Results for “risk management flight projects” — Page 2

NASA NTRS2011

Ensuring Success of Adaptive Control Research Through Project Lifecycle Risk Mitigation

Lessons Learne: 1. Design-out unnecessary risk to prevent excessive mitigation management during flight. 2. Consider iterative checkouts to confirm or improve human factor characteristics. 3. Consider the total flight test profile to uncover unanticipated human-algorithm interactions. 4. Consider test card cadence as a metric to assess test readiness. 5. Full-scale flight test is critical to development, maturation, and acceptance of adaptive control laws for operational use.

Pavlock, Kate M.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer's Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer’s Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Propulsion System Major Events and the Final 22 Flights

Numerous lessons have been documented from the Space Shuttle Propulsion elements. Major events include loss of the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's) on STS-4 and shutdown of a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) during ascent on STS-51F. On STS-112 only half the pyrotechnics fired during release of the vehicle from the launch pad, a testament for redundancy. STS-91 exhibited freezing of a main combustion chamber pressure measurement and on STS-93 nozzle tube ruptures necessitated a low liquid level oxygen cut off of the main engines. A number of on pad aborts were experienced during the early program resulting in delays. And the two accidents, STS-51L and STS-107, had unique heritage in history from early program decisions and vehicle configuration. Following STS-51L significant resources were invested in developing fundamental physical understanding of solid rocket motor environments and material system behavior. And following STS-107, the risk of ascent debris was better characterized and controlled. Situational awareness during all mission phases improved, and the management team instituted effective risk assessment practices. The last 22 flights of the Space Shuttle, following the Columbia accident, were characterized by remarkable improvement in safety and reliability. Numerous problems were solved in addition to reduction of the ascent debris hazard. The Shuttle system, though not as operable as envisioned in the 1970's, successfully assembled the International Space Station (ISS). By the end of the program, the remarkable Space Shuttle Propulsion system achieved very high performance, was largely reusable, exhibited high reliability, and was a heavy lift earth to orbit propulsion system. During the program a number of project management and engineering processes were implemented and improved. Technical performance, schedule accountability, cost control, and risk management were effectively managed and implemented. Award fee contracting was implemented to provide performance incentives. The Certification of Flight Readiness and Mission Management processes became very effective. A key to the success of the propulsion element projects was related to relationships between the MSFC project office and support organizations with their counterpart contractor organizations. The teams worked diligently to understand and satisfy requirements and achieve mission success.

Owen, James W.↗

NASA NTRS2000

The New Millenium Program: Serving Earth and Space Sciences

NASA has exciting plans for space science and Earth observations during the next decade. A broad range of advanced spacecraft and measurement technologies will be needed to support these plans within the existing budget and schedule constraints. Many of these technology needs are common to both NASA's Office of Earth Science (OES) and Office of Space Sciences (OSS). Even though some breakthrough technologies have been identified to address these needs, project managers have traditionally been reluctant to incorporate them into flight programs because their inherent development risk. To accelerate the infusion of new technologies into its OES and OSS missions, NASA established the New Millennium Program (NMP). This program analyzes the capability needs of these enterprises, identifies candidate technologies to address these needs, incorporates advanced technology suites into validation flights, validates them in the relevant space environment, and then proactively infuses the validated technologies into future missions to enhance their capabilities while reducing their life cycle cost. The NMP employs a cross-enterprise Science Working Group, the NASA Enterprise science and technology roadmaps to define the capabilities needed by future Earth and Space science missions. Additional input from the science community is gathered through open workshops and peer-reviewed NASA Research Announcement (NRAs) for advanced measurement concepts. Technology development inputs from the technology organizations within NASA, other government agencies, federally funded research and development centers (FFRDC's), U.S. industry, and academia are sought to identify breakthrough technologies that might address these needs. This approach significantly extends NASA's technology infrastructure. To complement other flight test programs that develop or validate of individual components, the NMP places its highest priority on system-level validations of technology suites in the relevant space environment. This approach is not needed for all technologies, but it is usually essential to validate advanced system architectures or new measurement concepts. The NMP has recently revised its processes for defining candidate validation flights, and selecting technologies for these flights. The NMP now employs integrated project formulation teams, 'Which include scientists, technologists, and mission planners, to incorporate technology suites into candidate validation flights. These teams develop competing concepts, which can be rigorously evaluated prior to selection for flight. The technology providers for each concept are selected through an open, competitive, process during the project formulation phase. If their concept is selected for flight, they are incorporated into the Project Implementation Team, which develops, integrates, tests, launches, and operates the technology validation flight. Throughout the project implementation phase, the Implementation Team will document and disseminate their validation results to facilitate the infusion of their validated technologies into future OSS and OES science missions. The NMP has successfully launched its first two Deep Space flights for the OSS, and is currently implementing its first two Earth Orbiting flights for the OES. The next OSS and OES flights are currently being defined. Even though these flights are focused on specific Space Science and Earth Science themes, they are designed to validate a range of technologies that could benefit both enterprises, including advanced propulsion, communications, autonomous operations and navigation, multifunctional structures, microelectronics, and advanced instruments. Specific examples of these technologies will be provided in our presentation. The processes developed by the NMP also provide benefits across the Space and Earth Science enterprises. In particular, the extensive, nation-wide technology infrastructure developed by the NMP enhances the access to breakthrough technologies for both enterprises.

