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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 361 records · Page 20
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2008

Contamination Sources Effects Analysis (CSEA) - A Tool to Balance Cost/Schedule While Managing Facility Availability

A CSEA is similar to a Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA). A CSEA tracks risk, deterrence, and occurrence of sources of contamination and their mitigation plans. Documentation is provided spanning mechanical and electrical assembly, precision cleaning, thermal vacuum bake-out, and thermal vacuum testing. These facilities all may play a role in contamination budgeting and reduction ultimately affecting test and flight. With a CSEA, visibility can be given to availability of these facilities, test sequencing and trade-offs. A cross-functional team including specialty engineering, contamination control, electrostatic dissipation, manufacturing, testing, and material engineering participate in an exercise that identifies contaminants and minimizes the complexity of scheduling these facilities considering their volatile schedules. Care can be taken in an efficient manner to insure correct cleaning processes are employed. The result is reduction in cycle time ("schedule hits"), reduced cost due to rework, reduced risk and improved communication and quality while achieving adherence to the Contamination Control Plan.

Wilcox, Margaret↗
NASA NTRS2005

Field Evaluations Test Plan for Validation of Alternative Low-Emission Surface Preparation/Depainting Technologies for Structural Steel

Headquarters National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) chartered the Acquisition Pollution Prevention (AP2) Office to coordinate agency activities affecting pollution prevention issues identified during system and component acquisition and sustainment processes. The primary objectives of the AP2 Office are to: (1) Reduce or eliminate the use of hazardous materials (HazMats) or hazardous processes at manufacturing, remanufacturing, and sustainment locations. (2) Avoid duplication of effort in actions required to reduce or eliminate HazMats through joint center cooperation and technology sharing. To achieve a substrate condition suitable for the application of a coating system, both new and old (in-situ) substrates must undergo some type of surface preparation and/or depainting operation to ensure adhesion of the new coating system. The level of cleanliness or anchor profile desired is typically a function of the type of coating to be applied and the specification being adhered to. In high performance environments, cleanliness and surface profile requirements for carbon steel (the dominant substrate for facilities, structures and equipment) dictates the use of abrasive media. Many of the abrasive media currently used across NASA and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) installations generate large quantities of fugitive particulate emissions and waste. The high quantities of airborne dust and waste generated from these operations pose significant environmental concern. Efforts to contain emissions and the reduce quantity of waste generated have significant implications on project cost; this is often a deterrent to engaging in maintenance activities. In response to recent technological developments and NASA's and AFSPC's need to undertake environmentally conscious corrosion prevention projects, a review of the industry needs to be undertaken to evaluate surface preparation technologies (materials and processes) for embrace. This project will identify, evaluate and approve alternative surface preparation technologies for use at NASA and AFSPC installations. Materials and processes will be evaluated with the goal of selecting those processes that will improve corrosion protection at critical systems, facilitate easier maintenance activity, extend maintenance cycles, eliminate flight hardware contamination and reduce the amount of hazardous waste generated. This Field Evaluations Test Plan defines the field evaluation and testing requirements for validating alternative surface preparation/depainting technologies and supplements the JTP. The field evaluations will be performed at Stennis Space Center, Mississippi, under the oversight of the Project Engineer. Additional field evaluations may be performed at other NASA centers or AFSPC facilities.

Lewis, Pattie↗
NASA NTRS2004

Hard Real-Time: C++ Versus RTSJ

In the domain of hard real-time systems, which language is better: C++ or the Real-Time Specification for Java (RTSJ)? Although ordinary Java provides a more productive programming environment than C++ due to its automatic memory management, that benefit does not apply to RTSJ when using NoHeapRealtimeThread and non-heap memory areas. As a result, RTSJ programmers must manage non-heap memory explicitly. While that's not a deterrent for veteran real-time programmers-where explicit memory management is common-the lack of certain language features in RTSJ (and Java) makes that manual memory management harder to accomplish safely than in C++. This paper illustrates the problem for practitioners in the context of moving data and managing memory in a real-time producer/consumer pattern. The relative ease of implementation and safety of the C++ programming model suggests that RTSJ has a struggle ahead in the domain of hard real-time applications, despite its other attractive features.

programming model↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Nuclear Devices for Planetary Defense

This paper summarizes the perspectives of panelists participating in the discussion of “Nuclear Devices for Planetary Defense” (PANEL-17) at the AIAA ASCEND conference in November 2020. The panelists’ backgrounds, and therefore their individual contributions below, cover the range of relevant disciplines: of course planetary defense threats and missions, but also space systems engineering, nuclear technologies, nuclear deterrence, and last but definitely not least space law. This approach helps illuminate the topic from multiple angles in order to encourage follow-on discussions among the communities of interest.

