Results for “Crew” — Page 20

NASA NTRS2014

Assessing the Risk of Crew Injury Due to Dynamic Loads During Spaceflight

Spaceflight requires tremendous amounts of energy to achieve Earth orbit and to attain escape velocity for interplanetary missions. Although the majority of the energy is managed in such a way as to limit the accelerations on the crew, several mission phases may result in crew exposure to dynamic loads. In the automotive industry, risk of serious injury can be tolerated because the probability of a crash is remote each time a person enters a vehicle, resulting in a low total risk of injury. For spaceflight, the level of acceptable injury risk must be lower to achieve a low total risk of injury because the dynamic loads are expected on each flight. To mitigate the risk of injury due to dynamic loads, the NASA Human Research Program has developed a research plan to inform the knowledge gaps and develop relevant tools for assessing injury risk. The risk of injury due to dynamic loads can be further subdivided into extrinsic and intrinsic risk factors. Extrinsic risk factors include the vehicle dynamic profile, seat and restraint design, and spacesuit design. Human tolerance to loads varies considerably depending on the direction, amplitude, and rise-time of acceleration therefore the orientation of the body to the dynamic vector is critical to determining crew risk of injury. Although a particular vehicle dynamic profile may be safe for a particular design, the seat, restraint, and suit designs can affect the risk of injury due to localized effects. In addition, characteristics intrinsic to the crewmember may also contribute to the risk of injury, such as crewmember sex, age, anthropometry, and deconditioning due to spaceflight, and each astronaut may have a different risk profile because of these factors. The purpose of the research plan is to address any knowledge gaps in the risk factors to mitigate injury risk. Methods for assessing injury risk have been well documented in other analogous industries and include human volunteer testing, human exposure to dynamic environments, post-mortem human subject (PMHS) testing, animal testing, anthropomorphic test devices (ATD), dynamic models of the human, numerical models of ATDs, and numerical models of the human. Each has inherent strengths and limitations. For example, human volunteer testing is advantageous because a population can be selected that is similar to the astronaut corps; however, because of the inherent ethical limitations, only sub-injurious conditions can be tested. PMHSs can be tested in a variety of conditions including injurious levels, but the responses are not completely analogous to living human subjects. In addition, it is exceedingly difficult to select a PMHS population that is similar to the astronaut corps. ATDs are currently widely used in the automotive industry and military because they are highly repeatable and durable. Unfortunately, because they are mechanical models of the human body, the biofidelity of the responses are limited to dynamic conditions used to validate the ATD. Numerical models of the ATD, in addition to the strengths and limitations for ATDs, are easy to use for a variety of designs before a design is fabricated, but also have additional limitations for ATDs, are easy to use for a variety of designs before a design is fabricated, but also have additional uncertainty. Dynamic models are simple and easy to use, but do not account for localized effects of the seat and suit. Finally, numerical models of the human have the potential to have the most advantages; however, the current models are not validated for the conditions expected during spaceflight. To properly assess spaceflight conditions with numerical human models, human data would be needed to optimize the model responses for those conditions. Using the appropriate assessment method with the knowledge gained for each risk factor, an appropriate approach for mitigating the risk of injury due to dynamic loads can be developed ensuring crew safety in future NASA vehicles.

Somers, J. T.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Potential Mission Scenarios Post Asteroid Crewed Mission

A deep-space mission has been proposed to identify and redirect an asteroid to a distant retrograde orbit around the moon, and explore it by sending a crew using the Space Launch System and the Orion spacecraft. The Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission (ARCM), which represents the third segment of the Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM), could be performed on EM-3 or EM-4 depending on asteroid return date. Recent NASA studies have raised questions on how we could progress from current Human Space Flight (HSF) efforts to longer term human exploration of Mars. This paper will describe the benefits of execution of the ARM as the initial stepping stone towards Mars exploration, and how the capabilities required to send humans to Mars could be built upon those developed for the asteroid mission. A series of potential interim missions aimed at developing such capabilities will be described, and the feasibility of such mission manifest will be discussed. Options for the asteroid crewed mission will also be addressed, including crew size and mission duration.

