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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Achievable Performance and Effective Interrogator Design for SAW RFID Sensor Tags

For many NASA missions, remote sensing is a critical application that supports activities such as environmental monitoring, planetary science, structural shape and health monitoring, non-destructive evaluation, etc. The utility of the remote sensing devices themselves is greatly increased if they are passive V that is, they do not require any on-board power supply such as batteries V and if they can be identified uniquely during the sensor interrogation process. Additional passive sensor characteristics that enable greater utilization in space applications are small size and weight, long read ranges with low interrogator power, ruggedness, and operability in extreme environments (vacuum, extreme high/low temperature, high radiation, etc.) In this paper, we consider one very promising passive sensor technology, called surface acoustic wave (SAW) radio-frequency identification (RFID), that satisfies all of these criteria. In general, RFID is a method of identifying items using radio waves to interrogate tags encoded with a unique identifier that are affixed to the items of interest. In the case of passive tags, only the interrogator, which transmits power to the tags in the form of radio-frequency electromagnetic radiation, requires access to a power supply. Passive RFID technologies are used today in many applications, including asset tracking and management, security and access control, and remote sensing. To date, most of the development and application in RFID technology has focused on either asset/inventory tracking and control or security and access control because these are the largest commercial application areas. Recently however, there has been growing interest in using passive RFID technology for remote sensing applications, and SAW devices are at the forefront of RFID sensing technology development. Although SAW RFID tags have great potential for use in numerous space-based remote sensing applications, the limited collision resolution capability of current generation tags limits the performance in a cluttered sensing environment. That is, as more SAW-based sensors are added to the environment, numerous tag responses are superimposed at the receiver and decoding all or even a subset of the telemetry becomes increasingly difficult. Background clutter generated by reflectors other than the sensors themselves is also a problem, as is multipath interference and signal distortion, but the limiting factor in many remote sensing applications can be expected to be tag mutual interference. This problem may be greatly mitigated by proper design of the SAW tag waveform, but that remains an open research problem, and in the meantime, several other related questions remain to be answered including: (1) What are the fundamental relationships between tag parameters such as bit-rate, time-bandwidth-product, SNR, and achievable collision resolution? (2) What are the differences in optimal or near-optimal interrogator designs between noise-limited environments and interference-limited environments? (3) What are the performance characteristics of different interrogator designs in term of parameters such as transmitter power level, range, and number of interfering tags? In this paper, we will present the results of a research effort aimed at providing at least partial answers to all of these questions.

Barton Richard J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) Prototype Radio - Generation 2 Security Architecture Lab Test Report

NASA Glenn Research Center, in cooperation with Rockwell Collins, is working to develop a prototype Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) radio platform as part of NASA Integrated Systems Research Program's (ISRP) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. A primary focus of the project is to work with the FAA and industry standards bodies to build and demonstrate a safe, secure, and efficient CNPC architecture that can be used by industry to evaluate the feasibility of deploying a system using these technologies in an operational capacity. GRC has been working in conjunction with these groups to assess threats, identify security requirements, and to develop a system of standards-based security controls that can be applied to the current GRC prototype CNPC architecture as a demonstration platform. The security controls were integrated into a lab test bed mock-up of the Mobile IPv6 architecture currently being used for NASA flight testing, and a series of network tests were conducted to evaluate the security overhead of the controls compared to the baseline CNPC link without any security. The aim of testing was to evaluate the performance impact of the additional security control overhead when added to the Mobile IPv6 architecture in various modes of operation. The statistics collected included packet captures at points along the path to gauge packet size as the sample data traversed the CNPC network, round trip latency, jitter, and throughput. The effort involved a series of tests of the baseline link, a link with Robust Header Compression (ROHC) and without security controls, a link with security controls and without ROHC, and finally a link with both ROHC and security controls enabled. The effort demonstrated that ROHC is both desirable and necessary to offset the additional expected overhead of applying security controls to the CNPC link.

Communication Networks↗
NASA NTRS2014

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control System Development

My job title is IT Security support for the Spaceport Command & Control System Development. As a cyber‐security analyst it is my job to ensure NASA's information stays safe from cyber threats, such as, viruses, malware and denial-of-service attacks by establishing and enforcing system access controls. Security is very important in the world of technology and it is used everywhere from personal computers to giant networks ran by Government agencies worldwide. Without constant monitoring analysis, businesses, public organizations and government agencies are vulnerable to potential harmful infiltration of their computer information system. It is my responsibility to ensure authorized access by examining improper access, reporting violations, revoke access, monitor information request by new programming and recommend improvements. My department oversees the Launch Control System and networks. An audit will be conducted for the LCS based on compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). I recently finished analyzing the SANS top 20 critical controls to give cost effective recommendations on various software and hardware products for compliance. Upon my completion of this internship, I will have successfully completed my duties as well as gain knowledge that will be helpful to my career in the future as a Cyber Security Analyst.

