Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “standard waste box”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2

Waste Control Specialists Technical Review Team Report

1. Modeling of Drum 68660 and the WCS Drums: A calibrated model of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Drum 68660 indicates that pressurization of the drum by restriction of drum venting could have led to the thermal runaway reaction at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in 2014, supporting the hypothesis that the contents of the drum were not fundamentally different from the overall remediated nitrate salt (RNS) waste stream. 2. Nitric Acid Reactions and Aging of the Waste: The stability of the WCS RNS waste with respect to autocatalytic thermal runaway due to nitric acid chemistry should increase over time as the nitric acid is depleted from chemical reactions in the drum. However, this cannot be confirmed because of the lack of long-term experimental data on the impact of aging on the reactivity of RNS waste. The calibrated model indicates that the waste drums retain most of their reactive components, metal nitrate salts and sWheat Scoop ® , even after eight years. 3. Pressure Effects and Runaway Reactions: The calibrated model indicates that if the drums and standard waste boxes (SWBs) are not allowed to pressurize during transport or storage and they are stored at historical WIPP repository temperatures, then an autocatalytic thermal runaway event is not expected to occur. Since the cause of Drum 68660 pressurization is not known, decision makers are not able to tailor mitigating strategies to the initiating event. Consequently, mitigating strategies must consider all feasible internal and external events that could lead to the pressurization of the drums. 4. Temperature Effects and Runaway Reactions: Temperature also has a strong influence on the stability of the waste. The calibrated model indicates that cooling the drums or SWBs can reduce the possibility of autocatalytic thermal runaway reactions. Simulations suggest that for a drum with a plugged vent, the probability of thermal runaway may be reduced or eliminated if wastes are maintained at or below 43 °F through active cooling measures from the initiation of transport until emplacement at WIPP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Cask Processing Enclosure for the TRU Waste Processing Center - 13408

This paper will discuss the key elements considered in the design, construction, and use of an enclosure system built for the TRU Waste Processing Center (TWPC). The TWPC system is used for the repackaging and volume reduction of items contaminated with radioactive material, hazardous waste and mixed waste. The modular structural steel frame and stainless steel skin was designed for rapid field erection by the use of interchangeable self-framing panel sections to allow assembly of a sectioned containment building and for ease of field mobility. The structure was installed on a concrete floor inside of an outer containment building. The major sections included an Outer Cask Airlock, Inner Cask Airlock, Cask Process Area, and Personnel Airlocks. Casks in overpacks containing transuranic waste are brought in via an inter-site transporter. The overpack lid is removed and the cask/overpack is transferred into the Outer Cask Airlock. A contamination cover is installed on the overpack body and the Outer Cask Airlock is closed. The cask/overpack is transferred into the Inner Cask Airlock on a cask bogie and the Inner Cask Airlock is closed. The cask lid is removed and the cask is transferred into the Cask Process Area where it is placed on a cask tilting station. Once the Cask Processing Area is closed, the cask tilt station is activated and wastes are removed, size reduced, then sorted and re-packaged into drums and standard waste boxes through bag ports. The modular system was designed and built as a 'Fast Track' project at IP Systems in Broomfield Colorado and then installed and is currently in use at the DOE TWPC located near Oak Ridge, Tennessee. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Journey From Sandia To Los Alamos - 12465

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) relies on laboratory experiments and computer-based models to verify the reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) tests various materials in extreme environments designed to mimic those of nuclear explosions using the Z machine. The Z machine is a key tool in the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) stockpile stewardship mission and is used to study the dynamic properties of nuclear weapon materials. In 2006, SNL/NM and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) defining experiments to be conducted in the Z machine involving plutonium (Pu) provided by LANL. Five Pu experiments have been completed with as many as 20 more planned through 2016. The experimental containment vessel used for the experiment and containing the Pu residues, becomes transuranic (TRU) waste after the experiment and termination of safeguards and is considered a LANL waste stream. Each containment vessel is placed in a 55-gallon Type A drum or standard waste box (SWB) for shipment back to LANL for final certification and eventual disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The experimental containment vessels are greater than 99% metallic materials (ferrous and non-ferrous metals). In addition to the Pu targets, detonators with high explosives (HE) are used in the experiments to isolate the containment vessel from the Z machine as energy is delivered to the Pu samples. The characterization requirements, transportation issues, required documentation, and the approvals needed before shipments were challenging and required close coordination between SNL/NM, Sandia Site Office, LANL, Los Alamos Site Office, Washington TRU Solutions, Inc., the Central Characterization Project, and the Carlsbad Field Office. Between 2006 and 2010, representatives from SNL/NM and LANL worked to develop an approved path forward to meet the requirements of all stakeholders. This project clearly demonstrates successful cooperation between LANL and SNL/NM, and support from the LASO, SSO, CBFO, WTS, and CCP. Key elements were communication and documented plans with responsible parties and due dates. Now that the first successful shipment has been accomplished, it is believed that future shipments will become a more routine activity. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Nondestructive Assay of Boxed Wastes for the TRU Waste Characterization Program

