Traffic-sensitive Live Migration of Virtual Machines
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This presentation reports on the results of InfiniBand performance and characterization. This work came about because of a demand for user-defined software stacks within supercomputing centers.
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Possibility for control and operation of a three-phase solid state soft switching transformer based as a virtual synchronous machine or synchronverter has been investigated in this paper. The soft switching solid state transformer is used as an interface between the ac grid and a photovoltaic power generation unit supported by a battery bank. The control architecture investigated in this paper is that of a synchronverter to achieve inertial support to the grid and local loads. The operation of the soft switching solid state transformer has also been investigated as a V S M during unbalanced/distorted grid voltage condition. Control objective to achieve oscillation free power transfer between the ports (photovoltaic, battery and grid) has been achieved. The presented architecture has been verified for several important case studies via numerical simulations based on MATLAB/Simulink domain.
A method and apparatus for protecting virtual machines. A computer system creates a copy of a group of the virtual machines in an operating network in a deception network to form a group of cloned virtual machines in the deception network when the group of the virtual machines is accessed by an adversary. The computer system creates an emulation of components from the operating network in the deception network. The components are accessible by the group of the cloned virtual machines as if the group of the cloned virtual machines was in the operating network. The computer system moves network connections for the group of the virtual machines in the operating network used by the adversary from the group of the virtual machines in the operating network to the group of the cloned virtual machines, enabling protecting the group of the virtual machines from actions performed by the adversary.
A computer-implemented method of verifying software is provided. The method comprises creating a number of virtual machines that simulate computing environments and running a number of software program on the virtual machines. The software programs have full access to the simulated computing environments, but the source code of the software program is unavailable. A hypervisor performs virtual machine introspection as the software programs run on the virtual machines, wherein the virtual machines and software programs are unaware the virtual machine introspection is being performed. Telemetry data is collected about the software programs, including any identified threats posed by the software programs to the simulated computing environments, and presented to a user via an interface.
As part of the Fermilab/KISTI cooperative research project, Fermilab has successfully run an experimental simulation workflow at scale on a federation of Amazon Web Services (AWS), FermiCloud, and local FermiGrid resources. We used the CernVM-FS (CVMFS) file system to deliver the application software. We established Squid caching servers in AWS as well, using the Shoal system to let each individual virtual machine find the closest squid server. We also developed an automatic virtual machine conversion system so that we could transition virtual machines made on FermiCloud to Amazon Web Services. We used this system to successfully run a cosmic ray simulation of the NOvA detector at Fermilab, making use of both AWS spot pricing and network bandwidth discounts to minimize the cost. On FermiCloud we also were able to run the workflow at the scale of 1000 virtual machines, using a private network routable inside of Fermilab. As a result, we present in detail the technological improvements that were used to make this work a reality.
In modeling and simulating complex systems such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) in de-fense communications, it is a major challenge to reconcile multiple important considerations: the rapidity of unavoidable changes to the software (network layers and applications), the difficulty of modeling the critical, implementation-dependent behavioral effects, the need to sustain larger scale scenarios, and the desire for faster simulations. Here we present our approach in success-fully reconciling them using a virtual time-synchronized virtual machine(VM)-based parallel ex-ecution framework that accurately lifts both the devices as well as the network communications to a virtual time plane while retaining full fidelity. At the core of our framework is a scheduling engine that operates at the level of a hypervisor scheduler, offering a unique ability to execute multi-core guest nodes over multi-core host nodes in an accurate, virtual time-synchronized manner. In contrast to other related approaches that suffer from either speed or accuracy issues, our framework provides MANET node-wise scalability, high fidelity of software behaviors, and time-ordering accuracy. The design and development of this framework is presented, and an ac-tual implementation based on the widely used Xen hypervisor system is described. Benchmarks with synthetic and actual applications are used to identify the benefits of our approach. The time inaccuracy of traditional emulation methods is demonstrated, in comparison with the accurate execution of our framework verified by theoretically correct results expected from analytical models of the same scenarios. In the largest high fidelity tests, we are able to perform virtual time-synchronized simulation of 64-node VM-based full-stack, actual software behaviors of MANETs containing a mix of static and mobile (unmanned airborne vehicle) nodes, hosted on a 32-core host, with full fidelity of unmodified ad-hoc routing protocols, unmodified application executables, and user-controllable physical layer effects including inter-device wireless signal strength, reachability, and connectivity.
Cloud-computing services are provided to consumers through a network of servers and network equipment. Cloud-network (CN) providers virtualize resources [e.g., virtual machine (VM) and virtual network (VN)] for efficient and secure resource allocation. Disasters are one of the worst threats for CNs as they can causemassive disruptions and CN disconnection. A disaster may also induce post-disaster correlated, cascading failures which can disconnect more CNs. Survivable virtual-network embedding (SVNE) approaches have been studied to protect VNs against single physical-link/- node and dual physical-link failures in communication infrastructure, but massive disruptions due to a disaster and their consequences can make SVNE approaches insufficient to guarantee cloud-computing survivability. In this work, we study the problem of survivable CN mapping from disaster. We consider risk assessment, VM backup location, and post-disaster survivability to reduce the risk of failure and probability of CN disconnection and the penalty paid by operators due to loss of capacity.We formulate the proposed approach as an integer linear program and study two scenarios: a natural disaster, e.g., earthquake and a human-made disaster, e.g., weapons-of-mass-destruction attack. Finally, our illustrative examples show that our approach reduces the risk of CN disconnection and penalty up to 90% compared with a baseline CN mapping approach and increases the CN survivability up to 100% in both scenarios.