Li, Fuk K.↗

NASA NTRS1998

Crew Alertness Management on the Flight Deck: Cognitive and Vigilance Performance

This project had three broad goals: (1) to identify environmental and organismic risks to performance of long-haul cockpit crews; (2) to assess how cognitive and psychomotor vigilance performance, and subjective measures of alertness, were affected by work-rest schedules typical of long-haul cockpit crews; and (3) to determine the alertness-promoting effectiveness of behavioral and technological countermeasures to fatigue on the flight deck. During the course of the research, a number of studies were completed in cooperation with the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Program. The publications emerging from this project are listed in a bibliography in the appendix. Progress toward these goals will be summarized below according to the period in which it was accomplished.

Dinges, David F.↗

NASA NTRS2001

The Role of Space Medicine in Management of Risk in Spaceflight

The purpose of Space Medicine is to ensure mission success by providing quality and comprehensive health care throughout all mission phases to optimize crew health and performance and to prevent negative long-term health consequences. Space flight presents additional hazards and associated risks to crew health, performance, and safety. With an extended human presence in space it is expected that illness and injury will occur on orbit, which may present a significant threat to crew health and performance and to mission success. Maintaining crew health, safety and performance and preventing illness and injury are high priorities necessary for mission success and agency goals. Space flight health care should meet the standards of practice of evidence based clinical medicine. The function of Space Medicine is expected to meet the agency goals as stated in the 1998 NASA Strategic Plan and the priorities established by the Critical Path Roadmap Project. The Critical Path Roadmap Project is an integrated NASA cross-disciplinary strategy to assess, understand, mitigate, and manage the risks associated with long-term exposure to the space flight environment. The evidence based approach to space medicine should be standardized, objective process yielding expected results and establishing clinical practice standards while balancing individual risk with mission (programmatic) risk. The ability to methodically apply available knowledge and expertise to individual and mission health issues will ensure appropriate priorities are assigned and resources are allocated. NASA Space Medicine risk management process is a combined clinical and engineering approach. Competition for weight, power, volume, cost, and crew time must be balanced in making decisions about the care of individual crew with competing agency resources.

Clark, Jonathan B.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Learning Lessons from the X-37 Project

The X-37 was planned as an automated vehicle capable of flight-testing new aerospace technologies in combined environments that are beyond the capability of existing ground or flight platforms. Flight demonstration with the X-37 architecture and configuration in relevant environments was planned to reduce the risk of developing launch vehicle technologies for sustainable, affordable exploration and other aerospace applications. Current plans are for the X-37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle (ALTV) to be atmospheric tested in 2005 from Scaled Composite s White Knight carrier aircraft at up to 40,000 feet over California's Mojave Spaceport, with landing and turnaround maintenance performed. The Flight Operations Control Center will conduct the mission, using a streamlined operations concept. Taxi-tow and captive-carry tests will be conducted prior to the atmospheric-test series. Sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) with NASA participation, technical objectives are to: (1) mature Computed Air Data System/Remote Pressure Sensor technology, (2) manage energy during Terminal Area Energy Management/Heading Alignment Cone maneuvers, and (3) validate the aerodatabase. The X-37 Project began in 1999 under a cooperative agreement as an element of NASA's Future X Program and transitioned to a NASA Research Announcement under the Space Launch Initiative. In mid-2004, NASA transferred ownership to DARPA, with its heritage of performing high-risk, high-payoff research and development (R&D). NASA contributes technical expertise, including risk analysis and system integration. The Boeing Company is the prime contractor, with nationwide suppliers. This partnership exemplifies the synergy attainable when NASA Centers, other Government agencies, and industry work together toward a common goal - contributing to the knowledge base for U.S. exploration and other aerospace endeavors. The X-37 team represents a range of space transportation disciplines - from engineering to management. Some members have been with the project since its inception. All have gained priceless experience during the design, manufacturing, and testing of the ALTV, as well as through developing advanced orbital flight technologies, such as state-of-the-art Thermal Protection Systems and hot structures. Throughout this process, the X-37 Project team captures lessons that are directly applicable to other such efforts. The upcoming ALTV flights offer another dimension of data and first-hand experience that will prove invaluable to those designing new generations of reusable spacecraft. And ongoing technology developments will expand the aerospace knowledge base. Delivering prototype hardware is always a risky proposition. During the course of this effort, the X-37 team has experienced many challenging opportunities, delivering significant accomplishments and learning numerous lessons in the process. The ability to manage the risk landscape is key to overcoming obstacles, especially technical hurdles that are encountered in progressing hardware from design to flight. The approach to managing risk under this partnership is evolving but, in general, the team allocates resources to reduce the likelihood of severe-consequence risks, thus maximizing mission success and ensuring that the X-37 Project delivers value to its stakeholders. As the team sharpens its focus on operations, it continues to contribute knowledge to those who would undertake high-risk, high-payoff R&D and provides valuable experience to implement the Vision for Space Exploration.