IT Security↗
NASA NTRS2019

Cloud Governance at Scale

Operating and maintaining a large multi-tenant ecosystem in the cloud requires scalable solutions to unique technical and process challenges. The Cloud Computing model grants significant permissions to development teams that traditionally were reserved for Data-Center Administrators and Supply-Chain Managers. Earthdata Cloud has worked to re-cast traditional data-center management into a sensible cloud-first model. This talk discusses some of our challenges, solutions, and way ahead.

financial controls↗
NASA NTRS2015

Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) Prototype Radio - Generation 2 Security Flight Test Report

NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC), in cooperation with Rockwell Collins, is working to develop a prototype Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) radio platform as part of NASA Integrated Systems Research Program's (ISRP) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. A primary focus of the project is to work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and industry standards bodies to build and demonstrate a safe, secure, and efficient CNPC architecture that can be used by industry to evaluate the feasibility of deploying a system using these technologies in an operational capacity. GRC has been working in conjunction with these groups to assess threats, identify security requirements, and to develop a system of standards-based security controls that can be applied to the GRC prototype CNPC architecture as a demonstration platform. The proposed security controls were integrated into the GRC flight test system aboard our S-3B Viking surrogate aircraft and several network tests were conducted during a flight on November 15th, 2014 to determine whether the controls were working properly within the flight environment. The flight test was also the first to integrate Robust Header Compression (ROHC) as a means of reducing the additional overhead introduced by the security controls and Mobile IPv6. The effort demonstrated the complete end-to-end secure CNPC link in a relevant flight environment.

Communication Networks↗
NASA NTRS2013

IT Security Support for Spaceport Command and Control System

During the fall 2013 semester, I worked at the Kennedy Space Center as an IT Security Intern in support of the Spaceport Command and Control System under the guidance of the IT Security Lead Engineer. Some of my responsibilities included assisting with security plan documentation collection, system hardware and software inventory, and malicious code and malware scanning. Throughout the semester, I had the opportunity to work on a wide range of security related projects. However, there are three projects in particular that stand out. The first project I completed was updating a large interactive spreadsheet that details the SANS Institutes Top 20 Critical Security Controls. My task was to add in all of the new commercial of the shelf (COTS) software listed on the SANS website that can be used to meet their Top 20 controls. In total, there are 153 unique security tools listed by SANS that meet one or more of their 20 controls. My second project was the creation of a database that will allow my mentor to keep track of the work done by the contractors that report to him in a more efficient manner by recording events as they occur throughout the quarter. Lastly, I expanded upon a security assessment of the Linux machines being used on center that I began last semester. To do this, I used a vulnerability and configuration tool that scans hosts remotely through the network and presents the user with an abundance of information detailing each machines configuration. The experience I gained from working on each of these projects has been invaluable, and I look forward to returning in the spring semester to continue working with the IT Security team.

computer security↗
NASA NTRS2024

DSS Security Assessment

The Discovery and Synchronization service (DSS) has implemented some reasonable technical controls that help improve security and there are very few technical findings. The use of Docker and Kubernetes helps simplify the deployment process, and the DSS uses mutual TLS (mTLS) to connect. Much of the security risk across the DSS is a factor of its nature, a distributed environment that relies on all members to secure their parts correctly. As such, the DSS team should attempt to emphasize security controls that reduce complexity for securing entities’ Cockroach DB (CRDB) instances properly and improve coordination among DSS members for things like security patching, incident response, detecting, and removing bad actors. The DSS team must recognize that operating a DSS instance securely will require a combination of technical and procedural controls. Each DSS entity must configure their instance properly and follow standard operating procedures to ensure that the DSS service is secure.

threat modeling↗
NASA NTRS1991

MOD control center automated information systems security evolution

The role of the technology infusion process in future Control Center Automated Information Systems (AIS) is highlighted. The following subject areas are presented in the form of the viewgraphs: goals, background, threat, MOD's AISS program, TQM, SDLC integration, payback, future challenges, and bottom line.