Lopez, Pedro, Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Human and Robotic Exploration Missions to Phobos Prior to Crewed Mars Surface Missions

Phobos is a scientifically significant destination that would facilitate the development and operation of the human Mars transportation infrastructure, unmanned cargo delivery systems and other Mars surface systems. In addition to developing systems relevant to Mars surface missions, Phobos offers engineering, operational, and public engagement opportunities that could enhance subsequent Mars surface operations. These opportunities include the use of low latency teleoperations to control Mars surface assets associated with exploration science, human landing‐site selection and infrastructure development which may include in situ resource utilization (ISRU) to provide liquid oxygen for the Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV). A human mission to Mars' moons would be preceded by a cargo predeploy of a surface habitat and a pressurized excursion vehicle (PEV) to Mars orbit. Once in Mars orbit, the habitat and PEV would spiral to Phobos using solar electric propulsion based systems, with the habitat descending to the surface and the PEV remaining in orbit. When a crewed mission is launched to Phobos, it would include the remaining systems to support the crew during the Earth‐Mars transit and to reach Phobos after insertion in to Mars orbit. The crew would taxi from Mars orbit to Phobos to join with the predeployed systems in a spacecraft that is based on a MAV, dock with and transfer to the PEV in Phobos orbit, and descend in the PEV to the surface habitat. A static Phobos surface habitat was chosen as a baseline architecture, in combination with the PEV that was used to descend from orbit as the main exploration vehicle. The habitat would, however, have limited capability to relocate on the surface to shorten excursion distances required by the PEV during exploration and to provide rescue capability should the PEV become disabled. To supplement exploration capabilities of the PEV, the surface habitat would utilize deployable EVA support structures that allow astronauts to work from portable foot restraints or body restrain tethers in the vicinity of the habitat. Prototype structures were tested as part of NEEMO 20. PEVs would contain closed loop guidance and provide life support and consumables for two crew for 2 weeks plus reserves. The PEV has a cabin that uses the exploration atmosphere of 8.2 psi with 34% oxygen, enabling use of suit ports for rapid EVA with minimal oxygen prebreathe as well as dust control by keeping the suits outside the pressurized volume. When equipped with outriggers and control moment gyros, the PEV enables EVA tasks of up to 8 pounds of force application without the need to anchor. Tasks with higher force requirements can be performed with PEV propulsion providing the necessary thrust to react forces. Exploration of Phobos builds heavily from the developments of the cis‐lunar proving ground, and significantly reduces Mars surface risk by facilitating the development and testing of habitats, MAVs, and pressurized rover cabins that are all Mars surface forward. A robotic precursor mission to Phobos and Deimos is also under consideration and would need to launch in 2022 to support a 2031 human Phobos mission.

Gernhardt, Michael L.↗

NASA NTRS2015

AMO EXPRESS: A Command and Control Experiment for Crew Autonomy Onboard the International Space Station

The Autonomous Mission Operations project is investigating crew autonomy capabilities and tools for deep space missions. Team members at Ames Research Center, Johnson Space Center and Marshall Space Flight Center are using their experience with ISS Payload operations and TIMELINER to: move earth based command and control assets to on-board for crew access; safely merge core and payload command procedures; give the crew single action intelligent operations; and investigate crew interface requirements.

Cornelius, Randy↗

NASA NTRS2016

The Biomolecule Sequencer Project: Nanopore Sequencing as a Dual-Use Tool for Crew Health and Astrobiology Investigations

