Results for “standard operating procedure” — Page 2

DOE OSTI2023

An Investigation of Time Distributions for Task Primitives to Support the HUNTER Dynamic Human Reliability Analysis

As an effort to support data collection for dynamic human reliability analysis (HRA), this study investigates time distributions for task primitives defined in the Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection rules (GOMS)–Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) method. GOMS-HRA was developed to provide cognition-based time and human error probability information for dynamic HRA calculation in the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) framework. HUNTER is a framework to support the dynamic modelling of human error in conjunction with other modelling tools. In this paper, we investigate time distributions using experimental data collected from the Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP) study, which suggests an HRA data collection framework to complement full-scope simulator research as well as collect input data for dynamic HRA using simplified simulators such as the Rancor Microworld Simulator. In this study, time required for GOMS-HRA task primitives to satisfy thirteen statistical distributions is investigated. Then, the time distributions from student operators and professional operators are compared and discussed. As a result, this study identified several time distributions on five GOMS-HRA task primitives at a statistically significant level. According to analyses to date, a greater number of significant time distributions was found in abnormal or emergency operating procedures rather than standard operating procedures. In the future, it is expected that the result of this study can provide objective reference on elapsed time data for task primitives as well as help to realistically simulate scenarios within dynamic HRA.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRS1991

Philosophy, policies, and procedures - The three P's of flight-deck operations

Standard operating procedures are drafted and provided to flightcrews to dictate the manner in which tasks are carried out. Failure to conform to Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) is frequently listed as the cause of violations, incidents, and accidents. However, procedures are often designed piecemeal, rather than being based on a sound philosophy of operations and policies that follow from such a philosophy. A framework of philosophy, policies, and procedures is proposed.

Degani, Asaf↗

NASA NTRS1994

Integrating planning and reactive control

Our research is developing persistent agents that can achieve complex tasks in dynamic and uncertain environments. We refer to such agents as taskable, reactive agents. An agent of this type requires a number of capabilities. The ability to execute complex tasks necessitates the use of strategic plans for accomplishing tasks; hence, the agent must be able to synthesize new plans at run time. The dynamic nature of the environment requires that the agent be able to deal with unpredictable changes in its world. As such, agents must be able to react to unanticipated events by taking appropriate actions in a timely manner, while continuing activities that support current goals. The unpredictability of the world could lead to failure of plans generated for individual tasks. Agents must have the ability to recover from failures by adapting their activities to the new situation, or replanning if the world changes sufficiently. Finally, the agent should be able to perform in the face of uncertainty. The Cypress system, described here, provides a framework for creating taskable, reactive agents. Several features distinguish our approach: (1) the generation and execution of complex plans with parallel actions; (2) the integration of goal-driven and event driven activities during execution; (3) the use of evidential reasoning for dealing with uncertainty; and (4) the use of replanning to handle run-time execution problems. Our model for a taskable, reactive agent has two main intelligent components, an executor and a planner. The two components share a library of possible actions that the system can take. The library encompasses a full range of action representations, including plans, planning operators, and executable procedures such as predefined standard operating procedures (SOP's). These three classes of actions span multiple levels of abstraction.

Wilkins, David E.↗

DOE OSTI2026

Project 2.8: Biological Specimen Repository for the Mayak Project

Curation of the existing specimens, including Standard Operating Procedures: The Southern Urals Biophysics Institute (SUBI) will continue to manage the day-to-day operations of the biorepository, but will have to assume the financial costs of maintaining and purchasing equipment such as freezers; Standard Operating Procedures are already in place for all aspects of the operations, and the Georgetown University team will be available on a voluntary and ad hoc basis to answer any technical questions in the future. Acquisition and tracking of new specimens: SUBI will decide on the collection of new tissues and blood samples in the future, and on what scale, depending on available resources and research needs. The Georgetown University team is willing to provide advice on a voluntary and ad hoc basis. Procedures for receiving and approving specimen requests from users: SUBI can take over this function; Chris Loffredo and other qualified research scientists at Georgetown University would be willing to serve as Tissue Review Committee members on a voluntary and ad hoc basis. Biospecimens remaining at Georgetown University: pursuant to the original terms of the Biospecimen Transfer Agreement between SUBI and Georgetown University, all unused portions of specimens (FFPE blocks, slides, and frozen tissues) will be returned to SUBI at the conclusion of the approved scientific research for which they were transferred. It was anticipated that the return shipment of biospecimens would occur in the fall of 2023. However, at this time, due to international developments, there are no shipping companies who can provide such deliveries to Russia. For now, the biospecimens can remain at Georgetown University where they are stored at the Genomics and Epigenomics Shared Resource. There have not been any storage costs to date, but this could change in the future.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2024

