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DOE OSTI2022

Domestic and International Standards for Nuclear Criticality Safety – Overview and Status

The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for staff performing hands-on work in operations with fissionable materials. These consensus standards have contributed directly to the significant reduction in the rate of criticality accidents in process facilities since the 1940s. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 43 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (23 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently eighteen standards in the ANS-8 series. Currently, there are six ANS-8 standards in revision mode and eleven in a maintenance mode with one new standard under development. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eleven standards are currently available, three standards are in revision mode, and two standards are development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Domestic and International Standards for Nuclear Criticality Safety - Overview & Status [Abstract]

The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for staff performing hands-on work in operations with fissionable materials. These consensus standards have contributed directly to the significant reduction in the rate of criticality accidents in process facilities since the 1940s. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 43 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (22 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently eighteen standards in the ANS-8 series. Currently, there are six ANS-8 standards in re- vision mode and eleven in a maintenance mode with one new standard under development. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eleven standards are currently available, three standards are in revision mode, and two standards are development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Comparative Analysis of Standard and Advanced USL Methodologies for Nuclear Criticality Safety

The American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society national standards 8.1 and 8.24 provide guidance on the requirements and recommendations for establishing confidence in the results of the computerized models used to support operation with fissionable materials. By design, the guidance is not prescriptive, leaving freedom to the analysts to determine how the various sources of uncertainties are to be statistically aggregated. Due to the involved use of statistics entangled with heuristic recipes, the resulting safety margins are often difficult to interpret. Also, these technical margins are augmented by additional administrative margins, which are required to ensure compliance with safety standards or regulations, eliminating the incentive to understand their differences. With the new resurgent wave of advanced nuclear systems, e.g., advanced reactors, fuel cycles, and fuel concepts, focused on economizing operation, there is a strong need to develop a clear understanding of the uncertainties and their consolidation methods to reduce them in manners that can be scientifically defended. In response, the current studies compare the analyses behind four notable methodologies for upper subcriticality limit estimation that have been documented in the nuclear criticality safety literature: the parametric, nonparametric, Whisper, and TSURFER methodologies. Specifically, the work offers a deep dive into the various assumptions of the noted methodologies, their adequacies, and their limitations to provide guidance on developing confidence for the emergent nuclear systems that are expected to be challenged by the scarcity of experimental data. Here, to limit the scope, the current work focuses on the application of these methodologies to criticality safety experiments, where the goal is to calculate a bias, a bias uncertainty, and a tolerance limit for k eff in support of determining an upper subcriticality limit for nuclear criticality safety.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Criticality Safety Training: Needs and Efforts [Slides]

This presentation on Nuclear Criticality Safety Training: Needs and Efforts covers several points. This presentation starts with a quick overview of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Training. Then it lists current and ongoing training with a focus on the training in progress. This presentation then concludes with a look at supporting efforts.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Availability of Critical Benchmark Experiments for the Pebble Tanker Transportation Model for Nuclear Criticality Safety Validation of TRISO Pebbles

This study addresses the need for comprehensive investigations into TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) fuel pebble transportation validation. In this work, an exploratory model, the pebble tanker(PT), was developed with the aim of facilitating the validation of nuclear criticality safety calculations in the context of industrial-scale transportation of TRISO fuel. The PT model was designed to investigate the availability and applicability of critical benchmark experiments crucial for assessing the transportation of these pebbles. This work incorporated sensitivity/uncertainty (S/U) similarity studies to quantify the applicability of critical benchmark experiments and to address nuclear data uncertainties in the context of TRISO transportation. Two container models were investigated: one for the Hermes-type pebble and one for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)–type pebble. The models were simplified, considering fuel, containment, and either water or air, to enable a focus on the underlying physics of applications involving TRISO fuel pebbles using the PT model. A crucial aspect under consideration was the capacity of the transport package to hold pebbles while ensuring subcriticality in the flooded state. An approach in the criticality validation process involves assessing the similarity between systems through an integral index parameter evaluation. This involves calculating a correlation coefficient (referred to as c k ) based on shared nuclear data–induced uncertainty between a benchmark experiment and the application of the PT model. To facilitate this analysis, the SCALE tools, particularly the CSAS6-Shift, TSUNAMI-3D-Shift, and TSUNAMI-IP sequences, were employed for comprehensive studies in neutronics and S/U analysis. Our findings showed that there are sufficient critical experimental benchmarks to perform this validation of the PT model in the most reactive state, i.e. when the tanker is flooded. This paper provides valuable insights into validating a transport package for Generation IV TRISO fuel pebbles.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Overview and Current Progress of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Training and Education Program [Slides]

