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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2017

Security Vulnerability Profiles of Mission Critical Software: Empirical Analysis of Security Related Bug Reports

While some prior research work exists on characteristics of software faults (i.e., bugs) and failures, very little work has been published on analysis of software applications vulnerabilities. This paper aims to contribute towards filling that gap by presenting an empirical investigation of application vulnerabilities. The results are based on data extracted from issue tracking systems of two NASA missions. These data were organized in three datasets: Ground mission IVV issues, Flight mission IVV issues, and Flight mission Developers issues. In each dataset, we identified security related software bugs and classified them in specific vulnerability classes. Then, we created the security vulnerability profiles, i.e., determined where and when the security vulnerabilities were introduced and what were the dominating vulnerabilities classes. Our main findings include: (1) In IVV issues datasets the majority of vulnerabilities were code related and were introduced in the Implementation phase. (2) For all datasets, around 90 of the vulnerabilities were located in two to four subsystems. (3) Out of 21 primary classes, five dominated: Exception Management, Memory Access, Other, Risky Values, and Unused Entities. Together, they contributed from 80 to 90 of vulnerabilities in each dataset.

Goseva-Popstojanova, Katerina↗
DOE OSTI2023

A National Secure-by-Design Strategy

The US National Cybersecurity Strategy published March 2, 2023 uses plain language to communicate that the US is calling for a major change in how we prioritize the security of software systems used in critical infrastructure. It acknowledges that our current approach, which is essentially, “let the buyer beware,” leaves entities who are least able to assess or defend vulnerable software responsible for the impacts of designed-in weaknesses while the makers of the technology bear no liability. The strategy recommends a security-by-design approach, recommending that software vendors be held liable to uphold a “duty of care” to consumers and for systems to be designed to “fail safely and recover quickly” . For energy infrastructure, the strategy calls out the need to implement the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy to achieve higher confidence security for energy infrastructures. The Idaho National Laboratory, a pioneer in cyber-informed engineering concepts, is at the forefront of organizations educating others in industry, academia, and government on how to apply these concepts to real-world challenges. In this brief, we'll outline some of the basic principles of security-by-design and offer examples of how, in a water sector context, they're being put into successful practice.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2016

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IV&V projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IV&V techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. Additionally, the role FM has with regard to strengthened security requirements, with potential to advance overall asset protection of flight software systems, is being addressed with the development of an adverse conditions database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities. Capitalizing on the established framework, this TR suite provides assurance capability for a variety of FM architectures and varied development approaches. Research results are being disseminated across NASA, other agencies, and the software community. This paper discusses the findings and TR suite informing the FM domain in best practices for FM architectural design, visibility observations, and methods employed for IV&V and mission assurance.

Fitz, Rhonda↗
DOE OSTI2025

V-INT: Automated Vulnerability Intelligence and Risk Assessment

The project team, including the University of Arkansas (UA) as the lead, the University of Arkansas at Little Rock (UALR), Network Perception (NP), and Bastazo, has successfully researched, developed, and demonstrated the V-INT toolset, and also integrated it into the commercial products of NP (i.e., NP-View) and Bastazo (i.e., Spartan). The end product is a cybersecurity software tool for energy utilities that can automatically assess the risks of software vulnerabilities in an organization’s assets considering the organization’s firewall policies. It allows security operators to identify the small portion of vulnerabilities that poses true threats to their system (i.e., those that are not protected by firewall policies) and prioritize the mitigation of these vulnerabilities to minimize risks. It also allows security operators to identify the vulnerability-induced attack paths under their organization’s firewall policy, providing effective decision supports for mitigating potential attacks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