Jan Osburg↗
DOE OSTI2012

Los Alamos National Laboratory A National Science Laboratory

Our mission as a DOE national security science laboratory is to develop and apply science, technology, and engineering solutions that: (1) Ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear deterrent; (2) Protect against the nuclear threat; and (3) Solve Energy Security and other emerging national security challenges.

Astronomy & Astrophysics(79)↗
DOE OSTI2012

Transducer Signal Noise Analysis for Sensor Authentication

The abstract is being passed through STIMS for submision to the conference. International safeguards organizations charged with promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy employ unattended and remote monitoring systems supplemented with onsite inspections to ensure nuclear materials are not diverted for weaponization purposes. These systems are left unattended for periods of several months between inspections. During these periods physical security means are the main deterrent used to detect intentional monitoring system tampering. The information gathering components are locked in secure and sealed rooms. The sensor components (i.e. neutron and gamma detectors) are located throughout the plant in unsecure areas where sensor tampering could take place during the periods between inspections. Sensor tampering could allow the diversion of nuclear materials from the accepted and intended use to uses not consistent with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A method and an apparatus is presented that address the detection of sensor tampering during the periods between inspections. It was developed at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Department of Energy (DOE) in support of the IAEA. The method is based on the detailed analysis of the sensor noise floor after the sensor signal is removed. The apparatus consists of a 2.1” x 2.6” electronic circuit board containing all signal conditioning and processing components and a laptop computer running an application that acquires and stores the analysis results between inspection periods. The sensors do not require any modification and are remotely located in their normal high radiation zones. The apparatus interfaces with the sensor signal conductors using a simple pass through connector at the normal sensor electronics interface package located in the already secure and sealed rooms. The apparatus does not require hardening against the effects of radiation due to its location. Presented is the apparatus design, the analysis method, and the test results as applied to tamper detection using three HE3 neutron sensors and two gamma sensors designed and built for safeguards monitoring.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2013

Techno-Economic Analysis of BEV Service Providers Offering Battery Swapping Services (Presentation)

Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) could significantly reduce the nation's gasoline consumption and greenhouse gas emissions rates. However, both the upfront cost and the limited range of the vehicle are perceived to be deterrents to the widespread adoption of BEVs. A service provider approach to marketing BEVs, coupled with a battery swapping infrastructure deployment could address both issues and accelerate BEV adoption. This presentation examines customer selection, service usage statistics, service plan fees and driver economics. Our results show it is unlikely that a battery swapping service plan will be more cost-effective than ownership of a conventional vehicle. A battery swapping service plan may be a more cost-effective solution than a directly owned BEV for some single-vehicle, high-mileage consumers. However, other factors not considered in this analysis could decrease the viability of such a service.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2013

Hardware device to physical structure binding and authentication

Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a hardware device for authenticating a binding of the hardware device and a physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes an internal physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generate an internal PUF value. Binding logic is coupled to receive the internal PUF value, as well as an external PUF value associated with the physical structure, and generates a binding PUF value, which represents the binding of the hardware device and the physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit also includes a cryptographic unit that uses the binding PUF value to allow a challenger to authenticate the binding.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2013

The Case for the Application of Worldwide Marine Radioactivity Studies In the Search for Undeclared Facilities and Activities