This presentation covers the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) training & education program. The presentation details the training courses offered by the NCSP and the NCSP training pipelines. Additionally, the presentation shows the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Education Training (NCSET) modules along with new capabilities and new courses. This lecture finishes up with some concluding remarks.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

A New Era of Nuclear Criticality Experiments: The First 10 Years of Planet Operations at NCERC

Planet is a vertical-lift assembly machine currently located at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site. In the past, Planet resided at Technical Area-18 in Los Alamos, New Mexico, as part of the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF). Following the de-inventorying of LACEF, the Planet assembly was relocated to NCERC in 2008 and became fully operational in June of 2011. The Class Foils experiment, which involves stacking highly enriched uranium foils to obtain a critical configuration, was the first critical experiment performed on Planet. As a major component of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Class taught for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, the Class Foils experiment allows personnel from all over the DOE complex to handle nuclear material and to complete the approach to critical safely and successfully. This paper describes the Planet vertical assembly and recent engineering upgrade and a selection of the experiments that have been performed on Planet since its transition to NCERC 10 years ago.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Comparison of ISO and ANSI/ANS Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards

This paper provides a high-level comparison between the international and domestic Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) standards, as requested by members of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division. Currently, there are 18 enacted American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American National Standards (ANS) and 1 ANSI/ANS standard in progress. There are 11 NCS standards from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Technical Committee 85 (TC85) on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 (SC5) on Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Working Group 8 (WG8). There are NCS standard revisions in progress for both standards organizations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Comparison of ISO and ANSI/ANS Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards [Slides]

This paper provides a high-level comparison between the international and domestic nuclear criticality safety (NCS) standards, as requested by members of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division. Currently, there are 18 enacted American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American National Standards (ANS) standards, and 1 ANSI/ANS standard, in progress. There are 11 NCS standards from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Technical Committee 85 (TC85) on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 (SC5) on Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Working Group 8 (WG8). NCS standard revisions are in progress for both standards organizations. The key differences between the ISO TC85/SC5/WG8 and ANSI/ANS-8 consensus NCS standards are summarized. The hard work done by the ANS-8 and WG8 volunteers allows for applicable, high-quality consensus standards for use by the NCS community. This paper defines the current status of each ANSI/ANS and ISO standard, the work in in progress, the revisions/amendments in progress, and WG8/ANS-8 non-standard business in progress. A forthcoming paper will compare the development process for ISO and ANSI/ANS standards.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Internal Collaboration on Recent Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessments

Prevention of inadvertent criticality at facilities with large quantities of fissionable materials is one of the most important requirements those facilities grapple with. Given that criticality cannot be mitigated, only eliminated, a hard line must be taken on this requirement. The facilities and sites with the possibility of such an event must abide by a plethora of requirements, most stemming from the ANSI/ANS-8 series of consensus standards. One such standard, ANSI/ANS-8.19, Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety, gives requirements and recommendations necessary for establishing a nuclear criticality safety program for a given facility or site. One of those requirements includes periodic assessments of the NCS program. To meet the assessment requirement, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) conducts periodic assessments on individual facilities and overall programmatic health aspects. The teams developed to perform these assessments include people both inside and outside the LANL NCS program. Recently, the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division and the Critical Experiments Team of the Advanced Nuclear Technology Group established a collaboration to aid in fulfilling the assessment requirement.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Domestic and International Consensus Standards for Nuclear Criticality Safety - Overview & Status

The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) were developed based on the lessons-learned from process criticality accidents. These consensus standards were developed to reduce the rate of process criticality accidents in facilities that process, store, handle, or transport fissionable materials by hand. After a significant increase in criticality accidents through the mid-1960s, the rate of criticality accidents decreased as a result of these standards, and the criticality accident rate is extremely low from an industrial safety perspective. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 47 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (almost 26 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American National Standards (ANS) that are prepared and published by the American Nuclear Society and approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently 18 standards in the ANS-8 series. Nine ANS-8 standards are either in revision mode or planned for revision. A new standard for the use of nondestructive assay measurements (ANSI/ANS-8.28-2024) for NCS was approved in March of 2024. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 “Nuclear Energy,” Subcommittee 5, “Nuclear Fuel Technology,” and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eleven standards are currently available, four standards are proposed for revision, and four standards are at various stages of development. This paper provides the NCS community with a high-level overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

Bowen, Douglas G [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000212460026)↗
DOE OSTI2023

