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The conservatism and overtest indices measured for multiple transient and SRS tests and a least favorable response test are compared to those of a swept-sine test for a typical spacecraft component.
Critical Facilities Maintenance Assessment (CFMA) was first implemented by NASA following the March 2000 overtest of the High Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager (HESSI) spacecraft. A sine burst dynamic test using a 40 year old shaker failed. Mechanical binding/slippage of the slip table imparted 10 times the planned force to the test article. There was major structural damage to HESSI. The mechanical "health" of the shaker had not been assessed and tracked to assure the test equipment was in good working order. Similar incidents have occurred at NASA facilities due to inadequate maintenance (e.g., rainwater from a leaky roof contaminated an assembly facility that housed a spacecraft). The HESSI incident alerted NASA to the urgent need to identify inadequacies in ground facility readiness and maintenance practices. The consequences of failures of ground facilities that service these NASA systems are severe due to the high unit value of NASA products.
Even though working on a problem has been your primary effort for the past year, your leadership may have heard about this once in a briefing a decade ago. Now they are basically clueless. Pretend that you are talking to your daughter's fifth-grade class. Explain how your complicated gizmo works. If possible, do not use acronyms. Define your terms. Put your work in context. Assume your leader has no idea what you do, who you work for, or what your gizmo does. That is a good place to start. Remember, taking the next century to study the problem or spending the Gross National Product to invent a new solution are probably not going to be acceptable solutions. Real engineers and technicians build real hardware that works in the real world in a reasonable manner within a reasonable time at a reasonable cost. True, skimping on time or money can cause mistakes, but folks whose gizmos are delayed unreasonably or cost more than is practical get their programs canceled, force the business into bankruptcy, or give the market over to the competition. Real engineers and technicians always consider cost and schedule in their work. Raising questions is important. However, we are in the business of doing things. Engineers and technicians are paid to get things done. Yes, you have to identify the problem, frame the design, identify the tests, perform the analysis, and assemble the hardware. But the goal is to solve the problem. Nobody ever said flying in space was easy. We make it look easy the same way that an Olympic champion makes her sport look easy: by working hard at improving performance every day. Better are the results of a well-defined test. Remember that a test on a laboratory bench is always an approximation of reality, and rules similar to those for good analysis also apply. One should always be mindful of Mechelay's rule: "It is better to be stupid than to run a stupid test." Often we try to overtest. If a piece of hardware passes an unbelievably difficult test, then life is good. More often when an unbelievably difficult test fails, we are left with a very long discussion of why and what was wrong in the design or execution of the test. Make sure that the test is well defined. Even then, it is important to explain to your leaders what inherent accuracy (or error) the test conditions or equipment have and what the assumptions or initial conditions were for the test. Test results without a good understanding of the test's accuracy or the pedigree of the test assumptions are worth very little. Finally, there is flight test data. Always limited, never at the edge of the envelope, it still shows how the real hardware works in a combined environment. Flight experience is dangerous because it typically doesn't show how close to the edge of the cliff the equipment is operating, but it does demonstrate how the hardware really works. A flight test is the ultimate test, again taken with the knowledge that it is probably not the extreme but something more like the middle of the environmental and systems performance. Good understanding of a problem and its solution always relies on a combination of all these methods. Be sure to lead your leaders by using all the tools you have at your disposal. At the end of the day, decisions in space flight always come down to a risk trade. Our business is not remotely safe, not in the sense that the public, the media, or our legislators use the term. Everything we do has a risk, cost, schedule, or performance trade-off. For your leaders to make an appropriate decision, you need to educate them, lead them, talk with them, and engage them in the discussion until full understanding takes place. It's your job. *
Finite element enforced response analysis was performed on a multiple degree of freedom expander head shaker table to aid in the design of the table structure and vibration control system. The payload for this shaker system is a spacecraft with a multitude of flexible modes across a broad frequency band. A Craig-Bampton representation of the spacecraft was used to expedite analysis of multiple shaker table designs. The analysis examines the required forces in the actuators for a constant amplitude base acceleration sine sweep test, the resulting forces in the spacecraft and table attachment restraints, and the resulting accelerations on the spacecraft structure. The results show the spacecraft response at low frequencies is very high near the tip due to the low order spacecraft bending and axial modes. The high response can be addressed by notching the input vibration levels to avoid overtesting the spacecraft. At frequencies above 25 Hz, the spacecraft modal effective masses are very small, and the response of the shaker table dominates the response. Anti-resonances of the shaker table in the frequency range of interest reduce the acceleration output and require much higher actuator forces to achieve the acceleration specification. These effects may require stiffening the shaker structure to move the modes out of the test frequency range or increasing the shaker table damping.
The force-limited vibration test approaches discussed in NASA-7004C were developed to reduce overtesting associated with base shake vibration tests of aerospace hardware where the interface responses are excited coherently. This handbook outlines several different methods of specifying the force limits. The rationale for force limiting is based on the disparity between the impedances of typical aerospace mounting structures and the large impedances of vibration test shakers when the interfaces in general are coherently excited. Among these approaches, the semi-empirical method is presently the most widely used method to derive the force limits. The inclusion of the incoherent excitation of the aerospace structures at mounting interfaces has not been accounted for in the past and provides the basis for more realistic force limits for qualifying the hardware using shaker testing. In this paper current methods for defining the force limiting specifications discussed in the NASA handbook are reviewed using data from a series of acoustic and vibration tests. A new approach based on considering the incoherent excitation of the structural mounting interfaces using acoustic test data is also discussed. It is believed that the new approach provides much more realistic force limits that may further remove conservatism inherent in shaker vibration testing not accounted for by methods discussed in the NASA handbook. A discussion on using FEM/BEM analysis to obtain realistic force limits for flight hardware is provided.
The force limited vibration test approaches discussed in NASA-HDBK-7004C were developed to reduce overtesting associated with base shake vibration tests of aerospace hardware. This handbook outlines several different methods of specifying force limiting specifications. The basis for deriving force limiting specifications is related to the differences between mechanical impedances of typical aerospace hardware interfacing the mounting structures in flight configurations and the large impedances inherent in shaker vibration testing. Among these approaches, the semi-empirical method is presently the most widely used method to derive the force limiting specifications. This method is developed based on the assumption that the hardware interface responses are coherently excited. The inclusion of the incoherent excitation of the aerospace structures at mounting interfaces provides the basis for developing a more realistic force limiting specification that may be used to qualify flight hardware for launch environments using shaker testing. In this paper the semi-empirical method for defining force limiting specifications discussed in NASA handbook are reviewed using data recently obtained from a series of acoustic and vibration tests. A mathematical formation of a new force limiting approach based on considering the incoherent excitation of the hardware at their mounting interfaces is developed. Results from the analysis, which are correlated to the data obtained from a series of well instrumented acoustic and vibration tests, are discussed. The new approach provides much more realistic force limits that may further remove conservatism inherent in shaker vibration testing not accounted for by methods discussed in the NASA handbook.