DSS Security Assessment

The Discovery and Synchronization service (DSS) has implemented some reasonable technical controls that help improve security and there are very few technical findings. The use of Docker and Kubernetes helps simplify the deployment process, and the DSS uses mutual TLS (mTLS) to connect. Much of the security risk across the DSS is a factor of its nature, a distributed environment that relies on all members to secure their parts correctly. As such, the DSS team should attempt to emphasize security controls that reduce complexity for securing entities’ Cockroach DB (CRDB) instances properly and improve coordination among DSS members for things like security patching, incident response, detecting, and removing bad actors. The DSS team must recognize that operating a DSS instance securely will require a combination of technical and procedural controls. Each DSS entity must configure their instance properly and follow standard operating procedures to ensure that the DSS service is secure.

threat modeling↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Progress in Red vs. Green Propellant Operations: ASCENT Load Operations Lessons Learned

The Green Propellant Infusion Mission (GPIM) [1] is a NASA Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) effort to establish via demonstration ASCENT propellant (Advanced Space Craft Energetic Non-Toxic propellant, formerly referred to as AF-M315E) ground operations through on –orbit performance. ASCENT was developed by Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) as an increased energy density, reduced toxicity and reduced hazard monopropellant formulation relative to hydrazine. The GPIM team was led by Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation (BATC) as Program Management and Principal Investigator with AFRL, Aerojet-Rocketdyne (AR), the United States Space Force Space and Missile Systems Center (USSF/SMC), NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC), NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), and NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) as Co-Investigators. The AFRL co-investigator role in the GPIM program was to develop the Propellant Ground Support Equipment (PGSE), associated Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Check Lists (CL), propellant load, propellant specification standard conventions and analysis methods, decontamination and waste disposal practices. This paper will discuss lessons learned in documentation, crew composition and readiness, equipment readiness, propellant readiness and potential improvements in the PGSE design.

Anthony P Zuttarelli↗

DOE OSTI2023

An interlaboratory comparison of mid-infrared spectra acquisition: Instruments and procedures matter

Diffuse reflectance spectroscopy has been extensively employed to deliver timely and cost-effective predictions of a number of soil properties. However, although several soil spectral laboratories have been established worldwide, the distinct characteristics of instruments and operations still hamper further integration and interoperability across mid-infrared (MIR) soil spectral libraries. In this study, we conducted a large-scale ring trial experiment to understand the lab-to-lab variability of multiple MIR instruments. By developing a systematic evaluation of different mathematical treatments with modeling algorithms, including regular preprocessing and spectral standardization, we quantified and evaluated instruments' dissimilarity and how this impacts internal and shared model performance. We found that all instruments delivered good predictions when calibrated internally using the same instruments' characteristics and standard operating procedures by solely relying on regular spectral preprocessing that accounts for light scattering and multiplicative/additive effects, e.g., using standard normal variate (SNV). When performing model transfer from a large public library (the USDA NSSCKSSL MIR library) to secondary instruments, good performance was also achieved by regular preprocessing (e. g., SNV) if both instruments shared the same manufacturer. However, significant differences between the KSSL MIR library and contrasting ring trial instruments responses were evident and confirmed by a semi-unsupervised spectral clustering. For heavily contrasting setups, spectral standardization was necessary before transferring prediction models. Non-linear model types like Cubist and memory-based learning delivered more precise estimates because they seemed to be less sensitive to spectral variations than global partial least square regression. In summary, the results from this study can assist new laboratories in building spectroscopy capacity utilizing existing MIR spectral libraries and support the recent global efforts to make soil spectroscopy universally accessible with centralized or shared operating procedures.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2009

Towards Verification of Operational Procedures Using Auto-Generated Diagnostic Trees

