Steady-State Analysis of Microgrid Distributed Control Under Denial of Service Attacks
Distributed control is an effective method to coordinate multiple components in a microgrid. It usually has mandatory requirements for communication graph topology; changing the topology unexpectedly could disrupt the operation of a distributed controller. A denial of service (DoS) attack blocks communication channels to cause variations in communication graph. Unforeseen topology changes render a controller to receive incomplete system information. Control decisions made based on incorrect information can lead to significantly reduced grid supporting capability. As a result, the vital power balance between generation and load may be challenged. Determining power balance requires steady-state power flow analysis; however, the cyber-induced steady-state analysis is not well studied in the literature. Here, in this article, we show that a cyber–physical microgrid with unknown DoS attacks has augmented uncertain power flow equations, whose special structure creates new computational issue to determining power balance. To deal with the issue, we develop a novel cyber-induced microgrid model: the cyber–physical system is transformed into a pure physical model, where the disruption effects of DoS in the cyber layer are shown to be equivalent to the variations of the physical model parameters. With the transformed system, we develop a sufficient condition to ascertain the system power balance under unknown DoS attacks. In addition, practical insights for resilient distributed control design are shown as well.