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Emergency and incident response planning requires a detailed plan be in place. Each incident may be unique, and no plan can be expected to give an exact solution to every problem; however, a step-by-step approach for responding to a problem will ensure appropriate response.
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Task Group 120 (TG120) is developing ICRP recommendations for radiological protection for a wide range of radiation accidents and malicious events, complementing those given in ICRP Publication 146 (2020) for large nuclear accidents. The scope includes accidents involving criticalities, operating faults, and fires and explosions in nuclear facilities, inadvertent damage to sealed radiation sources, as well as malicious events, such as sabotage of nuclear facilities or materials, use of radiological dispersal devices, the contamination of food and drinking water supplies, and the deployment of nuclear weapons. A template has been designed to collate relevant information on a wide range of case studies and hypothetical malicious scenarios to ensure that the recommendations developed are broadly applicable and comprehensive. For all scenarios, a graded approach to protection is being taken, accepting that specific guidance may be required for some distinctive aspects, for example, protection during times of armed conflict. This paper provides an overview of the scenarios and scope of the work of TG120, including some of the radiological and non-radiological impacts of radiation emergencies, along the response and recovery timeline.
The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) provides a comprehensive bicoastal radiological and nuclear emergency response to United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. A major part of the support is to provide systematic radiological search for lost or stolen sources, Radiological search is a core competency of the NNSS with its origin dating back to nuclear weapons test era. Search operations from multiple platforms is the common thread among the various NNSS assets, which include Aerial Measuring System (AMS), Maritime Support Team (MST), National Capitol Response (NCR), National Search Team (NST) and Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). Information collected and analyzed during search operations add to the actionable intelligence for the law enforcement agencies and provide valuable guidance for the tactical resolution of a nuclear or radiological crisis. Search is an intelligence and situational awareness driven operation and most often called upon during a radiological emergency, however it can be brought into play to thwart a potential threat by providing monitoring and surveillance support. The Office of Nuclear Incident Response (NA-84) serves as the technical leader in responding to and resolving nuclear and radiological threats worldwide and integrates its efforts with other NNSA stakeholders (e.g., NNSA office of Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation NA-22). The response includes expertise in the areas of radiological search, render safe, and consequence management. This article will discuss the methodologies, tools, procedures, and techniques to extract maximum radiological characterization information (isotopic composition, activities for individual isotopes, threat assessment etc.) from field monitoring or Search operation data.
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This document provides guidance on how to apply data quality practices to measurements and information collected during the response and recovery to a radiological release. The process of applying data quality practices to measurement data is called data assessment. All data quality practices applied during a radiological incident response must balance the rigorous and time-consuming process normally applied to, for example, site decommissioning and decontamination, with the time- and resource-constraints present during emergency response. The guidance in this document presents the application of data quality practices for data assessment in a graded approach, where the recommended rigor increases as the response continues through its phases and as time and resource constraints relax.
The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is an operational center, available on request by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to respond to nuclear and radiological incidents as described in the National Response Framework (NRF). Under the Federal Interagency Operational Plan for Response and Recovery’s Nuclear/Radiological Annex, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has the responsibility to maintain the operational readiness of the FRMAC during the emergency phase of an event. FRMAC is initially established and managed by the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) and serves as an interagency operations center with representatives from various federal, state, and local radiological response organizations. The purpose of the FRMAC is to assist state, local, tribal, and territorial governments (SLTT) in their mission to protect the health and well-being of their citizens with: • Verified radiation measurements. • Interpretations of radiation distributions based on Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), or local Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs). • Characterization of overall radiological conditions. Once a declaration to respond to a radiological emergency has been made, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Headquarters will coordinate the response in consultation with the cognizant NNSA Regional Coordinating Office (RCO). Each of the eight RCOs maintain a 24-hour response capability for radiological emergencies that may occur in states served by its region. When a FRMAC is established, it operates under the parameters of the Incident Command System (ICS), as defined in the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) construct. The Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) will be activated immediately during normal business hours (Pacific Time Zone), and within two hours otherwise. The Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT) is prepared for deployment within six hours after activation. Along with the assets, FRMAC provides an operational framework for coordinating of all federal off-site radiological monitoring and assessment activities during a response to a radiological emergency to support the coordinating agency and SLTT governments. Potential radiological emergencies that fall within FRMAC vary widely in terms of the area affected, the nature of the contamination, and the scope of the government’s response. Detonation of a nuclear device, accidental release of radiation from a nuclear power plant, and a terrorist threat are just a few of the many possible scenarios FRMAC must be prepared to address. Through all this, supporting the state, local, and tribal organizations in the protection of the public remains the primary goal of the federal response.