Undeclared nuclear facilities unequivocally remain the most difficult safeguards challenge facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent cases of undeclared facilities revealed in Iran and Syria, which are NPT signatory States, show both the difficulty and the seriousness of this threat to nonproliferation. In the case of undeclared nuclear facilities, the most effective deterrent against proliferation is the application of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES); however, WAES is currently cost-prohibitive. As with any threat, the most effective countering strategy is a multifaceted approach. Some of the approaches applied by the IAEA include: open source analysis, satellite imagery, on-site environmental sampling, complementary access under the Additional Protocol (where in force), traditional safeguards inspections, and information provided by member States. These approaches, naturally, are focused on specific States. Are there other opportunities not currently within the IAEA purview to assess States that may provide another opportunity to detect clandestine facilities? In this paper, the author will make the case that the IAEA Department of Safeguards should explore the area of worldwide marine radioactivity studies as one possible opportunity. One such study was released by the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory in January 2005. This technical document focused on 90Sr, 137Cs, and 239/240Pu. It is clearly a challenging area because of the many sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the world’s oceans and seas including: nuclear weapons testing, reprocessing, accidents, waste dumping, and industrial and medical radioisotopes, whose distributions change based on oceanographic, geochemical, and biological processes, and their sources. It is additionally challenging where multiple States share oceans, seas, and rivers. But with the application of modern science, historical sampling to establish baselines, and a focus on the most relevant radionuclides, the potential is there to support this challenging IAEA safeguards mission.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Hardware device binding and mutual authentication

Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic unit within a computing device for binding multiple hardware devices and mutually authenticating the devices. The cryptographic unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generates a binding PUF value. The cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF value during an enrollment phase and subsequent authentication phases. During a subsequent authentication phase, the cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF values of the multiple hardware devices to generate a challenge to send to the other device, and to verify a challenge received from the other device to mutually authenticate the hardware devices.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2013

Verification Challenges at Low Numbers

Many papers have dealt with the political difficulties and ramifications of deep nuclear arms reductions, and the issues of “Going to Zero”. Political issues include extended deterrence, conventional weapons, ballistic missile defense, and regional and geo-political security issues. At each step on the road to low numbers, the verification required to ensure compliance of all parties will increase significantly. Looking post New START, the next step will likely include warhead limits in the neighborhood of 1000 . Further reductions will include stepping stones at1000 warheads, 100’s of warheads, and then 10’s of warheads before final elimination could be considered of the last few remaining warheads and weapons. This paper will focus on these three threshold reduction levels, 1000, 100’s, 10’s. For each, the issues and challenges will be discussed, potential solutions will be identified, and the verification technologies and chain of custody measures that address these solutions will be surveyed. It is important to note that many of the issues that need to be addressed have no current solution. In these cases, the paper will explore new or novel technologies that could be applied. These technologies will draw from the research and development that is ongoing throughout the national laboratory complex, and will look at technologies utilized in other areas of industry for their application to arms control verification.

Nuclear Weapons↗
DOE OSTI2014

Concealed identification symbols and nondestructive determination of the identification symbols

The concealing of one or more identification symbols into a target object and the subsequent determination or reading of such symbols through non-destructive testing is described. The symbols can be concealed in a manner so that they are not visible to the human eye and/or cannot be readily revealed to the human eye without damage or destruction of the target object. The identification symbols can be determined after concealment by e.g., the compilation of multiple X-ray images. As such, the present invention can also provide e.g., a deterrent to theft and the recovery of lost or stolen objects.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Multi-factor authentication

Detection and deterrence of spoofing of user authentication may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a hardware device for authenticating a user of the hardware device. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes an internal physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generates a PUF value. Combining logic is coupled to receive the PUF value, combines the PUF value with one or more other authentication factors to generate a multi-factor authentication value. A key generator is coupled to generate a private key and a public key based on the multi-factor authentication value while a decryptor is coupled to receive an authentication challenge posed to the hardware device and encrypted with the public key and coupled to output a response to the authentication challenge decrypted with the private key.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Evaluating Safeguards Benefits of Process Monitoring as compared with Nuclear Material Accountancy