Owen, Rich↗
NASA NTRS2005

Internet-Based System for Voice Communication With the ISS

The Internet Voice Distribution System (IVoDS) is a voice-communication system that comprises mainly computer hardware and software. The IVoDS was developed to supplement and eventually replace the Enhanced Voice Distribution System (EVoDS), which, heretofore, has constituted the terrestrial subsystem of a system for voice communications among crewmembers of the International Space Station (ISS), workers at the Payloads Operations Center at Marshall Space Flight Center, principal investigators at diverse locations who are responsible for specific payloads, and others. The IVoDS utilizes a communication infrastructure of NASA and NASArelated intranets in addition to, as its name suggests, the Internet. Whereas the EVoDS utilizes traditional circuitswitched telephony, the IVoDS is a packet-data system that utilizes a voice over Internet protocol (VOIP). Relative to the EVoDS, the IVoDS offers advantages of greater flexibility and lower cost for expansion and reconfiguration. The IVoDS is an extended version of a commercial Internet-based voice conferencing system that enables each user to participate in only one conference at a time. In the IVoDS, a user can receive audio from as many as eight conferences simultaneously while sending audio to one of them. The IVoDS also incorporates administrative controls, beyond those of the commercial system, that provide greater security and control of the capabilities and authorizations for talking and listening afforded to each user.

Chamberlain, James↗
NASA NTRS2018

Reliable and Secure Surveillance, Communications and Navigation (RSCAN) for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in Controlled Airspace

The aviation industry faces a rapidly-emerging need for integrating Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) into the national airspace (NAS). This trend will present challenging questions for the safe operation of UAS in controlled and uncontrolled airspaces based on new Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating ever increasing numbers of UAS worldwide? Does the communications network provide ample Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow Air Traffic Control (ATC) to securely address each UAS? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Under NASA contract NNA16BD84C, Boeing is developing an integrated CNS architecture to enable UAS operations in the NAS. Revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives are needed to support UAS operations at all altitudes and in all airspaces, including both controlled and uncontrolled. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. Our approach considers CNS requirements that address the range of UAS missions where they will be most beneficial and cost-effective.A cybersecure future UAS CNS architecture is needed to support the NASA vision for an Unmanned Air Traffic Management (UTM) system in uncontrolled airspace and a cooperative operation of manned and unmanned aircraft in the controlled global Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. The architecture must, therefore, support always-available and cyber secure operations. This paper presents UAS CNS architecture concepts for large UAS operating in the ATM system in controlled airspace. Future companion works will consider small UAS operating in the UTM system in uncontrolled airspace.

Ponchak, Denise S.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Encryption for Remote Control via Internet or Intranet

A data-communication protocol has been devised to enable secure, reliable remote control of processes and equipment via a collision-based network, while using minimal bandwidth and computation. The network could be the Internet or an intranet. Control is made secure by use of both a password and a dynamic key, which is sent transparently to a remote user by the controlled computer (that is, the computer, located at the site of the equipment or process to be controlled, that exerts direct control over the process). The protocol functions in the presence of network latency, overcomes errors caused by missed dynamic keys, and defeats attempts by unauthorized remote users to gain control. The protocol is not suitable for real-time control, but is well suited for applications in which control latencies up to about 0.5 second are acceptable. The encryption scheme involves the use of both a dynamic and a private key, without any additional overhead that would degrade performance. The dynamic key is embedded in the equipment- or process-monitor data packets sent out by the controlled computer: in other words, the dynamic key is a subset of the data in each such data packet. The controlled computer maintains a history of the last 3 to 5 data packets for use in decrypting incoming control commands. In addition, the controlled computer records a private key (password) that is given to the remote computer. The encrypted incoming command is permuted by both the dynamic and private key. A person who records the command data in a given packet for hostile purposes cannot use that packet after the public key expires (typically within 3 seconds). Even a person in possession of an unauthorized copy of the command/remote-display software cannot use that software in the absence of the password. The use of a dynamic key embedded in the outgoing data makes the central-processing unit overhead very small. The use of a National Instruments DataSocket(TradeMark) (or equivalent) protocol or the User Datagram Protocol makes it possible to obtain reasonably short response times: Typical response times in event-driven control, using packets sized .300 bytes, are <0.2 second for commands issued from locations anywhere on Earth. The protocol requires that control commands represent absolute values of controlled parameters (e.g., a specified temperature), as distinguished from changes in values of controlled parameters (e.g., a specified increment of temperature). Each command is issued three or more times to ensure delivery in crowded networks. The use of absolute-value commands prevents additional (redundant) commands from causing trouble. Because a remote controlling computer receives "talkback" in the form of data packets from the controlled computer, typically within a time interval < or =1 s, the controlling computer can re-issue a command if network failure has occurred. The controlled computer, the process or equipment that it controls, and any human operator(s) at the site of the controlled equipment or process should be equipped with safety measures to prevent damage to equipment or injury to humans. These features could be a combination of software, external hardware, and intervention by the human operator(s). The protocol is not fail-safe, but by adopting these safety measures as part of the protocol, one makes the protocol a robust means of controlling remote processes and equipment by use of typical office computers via intranets and/or the Internet.

