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This symposium reflects on forty years of U.S. Human Spaceflight, its role over the next four decades and beyond. The topics include: 1) Perspectives on the Past Forty Years of Human Spaceflight; 2) The Experience of Spaceflight; 3) Perspectives on the Next Forty Years of Human Spaceflight; and 4) The International Space Station and the Future of Human Spaceflight.
As NASA prepares for future human spaceflight missions with extended crew duration in destinations beyond low Earth orbit (LEO), the Agency has focused itself on understanding the drivers to sustainably support human life beyond Earth’s atmosphere. Future missions to deep space, the lunar surface, and eventually the Martian surface pose new challenges in ensuring the crew is sufficiently supplied with all necessary materials. To mitigate the risk of not delivering sufficient consumables and logistics for human spaceflight missions, NASA has examined past human space mission data and developed metabolic modeling to determine estimates for the crew consumption rates of fluids, solid consumables, and additional equipment needed. This paper is a compilation of guidelines, rates, and assumptions necessary to evaluate the logistics needs for future human exploration conceptual missions beyond LEO, providing a starting point and resource of information regarding usage rates and overall logistics supply planning for crewed exploration missions. Logistics represent all equipment and supplies not installed as part of the vehicle that are needed to support mission activities. Logistics can be further divided into specific categories, including consumables, maintenance items, spares, utilization, outfitting, as well as any packaging required. This paper will also provide use case examples of logistics needs to support human missions in deep space, including a conceptual lunar surface mission. The paper provides information necessary to calculate the mass and volume of known logistics for conceptual future human exploration missions beyond LEO. The assumptions in the paper are updated versions of previous assumptions made by the Agency and were derived from a number of sources, including International Space Station (ISS) historical usage and resupply rates, the Life Support Baseline Values and Assumptions Document (BVAD) 2022, Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH) 2014, and data gathered from NASA human spaceflight programs and projects. The primary goal of the paper is to establish a set of consistent reference rates that multiple teams and groups can utilize to conduct logistics analysis and compare cases. This methodology is for initial estimates of conceptual human missions and does not take the place of detailed analysis for programs, nor does it provide requirements for programs.
As NASA prepares for future human spaceflight missions with extended crew duration in destinations beyond low Earth orbit (LEO), the Agency has focused itself on understanding the drivers to sustainably support human life beyond Earth’s atmosphere. Future missions to deep space, the lunar surface, and eventually the Martian surface pose new challenges in ensuring the crew is sufficiently supplied with all necessary materials. To mitigate the risk of not delivering sufficient consumables and logistics for human spaceflight missions, NASA has examined past human space mission data and developed metabolic modeling to determine estimates for the crew consumption rates of fluids, solid consumables, and additional equipment needed. This paper is a compilation of guidelines, rates, and assumptions necessary to evaluate the logistics needs for future human exploration conceptual missions beyond LEO, providing a starting point and resource of information regarding usage rates and overall logistics supply planning for crewed exploration missions. Logistics represent all equipment and supplies not installed as part of the vehicle that are needed to support mission activities. Logistics can be further divided into specific categories, including consumables, maintenance items, spares, utilization, outfitting, as well as any packaging required. This paper will also provide use case examples of logistics needs to support human missions in deep space, including a conceptual lunar surface mission. The paper provides information necessary to calculate the mass and volume of known logistics for conceptual future human exploration missions beyond LEO. The assumptions in the paper are updated versions of previous assumptions made by the Agency and were derived from a number of sources, including International Space Station (ISS) historical usage and resupply rates, the Life Support Baseline Values and Assumptions Document (BVAD) 2022, Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH) 2014, and data gathered from NASA human spaceflight programs and projects. The primary goal of the paper is to establish a set of consistent reference rates that multiple teams and groups can utilize to conduct logistics analysis and compare cases. This methodology is for initial estimates of conceptual human missions and does not take the place of detailed analysis for programs, nor does it provide requirements for programs.