StructuredFuzzer: Fuzzing Structured Text-Based Control Logic Applications

Rigorous testing methods are essential for ensuring the security and reliability of industrial controller software. Fuzzing, a technique that automatically discovers software bugs, has also proven effective in finding software vulnerabilities. Unsurprisingly, fuzzing has been applied to a wide range of platforms, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs). However, current approaches, such as coverage-guided evolutionary fuzzing implemented in the popular fuzzer American Fuzzy Lop Plus Plus (AFL++), are often inadequate for finding logical errors and bugs in PLC control logic applications. They primarily target generic programming languages like C/C++, Java, and Python, and do not consider the unique characteristics and behaviors of PLCs, which are often programmed using specialized programming languages like Structured Text (ST). Furthermore, these fuzzers are ill suited to deal with complex input structures encapsulated in ST, as they are not specifically designed to generate appropriate input sequences. This renders the application of traditional fuzzing techniques less efficient on these platforms. To address this issue, this paper presents a fuzzing framework designed explicitly for PLC software to discover logic bugs in applications written in ST specified by the IEC 61131-3 standard. The proposed framework incorporates a custom-tailored PLC runtime and a fuzzer designed for the purpose. We demonstrate its effectiveness by fuzzing a collection of ST programs that were crafted for evaluation purposes. We compare the performance against a popular fuzzer, namely, AFL++. The proposed fuzzing framework demonstrated its capabilities in our experiments, successfully detecting logic bugs in the tested PLC control logic applications written in ST. On average, it was at least 83 times faster than AFL++, and in certain cases, for example, it was more than 23,000 times faster.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Lamellar: A Rust-based Asynchronous Tasking and PGAS Runtime for High Performance Computing

Cybersecurity is one of the largest concerns in modern computing, impacting and dictating how governments, private corporations, and individuals interact with and live in an increasingly digital world. The NSA has recently released a memo [ 1] on “Software Memory Safety” where they highlight that both Microsoft and Google have stated around 70% of software vulnerabilities were due to memory safety issues. Although languages such as C and C++ provide freedom and flexibility with memory management, guaran- teeing safety falls mostly on the developer. The NSA recommends using “memory safe” languages whenever possible. In this paper we introduce Lamellar, an asynchronous tasking and PGAS HPC runtime written in Rust, one such "memory safe" language. We describe the entire Lamellar stack, from network interfaces to high- level abstractions such as distributed LamellarArrays and Active Messages. We conclude by showing comparable performance to legacy PGAS runtimes (e.g. OpenSHMEM) on a subset of the BALE kernel suite while maintaining strong memory safety principles.

HPC Software Systems, Rust Programming Language, P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Infrastructure Expression: Discovery Tools

The Infrastructure Expression: Discovery Tools is a toolset that allows for the automated collection of various network, hardware, and software vulnerabilities and details to be collected from systems on a given network. These details are then converted into a STIX 2.1 format, allowing for easy viewing in existing applications as well as sharing and interfacing with tools that already use the STIX 2.1 format.

Cutshaw, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity-Tools/V2W-BERT

Software Vulnerabilities to Weakness Mapping. V2W-BERT optimizes the learnable parameters θ of Fθ in two steps. In the first step, the pre-trained BERT language model is further fine-tuned with CVE/CWE descriptions specific to cyber security. In the second step, the trained BERT model is employed in a Siamese network architecture to establish links between CVEs and CWEs. The architecture takes a specific CVE-CWE pair as input and predicts whether the CVE belongs to the CWE or not, with a confidence value. V2W-BERT includes a Mask Language Model (LM) based Reconstruction Decoder to ensure that the descriptions’ contexts are not changed too much during the training process.

Halappanavar,, Mahantesh↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy – State of Cybersecurity in the Oil & Natural Gas Sector

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system touches every corner of the nation and increased communications & control capabilities have not only allowed for greater efficiency of system operation, but have also created a massive target for adversaries to launch cyber-attacks. Like any other heavy industrial process, the ONG system relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. The current state of cyber-preparedness across the ONG industry varies from organization to organization. Among the most common challenges that ONG companies face are remote locations, longlived field assets, and lacking capabilities to find and track malware on their systems. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. Various industry and government organizations are performing research and development activities to address some of these challenges, but in many cases industry stakeholders are not aware of solutions that already exist. It is clear that a need exists for a coherent, comprehensive, multi-layered strategy for assuring the security and resilience of the nation's pipeline infrastructure against cyber threats. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cyber-security within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cyber-security of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: The sheer number of differing regulatory bodies and trade groups offering both standards and best-practice recommendations for ONG cyber-security makes it difficult to create a comprehensive, directed, and coherent strategy that is applicable to all players within the ONG industry. The ONG industry is unaware of potentially useful technologies that have been developed for ensuring cyber-security of other infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid. Leveraging these technologies—and the science and engineering behind them—can provide some low-hanging fruit that can greatly improve cyber-security in the ONG industry without significant investments in terms of time and money. In the months following this report, LLNL will continue to perform outreach to key oil & gas industry stakeholders in a continual effort to identify the most pressing cyber-resilience issues in the industry. This outreach will be supplemented with LLNL’s threat intelligence capabilities to begin painting a clearer picture of the overall threat landscape faced by this sector. This assessment will be threat-informed and while the strategy itself will not be classified we will leverage intelligence analysis and adversary capabilities to identify gaps in current cybersecurity practices for oil & gas pipeline systems. Recommended efforts will be compiled into a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, in which LLNL will highlight priority activities to immediately improve the state of cyber-resilience in the industry.