The design, development, and operation of complex space, lunar and planetary exploration systems require the development of general procedures that describe a detailed set of instructions capturing how mission tasks are performed. For both crewed and uncrewed NASA systems, mission safety and the accomplishment of the scientific mission objectives are highly dependent on the correctness of procedures. In this paper, we describe how to use the auto-generated diagnostic trees from existing diagnostic models to improve the verification of standard operating procedures. Specifically, we introduce a systematic method, namely the Diagnostic Tree for Verification (DTV), developed with the goal of leveraging the information contained within auto-generated diagnostic trees in order to check the correctness of procedures, to streamline the procedures in terms of reducing the number of steps or use of resources in them, and to propose alternative procedural steps adaptive to changing operational conditions. The application of the DTV method to a spacecraft electrical power system shows the feasibility of the approach and its range of capabilities

Kurtoglu, Tolga↗

NASA NTRS2023

Safety Case for Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Operations at NASA Langley Research Center

This Technical Memorandum (TM) is written to provide for dissemination of the methods and safety considerations for operations of small Uncrewed Aerial Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS)at NASA Langley Research Center. It includes the Safety Case used to acquire a BVLOS Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the FAA and is being published to enable others to benefit from this work. The intended operations, subject to approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), will include a combination of Within Visual Line of Sight (WVLOS) and Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flights, comprising of at most five sUAS operating concurrently, with no more than three operating BVLOS. Flights will occur in a subset of the Langley Air Force Base (LAFB) Class D airspace (KLFI) at a maximum altitude of 400 ft AGL. Most operations within this subset will take place in the City Environment Range Testing for Autonomous Integrated Navigation (CERTAIN) Range. The CERTAIN Range includes airspace inside the borders of NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). Additional airspace over the northern section of CERTAIN will be requested as part of the Certificate of Authorization (COA). NASA LaRC BVLOS operations on the CERTAIN Range can be broken down into five critical components needed to meet the 14 CFR § 91.113 see and avoid requirement: 1) procedural deconfliction with LAFB for UAS operations at or below 400 ft and manned aircraft at or above 900’ AGL; 2) ground equipment for detection of intruder aircraft and to support communications between crewmembers ; 3) sUAS vehicles with advanced onboard automation capable of autonomously maintaining safe separation; 4) BVLOS standardized operating procedures (SOPs); 5) and personnel to execute the flight operations in accordance with the SOPs and respond to airborne contingencies. The introduction of new ground equipment includes the use of the Remote Operations for Autonomous Missions (ROAM) UAS Operations Center, development and use of an Integrated Airspace Display (IAD), use of the L-STAR and GA-9120 radars, and the incorporation of standardized Vertiports. The ROAM Operations Center will be the central point for all BVLOS sUAS operations. All command and control (C2), voice communications and airspace awareness displays will reside inside ROAM. The IAD will provide raw data from ADS-B, FLARM, radar tracks and telemetered GPS vehicle positions for interpretation by an Airspace Monitor. The radars will search the class D airspace around the CERTAIN Range and serve as a backup to procedural deconfliction procedures coordinated with LAFB. In the event of a procedural deconfliction breakdown, radar detections of non-participating aircraft will be available so that the 91.113 see and avoid requirement can still be safely met. Finally, the incorporation of Vertiports will have video and network connectivity that enables large numbers of sUAS launches and recoveries from a single location. This is a continuation of the remote command and control of unpiloted aircraft component focused on evaluating unpiloted aircraft flight crew roles and responsibilities, control interfaces and the associated data links needed to operate a fleet of aircraft within a UAM Ecosystem. This work supports the development of future aviation operational concepts based on an Urban Air Mobility Maturity Level (UML) 4 environment (Patterson, 2020). It is assumed that future airspace will include hundreds of simultaneous aircraft operations within the airspace, therefore scalable operations are essential for enabling this future airspace to become a reality. Follow on work includes envisioned flights that expand operations beyond the CERTAIN range and lead to an effective Maritime Surveillance capability.

Matthew W Coldsnow↗

DOE OSTI2023

Challenges in practical button cell testing for hydrogen production from high temperature electrolysis of water

High temperature electrolysis of water using solid oxide electrochemical cells (SOEC) is a promising technology for hydrogen production with high energy efficiency and may promote decarbonization when coupled with renewable energy sources and excess heat from nuclear reactors. Over the past several decades there have been extensive scientific and engineering studies on cell materials and degradation behaviors that have greatly improved current density, decreased total resistance, and lowered degradation rates. Although the technology is now at a near-commercial level, maintaining consistency in cell testing and minimizing variance in practical testing environments is an often overlooked but crucial topic. To promote high quality data collection, testing procedures and balance of plant component details are extremely important to consider. This work discusses some key factors affecting the reproducibility of practical SOEC testing on the button cell level, namely, current collection layers, cell sealing procedures, the reliability of steam and hydrogen delivery systems, cell testing fixture design, and reduction procedures. To provide a baseline and a level of standardization for the SOEC community, this work also discloses details of the standard operating procedure and techniques adopted for o-SOEC testing at Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