Historically, NASA human spaceflight planning has included healthy doses of life cycle cost analysis. Planners put projects and their cost estimates in a budget context. Estimated costs became expected budgets. Regardless, real budgets rarely matched expectations. So plans would come and go as NASA canceled projects. New projects would arise and the cycle would begin again. Repeatedly, NASA schedule and performance ambitions come up against costs growing at double-digit rates while budgets barely rise a couple of percent a year. Significant skepticism greets proposed NASA programs at birth, as cost estimates for new projects are traditionally very high, and worse, far off the mark for those carried forward. In this environment the current "capability driven framework" for NASA human spaceflight evolved, where long term life cycle cost analysis are even viewed as possibly counter-productive. Here, a space exploration project, for example the Space Launch System, focuses on immediate goals. A life cycle is that of a project, not a program, and for only that span of time to a near term milestone like a first test launch. Unfortunately, attempting to avoid some pitfalls in long-term life cycle cost analysis breeds others. Government audits have noted that limiting the scope of cost analysis "does not provide the transparency necessary to assess long-term affordability" making it difficult to understand if NASA "is progressing in a cost-effective and affordable manner." Even in this short-term framework, NASA realizes the importance of long-term considerations, that it must "maximize the efficiency and sustainability of the Exploration Systems development programs", that this is "critical to free resources for re-investment...such as other required deep space exploration capabilities." Assuming the value of long-term life cycle cost analysis, where due diligence meets reconnaissance, and accepting past shortcomings, the work here approaches life cycle cost analysis for human spaceflight differently. 1) If costs have traditionally been so high that adding them up is discouraging, are there any new facts on the ground offering paths to significantly lower costs? 2) If NASA's spaceflight budget and process is an over-arching constraint, with its planning limitations favoring short-term outlooks, is there a way to step outside the budget box? 3) If life cycle answers have historically been too uncertain to be useful, is there a process where stakeholders gain valuable insights merely from emphasizing a common understanding around questions? We analyze the potential life cycle cost of assorted NASA human spaceflight architectures - an architecture as a sum of individual systems, working together. With the prior questions of high costs, limited budgets and uncertainties in mind, public private partnerships are central in these architectures. The cost data for current commercial public private partnerships is encouraging, as are cost estimates for future partnership approaches beyond low Earth orbit. Private capital, directly or indirectly, an ingredient of public private partnerships, may be a significant factor in finding a path around the limits of the NASA spaceflight budget. Also, understanding and reviewing the pros, cons and uncertainties of assorted architectures can assist in developing a common understanding around key questions as important if not more so than the numbers and answers. Lastly, a scenario planning technique is briefly explored that can mature a common understanding about the agencies situation at hand and how diverse stakeholders can go forward together. Scenario planning, rather than focusing on answers, places emphasis on stakeholders developing a common understanding about the future. Putting aside costs, this is especially true of questions about sustainability and growth, results, benefits and expectations. While efficiency exercises or analysis look to reduce resources in one place to apply them elsewhere, moving around slices in a pie, scenario planning can get at the heart of the matter, growing the pie, transforming it, and making the pieces relevant. Especially important is the question of sustainability for different scenarios in the broad sense of the word - not just the narrow ability to survive or continue, but also the ability to adapt, prosper and grow.
Long-endurance human spaceflight - such as missions to Mars or its moons - will present a never-before-seen maintenance logistics challenge. Crews will be in space for longer and be farther way from Earth than ever before. Resupply and abort options will be heavily constrained, and will have timescales much longer than current and past experience. Spare parts and/or redundant systems will have to be included to reduce risk. However, the high cost of transportation means that this risk reduction must be achieved while also minimizing mass. The concept of increasing system and component reliability is commonly discussed as a means to reduce risk and mass by reducing the probability that components will fail during a mission. While increased reliability can reduce maintenance logistics mass requirements, the rate of mass reduction decreases over time. In addition, reliability growth requires increased test time and cost. This paper assesses trends in test time requirements, cost, and maintenance logistics mass savings as a function of increase in Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) for some or all of the components in a system. In general, reliability growth results in superlinear growth in test time requirements, exponential growth in cost, and sublinear benefits (in terms of logistics mass saved). These trends indicate that it is unlikely that reliability growth alone will be a cost-effective approach to maintenance logistics mass reduction and risk mitigation for long-endurance missions. This paper discusses these trends as well as other options to reduce logistics mass such as direct reduction of part mass, commonality, or In-Space Manufacturing (ISM). Overall, it is likely that some combination of all available options - including reliability growth - will be required to reduce mass and mitigate risk for future deep space missions.