Each testing and analytical facility performing waste characterization activities for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) participates in the Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) to comply with the Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WAC) (DOE/WIPP-02-3122) and the Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) (CBFO-94-1012). The PDP serves as a quality control check for data generated in the characterization of waste destined for WIPP. Single-blind audit samples are prepared and distributed to each of the facilities participating in the PDP. Different PDPs evaluate the analyses of simulated headspace gases (HSGs), constituents of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and transuranic (TRU) radionuclides using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CH Packaging Operations Manual

This document provides the user with instructions for assembling a payload. All the steps in Subsections 1.2, Preparing 55-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.3, Preparing "Short" 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT); 1.4, Preparing "Tall" 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (HalfPACT only); 1.5, Preparing 100-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.6, Preparing Shielded Container Payload Assembly; 1.7, Preparing SWB Payload Assembly; and 1.8, Preparing TDOP Payload Assembly, must be completed, but may be performed in any order as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Transport trailer operations, package loading and unloading from transport trailers, hoisting and rigging activities such as ACGLF operations, equipment checkout and shutdown, and component inspection activities must be performed, but may be performed in any order and in parallel with other activities as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Steps involving OCA/ICV lid removal/installation and payload removal/loading may be performed in parallel if there are multiple operators working on the same packaging. Steps involving removal/installation of OCV/ICV upper and lower main O-rings must be performed in sequence, except as noted.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CH Packaging Operations Manual (Rev. 10)

This document provides the user with instructions for assembling a payload. All the steps in Subsections 1.2, Preparing 55-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.3, Preparing "Short" 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT); 1.4, Preparing "Tall" 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (HalfPACT only); 1.5, Preparing 100-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.6, Preparing Shielded Container Payload Assembly; 1.7, Preparing SWB Payload Assembly; and 1.8, Preparing TDOP Payload Assembly, must be completed, but may be performed in any order as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Transport trailer operations, package loading and unloading from transport trailers, hoisting and rigging activities such as ACGLF operations, equipment checkout and shutdown, and component inspection activities must be performed, but may be performed in any order and in parallel with other activities as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Steps involving OCA/ICV lid removal/installation and payload removal/loading may be performed in parallel if there are multiple operators working on the same packaging. Steps involving removal/installation of OCV/ICV upper and lower main O-rings must be performed in sequence, except as noted.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CH Packaging Operations Manual (Rev. 10.1)

This document provides the user with instructions for assembling a payload. All the steps in Subsections 1.2, Preparing 55-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.3, Preparing "Short" 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT); 1.4, Preparing "Tall" 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (HalfPACT only); 1.5, Preparing 100-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.6, Preparing Shielded Container Payload Assembly; 1.7, Preparing SWB Payload Assembly; and 1.8, Preparing TDOP Payload Assembly, must be completed, but may be performed in any order as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Transport trailer operations, package loading and unloading from transport trailers, hoisting and rigging activities such as ACGLF operations, equipment checkout and shutdown, and component inspection activities must be performed, but may be performed in any order and in parallel with other activities as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Steps involving OCA/ICV lid removal/installation and payload removal/loading may be performed in parallel if there are multiple operators working on the same packaging. Steps involving removal/installation of OCV/ICV upper and lower main O-rings must be performed in sequence, except as noted.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CNS 10-160B RH Cask Program Guidance (Rev. 2)

