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At least 37 records · Page 2

Blockchain-Enabled Cyber-Secure Microgrid Control Using Consensus Algorithm

This paper proposes a distributed control method based on a consensus algorithm for distributed energy resources (DERs) using blockchain as a secure communication medium for cyber resilience. Each DER communicates with a local blockchain server that is maintained by the distributed ledger technology to allow for securely sharing local measurements among neighbouring assets to achieve the global control objectives, i.e., voltage and frequency regulation as well as accurate power sharing among the DERs, including collective grid-forming capability. To prove that the distributed control can retain system stability under a blockchain-induced variable communication delay, Lyapunov function-based stability analysis is carried out. This paper demonstrates the concept on an 11-bus test case developed in MATLAB Simulink, which has been modified from the IEEE 9-bus test case, to study dynamic operations of the five inverter-based DERs working with a blockchain-induced variable delay. The results validate the superior performance of the proposed control method, compared to heavily compromised operations of the other test cases without the security measure, affected by heavy communication delays and communication interruptions.

blockchains↗

PMU-Aided Voltage Security Assessment for a Wind Power Plant

Because wind power penetration levels in electric power systems are continuously increasing, voltage stability is a critical issue for maintaining power system security and operation. The traditional methods to analyze voltage stability can be classified into two categories: dynamic and steady-state. Dynamic analysis relies on time-domain simulations of faults at different locations; however, this method needs to exhaust faults at all locations to find the security region for voltage at a single bus. With the widely located phasor measurement units (PMUs), the Thevenin equivalent matrix can be calculated by the voltage and current information collected by the PMUs. This paper proposes a method based on a Thevenin equivalent matrix to identify system locations that will have the greatest impact on the voltage at the wind power plant's point of interconnection. The number of dynamic voltage stability analysis runs is greatly reduced by using the proposed method. The numerical results demonstrate the feasibility, effectiveness, and robustness of the proposed approach for voltage security assessment for a wind power plant.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Borders and Maritime Security Division : Renewable Energy Research Roadmap

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate, Borders and Maritime Security Division (BMD) is identifying next-generation renewable-energy solutions for inclusion in its research portfolio. Recognizing the potential of renewable energy to contribute to border security, BMD partnered with the U.S. Department of Energy National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)to examine border-security energy demands and to ensure that advances in renewable energy and energy storage lead to increased security in these areas. NREL examined the energy needs along U.S. borders--especially in remote areas--to identify opportunities to apply renewable energy solutions today and to define the near- and long-term research agendas that will position border components and activities to take advantage of renewable energy technologies in the future. This report provides a summary of the work that BMD and NREL have performed to date, outlines renewable energy technologies that have applicability to DHS operations, and highlights opportunities for future technology pilot projects or research initiatives that can supplement current technologies by developing solutions for DHS operational needs.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution: Security analysis and fast implementation

One of the most pressing issues in quantum key distribution (QKD) is the problem of detector side-channel attacks. To overcome this problem, researchers proposed an elegant “time-reversal” QKD protocol called measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), which is based on time-reversed entanglement swapping. However, MDI-QKD is more challenging to implement than standard point-to-point QKD. Recently, an intermediary QKD protocol called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD) has been proposed to overcome the drawbacks of MDI-QKD, with the hope that it would eventually lead to a more efficient detector side-channel-free QKD system. Here, we analyze the security of DDI-QKD and elucidate its security assumptions. We find that DDI-QKD is not equivalent to MDI-QKD, but its security can be demonstrated with reasonable assumptions. On the more practical side, we consider the feasibility of DDI-QKD and present a fast experimental demonstration (clocked at 625 MHz), capable of secret key exchange up to more than 90 km.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Ultra-secure RF Tags for Safeguards and Security - SBIR Phase II Final Report

