutron and gamma-ray flux profiles and magnitudes were simulated using Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) in the near-core B-8 irradiation position. These simulations were performed at 69 discrete axial locations inside the B-8 position for three separate orientations of the nearby hafnium outer shim control cylinders and at a power level of 700 Wth. The resulting neutron and gamma-ray flux values were used to determine the MPFD response for various fissile masses and detector gas pressures. The optimal gas-operating pressure was determined to be between 30 and 60 psig. The required fissile-layer mass was determined to be between 1–2 µg of 235 U. Additionally, the gamma-ray to fission-fragment interaction rate was determined to be 4.42 × 10 -3 with average energy deposition for gamma rays and fission fragments in 30 psig argon gas to be 1 keV and 9.5 MeV, respectively.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Market-based Policies for Non-Proliferation

Access to weapons-useable fissile material—highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium—is the primary technical barrier to nuclear weapons development. Nuclear non-proliferation policy is largely concerned with the secure distribution and use of these materials and the technologies that produce them. To the extent that both materials and technologies are traded in markets, the problem may be viewed as one of regulating markets to give an acceptable set of allocative outcomes. While a laissez-faire approach to these markets was rejected long ago, most current policy is based on prescribed or proscribed behavior rather than market incentives. “Market-based” non-proliferation policies would act through incentives in the nuclear materials and technology markets rather than by prescribing outcomes or behavior. Possible polices of this sort include subsidized enrichment services, credits to impute value to spent nuclear fuel, and new markets for special scarce nuclear materials. While market-based policies will not replace command-and-control policies entirely, they could lead to efficient regulation which suffices for most market participants, reserving special, more discriminatory instruments for the few hard cases.

nulcear fuel markets, nonproliferation, SWU↗

Deferred Verification: The Role of New Verification Technologies and Approaches

Researchers at UNIDIR have recently proposed a fundamentally new approach to nuclear arms control verification, dubbed "deferred verification." The concept forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and inspections of nuclear materials or components in classified form. To implement this concept, a state first divides its territory into a closed segment and an open segment. The total fissile material inventory in the closed segment, which includes the weapon complex, is known and declared with very high accuracy. Essentially no inspections take place in the closed segment. Yet, inspectors have access to the open segment, which includes in particular the civilian nuclear sector. The fissile material inventory in the open segment is known with less accuracy, but uncertainties can be reduced over time using methods of nuclear archaeology. Deferred verification relies primarily on established safeguards techniques and avoids many unresolved verification challenges, including for example the need for information barriers for warhead confirmation measurements. At the same time, deferred verification faces some unique challenges. In this work, we explore some of these challenges and offer possible solutions while maintaining the strengths of the concept; to do so, we examine possible noncompliance strategies in which a state would seek to withhold a higher-than-declared inventory.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Possible shears bands in {sup 204}At and {sup 206}Fr, and identification of excited states in {sup 205,207}Fr.

Neutron-deficient astatine and francium nuclei were produced in the reaction {sup 30}Si + {sup 181} Ta {yields} {sup 211}Fr* at 152 MeV. The evaporation residues from this very fissile system were selected with the HERCULES-II detector system and residue-gated {gamma} rays were measured with Gammasphere. Excited states were observed for the first time in {sup 205,207}Fr, as well as sequences of low-energy transitions between high-spin states in {sup 204}At and {sup 206}Fr. These latter structures have properties similar to those associated with magnetic rotation (shears bands) in lead nuclei. Comparisons with established shears bands are presented and prospects for the magnetic-rotation phenomenon near the predicted N = 120 'magic' number are explored.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

A new set-up for the simultaneous measurement of neutron-induced capture and fission reactions

The measurement of the capture cross section of fissile elements, of upmost importance for the design of innovative nuclear reactors and the management of nuclear waste, involves particular difficulties related to the {gamma}-ray background produced in the fission reactions. These difficulties are the reason why five out of the six actinide {sigma}(n,{gamma}) measurements in the NEA High Request Priority List are fissile isotopes. At n-TOF we have combined the Total Absorption Calorimeter capture detector with a set of three {sup 235}U loaded MicroMegas fission detectors for measuring simultaneously the two reactions: capture and fission. In a first test measurement we have succeeded in measuring simultaneously with high efficiency the {sup 235}U capture and fission cross sections, disentangling accurately the two types of reactions. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Spectral indices measurements using miniature fission chambers at the MINERVE zero-power reactor at CEA using calibration data obtained at the BR1 reactor at SCK.CEN