08 HYDROGEN↗

NASA NTRS2022

An Examination of the Recent Stability of Ozonesonde Global Network Data

The recent Assessment of Standard Operating Procedures for OzoneSondes (ASOPOS 2.0; WMO/GAW Report #268) addressed questions of homogeneity and long-term stability in global electrochemical concentration cell (ECC) ozone sounding network time series. Among its recommendations was adoption of a standard for evaluating data quality in ozonesonde time series. Total column ozone (TCO) derived from the sondes compared to TCO from Aura’s Ozone Monitoring Instrument (OMI) is a primary quality indicator. Comparisons of sonde ozone with Aura’s Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS) are used to assess the stability of stratospheric ozone. This paper provides a comprehensive examination of global ozonesonde network data stability and accuracy since 2004 in light of the sudden post-2013 TCO “dropoff” of ~3-4% that was reported previously at select stations (Stauffer et al., 2020). Comparisons with Aura OMI TCO averaged across the network of 60 stations are stable within about ±2% over the past 18 years. Sonde TCO has similar stability compared to three other TCO satellite instruments, and the stratospheric ozone measurements average to within ±5% of MLS from 50 to 10 hPa. Thus, sonde data are reliable for trends, but with a caveat applied for a subset of dropoff stations in the tropics and subtropics. The dropoff is associated with only one of two major ECC instrument types. A detailed examination of ECC serial numbers pinpoints the timing of the dropoff. However, we find that overall, ozonesonde data are stable and accurate compared to independent measurements over the past two decades.

Ryan M. Stauffer↗

DOE OSTI2024

Practical procedures for sensor quality assessment

Sensors are increasingly deployed for process monitoring and control. These produce on-line measurements at a high frequency, in parallel with low-frequency laboratory measurements. Compared to laboratory practices, sensor data quality assessment and control practices are far less structured at most utilities. This leads to inaccurate sensor data with unknown uncertainty factors.This chapter shows how to establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) to support sensor data quality assessment and control and subsequent maintenance actions by producing relevant sensor metadata. Furthermore, SOPs are provided for the most commonly used wastewater quality sensors, inspired by utility and academic best practices. This chapter builds on definitions provided in Chapter 3 and provides additional definitions specifically related to sensors maintenance. Chapter 6 complements the methods in this chapter, which are based on reference measurements, with data-analytical techniques.

Alferes, Janelcy↗

NASA NTRS1985

Some comparison of ECMWF 3b and GFDL 3b analyses in the tropics

Owing to the problems that data assimilation procedures have in analyzing data in the tropics and to the apparent differences in the descriptions of the European Center for Medium Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) and Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) assimilation suites, a brief comparison was done of the resulting analyses in the tropics. Three cases each were selected for Standard Operating Procedures 1 and 2 at the 200 and 850 mb levels, the wind fields for 25 deg N 25 deg S were partitioned into a rotational and divergent component, and various statistics of each were calculated.

Julian, P. R.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Long-Term Changes in Atmospheric Ozone

Ozonesondes have made inexpensive, accurate measurements of ozone from the ground to 30km for more than 50 years. The data are used extensively for trend analyses and for evaluation of satellite and model data products, and are also part of climatologies that are used as a priori data for satellite retrievals. They are essential as a transfer standard when merging shorter satellite-derived time series, and are the most important source of trend-quality long-term records below about 18 km. The importance of long-term ozonesonde records as a stable reference has led to increased attention to quantifying uncertainties and changes in ozonesonde data. Based on past intercomparison data, ECC sondes show a modest (~1-5%) high bias with respect to UV-absorption measurements (including MOZAIC-IAGOS) in the troposphere, with an uncertainty of 5%, but no evidence of a change with time. Other sonde types show an increase of 5-20% in sensitivity to tropospheric ozone from 1970-1995. Agreement in the stratosphere is much better. In the past 20 years ozonesonde precision has improved by a factor of 2, primarily through the adoption of strict standard operating procedures. In addition, many of the most important ozonesonde records have been re-evaluated and corrected, and detailed estimates made of their biases and uncertainties. Corrections to historical data for known issues may reduce biases but simultaneously introduce additional uncertainties. The uncertainty budget for the ozone partial pressure reading has contributions from stoichiometry, cell background current, pump efficiency and temperature, sensing solution type and volume. The much-discussed “background current” has recently been shown to be primarily related to reaction stoichiometry. Several quality assurance issues remain, but are tractable problems that can be addressed with further research. This will be required if the present goal of better than 5% overall uncertainty throughout the global ozonesonde network is to be achieved. Finally, the importance of regular sonde intercomparisons, employing UV photometers traceable to the modern UV-absorption standard, and of regular comparison of operational station records with multiple satellite sensors, is emphasized.