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy Kickoff Report [Slides]

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system like any other heavy industrial process, relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. Cyber-preparedness varies across the ONG industry from organization to organization. Common challenges include remote locations, long-lived field assets, and insufficient capabilities to find and track malware. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cybersecurity within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cybersecurity of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: regulatory overlap and inefficiencies, and lack of industry awareness of potentially useful technologies for solving known issues. In the months following this report, LLNL will develop a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, coupling threat intelligence, industry knowledge base, and ongoing outreach

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2021

AEDAM: Whole Program Adaptive Error Detection and Mitigation (Final Report)

The overall goals of the AEDAM project were to fundamentally transform software transient-error detection through the design of configurable specialized detectors, quantitative characterization of hardware resilience and software vulnerabilities, and composition of the specialized detectors to most efficiently protect the whole program. Within this scope, UT Austin's research contribution related to enabling and studying the composition of detectors and possible different hardware errors, specifically: (1) developed the Hamartia open-source error injection framework that is designed to make composition studies simple, and (2) develop the methodology and demonstrate the potential benefits of error detector composition.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Stucco System

Security event data, such as intrusion detection system alerts, provide a starting point for analysis, but are information impoverished. To provide context, analysts must manually gather and synthesize relevant data from myriad sources within their enterprise and external to it. Analysts search system logs, network flows, and firewall data; they search IP blacklists and reputation lists, software vulnerability information, malware and threat data, OS and application vendor blogs, and news sites. All of these sources are manually searched for data relevant to the event being investigated. Relevant results must then be brought together and synthesized to put the event in context and make decisions about its importance and impact.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Women in Science: Fermilab cybersecurity analyst Jeny Teheran

With 11 February marking the International Day of Women and Girls in Science, female physicists, engineers and computer scientists from CERN and from Fermilab share their experiences of building a career in science. Jeny Teheran is a security analyst and cybersecurity researcher at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. That means keeping up with and taking care of hardware and software vulnerabilities so that the experiments can carry out their science in a secure manner. It's a fast-paced job where you have to come with the best solution you can put in place, right in the moment. "I would recommend this job because it challenges you. It pushes you to be on top of your game. You have to improve your analytical skills; you have to react fast; you have to communicate better." - Jeny says. Jeny came to Fermilab from the Caribbean coast of Colombia. She grew up in a house with few toys but lots of books, and says she has always felt close to science. With a degree in systems and computing engineering, she arrived at Fermilab four years ago as an intern to work on the offline production team for neutrino experiments. A year later, she was hired as a security analyst. "And I'm loving it," she says. Credits: Video production - Fermilab Creative Services Music Copyright: Universal Production Music Astral Light Chevalier Idea originally conceived by Tanya Levshina, Fermilab and Maria Dimou, CERN.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Dynamic Risk-Aware Patch Scheduling

A program that defines and assesses the dynamic risk of software vulnerabilities and considers the dynamic risks into patch scheduling to reduce security risks posed by vulner­abilities and provide formal guidance to security operations at various organizations.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Grid Utility Asset Vulnerability Assessment (GUAVA) Software Tool

Increasing demand and changes in generation portfolios is pushing power grid to operate towards the limit. However, due to lack of analytical tools for understanding various scales of impact on grid, it is becoming more vulnerable to wide scale power outages and blackouts. A vulnerable grid operating at its limit can be easily disrupted by asset failures caused by devastating hurricanes which has been known to damage transmission and distribution lines along its track. In this direction, researchers have focused on determining these assets by conducting Monte Carlo simulations of hurricanes with uncertainties and collected a large set of simulation data. To determine the infrastructure updates necessary for mitigating wide scale impact of hurricanes on the grid, we propose a software tool named “Grid Utility Asset Vulnerability Analysis” (GUAVA) framework. GUAVA presents a novel data-driven probabilistic analytical approach to (1) post-process hurricane failure scenarios, (2) identify/rank assets that are most vulnerable and critical to failing and are associated with highest impact/risk, and (3) to inform system upgrade decisions & prioritization. Based on the observed results and employed data-driven methodology, it is expected GUAVA can be adapted to provide power system planners with a recommendation engine for making informed decisions to improve resilience of grid.