Spectral indices are parameters of major importance to characterize a multiplying medium and to evaluate performances of neutronics calculation tools as well as quality of associated nuclear data. Experiments performed in 2004 at the CEA MINERVE facility loaded with the R1-UO{sub 2} lattice [1], using homemade miniature fission chambers and calibration data acquired at the SCK.CEN BR1 facility in 2001 [2], resulted in ambivalent conclusions. On one hand, spectral indices involving only fissile isotopes gave relevant results and consistent discrepancies between calculation and experiment. On the other hand, spectral indices involving both fissile and fertile isotopes showed inconsistent results depending on the type of calibration data used. In particular, the {sup 238}U(n,f)/{sup 235}U(n,f) spectral indices resulted in values far from the calculations in all cases. In 2004, those differences between measurement and calculation were mainly attributed to an imprecise knowledge of the isotopic composition of the deposits loaded in the {sup 238}U chambers. At that time, priorities in the development of programs in MINERVE and other considerations about the manufacturing and calibration of new fission chambers did not allow to further investigate these discrepancies. In 2009, the preparation of a new program at the EOLE facility [1] and changes in the regulatory framework for management of fission chambers motivated the manufacturing of new detectors. At the same time, the re-installation of the R1-UO{sub 2} lattice in MINERVE gave the opportunity to carry out a new spectral indices measurement campaign. Nevertheless, although the isotopic composition of active deposits was better known than previously, the comparison between experimental results and calculations still resulted in inconsistent discrepancies. A sensitivity study indicated afterwards that, among all parameters to be considered for the analysis and the assessment of final uncertainty, calibration data have the greatest impact. In April 2010, a new calibration campaign conducted again at the BR1 facility allowed the CEA to reanalyze the spectral indices measurements performed in 2009. With this new set of calibration data, the experimental values of spectral indices finally matched the calculation results within the uncertainty margins. In addition, the confrontation of data from 2001 and 2010 calibration campaigns, both performed with the same experimental conditions, allowed to shed on the light dead time correction issues in the monitoring of calibration measurements. At the end, this also explained the inconsistencies observed during the 2004 campaign. This paper first, presents the two different analysis methods for getting the experimental value of a spectral index and, lists main parameters that influence the determination of the experimental value. It then details the calibration processes that are set-up at the MINERVE and BR1 facilities, describes the various experiments carried out and finally comments the results obtained. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Status of the nuclear measurement stations for the process control of spent fuel reprocessing at AREVA NC/La Hague

Nuclear measurements are used at AREVA NC/La Hague for the monitoring of spent fuel reprocessing. The process control is based on gamma-ray spectroscopy, passive neutron counting and active neutron interrogation, and gamma transmission measurements. The main objectives are criticality and safety, online process monitoring, and the determination of the residual fissile mass and activities in the metallic waste remained after fuel shearing and dissolution (empty hulls, grids, end pieces), which are put in radioactive waste drums before compaction. The whole monitoring system is composed of eight measurement stations which will be described in this paper. The main measurement stations no. 1, 3 and 7 are needed for criticality control. Before fuel element shearing for dissolution, station no. 1 allows determining the burn-up of the irradiated fuel by gamma-ray spectroscopy with HP Ge (high purity germanium) detectors. The burn-up is correlated to the {sup 137}Cs and {sup 134}Cs gamma emission rates. The fuel maximal mass which can be loaded in one bucket of the dissolver is estimated from the lowest burn-up fraction of the fuel element. Station no. 3 is dedicated to the control of the correct fuel dissolution, which is performed with a {sup 137}Cs gamma ray measurement with a HP Ge detector. Station no. 7 allows estimating the residual fissile mass in the drums filled with the metallic residues, especially in the hulls, from passive neutron counting (spontaneous fission and alpha-n reactions) and active interrogation (fission prompt neutrons induced by a pulsed neutron generator) with proportional {sup 3}He detectors. The measurement stations have been validated for the reprocessing of Uranium Oxide (UOX) fuels with a burn-up rate up to 60 GWd/t. This paper presents a brief overview of the current status of the nuclear measurement stations. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Fast multiplicity counter featuring stilbene detectors for special nuclear material assay

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons demands for new instruments to prevent diversion of fissile material and safeguard controls. We present a fast neutron multiplicity counting system based on organic scintillators, i.e. liquid EJ-309 and stilbene. The system is able to detect fission correlated counts and photon and neutron multiplets, needed to quantify fissile mass, without the need of complex electronic circuitry and unfolding procedures, required in moderated systems. Moderated system, typically based on helium-3 detectors, feature a gate time of hundreds of microseconds. Conversely, the use of organic scintillators allows an exceptionally short gate time of hundreds of nanoseconds. This results in a reduction of accidental neutron coincidence. In our system, the superior gamma-neutron discrimination capabilities of stilbene scintillators allow to measure high-order multiplicities (> 3) and the inspection of complex source terms. This counter is thus also suitable for the assay of newer fuels containing plutonium and other fissionable actinides. A prototypal version of the well-counter was assembled and tested at the University of Michigan, using a spontaneous fission and an (a,n) neutron source, i.e. 252Cf and PuBe respectively. Presented measured results show excellent agreement with simulations. The viability of the system to discriminate time-correlated fission neutrons from random, uncorrelated neutrons was proved. An experimental campaign will be carried out at Idaho National Laboratory in August 2015 to characterize weapon grade plutonium samples.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Spectral indices measurements using miniature fission chambers at the MINERVE zero-power reactor at CEA using calibration data obtained at the BR1 reactor at SCK.CEN