Train before you fly has always been a watchword at NASA, and consequently, NASA has been conducting training for human spaceflight missions for longer than it has been involved in the actual conduct of human spaceflight missions. Throughout that time, NASA s approach to human spaceflight training has continuously evolved to keep pace with the technology of the modern world, but the approach to training itself has not changed significantly. Today, there are more tools and technologies that enable learning than ever before. This paper intends to review the challenges of human spaceflight training and how modern technology and an updated approach could improve that training. The Spaceflight Training Management Office (DA7) within the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) has been investigating the current training of instructors, flight controllers and astronauts in order to identify where a new approach to training and training management may be necessary to improve the efficacy of the training provided. Through this investigation, the DA7 team has identified potential areas of improvement within International Space Station (ISS) training in a wide range of areas, including the delivery of training, the structure of the training program, the concept of what is considered training, and the management of that training. The ISS is an operational program with an established training paradigm. As such, the implementation of these concepts will be met with several challenges that may prevent or preclude them from being adopted. These challenges include demonstrating return-on-investment (ROI) and overcoming cultural or technological obstacles. This report will delve into the possible improvement areas for training, the future training concepts that are being considered, and the challenges associated with implementation. The paper will include concepts for utilization of Web 2.0 technologies, electronic learning, digital media, and other technologies in the development, management, and conduct of human spaceflight training.
The next-generation human spaceflight vehicle is in a unique position to realize the benefits of more than thirty years of technological advancements since the Space Shuttle was designed. Computer enhancements, the emergence of highly reliable decision-making algorithms, and an emphasis on efficiency make an increased use of autonomous systems highly likely. NASA is in a position to take advantage of these advances and apply them to the human spaceflight environment. One of the key paradigm shifts will be the shift, where appropriate, of monitoring, option development, decision-making, and execution responsibility from humans to an Autonomous Flight Management (AFM) system. As an effort to reduce risk for development of an AFM system, NASA engineers are developing a prototype to prove the utility of previously untested autonomy concepts. This prototype, called SMART (Spacecraft Mission Assessment and Replanning Tool), is a functionally decomposed flight management system with an appropriate level of autonomy for each of its functions. As the development of SMART began, the most important and most often asked question was, How autonomous should an AFM system be? A thorough study of the literature through 2002 surrounding autonomous systems has not yielded a standard method for designing a level of autonomy into either a crewed vehicle or an uncrewed vehicle. The current focus in the literature on defining autonomy is centered on developing IQ tests for built systems. The literature that was analyzed assumes that the goal of all systems is to strive for complete autonomy from human intervention, rather than identifying how autonomous each function within the system should have been. In contrast, the SMART team developed a method for determining the appropriate level of autonomy to be designed into each function within a system. This paper summarizes the development of the Level of Autonomy Assessment Tool and its application to the SMART project.
Mission operations will have to adapt for long duration, long distance human spaceflight missions. This change is driven mainly by the significantly different communication availability between Earth and space. As astronauts travel farther from Earth, the one-way communication latency increases; the amount of bandwidth will be limited; and there will be period of long and/or no communication. Currently, ground flight controllers collaborate and cooperate with astronauts in space to accomplish essential operational functions. Astronaut autonomy, i.e., the crew’s ability to work more independently from mission control, will be a key enabler in future exploration missions. Over the last several years, the NASA Ames Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) Group has investigated various ways to promote and support astronaut autonomy in human spaceflight missions. Software prototypes are researched, designed, implemented, and assessed for their ability to enable astronaut autonomy. From integrated Internet of Thing for Space, advanced procedures interfaces, comm-delayed chats, and self-scheduling tools, the HCI Group has explored different aspects of astronaut autonomy. Specifically, the self-scheduling tool Playbook has been evaluated in analog extreme environments and onboard the International Space Station, successfully paving the way for future autonomous astronauts.