Conducting experiments on large-scale distributed computing systems is becoming significantly easier with the assistance of emulation. Researchers can now create a model of a distributed computing environment and then generate a virtual, laboratory copy of the entire system composed of potentially thousands of virtual machines, switches, and software. The use of real software, running at clock rate in full virtual machines, allows experiments to produce meaningful results without necessitating a full understanding of all model components. However, the ability to inspect and modify elements within these models is bound by the limitation that such modifications must compete with the model, either running in or alongside it. This inhibits entire classes of analyses from being conducted upon these models. We developed a mechanism to snapshot an entire emulation-based model as it is running. This allows us to \freeze time" and subsequently fork execution, replay execution, modify arbitrary parts of the model, or deeply explore the model. This snapshot includes capturing packets in transit and other input/output state along with the running virtual machines. We were able to build this system in Linux using Open vSwitch and Kernel Virtual Machines on top of Sandia's emulation platform Firewheel. This primitive opens the door to numerous subsequent analyses on models, including state space exploration, debugging distributed systems, performance optimizations, improved training environments, and improved experiment repeatability.
Cloud and Virtual machine (VM) technologies present new challenges with respect to performance and monetary cost in executing parallel discrete event simulation (PDES) applications. Due to the introduction of overall cost as a metric, the traditional use of the highest-end computing configuration is no longer the most obvious choice. Moreover, the unique runtime dynamics and configuration choices of Cloud and VM platforms introduce new design considerations and runtime characteristics specific to PDES over Cloud/VMs. Here, an empirical study is presented to guide an understanding of the dynamics, trends, and trade-offs in executing PDES on Cloud/VM platforms. Performance and cost measures obtained from multiple PDES applications executed on the Amazon EC2 Cloud and on a high-end VM host machine reveal new, counterintuitive VM--PDES dynamics and guidelines. One of the critical aspects uncovered is the fundamental mismatch in hypervisor scheduler policies designed for general cloud workloads versus the virtual time ordering needed for PDES workloads. This insight is supported by experimental data revealing the gross deterioration in PDES performance traceable to VM scheduling policy. To overcome this fundamental problem, the design and implementation of a new deadlock-free scheduler algorithm are presented, optimized specifically for PDES applications on VMs. The scalability of our scheduler has been tested up to 128 VMs multiplexed on 32 cores, showing significant improvement in the runtime relative to the default Cloud/VM scheduler. The observations, algorithmic design, and results are timely for emerging cloud/VM-based installations, highlighting the need for PDES-specific support in high performance discrete event simulations on Cloud/VM platforms.
At exascale, the challenge becomes to develop applications that run at scale and use exascale platforms reliably, efficiently, and flexibly. Workflows become much more complex because they must seamlessly integrate simulation and data analytics. They must include down-sampling, post-processing, feature extraction, and visualization. Power and data transfer limitations require these analysis tasks to be run in-situ or in-transit. We expect successful workflows will comprise multiple linked simulations along with tens of analysis routines. Users will have limited development time at scale and, therefore, must have rich tools to develop, debug, test, and deploy applications. At this scale, successful workflows will compose linked computations from an assortment of reliable, well-defined computation elements, ones that can come and go as required, based on the needs of the workflow over time. We propose a novel framework that utilizes both virtual machines (VMs) and software containers to create a workflow system that establishes a uniform build and execution environment (BEE) beyond the capabilities of current systems. In this environment, applications will run reliably and repeatably across heterogeneous hardware and software. Containers, both commercial (Docker and Rocket) and open-source (LXC and LXD), define a runtime that isolates all software dependencies from the machine operating system. Workflows may contain multiple containers that run different operating systems, different software, and even different versions of the same software. We will run containers in open-source virtual machines (KVM) and emulators (QEMU) so that workflows run on any machine entirely in user-space. On this platform of containers and virtual machines, we will deliver workflow software that provides services, including repeatable execution, provenance, checkpointing, and future proofing. We will capture provenance about how containers were launched and how they interact to annotate workflows for repeatable and partial re-execution. We will coordinate the physical snapshots of virtual machines with parallel programming constructs, such as barriers, to automate checkpoint and restart. We will also integrate with HPC-specific container runtimes to gain access to accelerators and other specialized hardware to preserve native performance. Containers will link development to continuous integration. When application developers check code in, it will automatically be tested on a suite of different software and hardware architectures.