This is the Final Report for the DOE Phase II SBIR project “Ultra-secure RF Tags for Safeguards and Security.” The topics covered herein include technical progress made, progress against the planned milestones and deliverables, project outcomes (results, collaborations, intellectual property, etc.), and a discussion on future expectations of deployment and impacts of the results of this work. In brief, all planned work for the project was successfully completed, on or ahead of schedule and on budget. The major accomplishment was the successful development of a very advanced passive ultra-secure RFID tag system with combined security features unmatched by any commercially available ones. These tags have high-level dynamic encrypted authentication, a novel tamper-proofing mechanism, system software including graphical user interfaces and networking, and integration with a fiber-optic seal mechanism. This is all accomplished passively (with no battery) by incorporating sophisticated hardware in the tag which harvests the energy from the RFID readers that are interrogating the tag. Based on initial feedback (and deployments) at DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), it is anticipated these tags and their offspring will meet DOE and international community needs for highly secure RFID systems. Beyond the accomplishment of those original objectives for the ultra-secure RF tags, major new spin-off thrusts from the original work were identified and successfully pursued with the cognizance of the DOE sponsor office. In particular, new classes of less sophisticated RFID tags were developed whose lineage derives from the core R&D thrusts of this SBIR. These RF “tag variants” have some, but not necessarily all, of the advanced characteristics described above and can therefore be less expensive and meet far wider markets. With customer pull from the DOE and its national laboratories, new RFID tags and systems (including custom readers and software) for government needs in asset management and tracking were developed. These were tested at a national laboratory and other government facilities, and resulted in immediate procurement actions by the government and deployment of these new systems. Thus, commercialization of the results of this Phase II DOE SBIR was already underway before the end of the SBIR itself. More importantly, operations involving asset management at selected DoE and government sites are already being impacted favorably and could have much broader impacts in the near future.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Workshop on Establishing and Operating a National Nuclear Security Support Centre Hypothetical Scenario: “Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre Strategy Implementation Plan”

[This is part of a hypothetical scenario-based exercise for workshop participants, based on the fictitious country "Centralia."] In prior years, as a part of efforts to strengthen and better sustain nuclear security within the State, Centralia requested through the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) framework that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conduct an expert mission on establishing and operating a national nuclear security support centre (NSSC). After the IAEA conducted the NSSC expert mission, members of the Centralia Committee on Nuclear Security (CNS) agreed to initiate the feasibility determination phase of establishing an NSSC, in line with the systematic process recommended by the IAEA. Centralia Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CNRA), as the designated lead organization for coordinating the feasibility determination process, prepared a Feasibility Report in collaboration with members of the CNS and based on input gathered among relevant national stakeholders. The report was presented to the National Security Advisor (NSA), who reviewed and approved the proposal for Centralia to proceed with establishing an NSSC. After Centralia moved into the planning phase for the Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre (CNSSC), per REF, the primary stakeholders of the centre jointly developed this strategy implementation plan, which provides an outline of the organizational structure, needs analysis, programme objectives, financial and project management, risk management, and other key aspects of the centre. This document will be reviewed and updated as necessary on a semi-annual basis during the project implementation period of establishing CNSSC.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Artificial Intelligence for (AI) Nuclear Security: Expert Perspectives on AI Priorities for the Office of International Nuclear Security

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform nuclear security operations, offering opportunities to enhance effectiveness while simultaneously introducing new challenges. As AI technologies rapidly evolve, agencies across the United States Government (USG) are researching, implementing, and evaluating various AI models and systems. Given the broad capabilities and applications of these technologies, it is essential for each agency to identify and articulate those areas where it can make meaningful contributions aligned with its mission and expertise. To address this need for strategic focus, in late Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025), the Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) established an AI Task Force (AITF) to gather input from subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding the most appropriate role INS could serve in researching, evaluating, or implementing AI for nuclear security. The AITF engaged 15 experts from national laboratories with backgrounds in cyber security, physical security, transport security, insider threat mitigation, nuclear engineering, human-systems engineering, and AI/ML development. This white paper summarizes the insights gathered from these SMEs and presents a potential roadmap for INS engagement with AI technologies. The recommendations outlined here are intended to inform INS leadership as they make strategic decisions about resource allocation and program direction in this rapidly evolving technological domain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Vision Strengthening our Nation through Nuclear Security