Nuclear power, offshore oil & gas exploration, and human spaceflight all have high consequence potential if something goes wrong. Each has had at least one major incident that pointed to a need for improved risk assessment. Careful risk analysis is very important for technologies having complexity, uncertainty, and high consequence potential. All rely on multiple barriers/controls/redundancy to minimize risk. NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) has moved towards risk informed regulation with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as a major input.
Current Human Space Flight Programs: a) Space Shuttle Program (SSP); b) International Space Station (ISS) Program; c) Constellation Program (CxP).
This viewgraph presentation discusses a brief history of NASA Human Spaceflight Conjunction Assessment (CA) activities, an overview of NASA CA process for ISS and Shuttle, and recent examples from Human Spaceflight conjunctions.
Privatization is key to America's current and future interests in Space and is consistent with the 2010 Title 51 "National Aeronautics and Space Act" which states "COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE. - Congress declares that the general welfare of the United States requires that the Administration seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space." With this thought in mind, this paper discusses several key considerations when entering into a Human Spaceflight Public/Private partnership, with particular attention to the engineering team engagement. NASA's historically develops technology and capability in areas that are not commercially profitable but can enable future commercial opportunities. By leveraging the experiences and lessons learned from the past, we can improve our opportunities for success in the future. We have made great strides in these areas, but there is significant room for improvement. This paper intends to highlight many of the thoughts and considerations, which are necessary when developing a public/private partnership for "Human Spaceflight". Although this paper is being developed with an emphasis on "Human Spaceflight", many of the thoughts may have applicability to un-crewed missions. This paper does not attempt to define specific lines between government and private entities, since those lines vary based on many factors such as allocation of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities between participants and risk tolerance for both safety of flight and mission success.
A launch pad escape system for human spaceflight is one of those things that everyone hopes they will never need but is critical for every manned space program. Since men were first put into space in the early 1960s, the need for such an Emergency Escape System (EES) has become apparent. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has made use of various types of these EESs over the past 50 years. Early programs, like Mercury and Gemini, did not have an official launch pad escape system. Rather, they relied on a Launch Escape System (LES) of a separate solid rocket motor attached to the manned capsule that could pull the astronauts to safety in the event of an emergency. This could only occur after hatch closure at the launch pad or during the first stage of flight. A version of a LES, now called a Launch Abort System (LAS) is still used today for all manned capsule type launch vehicles. However, this system is very limited in that it can only be used after hatch closure and it is for flight crew only. In addition, the forces necessary for the LES/LAS to get the capsule away from a rocket during the first stage of flight are quite high and can cause injury to the crew. These shortcomings led to the development of a ground based EES for the flight crew and ground support personnel as well. This way, a much less dangerous mode of egress is available for any flight or ground personnel up to a few seconds before launch. The early EESs were fairly simple, gravity-powered systems to use when thing's go bad. And things can go bad very quickly and catastrophically when dealing with a flight vehicle fueled with millions of pounds of hazardous propellant. With this in mind, early EES designers saw such a passive/unpowered system as a must for last minute escapes. This and other design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design aspects for a launch pad escape system.
This is an overview of key challenges of human-robotic interaction in human spaceflight.