At exascale, the challenge becomes to develop applications that run at scale and use exascale platforms reliably, efficiently, and flexibly. Workflows become much more complex because they must seamlessly integrate simulation and data analytics. They must include down-sampling, post-processing, feature extraction, and visualization. Power and data transfer limitations require these analysis tasks to be run in-situ or in-transit. We expect successful workflows will comprise multiple linked simulations along with tens of analysis routines. Users will have limited development time at scale and, therefore, must have rich tools to develop, debug, test, and deploy applications. At this scale, successful workflows will compose linked computations from an assortment of reliable, well-defined computation elements, ones that can come and go as required, based on the needs of the workflow over time. We propose a novel framework that utilizes both virtual machines (VMs) and software containers to create a workflow system that establishes a uniform build and execution environment (BEE) beyond the capabilities of current systems. In this environment, applications will run reliably and repeatably across heterogeneous hardware and software. Containers, both commercial (Docker and Rocket) and open-source (LXC and LXD), define a runtime that isolates all software dependencies from the machine operating system. Workflows may contain multiple containers that run different operating systems, different software, and even different versions of the same software. We will run containers in open-source virtual machines (KVM) and emulators (QEMU) so that workflows run on any machine entirely in user-space. On this platform of containers and virtual machines, we will deliver workflow software that provides services, including repeatable execution, provenance, checkpointing, and future proofing. We will capture provenance about how containers were launched and how they interact to annotate workflows for repeatable and partial re-execution. We will coordinate the physical snapshots of virtual machines with parallel programming constructs, such as barriers, to automate checkpoint and restart. We will also integrate with HPC-specific container runtimes to gain access to accelerators and other specialized hardware to preserve native performance. Containers will link development to continuous integration. When application developers check code in, it will automatically be tested on a suite of different software and hardware architectures.
This report describes a generic virtual synchronous machine (VSM) grid-forming inverter (GFM) model - REGFM_B1. The initial model specification was proposed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), General Electric (GE), and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy (SGRE) also provided inputs to the specification. The model specification has been revised multiple times based on the discussions between all the contributors listed in this report. This work was funded by the Universal Interoperability for Grid-Forming Inverters (UNIFI) Consortium. This generic model is developed to help the utility industry understand the concept of VSM GFMs. The model could be used to represent equipment for long-term planning studies where vendor-specific models are not available. As equipment mature and improve, generic models will be updated to capture the new functionalities of GFMs. It is not intended that these models will always remain representative of all future GFM technologies.
As systems and devices become virtualized and deployed in the cloud, the hypervisor becomes an increasingly appropriate place to collect performance data, system state, system landscape, function calls, transaction traces, and other characteristics. We developed a method by which an introspection application may be coupled with a hypervisor to “reach into” the VM with minimal intrusiveness to collect data critical to the reconstruction of events, files, and operations. Such a capability is required to take advantage of the hypervisor as an instrumentation platform and to integrate that data with more traditional collection mechanisms. The concept of a VM serviced by a lightweight hypervisor is a relatively new paradigm for forensic practitioners. Traditional forensic techniques, based on assumptions that the filesystem was directly interacting with the hardware through an abstraction, afforded the forensic practitioner the assumption that there was nothing controlling the application below the filesystem. This is not the case when using virtualized technologies. Hypervisors can covertly monitor, introspect and interact with the guest in a transparent fashion. The problems of storage and collection of actionable data are exhausting. The current challenge is most hypervisors do not expose a useful application programming interface (API) at a sufficient level to do transparent, fine-grained and customizable introspection. Scalable VM instrumentation and introspection at an in-depth level requires fast handling of events, as well as direct access to VM state. Furthermore, deep introspection benefits greatly from the ability to gather data from the hardware during the VM’s exit to the hypervisor. All of this requires identical access to the system as the hypervisor itself; improper use of this ability could easily cause system instability. It is for this reason we believe that the hypervisor developers have been hesitant to grant this much control through their APIs. However, our approach leverages other means to collect and monitor the guests in a targeted fashion. Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is a technique used to monitor the runtime state of a system-level virtual machine. The runtime state can be may include processor registers, memory, disk, network, and any other hardware-level events A review of research literature and current VMI technologies exposed several limitations and tradeoffs in VMI approaches, including: the use of in-guest agents; kernel to user space transitions (dramatically slowing down processing); VMI tool pre-configuration requirements; hypervisor version lock-in or source code patching; reliance on operating system symbols; limited processor features due to hypervisor (even if the hardware could do more). To address these constraints, a VMI tool was envisioned to provide the cloud forensic capabilities while having as few of these limitations as possible. The Kernel-based Virtual Machine Introspection (KVMi) tool was developed for hypervisors on Intel’s x86-64 architecture. To meet performance, scoping and use-case demands, the follow criteria were applied to KVMi to support live, forensic data collection: • Shall not require in-guest agents. • Shall work with any recent version of modern hypervisors. • Shall introspect upon any guest (VM) running modern versions of Windows, Linux and OS X. • Shall have the ability to find and track operating system artifacts • Shall not require operating system symbol files. • Shall be able to fully handle VM-exits, bypassing execution of the hypervisor if necessary, to facilitate new features the hypervisor may not support. • Shall be compilable/loadable on a running system with standard build tools.