The MELCOR Accident Consequence Calculation System (MACCS), used for safety basis accident analyses at SRS, implements adjustment factors to consider the increased vertical turbulence associated with local surface roughness and the increased lateral turbulence associated with time-based plume meander. The two models used for SRS emergency planning radiological consequence assessment, i.e., Hotspot and Puff/Plume, currently do not have an option to input or apply diffusion adjustments for meander or surface roughness. Adverse meteorology conditions at SRS have been determined as E stability class and 1.3 meters per second wind speed for ground level releases. This is the input used for emergency planning models. Contrastingly safety basis analyses use a different input, representing adverse meteorology values as F stability class and wind speeds of 1.3 meters per second (for a ground level release). This results in an apparent discrepancy between the two approaches. In this report we document the differing modeling assumptions, discuss the logic behind each modeling approach used to represent local roughness and plume meander conditions, and numerically compare dispersion coefficients and concentration estimates obtained from each set of model inputs.
A nuclear criticality results in the emission of both neutron and gamma radiation and can produce doses to personnel near the event that exceed 0.1 Gy (10 rad). The primary purpose of nuclear accident dosimetry is to rapidly identify affected personnel in need of prompt medical treatment and to reassure personnel who have been only minimally exposed. While accurate dosimetry is desired, it must be recognized that dose determinations made from whole-body dosimeters or simple triage methods are very rough estimates and contain significant uncertainties. Even when accounting for factors like varying neutron energy spectra, mean photon energies, body orientation within the radiation field, and transient effects on dosimeter response, etc., the end value is a dosimetric quantity defined for very specific radiological conditions and determined within a simple phantom usually at a single depth. Of more importance is the biological response to the radiation, which will vary by person and can be affected by the individual’s radiation sensitivity, age, gender, mass, and underlying health conditions. The overall biological, person-specific response to a given dose cannot be precisely determined except by patient symptom observation and individual biological dosimetry (e.g. chromosome analysis, lymphocyte ratios, etc.). This work describes and discusses the criticality accident dosimetry program at the Y-12 National Security Complex, a United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration facility. In conclusion, the primary goals of the Y-12 accident dosimetry program are, among others, the rapid identification of significantly exposed persons, prompt routing of exposed workers for medical evaluation and treatment, and the ultimate processing of dosimeters to assign doses to personnel.
Here, the resuspension of radioactively contaminated particles in a built environment, such as from urban surfaces like foliage, building exteriors, and roadways, is described empirically by current plume and dosimetry models used for hazard assessment and long-term risk purposes. When applying these models to radiological contamination emergencies affecting urban areas, the accuracy of the results for recent contamination deposition is impacted in two main ways. First, the data supporting the underlying resuspension equations was acquired for open, quiescent conditions with no vehicle traffic or human activities, so it is not necessarily representative of the urban environment. Second, mechanical disturbance by winds in urban canyons and during emergency operations caused by vehicle traffic and human activities are not directly considered by the equations. Accordingly, plume and dosimetry models allow the user to input certain compensating values, but the models do not necessarily supply users instructions on what values to use. This manuscript reviews the available literature to comprehensively and consistently pool data for resuspension due to mechanically induced resuspension applicable to urban contamination. Because there are few studies that directly measured radioactive resuspension due to vehicles and pedestrians, this review novelly draws on a range of other studies involving non-radioactive particles, ranging from outdoor air pollution emissions to indoor allergen transport. The results lead to tabulated, recommended values for specific conditions in the emergency phase to help users of plume and dosimetry models maintain the conservativeness needed to properly capture the potential radiation dose posed by mechanically induced resuspension. These values are of benefit to model users until better data are available. The results also suggest the types of data that may result in improved plume and dose modeling.
Presentation to be submitted to and presented during the Health Physics Society (HPS) Annual Meeting 2023, July 23–27, 2023, National Harbor, MD (http://burkclients.com/hps/2023AM/site/index.html).
Manuscript to submit for publication in the Proceedings of the 2021 SPIE Optics + Photonics Conference,1–5 August, 2021, San Diego, CA.
Following a radiological or nuclear emergency, workers, responders and the public may be internally contaminated with radionuclides. Screening, monitoring and assessing any internal contamination and providing necessary medical treatment, especially when a large number of individuals are involved, is challenging. Experience gained and lessons learned from the management of previous incidents would help to identify gaps in knowledge and capabilities on preparedness for and response to radiation emergencies. In this paper, eight largescale and five workplace radiological and nuclear incidents are reviewed cross 14 technical areas, under the broader topics of emergency preparedness, emergency response and recovery processes. The review findings suggest that 1) new strategies, algorithms and technologies are explored for rapid screening of large populations; 2) exposure assessment and dose estimation in emergency response and dose reconstruction in recovery process are supported by complementary sources of information, including ‘citizen science’; 3) surge capacity for monitoring and dose assessment is coordinated through national and international laboratory networks; 4) evidence-based guidelines for medical management and follow-up of internal contamination are urgently needed; 5) mechanisms for international and regional access to medical countermeasures are investigated and implemented; 6) long-term health and medical follow up programs are designed and justified; and 7) capabilities and capacity developed for emergency response are sustained through adequate resource allocation, routine nonemergency use of technical skills in regular exercises, training, and continuous improvement.