Hand Calculation Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety

This primer provides an overview of the most common hand calculation methods used for criticality safety calculations. The most widely used tools available to a nuclear criticality safety (NCS) practitioner are probably the common Monte Carlo or deterministic criticality safety codes, which can be used to model very complex systems. However, use of these codes can obscure the parameters to which a particular fissile system may be sensitive, whereas the hand calculation methods can be used to delve into the ways each parameter may affect the reactivity of a fissile material system. Furthermore, practitioners must avoid using computer codes as devices that take inputs and simply provide outputs (i.e., a “black box”). Many years ago, pioneers such as Joe Thomas, David Smith, and Hugh Paxton, among others in the field of nuclear criticality safety, took the time before the advent of high-speed desktop computers to create simple hand methods for criticality safety analyses. Some of the methods can be used for single fissile units; others are applicable to fissile units arranged into simple array configurations. This primer discusses the applicability of the various methods, illustrates how they are used, and provides an interpretation of the various results. The NCS practitioner will need to spend time to master the methods that could be most useful; however, they can provide the practitioner with fast and accurate answers to criticality safety problems if they are used correctly and if critical data exist for the problem at hand. Hand calculation methods can be used as a starting point for more advanced calculations, and in many circumstances, they can provide sensitivity and perturbation information more quickly than using a criticality code.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety – overview & status [Abstract]

The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) were developed as the lessons-learned from process criticality accidents. These consensus standards were developed to reduce the rate of process criticality accidents in facilities that process, store, handle or transport fissionable materials by hand. After a significant increase in criticality accidents through the mid-1960’s, the rate of criticality accidents decreased due to these standards and the criticality accident rate is extremely low from an industrial safety perspective.

ANS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Criticality Safety Program @ ORNL [Slides]

This presentation provides an overview of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) and its activities at Oak Ridge National Lab, including the program's history, mission and vision, accomplishments, challenges, initiatives, and tasks, as well as information regarding ORNL's NCSP budget.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Criticality Safety Pipeline Course with Hands-On Experimental Training at Lawrence Livermore's Inherently Safe Subcritical Assembly Training Center

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Divisions at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) have partnered with Prof. Massimiliano Fratoni of the University of California Berkeley to offer a semester long course on nuclear criticality safety. This course is part of a larger pipeline project among many of the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories designed to stimulate student interest in the field of criticality safety. The course focuses on teaching the fundamentals of criticality safety, familiarity with national and consensus standards, and preparing criticality safety evaluations. Students also receive hands-on experience with special nuclear material by performing experiments with the Inherently Safe Subcritical Assembly (ISSA) at LLNL. Guest lectures are taught remotely and in-person by criticality safety engineers at LLNL and LANL, giving students an opportunity to interact with professionals in the field. The students complete a semester long project involving developing and writing a criticality safety evaluation. As universities tend to focus heavily on nuclear power and advanced nuclear reactor design, this course gives students a better understanding and perspective of what criticality safety entails. The goal of this pipeline course is to introduce students to criticality safety as another available field for nuclear engineers. It is also a way for criticality safety programs to identify talented students who have the interest and aptitude to work in criticality safety for hire upon graduation. LLNL and LANL have both hosted past students as summer students, participated in student's graduate projects, and hired students as criticality safety engineers. This has provided a unique opportunity for criticality safety programs to spot young talent with better retention outcomes.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Update of the Nuclear Criticality Slide Rule: Review of the Estimation of the Number of Fissions

IRSN (France), LLNL (USA) and ORNL (USA) began a long-term collaboration effort in 2015 to update the nuclear criticality Slide Rule (https://ncsp.llnl.gov/analytical-methods/criticality-sliderule) for the emergency response to a nuclear criticality accident. The Slide Rule permits the estimation of neutron and gamma dose rates and integrated doses based upon estimated fission yields, as a function of distance from the fission source, and time after criticality accidents for different critical systems. This paper presents the review of the section “estimation of the number of fissions”, named “fission yield” in the Slide Rule document. This estimation is important because the other information provided by the Slide Rule is directly proportional to the number of fissions. The previous models, based on Hansen and Barbry formulae, will be presented with their associated assumptions and limitations. Then, new proposals will be presented with a comparison to past criticality accidents and experimental data. The new formulae, based on the heat energy equation, cover many types of criticality accidents (solution, dry or low-moderated powder, rods/assemblies in water and dry metal) and require limited information in an emergency situation.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Updated Guidance on Sensitivity/Uncertainty Methods Use for Nuclear Criticality Safety Validation

The use of sensitivity/uncertainty (S/U) methods in nuclear criticality safety (NCS) was established more than 25 years ago and has been increasing ever since. Recent interest in commercial applications involving uranium enrichments above 5 wt% 235 U has increased focus on demonstrating the applicability of existing critical experiments to this enrichment range. S/U techniques can also be particularly useful in assessing the similarity of new fuel forms in relation to those documented in existing published evaluations of benchmark critical experiments. Publishing updated recommendations for the use of these methods is thus important to ensure that new S/U practitioners can benefit from the years of development and application invested in generating a set of best practices to maximize the utility of these tools.

NCS↗