Spectral indices measurements performed in 2004 at the CEA MINERVE facility loaded with the R-UO{sub 2} lattice, using calibration data acquired at the SCK center dot CEN BR1 facility in 2001, resulted in ambivalent conclusions. On one hand, spectral indices involving only fissile isotopes gave consistent discrepancies between calculation and experiment. On the other hand, spectral indices involving both fissile and fertile isotopes, in particular the {sup 238}U(n, f)/{sup 235}U(n, f) spectral index, showed inconsistent results depending on the type of calibration data used. For different reasons, no definitive explanation was given at that time. In 2009, the preparation of the AMMON program at the EOLE facility motivated the manufacturing of a new set of detectors. At the same time, the re-installation of the R1-UO{sub 2} lattice in MINERVE provided the opportunity to carry out again a spectral indices measurement campaign. Nevertheless, although the isotopic compositions of active deposits were better known than previously, the comparison between experimental results and calculations still lead to inconsistent discrepancies. In April 2010, a new calibration series conducted again at the BR1 facility allowed the CEA to reanalyze the spectral indices measurements performed in 2009. With these very latest calibration data, experimental values of spectral indices finally matched calculations within the uncertainty margins. This paper also sums up the work that has been achieved to explain the incoherencies observed in 2004. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Effects of Correlated and Uncorrelated Gamma Rays on Neutron Multiplicity Counting

Neutron multiplicity counting relies on time correlation between neutron events to assay the fissile mass, (α,n) to spontaneous fission neutron ratio, and neutron self-multiplication of samples. Gamma-ray sensitive neutron multiplicity counters may misidentify gamma rays as neutrons and therefore miscalculate sample characteristics. Time correlated and uncorrelated gamma-ray-like signals were added into gamma-ray free neutron multiplicity counter data to examine the effects of gamma ray signals being misidentified as neutron signals on assaying sample characteristics. Multiplicity counter measurements with and without gamma-ray-like signals were compared to determine the assay error associated with gamma-ray-like signals at various gamma-ray and neutron rates. Correlated and uncorrelated gamma-ray signals each produced consistent but different measurement errors. Correlated gamma-ray signals most strongly led to fissile mass overestimates, whereas uncorrelated gamma-ray signals most strongly lead to (α,n) neutron overestimates. Gamma-ray sensitive neutron multiplicity counters may be able to account for the effects of gamma-rays on measurements to mitigate measurement uncertainties.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Development of a thin scintillation films fission-fragment detector and a novel neutron source

Here, investigation of prompt fission and neutron-capture Υ rays from fissile actinide samples at the Detector for Advanced Neutron Capture Experiments (DANCE) requires use of a fission-fragment detector to provide a trigger or a veto signal. A fission-fragment detector based on thin scintillating films and silicon photomultipliers has been built to serve as a trigger/veto detector in neutron-induced fission measurements at DANCE. The fissile material is surrounded by scintillating films providing a 4π detection of the fission fragments. The scintillations were registered with silicon photomultipliers. A measurement of the 235 U(n,f) reaction with this detector at DANCE revealed a correct time-of-flight spectrum and provided an estimate for the efficiency of the prototype detector of 11.6(7)%. Design and test measurements with the detector are described. A neutron source with fast timing has been built to help with detector-response measurements. The source is based on the neutron emission from the spontaneous fission of 252 Cf and the same type of scintillating films and silicon photomultipliers. Overall time resolution of the source is 0.3 ns. Design of the source and test measurements with it are described. An example application of the source for determining the neutron/gamma pulse-shape discrimination by a stilbene crystal is given.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Angular distribution of fission fragments of excited compound nuclei in multidimensional Langevin dynamics

Angular distributions of fission fragments were calculated within a multidimensional approach to the fission dynamics of excited nuclei, and the results of these calculations are presented. The evolution of the shape parameters of a fissile nucleus was described by the set of three-dimensional Langevin equations for collective coordinates introduced on the basis of the (c, h, a) parametrization. The evolution of the orientation degree of freedom (K mode, K being the projection of the total angular momentum on the symmetry axis of the nucleus under study) was described with the aid of the Langevin equation in an overdampedmode. The coupled Langevin equations for the shape and K-mode collective coordinates were integrated simultaneously. The friction parameter for the K mode was set to 0.077 (MeV Multiplication-Sign 10{sup -21} s){sup -1/2}, which is the estimate obtained previously for this quantity in calculating angular distributions of excited compound nuclei with allowance for the effects of the orientation degree of freedom. The developed model was used to analyze the anisotropy of angular distribution of fission fragments in {sup 16}O+{sup 208}Pb, {sup 16}O+{sup 232}Th, and {sup 16}O + {sup 238}U reactions over a broad interval of projectile-ion energies. The results of the calculations show that the developedmodel, usedwith the above value of the friction parameter for theK mode, leads to a rather good description of experimental data on the anisotropy of angular distributions of fission fragments. The effect of the dimensionality of the dynamicalmodel used to describe the evolution of the shape of a fissile nucleus on the results obtained by calculating the anisotropy of angular distributions is discussed.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