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s enduring mission is to protect our nation by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global nuclear threats, and providing our submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear propulsion. Although we have numerous strategic partners that enable, contribute to, and benefit from our efforts, no other organization, government or civilian, can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of the American people. In this area, we stand alone. This strategic vision pursues urgent change at a significant scale to develop creative approaches, make sustained investments, and be disciplined in our approach to develop a nuclear capability for our time and for the foreseeable future. It is incumbent on us to anticipate our future security challenges and ensure our country is ready to meet them. Not doing so would have far-reaching consequences. Failure to meet our vital mission objectives will erode confidence in the security that the United States strategic deterrent umbrella provides. In assessing the current mission environment in NNSA, we can count on one thing—change: The geopolitical environment for our deterrent is ever-changing Threats from rogue states and terrorists are evolving Our nuclear weapons and the infrastructure that supports them are aging Science and technology continue to move forward at an ever-increasing pace In this dynamic environment, it is not sufficient to remedy today’s situation and meet our current mission requirements. We must lean forward in the development, planning, and execution of programs that address our current challenges while developing the workforce, infrastructure, tools, and governance systems that will enable us to meet our deterrence, non-proliferation, and naval propulsion mission requirements for the next 50 years. We must embrace a next-generation enterprise that is flexible enough to respond to future challenges. With decades of stagnation following the end of the Cold War, we find ourselves in the unenviable position of implementing near-term fixes while using those lessons learned to better prepare for the future. Without sustained and predictable investments to restore and modernize our infrastructure, we will rapidly lose our ability to deliver on our promise of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, which will degrade our deterrent capability and render legacy weapon systems irrelevant to the defense of our nation. We must not and will not allow the next generation of our nuclear security enterprise to simply maintain the status quo. We have a storied past that guides us. For 75 years our enterprise has overcome every challenge, led the country in incredible scientific and engineering endeavors and discoveries, and successfully ensured constant vigilance in maintaining an effective deterrent, reducing global nuclear threats, and powering our nuclear navy. Now is the time for us to take decisive action in forging the enterprise of the future. As I have traveled to all of our labs, plants, and sites and met with people across our complex, I have been left with one overwhelming impression: the incredible workforce that makes up our nuclear security enterprise is up to all of the challenges we have before us. Together we can and will ensure that those in the future workforce have the resources and the responsive, agile infrastructure they need to maintain the systems of today and to design and field the systems of tomorrow.

Source record↗

Fusing Edge Computing with Transport Security by Leveraging the Controller Area Network Transport Security Tracking and Reporting (C-STAR) Unit

Rapid advances in embedded system complexity and capability provides exciting opportunities for transportation security deployment. Manufacturers and developers of these embedded systems continue to provide lower cost and more powerful solutions that can be leveraged by researchers and engineers. Furthermore, deploying these devices at the “edge” of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) infrastructure provides opportunities for highly capable applications in transport security. In an edge computation architecture, the device is co-located at the source of the data in the larger IoT structure – this provides computational capability at the location directly where the data is collected. For shipment transport security, this provides a direct compute node for digestion of data and mitigation actions in real-time. In our application, the vehicle provides a significant amount of this data that can be processed in real-time via the Controller Area Network Transport Security Tracking and Reporting (C-STAR) edge device. Utilization of a computational node located on the vehicle, such as the C-STAR, capitalizes on previously discussed opportunities of edge architectures. In this paper, we will discuss this security solution’s usability, current deployments, and scalability to further applications in transport security. First, we will cover the supported vehicle platforms that can leverage the C-STAR technology. This will be particularly relevant to medium- and heavy-duty vehicles transporting high-risk shipments. Second, we will speak to current deployments of the C-STAR that are ongoing. Finally, we will discuss additional areas for expansion such as maturing the onboard algorithms through continuing collaborations.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Secure Enclaves: An Isolation-centric Approach for Creating Secure High Performance Computing Environments

High performance computing environments are often used for a wide variety of workloads ranging from simulation, data transformation and analysis, and complex workflows to name just a few. These systems may process data at various security levels but in so doing are often enclaved at the highest security posture. This approach places significant restrictions on the users of the system even when processing data at a lower security level and exposes data at higher levels of confidentiality to a much broader population than otherwise necessary. The traditional approach of isolation, while effective in establishing security enclaves poses significant challenges for the use of shared infrastructure in HPC environments. This report details current state-of-the-art in virtualization, reconfigurable network enclaving via Software Defined Networking (SDN), and storage architectures and bridging techniques for creating secure enclaves in HPC environments.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Secure Software Defined Radio Project: Secure Wireless Systems for the Energy Sector (Briefing 6)