Turner, Susan↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗

DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2017

High-Fidelity Multi-Rotor Unmanned Aircraft System Simulation Development for Trajectory Prediction Under Off-Nominal Flight Dynamics

The NASA Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project is conducting research to enable civilian low-altitude airspace and UAS operations. A goal of this project is to develop probabilistic methods to quantify risk during failures and off nominal flight conditions. An important part of this effort is the reliable prediction of feasible trajectories during off-nominal events such as control failure, atmospheric upsets, or navigation anomalies that can cause large deviations from the intended flight path or extreme vehicle upsets beyond the normal flight envelope. Few examples of high-fidelity modeling and prediction of off-nominal behavior for small UAS (sUAS) vehicles exist, and modeling requirements for accurately predicting flight dynamics for out-of-envelope or failure conditions are essentially undefined. In addition, the broad range of sUAS aircraft configurations already being fielded presents a significant modeling challenge, as these vehicles are often very different from one another and are likely to possess dramatically different flight dynamics and resultant trajectories and may require different modeling approaches to capture off-nominal behavior. NASA has undertaken an extensive research effort to define sUAS flight dynamics modeling requirements and develop preliminary high fidelity six degree-of-freedom (6-DOF) simulations capable of more closely predicting off-nominal flight dynamics and trajectories. This research has included a literature review of existing sUAS modeling and simulation work as well as development of experimental testing methods to measure and model key components of propulsion, airframe and control characteristics. The ultimate objective of these efforts is to develop tools to support UTM risk analyses and for the real-time prediction of off-nominal trajectories for use in the UTM Risk Assessment Framework (URAF). This paper focuses on modeling and simulation efforts for a generic quad-rotor configuration typical of many commercial vehicles in use today. An overview of relevant off-nominal multi-rotor behaviors will be presented to define modeling goals and to identify the prediction capability lacking in simplified models of multi-rotor performance. A description of recent NASA wind tunnel testing of multi-rotor propulsion and airframe components will be presented illustrating important experimental and data acquisition methods, and a description of preliminary propulsion and airframe models will be presented. Lastly, examples of predicted off-nominal flight dynamics and trajectories from the simulation will be presented.

Foster, John V.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Cross-Cutting Risk Framework: Mining Data for Common Risks Across the Portfolio

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines risk management as an integrated framework, combining risk-informed decision making and continuous risk management to foster forward-thinking and decision making from an integrated risk perspective. Therefore, decision makers must have access to risks outside of their own project to gain the knowledge that provides the integrated risk perspective. Through the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Flight Projects Directorate (FPD) Business Change Initiative (BCI), risks were integrated into one repository to facilitate access to risk data between projects. With the centralized repository, communications between the FPD, project managers, and risk managers improved and GSFC created the cross-cutting risk framework (CCRF) team. The creation of the consolidated risk repository, in parallel with the initiation of monthly FPD risk managers and risk governance board meetings, are now providing a complete risk management picture spanning the entire directorate. This paper will describe the challenges, methodologies, tools, and techniques used to develop the CCRF, and the lessons learned as the team collectively worked to identify risks that FPD programs projects had in common, both past and present.

risk-informed decision making↗

NASA NTRS2008

A Successful Infusion Process for Enabling Lunar Exploration Technologies

The NASA Vision for Space Exploration begins with a more reliable flight capability to the International Space Station and ends with sending humans to Mars. An important stepping stone on the path to Mars encompasses human missions to the Moon. There is little doubt throughout the stakeholder community that new technologies will be required to enable this Vision. However, there are many factors that influence the ability to successfully infuse any technology including the technical risk, requirement and development schedule maturity, and, funds available. This paper focuses on effective infusion processes that have been used recently for the technologies in development for the lunar exploration flight program, Constellation. Recent successes with Constellation customers are highlighted for the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) Projects managed by NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC). Following an overview of the technical context of both the flight program and the technology capability mapping, the process is described for how to effectively build an integrated technology infusion plan. The process starts with a sound risk development plan and is completed with an integrated project plan, including content, schedule and cost. In reality, the available resources for this development are going to change over time, necessitating some level of iteration in the planning. However, the driving process is based on the initial risk assessment, which changes only when the overall architecture changes, enabling some level of stability in the process.