Users generates a fission product inventory from either reactor operating history or a nuclear criticality event. RSAC-7 models the effects of high-efficiency particulate air filters or other cleanup systems and calculates the decay and ingrowth during transport through processes, facilities, and the environment. Doses are calculated for inhalation, air immersion, ground surface, ingestion, and cloud gamma pathways. RSAC-7 is used as a tool to evaluate accident conditions in emergency response scenarios, radiological sabotage events, and safety basis accident consequences.
The Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) Program Version 7.4 (RSAC-7) is the newest version of the RSAC legacy code. RSAC-7 calculates the consequences of a release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. Users generates a fission product inventory from either reactor operating history or a nuclear criticality event. RSAC-7 models the effects of high-efficiency particulate air filters or other cleanup systems and calculates the decay and ingrowth during transport through processes, facilities, and the environment. Doses are calculated for inhalation, air immersion, ground surface, ingestion, and cloud gamma pathways. RSAC-7 is used as a tool to evaluate accident conditions in emergency response scenarios, radiological sabotage events, and safety basis accident consequences. This users’ manual contains the mathematical models and operating instructions for RSAC-7. Instructions, screens, and examples are provided to guide the user through the functions provided by RSAC-7. This program is designed for users who are familiar with radiological dose assessment methods.
On 25–26 March 2023, the U.S. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) held its 2024 annual meeting in Bethesda, Maryland, USA. The NCRP dates from 1929, and this meeting celebrated the 60th anniversary of receiving a U.S. Congressional Charter. For this annual meeting the NCRP felt it was essential to provide a briefing about advanced and small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). The Journal of Radiological Protection is delighted to publish the following synopsis of material presented at the U.S. NCRP meeting. This synopsis is divided into five sections. The first section provides an overview of the whole meeting together with summaries of two context setting overview papers. The following four sessions of this synopsis are specific to advanced and small modular nuclear power reactors. The meeting also included keynote presentations by three of NCRP annual award recipients. The meeting topical areas were Technology Overview and Critical Issues. The individual papers laid the groundwork to understanding reactor technologies, terminology, and the fundamental concepts and processes for electrical generation. The perspectives of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and states, through the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors were provided. The papers included a discussion of diverse topics including potential emergency preparedness considerations, radiological survey requirements, an evaluation of the future of nuclear power, the economics of reactors (both large and small), and the critical issues identified by the recent National Academies of Sciences’ study on advanced reactors. Here, the summary papers were developed to briefly document the major points and concepts presented during the oral papers presented at the 2024 NCRP Annual Meeting. The meeting heralded the dawn of a new era for commercial nuclear power.
On 2 May 2019, during the 137 Cs source recovery operation, a source capsule in a research irradiator containing approximately 77.1 TBq was breached. Based on a geometric reconstruction analysis of the damage to the capsule, approximately 46.3 GBq (0.04%) was impacted by the chop saw (grinder) inside a mobile hot cell on the loading dock at the University of Washington Harborview Research and Training (HRT) Building. A very small fraction of the material impacted, less than 1%, was released from the mobile hot cell and then to the rest of the HRT Building. The objectives of this project were to assess the accidental release of 137 CsCl and its implications related to emergency response methods and the ramifications of 137 CsCl transport. The phenomenology of this event was also compared with past alkali halide dispersal events. The vast number of measurements and samples collected by the remediation contractors, the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency Support Team, and the small number of retrospective samples collected by the authors informed the analysis. The techniques included (1) autoradiography and electron microscopy of samples collected from the HRT Building and the irradiator, (2) 3D visualization of deposition on surfaces and within the ventilation system, and (3) a study of the damage to the source capsule to evaluate the Cs particle size and particle composition due to the grinding accident. Subsequently, the cesium contaminant transport through the numerous pathways in the building was reconstructed to assess the deposition on surfaces as a function of particle size. Furthermore, the implications for emergency response are relevant to data quality and management. A Data Quality Objective guides data collection methods so that they have appropriate accuracy and precision for the intended application. Recommendations were made with respect to the sample collection protocols and archiving of samples.
The article describes two robot platfoems built at RSLA that provides a capability of unmanned radiation measurements in contaminated areas where human presence is restricted. The system collects radiation dose rates, gamma energy spevtra and send the data to the cloud using a smart phone. Data can be analyzed in the cloud
Identifying radiological abnormalities is critical during emergencies at nuclear facilities. This facilitates a necessity for the Emergency Management (EM) to map baseline radiation levels at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The INL uses scintillation detectors to measure radioactivity and gamma spectrums; but, because they are heavy and costly, these detectors can be impractical for mapping radiological areas. This presentation will establish initial radiological heat maps for emergencies and test the Radiacode-103G — a handheld scintillator with GPS and Bluetooth capability with a Gadolinium Aluminum Gallium Garnet (GAGG) crystal.