Strong industry interest in the SEL-FLT/FLR products has led to a large number of customers conducting various lab and field trial evaluations of the system. These trials are on-going but have allowed SEL to collect enough information about operation and deployment and security capabilities of the system to conclude the field demo phase of the project. The field-testing topical report has been completed and submitted. SEL has also prepared a SEL-FLT/FLR best practices guide based on learnings from the field demo phase of the project. This best practice guide has also been submitted. The final deliverable from this phase of the project is an economic and operational benefits white paper, which has also been written and submitted. The overall objective of the project, extending the cyber security capabilities of utility wired networks into last mile wireless networks has been successfully achieved. SEL chose to target a sensor network for implementation of this capability because it was one area of last mile networking where there was substantial need and opportunity. Based on customer interest in the product these efforts have been a success. Interest in, and support for many of the security features of the product has been expressed by customers trialing the product system. Key security features customers value are strong data encryption, sensor white listing, and use of secure account based log on for access to the system. These and other features of the product have gained strong acceptance from customers interested in purchasing these products. All project deliverables and tasks are now complete, and the project can be closed out.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

How to implement security controls for an information security program at CBRN facilities

This document was prepared by PNNL within the framework of Project 19 of the European Union Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative entitled, ''Development of procedures and guidelines to create and improve secure information management systems and data exchange mechanisms for CBRN materials under regulatory control.'' It provides management and workers at CBRN facilities, parent organization managers responsible for those facilities, and regulatory agencies (governmental and nongovernmental) with guidance on the best practices for protecting information security. The security mitigation approaches presented in this document were chosen because they present generally accepted guidance in an easy-to-understand manner, making it easier for facility personnel to grasp key concepts and envision how security controls could be implemented by the facility. This guidance is presented from a risk management perspective.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Designing a Secure Storage Repository for Sharing Scientific Datasets using Public Clouds

As Cloud platforms gain increasing traction among scientific and business communities for outsourcing storage, computing and content delivery, there is also growing concern about the associated loss of control over private data hosted in the Cloud. In this paper, we present an architecture for a secure data repository service designed on top of a public Cloud infrastructure to support multi-disciplinary scientific communities dealing with personal and human subject data, motivated by the smart power grid domain. Our repository model allows users to securely store and share their data in the Cloud without revealing the plain text to unauthorized users, the Cloud storage provider or the repository itself. The system masks file names, user permissions and access patterns while providing auditing capabilities with provable data updates.

Kumbhare, Alok↗

Using Mobile Agents and Overlay Networks to Secure Electrical Netoworks

ABSTRACT The use of wandering, mobile agents can provide a robust approach for managing, monitoring, and securing electrical distribution networks. However, the topological structure of electrical networks can affect system performance. For example, if the multi-agent system relies on a regular inspection rate (on average, points of interest are inspected with equal frequency), then locations that are not well connected will on average be inspected less frequently. This paper discusses creation and use of overlay networks that create a virtual grid graph can provide faster coverage and a more uniform average agent sampling rate. Using overlays agents wander a virtual neighborhood consisting of only points of interest that are interconnected in a regular fashion (each point has the same number of neighbors). Experimental results will show that an overlay can often provide better network coverage and a more uniform inspection rate, which can improve cyber security by providing a faster detection of threats

Dawes, Neal A.↗

System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance & Security: 3S Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors (Volume I)—Technical Evaluation of Safety Safeguards & Security

Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors—increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aim of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Protecting Websites from Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks: A Novel Configuration using Pulse Secure © Pulse Connect Secure © and Virtual Web Application Firewall (vWAF)

Cross-site scripting (XSS), one of the most prevalent forms of client-side attacks, is when bad actors attempt to access sensitive information from the backend web server and other systems on the backend network. Some XSS attacks attempt to access client-side sensitive information, such as cookies. Web application firewalls (WAFs) are a first line of defense where common Uniform Resource Locator (URL) patterns are analyzed to detect and block known attacks. This paper describes a novel configuration using the Pulse Secure © Pulse Connect Secure © (PCS © ) Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network software and Virtual Web Application Firewall (vWAF) that protects a website from XSS attacks. This paper also presents novel aspects of the configuration that control the redirection of traffic through the vWAF and provide fine-grained behavioral control at the application level while decoupling the PCS and vWAF configurations. The intended audience for this paper comprises system and site administrators who are familiar with standard web server environments. These configuration details might prove useful during the design of a more secure infrastructure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