The purpose of this document is to provide guidelines and to define responsibilities for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the 10-160B cask and directly related components used for shipments of DOE controlled TRU waste. This document complies with the minimum requirements specified in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for Model 10-160B Type B Radwaste Shipping Cask and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9204. In the event of a conflict between this document and the SAR or C of C, the C of C shall govern.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report - 2009 (Rev. 0)

This inventory report serves to update TRU waste inventory information last reported in the ATWIR-2008 (DOE 2008a). The information contained in the CID that supports this report is the best estimate of TRU waste inventory information as of December 31, 2008, and includes waste that is emplaced in the WIPP as reported from the WWIS. The information presented in this report includes qualified rollup reports generated from the CID, as well as TRU waste characterization data obtained from the sites and reported in the WWIS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Conceptual Model and Risk Assessment of Waste Package Evolution - 15643

A generic disposal facility model was created to mirror disposal of low-level radioactive waste in a humid environment. The standard waste package used is a painted and primed carbon steel box stacked four high and placed next to one another within the disposal facility, preventing outward deformations of individual boxes. Waste is placed in the facility in sections, and as each section is filled it is covered with a layer of natural soil. It was assumed that boxes are exposed to natural precipitation rates for approximately 12 months, reduced to natural background infiltration to simulate the soil cover, and dropping to 1% of background infiltration when the facility is filled and a water-shedding interim cover is installed. It was also assumed that each box retains its structural integrity at the time of disposal, with the exception of the top box, which has its lid collapse inward from the overlying soil cover. Waste packages experience different rates of corrosion, differential amounts of infiltration, and fill with liquid at different rates based on when and where they are placed in the facility. Using historical literature and DOE site reports, calculations were made to estimate a range of waste package failure outcomes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TRUPACT-III Operations Manual (Rev. 0)

This procedure provides instructions for assembling the following contact-handled (CH) packaging payload: Standard Large Box 2 (SLB2).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TRUPACT-III Operations Manual (Rev. 1)

This procedure provides instructions for assembling the following contact-handled (CH) packaging payload: Standard Large Box 2 (SLB2).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TRUPACT-III Operations Manual (Rev. 2)

This procedure provides instructions for assembling the following contact-handled (CH) packaging payload: Standard Large Box 2 (SLB2).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TRUPACT-III Operations Manual (Rev. 3)

This procedure provides instructions for assembling the following contact-handled (CH) packaging payload: Standard Large Box 2 (SLB2).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TRUPACT-III Operations Manual (Rev. 4)

This procedure provides instructions for assembling the following contact-handled (CH) packaging payload: Standard Large Box 2 (SLB2).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Alternative D and D Planning Tool - 12466

On August 1, 2011, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) began cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP). UCOR's $2.2 billion contract has an initial five-year term and a four-year option period for completing the cleanup of ETTP and performing surveillance and maintenance and waste management operations at both the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security Complex. ETTP D and D work includes disposition of large, complex, contaminated, Manhattan Project-era facilities such as the K-25 and K-27 uranium enrichment facilities. At ETTP, UCOR views the D and D process as a 'Waste Factory' with waste production lines from the point-of-generation to the point-of-disposal. Safely transforming vertically-standing buildings into horizontally-lying waste in a disposal facility is the primary cleanup objective. Whereas a factory produces widgets, D and D produces waste-lots of waste. In support of the Waste Factory view, UCOR is developing a systems planning tool to help better plan how to effect cleanup by improving waste planning, uniting waste generator with waste dis-positioner, and represent the 'waste factory' in a computer model that allows the D and D and waste management teams to better understand available disposal paths, waste uncertainties and potential consequences, driving variables, and sensitivity to changes. Any model of reality represents a compromise. Part of the Waste Factory Model's value may be in providing standardization and relative direction for assisting decision making as opposed to absolute cost or schedule answers. From that relative direction, management can commission detailed planning and estimating. Also, the model's output credibility is tied directly to its input quality. That is why, as discussed above, the Waste Factory Model's key informational component will be the standardized waste streams (e.g., Structure/Debris disposed at EMWMF) and associated standardized unit costs. The model development process generally, and the development team's collaboration, specifically, is most important. Building-in this integrity up-front, transparently, will help ensure that the model outputs are known, understood, and credible (no mysterious 'black-box' components). The Waste Factory Model is envisioned to help improve understanding of a given project's waste implications; help reveal and suggest the important few variables out of the trivial many; reveal likely process bottlenecks, and help focus risk mitigation and assumption management efforts to better manage the projected total cost. In the long term, the UCOR team's goal is to incorporate an information feedback loop to help improve the accuracy of key model attributes, such as the standardized cost information. This way, by design, the model output should improve over time and thus help the model mature into both a credible scenario tool and a standardized project planning resource. The initial model capabilities may be narrow, but with time and effort it may prove to be a timely and cost-effective tool. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Achievements and process improvements in processing transuranic waste at the TRU Waste Processing Center - 15488