Over, Ann P.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Learning Lessons from the X-37 Project

The X-37 was planned as an automated vehicle capable of flight-testing new aerospace technologies in combined environments that are beyond the capability of existing ground or flight platforms. Flight demonstration with the X-37 architecture and configuration in relevant environments was planned to reduce the risk of developing launch vehicle technologies for sustainable, affordable exploration and other aerospace applications. Current plans are for the X-37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle (ALTV) to be atmospheric tested in 2005 from Scaled Composite's White Knight carrier aircraft at up to 40,000 feet over California's Mojave Spaceport, with and turnaround maintenance performed. The fight Operations Control Center will conduct the mission, using a streamlined operations concept. Taxi-tow and captive-carry tests will be conducted prior to the atmospheric-test series. Sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) with NASA participation, technical objectives are to: (1) mature Computed Air Data System/Remote Pressure Sensor technology, (2) manage energy during Terminal Area Energy Management/Heading Alignment Cone maneuvers, and (3) validate the aerodatabase. The X-37 Project began in 1999 under a cooperative agreement as an element of NASA's Future X Program and transitioned to a NASA Research Announcement under the Space Launch Initiative. In mid-2004, NASA transferred ownership to DARPA, with its heritage of performing high-risk, high-payoff research and development. NASA contributes technical expertise, including risk analysis and system integration. The Boeing Company is the prime contractor, with nationwide suppliers. This recent partnership exemplifies the synergy attainable when NASA Centers, other Government agencies, and industry work together toward a common goal - contributing to the knowledge base for U.S. exploration and other aerospace endeavors. The X-37 team represents a range of space transportation disciplines - from engineering to management. Some members have been with the project since its inception. All have gained priceless experience during the design, manufacturing, and testing of the ALTV, as well as through developing advanced orbital flight technologies, such as state-of-the-art Thermal Protection Systems and hot structures. Throughout this process, the X-37 Project team captures lessons that are directly applicable to other such efforts. The upcoming ALTV flights offer another dimension of data and first-hand experience that will prove invaluable to those designing new generations of reusable spacecraft. And ongoing technology developments will expand the aerospace knowledge base. Delivering prototype hardware is always a risky proposition. During the course of the X-37 effort, the team has experienced many challenging opportunities, delivering significant accomplishments and learning numerous lessons in the process. The ability to manage the risk landscape is key to overcoming obstacles, especially technical hurdles that are encountered in progressing hardware from design to flight. The approach to managing risk under this partnership is evolving but, in general, the team allocates resources to reduce the likelihood of severe-consequence risks, thus maximizing mission success and ensuring that the X-37 Project delivers value to its stakeholders. As the team sharpens its focus on operations, it continues to contribute knowledge to those who would undertake high-risk, high-payoff research and development and provides valuable experience to implement the exploration vision.

Turner, Susan↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA NTRS1993

Mission operations and command assurance: Instilling quality into flight operations

Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA) is a Total Quality Management (TQM) task on JPL projects to instill quality in flight mission operations. From a system engineering view, MO&CA facilitates communication and problem-solving among flight teams and provides continuous process improvement to reduce the probability of radiating incorrect commands to a spacecraft. The MO&CA task has evolved from participating as a member of the spacecraft team to an independent team reporting directly to flight project management and providing system level assurance. JPL flight projects have benefited significantly from MO&CA's effort to contain risk and prevent rather than rework errors. MO&CA's ability to provide direct transfer of knowledge allows new projects to benefit from previous and ongoing flight experience.

Welz, Linda L.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Probing Aircraft Flight Test Hazard Mitigation for the Alternative Fuel Effects on Contrails & Cruise Emissions (ACCESS) Research Team

The Alternative Fuel Effects on Contrails & Cruise Emissions (ACCESS) Project Integration Manager requested in July 2012 that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) form a team to independently assess aircraft structural failure hazards associated with the ACCESS experiment and to identify potential flight test hazard mitigations to ensure flight safety. The ACCESS Project Integration Manager subsequently requested that the assessment scope be focused predominantly on structural failure risks to the aircraft empennage raft empennage.

Kelly, Michael J.↗