Lineberger, Lewis↗
NASA NTRS1978

Design of a microprocessor based packet switch

The design of a packet switch incorporating a minicomputer to control and process data packets in a communications system has been reported. This paper proposes a design which uses a 6500 series microprocessor to realize the functions of a message switch in order to evaluate the viability of microprocessors in this application. The proposed design realizes the functions of header analysis, packet security, error control and line prioritization. The system hardware and software are presented together with a brief description of operation.

Carville, D. E.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Actions Needed to Ensure Scientific and Technical Information is Adequately Reviewed at Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson Space Center, Langley Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center

This audit was initiated in response to a hotline complaint regarding the review, approval, and release of scientific and technical information (STI) at Johnson Space Center. The complainant alleged that Johnson personnel conducting export control reviews of STI were not fully qualified to conduct those reviews and that the reviews often did not occur until after the STI had been publicly released. NASA guidance requires that STI, defined as the results of basic and applied scientific, technical, and related engineering research and development, undergo certain reviews prior to being released outside of NASA or to audiences that include foreign nationals. The process includes technical, national security, export control, copyright, and trade secret (e.g., proprietary data) reviews. The review process was designed to preclude the inappropriate dissemination of sensitive information while ensuring that NASA complies with a requirement of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (the Space Act)1 to provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information resulting from NASA research activities. We focused our audit on evaluating the STI review process: specifically, determining whether the roles and responsibilities for the review, approval, and release of STI were adequately defined and documented in NASA and Center-level guidance and whether that guidance was effectively implemented at Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson Space Center, Langley Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center. Johnson was included in the review because it was the source of the initial complaint, and Goddard, Langley, and Marshall were included because those Centers consistently produce significant amounts of STI.

Information management↗
NASA NTRS2017

Considerations for an Integrated UAS CNS Architecture

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations. In Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under NASA Research Announcements (NRA) NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4. Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the objective to determine the most promising candidate technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS requirements and then develop architectures that satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. This contract is funded under NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project and proposes technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic Management (UTM) service.There is a need for accommodating large-scale populations of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in the national air space. Scale obviously impacts capacity planning for Communication, Navitation, and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating millions of small UASs (sUAS) nationwide? Does the communications network provide sufficient Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow air traffic control to securely address both UAS teams as a whole as well as individual UAS within each team? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Our objective is to identify revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives supporting UASs operating at all altitudes and in all airspace while accurately navigating in the absence of navigational aids. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The approach will identify CNS technology candidates that can meet the needs of the range of UAS missions to specific air traffic management applications where they will be most beneficial and cost effective.

Templin, Fred L.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Considerations for an Integrated UAS CNS Architecture

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations. In Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under NASA Research Announcements (NRA) NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4. Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the objective to determine the most promising candidate technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS requirements and then develop architectures that satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. This contract is funded under NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project and proposes technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic Management (UTM) service.There is a need for accommodating large-scale populations of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in the national air space. Scale obviously impacts capacity planning for Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating millions of small UASs (sUAS) nationwide? Does the communications network provide sufficient Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow air traffic control to securely address both UAS teams as a whole as well as individual UAS within each team? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Our objective is to identify revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives supporting UASs operating at all altitudes and in all airspace while accurately navigating in the absence of navigational aids. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The approach will identify CNS technology candidates that can meet the needs of the range of UAS missions to specific air traffic management applications where they will be most beneficial and cost effective.

Templin, Fred L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ISS Payload Operations Training During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Impacts and Solutions