Human missions to Mars will fundamentally transform how the planet is explored, enabling new scientific discoveries through more sophisticated sample acquisition and processing than can currently be implemented in robotic exploration. The presence of humans also poses new challenges, including ensuring astronaut safety and health and monitoring contamination. Because the capability to transfer materials to Earth will be extremely limited, there is a strong need for in situ diagnostic capabilities. Nucleotide sequencing is a particularly powerful tool because it can be used to: (1) mitigate microbial risks to crew by allowing identification of microbes in water, in air, and on surfaces; (2) identify optimal treatment strategies for infections that arise in crew members; and (3) track how crew members, microbes, and mission-relevant organisms (e.g., farmed plants) respond to conditions on Mars through transcriptomic and genomic changes. Sequencing would also offer benefits for science investigations occurring on the surface of Mars by permitting identification of Earth-derived contamination in samples. If Mars contains indigenous life, and that life is based on nucleic acids or other closely related molecules, sequencing would serve as a critical tool for the characterization of those molecules. Therefore, spaceflight-compatible nucleic acid sequencing would be an important capability for both crew health and astrobiology exploration. Advances in sequencing technology on Earth have been driven largely by needs for higher throughput and read accuracy. Although some reduction in size has been achieved, nearly all commercially available sequencers are not compatible with spaceflight due to size, power, and operational requirements. Exceptions are nanopore-based sequencers that measure changes in current caused by DNA passing through pores; these devices are inherently much smaller and require significantly less power than sequencers using other detection methods. Consequently, nanopore-based sequencers could be made flight-ready with only minimal modifications.

John, K. K.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Simulation Development and Analysis of Crew Vehicle Ascent Abort

NASA's Commercial Crew Program is an integral step in its journey to Mars as it would expedite development of space technologies and open up partnership with U.S. commercial companies. NASA reviews and independent assessment of Commercial Crew Program is fundamental to its success, and being able to model a commercial crew vehicle in a simulation rather than conduct a live test would be a safer, faster, and less expensive way to assess and certify the capabilities of the vehicle. To this end, my project was to determine the feasibility of using a simulation tool named SOMBAT version 2.0 to model a multiple parachute system for Commercial Crew Program simulation. The main tasks assigned to me were to debug and test the main parachute system model, (capable of simulating one to four main parachute bodies), and to utilize a graphical program to animate the simulation results. To begin tackling the first task, I learned how to use SOMBAT by familiarizing myself with its mechanics and by understanding the methods used to tweak its various parameters and outputs. I then used this new knowledge to set up, run, and analyze many different situations within SOMBAT in order to explore the limitations of the parachute model. Some examples of parameters that I varied include the initial velocity and orientation of the falling capsule, the number of main parachutes, and the location where the parachutes were attached to the capsule. Each parameter changed would give a different output, and in some cases, would expose a bug or limitation in the model. A major bug that I discovered was the inability of the model to handle any number of parachutes other than three. I spent quite some time trying to debug the code logically, but was unable to figure it out until my mentor taught me that digital simulation limitations can occur when some approximations are mistakenly assumed for certain in a physical system. This led me to the realization that unlike in all of the programming classes I have taken thus far that focus on pure logic, simulation code focuses on mimicking the physical world with some approximation and can have inaccuracies or numerical instabilities. Learning from my mistake, I adopted new methods to analyze these different simulations. One method the student used was to numerically plot various physical parameters using MATLAB to confirm the mechanical behavior of the system in addition to comparing the data to the output from a separate simulation tool called FAST. By having full control over what was being outputted from the simulation, I could choose which parameters to change and to plot as well as how to plot them, allowing for an in depth analysis of the data. Another method of analysis was to convert the output data into a graphical animation. Unlike the numerical plots, where all of the physical components were displayed separately, this graphical display allows for a combined look at the simulation output that makes it much easier for one to see the physical behavior of the model. The process for converting SOMBAT output for EDGE graphical display had to be developed. With some guidance from other EDGE users, I developed a process and created a script that would easily allow one to display simulations graphically. Another limitation with the SOMBAT model was the inability for the capsule to have the main parachutes instantly deployed with a large angle between the air speed vector and the chutes drag vector. To explore this problem, I had to learn about different coordinate frames used in Guidance, Navigation & Control (J2000, ECEF, ENU, etc.) to describe the motion of a vehicle and about Euler angles (e.g. Roll, Pitch, Yaw) to describe the orientation of the vehicle. With a thorough explanation from my mentor about the description of each coordinate frame, as well as how to use a directional cosine matrix to transform one frame to another, I investigated the problem by simulating different capsule orientations. In the end, I was able to show that this limitation could be avoided if the capsule is initially oriented antiparallel to its velocity vector.