Wastren Advantage, Inc., (WAI) is the DOE Prime contractor for the TRU Waste Processing Center (TWPC) located in Oak Ridge, TN. This paper highlights the TWPCs specific achievements and process improvements associated with both Contact (CH) and Remote Handled (RH), Transuranic (TRU) waste receipt processing and repackaging for disposal. The five key improvement areas and achievements include: - The TWPC installed, tested and operated successfully the Drum Venting System (DVS) to vent over-packed CH-TRU waste drums in several configurations including 55-gallon drums over-packed in 79 or 85-gallon drums. - A new Remote Drum Opener (RDO) system was designed, tested and placed in service to vent drums discovered in overpack boxes in the Box Breakdown Area and to vent overpack configurations that could not be handled in the standard DVS (e.g., 110 gallon overpacks and multiple drum configurations). - The Cask Processing Enclosure (CPE) approach to repackaging RH-TRU waste contained in concrete casks was developed and implemented - Hot Cell outage to incorporate planned equipment modifications and improvements to maintain processing rates. - To improve certification and segregation of CH-TRU from drums that meet Low Level Waste criteria for disposal at Nevada the TWPC added additional equipment/facilities for Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) and Real Time Radiography (RTR). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Validation of Non-Invasive Waste Assay System (Gamma Box Counter) Performance at AECL Whiteshell Laboratories - 13136

Low-level radioactive waste (LLW) in solid form, resulting from decommissioning and operations activities at AECL's Whiteshell Laboratories (WL), is packaged in B-25 and B-1000 standard waste containers and characterized before it is shipped to an on-site interim storage facility, pending AECL decisions on long term management of its LLW. Assay of the waste packages before shipment contributes to an inventory of the interim storage facility and provides data to support acceptance at a future repository. A key characterization step is a gamma spectrometric measurement carried out under standard conditions using an automated, multi-detector Waste Assay System (WAS), purchased from Antech Corporation. A combination of ORTEC gamma acquisition software and custom software is used in this system to incorporate multiple measurements from two collimated high-resolution detectors. The software corrects the intensities of the gamma spectral lines for geometry and attenuation, and generates a table of calculated activities or limits of detection for a user-defined list of radioisotopes that may potentially be present. Validation of WAS performance was a prerequisite to routine operation. Documentation of the validation process provides assurance of the quality of the results produced, which may be needed one or two decades after they were generated. Aspects of the validation included setting up a quality control routine, measurements of standard point sources in reproducible positions, study of the gamma background, optimization of user-selectable software parameters, investigation of the effect of non-uniform distribution of materials and radionuclides, and comparison of results with measurements made using other gamma detector systems designed to assay bulk materials. The following key components of the validation process have been established. A daily quality control routine has been instituted, to verify stability of the gamma detector operation and the background levels. A test box containing plywood (specific gravity 0.5) with holes for reproducible positioning of known point sources has been constructed and used in several configurations. Gamma spectra have been processed multiple times with user-adjustable parameters set to a variety of values to gain agreement on the most appropriate settings. A similar optimization process was followed with the custom software provided by the instrument manufacturer to reach agreement on the most stable settings for reliable results. Measurements made with the Canberra In-Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) instrument were compared with the WAS results as part of an estimate of instrument precision and accuracy. The validation report will conclude with recommendations for the configuration, appropriate use and limitations of the Waste Assay System. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