Mahapatra, Kaveri↗
NASA NTRS2024

Freddie Software Security Patching

Software applications become more complicated over time as they depend on many third-party, open-source libraries. The Freddie Platform Services team actively improves software security by addressing software bugs and vulnerabilities that negatively impact software applications, especially those providing real-time operations and services for the federal partners and industries. In order to detect bugs and patch vulnerabilities in software development and maintenance cycles, an automated and systematic approach is needed. This document describes what bugs and vulnerabilities are, and how they can be detected by using static code analyzers and software composition analysis tools. Once vulnerabilities are detected, the patching approaches, such as upgrading direct and transitive dependencies and loading custom classes first, are presented together with their strengths and weaknesses. In addition, patching walkthrough, example code, lessons learned throughout the vulnerability patching process and the recommended practices are discussed.

Chok Fung Lai↗
DOE OSTI2026

Hardware Aware Mitigation of Timing Side-Channel Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure Software

Program runtime/timing attacks exploit variations in a program’s execution times to extract sensitive information from the program (e.g. encryption keys, sensitive variable data, intellectual property). State-of-the-art solutions to runtime sidechannel attacks attempt to balance the execution time of the sensitive code for different control flow paths to eliminate the timing leakage. However, during the mitigation process, most techniques do not consider the underlying hardware/device on which the target program is supposed to run on. This can lead to over-fixing (unnecessary extra operations), under-fixing (not solving the imbalance properly), and even failures. We propose DISARM, a joint hardware-software methodology (unlike any existing solution) for mitigating runtime side-channel vulnerabilities that utilizes timing values from real embedded devices to generate targeted software fixes. We implement DISARM to support C/C++/Java source codes and validate it across 22 standard benchmarks. DISARM outperforms state-of-the-art solutions such as PENDULUM and DifFuzzAR in terms of execution time overhead (up to −46%), code size overhead (up to −10%), and correctness (no failures) on five different embedded/edge devices.

Suha, Tasneem [University of Maine]↗
NASA NTRS2018

Ground Software Technologies – Embracing Change: Mission Drivers and Technology Opportunities to Enable Long Lived Missions

Mission lifecycles have proven to extend well beyond their original design. The benefits to this are countless but introduce challenges in today’s rapidly changing ground infrastructure and software technologies used to enable mission success. What remains constant is the risk posture missions maintain when accepting change and the use of new technologies. Larger missions are ready for change in early lifecycle development but near launch and especially in operations, few continue to evolve beyond what is set in place in phase C. This paper will discuss how the Advance Multi-Mission Operations System (AMMOS) intends to address, three driving missions concerns: Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades, rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software, and finally the ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. These driving concerns are briefly described below: 1. Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades. Hardware updates considerably faster than 10 years ago. Expectations that a system can remain in place for more than 10 years is no longer valid. Expecting to find hardware replacements for a system older than 5 years will increasingly become more and more challenging. How than do missions plan for hardware changes for long lived missions? Principle Objective: Provide abstraction by virtualizing and containerizing software abstract away any hardware dependencies and package up the application lightweight units. 2. Rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software. Cost is often the main impediment and largely driven by the revalidation and testing of system that undergo change. In todays, environment security updates are a major diver demanding systems remain up to date. How then do missions accept these changes and avoid large testing efforts? Principle Objective: Help reduce the cost of re-testing by automation of testing, deployment, and compartmentalizing change. 3. Ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. Responding quickly to change is similar to the second concern in this paper regarding security vulnerabilities. In this case, it address broader concerns of updating software and infrastructure on a more realistic timeline. How do missions stay up to date with the most recent versions of software and allowing for improved functionality? Principle Objective: Use continuous integration techniques at the system level to ensure rapid turnaround. This paper explores each of these concerns in more detail. It focuses the AMMOS’s current plans, challenges and current roadmap.

Giovannoni, Brian J.↗