Wong, Chi S.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements Revision D

The Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements document has been prepared for use by designers of battery-powered vehicles, portable equipment, and experiments intended for crewed spaceflight. The purpose of the requirements document is to provide battery designers with information on design provisions to be incorporated in and around the battery and on the verification to be undertaken to demonstrate a safe battery is provided. The term "safe battery" means that the battery is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and use; safe to be used in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle; and safe to be mounted or used in unpressurized spaces adjacent to habitable areas. Battery design review, approval, and certification is required before the batteries can be used for ground operations and be certified for flight.

Russell, Samuel↗

NASA NTRS2018

Autonomous Surface Site Establishment to Ensure Safe Crew Arrival and Operations

Traditional human Mars missions have relied on crew to support the surface systems. However, for safety, the surface systems will likely need to be setup and capable of operating prior to the arrival of crew. To mitigate risks to the crew, a novel surface architecture has been developed that addresses risks associated with other Mars missions. This architecture relies on a reusable descent and ascent vehicle, extensive in-situ resource utilization, redundant habitation systems, and emerging autonomous capabilities. The resulting surface architecture increases safety for the crew while also providing potential to expand to support longer missions with larger populations in the future.

Jones, Christopher A.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Tactical Scientific Decision-Making during Crewed Astrobiology Mars Missions

The limitations placed upon human explorers on the surface of Mars will necessitate a methodology for scientific exploration that is different from standard approaches to terrestrial fieldwork and prior crewed exploration of the Moon. In particular, the data transmission limitations and communication latency between Earth and Mars create a unique situation for surface crew in contact with a terrestrial science team. The BASALT research program simulated a series of extravehicular activities (EVAs) in Mars analog terrains under various Mars-relevant bandwidth and latency conditions to investigate how best to approach this problem. Here we discuss tactical decision-making under these conditions, that is, how the crew on Mars interacts with a team of scientists and support personnel on Earth to collect samples of maximum scientific interest. We describe the strategies, protocols, and tools tested in BASALT EVAs and give recommendations on how best to conduct human exploration of Mars with support from Earth-based scientists. We find that even with scientists supporting them, the crew performing the exploration must be trained in the appropriate scientific disciplines in order to provide the terrestrial scientists with enough information to make decisions, but that with appropriate planning and structure, and tools such as a ‘‘dynamic leaderboard,’’ terrestrial scientists can add scientific value to an EVA, even under Mars communication latency

Decision-making↗

NASA NTRS2019

Moon Base Life Support Design Depends on Launch Cost, Crew Size, and Mission Duration

Brief human space missions such as Apollo and the Space Shuttle used material storage for life support but a long mission such as a space station uses a recycling life support system. The upcoming Moon visits will probably be brief with few crew at first but in the future there may be a long-term or even permanent Moon base with a large crew. The initial life support system will probably use storage and resupply of materials from Earth, but it could be replaced later by recycling, especially if launch cost per kilogram is high. Moon base life support design is investigated considering requirements, performance, reliability, cost, and risk. The launch cost, crew size, and mission duration are variable parameters that affect the life support design choice. Greater launch cost, crew size, or mission duration all tend to make recycling more cost-effective than resupply.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C Dempsey↗

NASA NTRS2020

University of Maryland Minimum Crew Cabin Studies ENAE484 X-Hab Final Report

With renewed interest in human spaceflight, and the astronomically high cost to send things into space, NASA is looking into methods for minimizing all aspects of crewed flight. While maintaining a crew of at least two to four people, there are considerations into duration, habitat size, habitat orientation, and many other factors to try and get the most science, safely, for the least amount of money. From these constraints, the class' project was organized. The topic of "Minimum Crew Cabin Sizing" was chosen, with a plan to do experimentation to verify or update some of the volumetric models for various activities. The actual crew cabin itself is something that can easily alter the mass, cost, and development time. In trying to quantify how small is too small { or what can be made smaller { programs can save money, time, and mass with an appropriately sized minimum volume habitat.