Ozonesondes↗

NASA NTRS1998

A Formal Approach for Designing and Evaluating Procedures

Operator interaction with modern control systems is a topic of great concern in high-risk industries such as nuclear power and commercial aviation. The issues associated with such systems focus on the ability of the operators (e.g., pilots) to achieve mission goals safely while containing failures. Operators must be able to interact safely and reliably with highly automatic and complex systems across the full spectrum of possible operating conditions, including normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. In environments such as commercial aviation, operator interaction with the machine is specified through a set of standard operating procedures (SOP). A procedure represents a collective agreement on the 'best' way to perform a given task. The intent of this paper is to suggest a formal methodology, for designing and evaluating procedures, that is both reliable and systematic. Our approach involves two major elements: a model of the machine and a list of the operator's task specifications (goals). We use formal modeling paradigms for describing the system and super-imposing on it the operator's tasks. Such paradigms, based on recent frameworks such as Statecharts and Hierarchical Hybrid Machines appear to be adequate methods for analyzing operator interaction with modern control systems. To illustrate this methodology, we model and analyze the sequence of actions for an emergency procedure. The procedure, Irregular Engine Start, for a medium-range aircraft, specifies the sequence of immediate actions that must be performed by the crew to avoid an uncontrolled rise in engine temperature during start-up. A model of engine behavior during a hot start is constructed. It also describes the various actions that can be taken by the crew and the resulting outcomes. The model is then opened up as a tree of all possible action sequences. This action tree allows us to trace the correct sequences necessary to achieve the desired end-goal (secure and shut down of the engine). In conclusion, we argue that the current process of designing and evaluating procedures can be improved. We discuss the implications of this approach for designing and evaluating this and other types of procedures. We conclude with insights about the benefits and limitation of this methodology, and offer suggestions for future research.

Degani, Asaf↗

NASA NTRS1999

Chemical Hygiene Program

The Chemical Management Team is responsible for ensuring compliance with the OSHA Laboratory Standard. The program at Lewis Research Center (LeRC) evolved over many years to include training, developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) for each laboratory process, coordinating with other safety and health organizations and teams at the Center, and issuing an SOP binder. The Chemical Hygiene Policy was first established for the Center. The Chemical Hygiene Plan was established and reviewed by technical, laboratory and management for viability and applicability to the Center. A risk assessment was conducted for each laboratory. The laboratories were prioritized by order of risk, higher risk taking priority. A Chemical Management Team staff member interviewed the lead researcher for each laboratory process to gather the information needed to develop the SOP for the process. A binder containing the Chemical Hygiene Plan, the SOP, a map of the laboratory identifying the personal protective equipment and best egress, and glove guides, as well as other guides for safety and health. Each laboratory process has been captured in the form of an SOP. The chemicals used in the procedure have been identified and the information is used to reduce the number of chemicals in the lab. The Chemical Hygiene Plan binder is used as a training tool for new employees. LeRC is in compliance with the OSHA Standard. The program was designed to comply with the OSHA standard. In the process, we have been able to assess the usage of chemicals in the laboratories, as well as reduce or relocate the chemicals being stored in the laboratory. Our researchers are trained on the hazards of the materials they work with and have a better understanding of the hazards of the process and what is needed to prevent any incident. From the SOP process, we have been able to reduce our chemical inventory, determine and implement better hygiene procedures and equipment in the laboratories, and provide specific training to our employees. As a result of this program, we are adding labeling to the laboratories for emergency responders and initiating a certified chemical user program.

Mayor, Antoinette C.↗

NASA NTRS2016

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗

NASA NTRS2016

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