Introduction: The onset and the protracted duration of the COVID-19 pandemic brought a dramatic and rapid transformation to almost every aspect of humanity in 2020. The world’s space agencies and their missions were not immune to the unpredictable and wide-sweeping changes. One discipline principally affected was mission operations and the various groups supporting that critical function. Mission support teams, especially for complex and crewed missions like the International Space Station (ISS) were forced to rapidly rethink how and where control center staff performed their vital work. Operations training – an essential element to mission ops, had unique hurdles to overcome. Operations training is responsible for preparing astronaut crews for their scientific missions, providing recurring proficiency and currency material to flight controllers, as well as ensuring new team members are ready to join their colleagues on console. Every element of training was impacted by COVID restrictions. From orientation and introductory classes for new controllers, training for scientists and payload developers, to simulations and advanced lessons, critical On the Job Training (OJT) and final evaluations; all aspects faced new challenges. Operations trainers at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, were forced to rethink, retool, and become more efficient with trainees and training resources in order to continue supporting payload operations on the ISS. Impacts and Barriers to Operations Training: The pandemic started in the United States in early March 2020. Immediately, NASA mandated that the support for ISS real-time operations was critical. As a result, physical access to the ISS Payload Operations Center was restricted to only those people supporting console operations. Thus, use of on-site NASA facilities and any trainer to trainee face-to-face interaction was not authorized. Trainers and trainees had to quickly shift to 100% remote learning. In the short term, this was not a problem since NASA had already prepared Information Technology (IT) resources that facilitated remote access to mission resources like classes, documents and teleconferences. However, instructors quickly discovered the classes that they were accustomed to delivering in a large classroom environment did not translate well to remote teaching. The lack of non-verbal communication with the class became a major barrier to instruction. Another significant hurdle to operations training was the mandate that all simulations could only be held remotely. The logistics of planning and executing even small simulations proved to be challenging, almost impossible, due to IT technology and public internet limitations. With simulations essentially stopped, as well as the restrictions on most OJT training, trainees were essentially stopped in their advancement towards certification. An additional barrier that had to be overcome was the formal documentation of the curriculum objectives. Even though NASA had been deliberately transitioning to electronic documents for years, some organizations were still relying on “pen and ink” documents to formalize training completion. The logistics of implementing secure and controlled e-signature documents in a standardized, NASA approved format had to be addressed. Lesson Learned and Efficiencies: Once the various limitations were identified, ISS trainers at MSFC discussed, proposed, and prioritized new options and techniques. Transitioning to all electronic learning materials and certifications was a relevantly easy fix. Teaching courses to large and diverse groups took additional shifts in the NASA training paradigm. Likewise, methods and procedures for preparing astronauts for their missions were forced to be revised. Simulation supervisors and their teams were also forced to find more efficient techniques to provide realistic training experience. Communication and approvals from management was essential. In every case, the ISS payload operations instructors found novel and efficient solutions to all functions listed above. This paper will discuss the factors and solutions payloads operations trainers found to keep scientific research on the ISS flying forward to mission success.

ISS Operations↗
NASA NTRS1991

NSI customer service representatives and user support office: NASA Science Internet

The NASA Science Internet, (NSI) was established in 1987 to provide NASA's Offices of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) missions with transparent wide-area data connectivity to NASA's researchers, computational resources, and databases. The NSI Office at NASA/Ames Research Center has the lead responsibility for implementing a total, open networking program to serve the OSSA community. NSI is a full-service communications provider whose services include science network planning, network engineering, applications development, network operations, and network information center/user support services. NSI's mission is to provide reliable high-speed communications to the NASA science community. To this end, the NSI Office manages and operates the NASA Science Internet, a multiprotocol network currently supporting both DECnet and TCP/IP protocols. NSI utilizes state-of-the-art network technology to meet its customers' requirements. THe NASA Science Internet interconnects with other national networks including the National Science Foundation's NSFNET, the Department of Energy's ESnet, and the Department of Defense's MILNET. NSI also has international connections to Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and several European countries. NSI cooperates with other government agencies as well as academic and commercial organizations to implement networking technologies which foster interoperability, improve reliability and performance, increase security and control, and expedite migration to the OSI protocols.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1929

Investigation of damping liquids for aircraft instruments

This report covers the results of an investigation carried on at the Bureau of Standards under a research authorization from, and with the financial assistance of, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The choice of a damping liquid for aircraft instruments is difficult owing to the range of temperature at which aircraft operate. Temperature changes affect the viscosity tremendously. The investigation was undertaken with the object of finding liquids of various viscosities otherwise suitable which had a minimum change in viscosity with temperature. The new data relate largely to solutions. The effect of temperature on the kinematic viscosity of the following liquids and solutions was determined in the temperature interval -18 degrees to +30 degrees C. (1) solutions of animal and vegetable oils in xylene. These were poppy-seed oil, two samples of neat's-foot oils, castor oil, and linseed oil. (2) solutions of mineral oil in xylene. These were Squibb's petrolatum of naphthene base and transformer oil. (3) glycerine solutions in ethyl alcohol and in mixture of 50-50 ethyl alcohol and water. (4) mixtures of normal butyl alcohol with methyl alcohol. (5) individual liquids, kerosene, mineral spirits, xylene, recoil oil. The apparatus consisted of four capillary-tube viscometers, which were immersed in a liquid bath in order to secure temperature control. The method of calibration and the related experimental data are presented.

Keulegan, G H↗