This paper illustrates potential safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) may have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). This benefit is illustrated by quantifying the standard deviation associated with detecting a considered material diversion scenario using either an NMA-based method or a PM-based approach. To illustrate the benefits of PM for effective safeguards, we consider a reprocessing facility. We assume that the diversion of interest for detection manifests itself as a loss of Pu caused by abnormally operating a dissolver for an extended period to accomplish protracted diversion (or misdirection) of Pu to a retained (unconditioned) waste stream. For detecting the occurrence of this diversion (which involves anomalous operation of the dissolver), we consider two different data evaluation and integration (DEI) approaches, one based on NMA and the other based on PM. The approach based on PM does not directly do mass balance calculations, but rather monitors for the possible occurrence of anomaly patterns related to potential loss of nuclear material. It is thus assumed that the loss of a given mass amount of nuclear material can be directly associated with the execution of proliferation-driven activities that trigger the occurrence of an anomaly pattern consisting of series of events or signatures occurring at different unit operations and time instances. By effectively assessing these events over time and space, the PM-based DEI approach tries to infer whether this specific pattern of events has occurred and how many times within a given time period. To evaluate the goodness of PM, the 3 Sigma of the estimated mass loss is computed under both DEI approaches as function of the number of input batches processed. Simulation results are discussed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system-centric strategy that utilizes data collected from a system of sensors and that effectively exploits known characterizations of sensors and facility operations in order to significantly improve anomaly detection, reduce false alarm, and enhance assessment robustness under unreliable partial sensor information.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- and small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Nuclear Naval Propulsion: A Feasible Proliferation Pathway?

There is no better time than now to close the loophole in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that excludes military uses of fissile material from nuclear safeguards. Several countries have declared their intention to pursue and develop naval reactor technology, including Argentina, Brazil, Iran, and Pakistan, while other countries such as China, India, Russia, and the United States are expanding their capabilities. With only a minority of countries using low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in their naval reactors, it is possible that a state could produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) under the guise of a nuclear navy while actually stockpiling the material for a nuclear weapon program. This paper examines the likelihood that non-nuclear weapon states exploit the loophole to break out from the NPT and also the regional ramifications of deterrence and regional stability of expanding naval forces. Possible solutions to close the loophole are discussed, including expanding the scope of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, employing LEU fuel instead of HEU fuel in naval reactors, amending the NPT, creating an export control regime for naval nuclear reactors, and forming individual naval reactor safeguards agreements.

export controls↗
DOE OSTI2014

SIGNATURES OF ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY APPROACHES AND RESULTS

The illicit trafficking of strategic nuclear commodities (defined here as the goods needed for a covert nuclear program excluding special nuclear materials) poses a significant challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation community. Export control regulations, both domestically and internationally, seek to inhibit the spread of strategic nuclear commodities by restricting their sale to parties that may use them for nefarious purposes. However, export controls alone are not sufficient for preventing the illicit transfer of strategic nuclear goods. There are two major pitfalls to relying solely on export control regulations for the deterrence of proliferation of strategic goods. First, export control enforcement today relies heavily on the honesty and willingness of participants to adhere to the legal framework already in place. Secondly, current practices focus on the evaluation of single records which allow for the necessary goods to be purchased separately and hidden within the thousands of legitimate commerce transactions that occur each day, disregarding strategic information regarding several purchases. Our research presents two preliminary data-centric approaches for investigating procurement networks of strategic nuclear commodities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been putting significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. In particular, the PNNL Signature Discovery Initiative (SDI) has codified several scientific methodologies for the detection, characterization, and prediction of signatures that are indicative of a phenomenon of interest. The methodologies and tools developed under SDI have already been applied successfully to problems in bio-forensics, cyber security and power grid balancing efforts and they have now made the nonproliferation of strategic goods into a challenge problem for testing their methodology and tools. As a first step towards the detection and characterization of illicit procurement networks, our research examines procurement networks as defined by a system of entities (people or companies) that enter into transactions of specific items with one another. Once we have defined such networks, we are interested in answering questions about the behavior and characterization of such networks. The questions we wish to answer regarding procurement networks are, first, “Can we detect networks within large, noisy datasets?” and second, “To what extent can we compare multiple networks and identify their similarities?” As procurement networks can be naturally viewed as a graph, we have employed several graph analytic tools to aid in these tasks. In particular, Graphscape, an SDI tool, uses a novel method to approximate edit distance, a graph distance measure based on the number of changes needed to transform one graph into another, in order to measure how similar two given graphs are to each other. Given a set of graphs where vertices represent companies and edges represent a shipment from company A to company B, we can calculate an all-for-all comparison of graphs. In this way, we are able to determine which graphs are most similar, and which require more changes to transform one into the other. The set of graphs to be compared can be further specialized to provide more insight, e.g., using different time periods to explore events in a company life cycle.

graph analysis↗