David Lee Akin↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Autonomy through Self-Scheduling: Scheduling Performance Pilot Study

Within the domain of human spaceflight, crew scheduling for International Space Station (ISS) remains a human-driven planning task. Large teams of flight controllers (called Ops Planners) spend weeks creating violation-free schedules for all crewmembers. As NASA considers long-duration exploration missions, the necessary shift of scheduling and planning management from Ops Planners to crew members requires significant research and investigation of crew performance to complete these scheduling tasks. This pilot study was conducted to evaluate non-expert human performance for the task of planning and scheduling, focusing on scheduling problems that increased in complexity based on the number of activities to be scheduled and the number of planning constraints. Nine non-expert planners were recruited to complete scheduling tasks using Playbook, a scheduling software. The results of this pilot study show that scheduling performance decreased as scheduling workload (i.e. number of activities and percent of activities with planning constraints) increased. This paper provides evidence towards developing a model for scheduling task difficulty and identifies potential implications for future automated aids for flight crew scheduling.

planning↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Autonomy Through Self-Scheduling: Scheduling Performance Pilot Study

Within the domain of human spaceflight, crew scheduling for International Space Station (ISS) remains a human-driven planning task. Large teams of flight controllers (called Ops Planners) spend weeks creating violation-free schedules for all crewmembers. As NASA considers long-duration exploration missions, the necessary shift of scheduling and planning management from Ops Planners to crew members requires significant research and investigation of crew performance to complete these scheduling tasks. This pilot study was conducted to evaluate non-expert human performance for the task of planning and scheduling, focusing on scheduling problems that increased in complexity based on the number of activities to be scheduled and the number of planning constraints. Nine non-expert planners were recruited to complete scheduling tasks using Playbook, a scheduling software. The results of this pilot study show that scheduling performance decreased as scheduling workload (i.e. number of activities and percent of activities with planning constraints) increased. This paper provides evidence towards developing a model for scheduling task difficulty and identifies potential implications for future automated aids for flight crew scheduling.

planning↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crewed Mars Mission Mode Options for Nuclear Electric/Chemical Hybrid Transportation System

NASA's Human Exploration and Operation Mission Directorate is continuing to study different concepts and options to field human Mars missions as part of NASA's Moon2Mars directive. For crewed missions to Mars, the transportation system sizing is highly dependent on the total mission duration, Mars orbit dwell time, mission concept of operations, and the chosen propulsion system. NASA has been investigating the use of low-thrust electric propulsion systems to augment high-thrust chemical propulsion system for crewed Mars mission to enable a more energy-efficient operations. Recent studies on these missions have focused on ``All-Up'' piloted mission modes in which the in-space transportation system for crew transit departs Earth with everything it needs for the roundtrip journey, with only the Mars landers and surface assets pre-deployed. This design choice was made to minimize the mission operation risk, as the crew could return safely to Earth in the event of a failure to rendezvous or other failure of any pre-deployed assets. As the Mars Architecture Team continues to investigate and understand the Mars mission trade space, alternate mission mode studies were conducted to understand their impact to the transportation system. These include pre-positioning return assets and discarding expended stages to reduce the overall system mass.

Patrick R Chai↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fast Earth-Mars Roundtrip Trajectories to Reduce Health and Safety Risks for Crewed Missions

The extended mission duration of a crewed Mars mission compounds integrated risks to crew health and safety. Shortening mission duration would therefore have a direct impact on reducing many human health and performance risk factors. This paper describes trajectory feasibility analyses performed to examine trajectory options for a fast crewed mission to Mars. Studies were conducted to examine options with short overall mission durations (≤ 400-day roundtrip) and options that focus on minimizing astronaut time in deep space, while allowing for longer Mars surface stays. Trade studies were performed to determine ∆v requirements for a range of launch dates, Mars orbit periods, Mars stay times, and Earth-to-Mars flight time maxima. The implications of a Venus gravity assist are also described. The analyses presented here build on and specifically aim to optimize and address key concerns of assumptions made in previously published studies of fast crewed Mars missions.

Mars↗