Since its formation in 2007, the NASA Human Research Program’s (HRP) mission has been to reduce human health and performance risks for spaceflight exploration missions. The program has achieved this mission primarily through work in ground analogs and on the International Space Station. Over the last three years, NASA overall has seen transformative changes with the flight of Artemis I, formation of the Commercial LEO Destinations Program, commercial flights to the ISS, and new International Partners participating in human spaceflight. NASA’s HRP has embraced these new opportunities and is collaborating on all these fronts to collect biomedical research data. Artemis I marked the arrival of NASA’s new human spaceflight exploration missions. NASA has developed a Moon-to-Mars Architecture to map out how it will use the moon to de-risk and enable Mars missions. NASA’s HRP is a critical component to develop and deliver research and technologies for future Artemis Crew Health and Performance (CHP) Systems. The program is working closely with NASA’s Moon-to-Mars Office to ensure CHP deliverables are ready to demonstrate on the moon, as we also look toward Mars, and is developing the partnership strategies required to support these deliverables. Commercial space flights, both free flyer and suborbital missions and private astronaut missions to the ISS, are providing broader opportunities and subjects to characterize the space-induced changes to the human system and to test countermeasures. To better use these opportunities to achieve its mission, HRP has been working to understand the commercial spaceflight companies’ needs and then partner with them on aspects of mutual interest. In addition, NASA HRP continues to engage in long-standing relationships with its international partners through the International Space Life Sciences Working Group (ISLSWG) and other joint international groups. The Program is now also interested in sharing its knowledge and ability to collaborate on projects of mutual interest with new countries developing capabilities for human spaceflight. The next 10 years will shape how humanity partners on exploration missions to Mars. NASA’s HRP is committed to enabling and developing collaborative strategies with commercial and international partners to keep humans safe and productive as we explore longer and further into space.
This paper presents a look at the historical Apollo Program and it's comparisons to NASA's human spaceflight program today. The author gives three examples of how audacity began with the Apollo Program and explains how human spaceflight must continue with this audacity to do new things and take on large missions.
NASA's Human Spaceflight Architecture Team (HAT) Lunar Destination Team has been developing a number of "Design Reference Missions" (DRM) to inform exploration architecture development, transportation approaches, and destination elements and operations. There are four destinations being considered in the HAT studies: Cis-Lunar, Lunar, Near Earth Asteroids and Mars. The lunar destination includes all activities that occur on the moon itself, but not low lunar orbit operations or Earth Moon LaGrange points which are the responsibility of the HAT Cis-Lunar Team. This paper will review the various surface DRMs developed as representative scenarios that could occur in a human lunar return. The approaches have been divided into two broad categories: a seven day short stay mission with global capabilities and a longer extended duration stay of 28 days which is limited to the lunar poles as a landing zone. The surface elements, trade studies, traverses, concept of operations and other relevant issues and methodologies will be presented and discussed in the context and framework of the HAT ground rules and assumptions which are constrained by NASA's available transportation systems. An international collaborative effort based on the 2011 Global Exploration Roadmap (GER) will also be examined and evaluated.
As we push toward new and diverse space transportation capabilities, reduction in operations cost becomes increasingly important. Achieving affordable and safe human spaceflight capabilities will be the mark of success for new programs and new providers. The ability to perceive the operational implications of design decisions is crucial in developing safe yet cost competitive space transportation systems. Any human spaceflight program - government or commercial - must make countless decisions either to implement spacecraft system capabilities or adopt operational constraints or workarounds to account for the lack of such spacecraft capabilities. These decisions can benefit from the collective experience that NASA has accumulated in building and operating crewed spacecraft over the last five decades. This paper reviews NASA s history in developing and operating human rated spacecraft, reviewing the key aspects of spacecraft design and their resultant impacts on operations phase complexity and cost. Specific examples from current and past programs - including the Space Shuttle and International Space Station - are provided to illustrate design traits that either increase or increase cost and complexity associated with spacecraft operations. These examples address factors such as overall design performance margins, levels of redundancy, degree of automated failure response, type and quantity of command and telemetry interfaces, and the definition of reference scenarios for analysis and test. Each example - from early program requirements, design implementation and resulting real-time operations experience - to tell the end-to-end "story" Based on these experiences, specific techniques are recommended to enable earlier and more effective assessment of operations concerns during the design process. A formal method for the assessment of spacecraft operability is defined and results of such operability assessments for recent spacecraft designs are provided. Recent experience in applying these techniques to Orion spacecraft development is reviewed to highlight the direct benefits of early operational assessment and collaborative development efforts.