SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “historical timeline”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Battery Key Performance Projections based on Historical Trends and Chemistries

Recent improvements in state-of-the-art (SOA) batteries driven by the automotive sector have led to many electrified aircraft concepts choosing batteries as the preferred energy-storage method. Current SOA batteries are at the point of enabling certain hybrid and all-electric aircraft, particularly small, short range, lower speed aircraft. Higher performance batteries improve aircraft range and can enable larger, higher speed aircraft. In this work, we develop specific energy projections for future electrified aircraft. The projections are developed based on examining historical commercial SOA trends as well as practical limitations of future chemistries. Accurate projections of future specific energy values are important for estimating the timeline for commercial introduction of electrified aircraft. This work estimates nominal cell level specific energies for rechargeable batteries of 489 Wh/kg by 2030, 638 Wh/kg by 2040, and 764 Wh/kg by 2050. More conservative as well as more aggressive estimates are also provided.

Blake Tiede↗

NASA NTRS2009

An Analysis of Rocket Propulsion Testing Costs

The primary mission at NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC) is rocket propulsion testing. Such testing is generally performed within two arenas: (1) Production testing for certification and acceptance, and (2) Developmental testing for prototype or experimental purposes. The customer base consists of NASA programs, DOD programs, and commercial programs. Resources in place to perform on-site testing include both civil servants and contractor personnel, hardware and software including data acquisition and control, and 6 test stands with a total of 14 test positions/cells. For several business reasons there is the need to augment understanding of the test costs for all the various types of test campaigns. Historical propulsion test data was evaluated and analyzed in many different ways with the intent to find any correlation or statistics that could help produce more reliable and accurate cost estimates and projections. The analytical efforts included timeline trends, statistical curve fitting, average cost per test, cost per test second, test cost timeline, and test cost envelopes. Further, the analytical effort includes examining the test cost from the perspective of thrust level and test article characteristics. Some of the analytical approaches did not produce evidence strong enough for further analysis. Some other analytical approaches yield promising results and are candidates for further development and focused study. Information was organized for into its elements: a Project Profile, Test Cost Timeline, and Cost Envelope. The Project Profile is a snap shot of the project life cycle on a timeline fashion, which includes various statistical analyses. The Test Cost Timeline shows the cumulative average test cost, for each project, at each month where there was test activity. The Test Cost Envelope shows a range of cost for a given number of test(s). The supporting information upon which this study was performed came from diverse sources and thus it was necessary to build several intermediate databases in order to understand, validate, and manipulate data. These intermediate databases (validated historical account of schedule, test activity, and cost) by themselves are of great value and utility. For example, for the Project Profile, we were able to merged schedule, cost, and test activity. This kind of historical account conveys important information about sequence of events, lead time, and opportunities for improvement in future propulsion test projects. The Product Requirement Document (PRD) file is a collection of data extracted from each project PRD (technical characteristics, test requirements, and projection of cost, schedule, and test activity). This information could help expedite the development of future PRD (or equivalent document) on similar projects, and could also, when compared to the actual results, help improve projections around cost and schedule. Also, this file can be sorted by the parameter of interest to perform a visual review of potential common themes or trends. The process of searching, collecting, and validating propulsion test data encountered a lot of difficulties which then led to a set of recommendations for improvement in order to facilitate future data gathering and analysis.

Ramirez-Pagan, Carmen P.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Design and Testing of a 2-Hour Oxygen Prebreathe Protocol for Space Walks from the International Space Station

To develop and test a 2-hour prebreathe protocol for performing extravehicular activities (EVAs) from the International Space Station (ISS). Combinations of adynamia (non-walking), prebreathe exercise, and space suit donning options (10.2 vs. 14.7 psi) were evaluated, against timeline and consumable contraints to develop an operational 2- hour prebreathe protocol. Prospective accept/reject criteria were defined for decompression sickness (DCS) and venous gas emboli (VGE) from analysis of historical DCS data, combined with risk management of DCS under ISS mission circumstances. Maximum operational DCS levels were defined based on protecting for EVA capability with two crew-members at 95% confidence, throughout ISS lifetime (within the constraints of NASA DCS disposition policy JPG 1800.3). The accept/reject limits were adjusted for greater safety based on analysis of related medical factors. Monte-Carlo simulation was performed to design a closed sequential, multi-center human trial. Protocols were tested with 4 different prebreathe exercises (Phases I-IV), prior to exposure to 4.3 psi for 4 hrs. Subject selection, Doppler monitoring for VGE, test termination criteria, and DCS definitions were standardized. Phase I: upper and lower body exercises using dual-cycle ergometry (75% VO2 max for 10 min). Phase II: ergometry plus 24 min of light exercise (simulating space-suit preparations). Phase III: same 24 min of light exercise but no ergometry, and Phase IV: 56 min of light exercise without ergometry. A prebreathe procedure was accepted if, at 95% confidence, the incidence of DCS was less than 15% (with no Type II DCS), and Grade IV VGE was less than 20%.

Gernhardt, Michael L.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Historic and Current Launcher Success Rates

This presentation reviews historic and current space launcher success rates from all nations with a mature launcher industry. Data from the 1950's through present day is reviewed for possible trends such as when in the launch timeline a failure occurred, which stages had the highest failure rate, overall launcher reliability, a decade by decade look at launcher reliability, when in a launchers history did failures occur, and the reliability of United States human-rated launchers. This information is useful in determining where launcher reliability can be improved and where additional measures for crew survival (i.e., Crew Escape systems) will have the greatest emphasis

Rust, Randy↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Digital Prototyping Methods to Enable Product Development Analysis Cycle Compression in Aerospace Systems

Historically, the product development life cycle (spanning from origination of a systems concept to initial delivery or fielding) for large-scale aerospace systems is 10-25 years. Examples of recent programs exhibiting this timeline are the Space Shuttle (13 years), , International Space Station (18 years), NASA Hubble telescope (16 years), USAF F-35 Strike Fighter (22 years), Missile Defense Agency THAAD (21 years), USAF V-22 Osprey (26 years), USAF B-2 Spirt (19 years), US Army RAH-66 Comanche (22 years, cancelled prior to fielding), James Webb Space Telescope (25 years), Space Launch System (10 years). This list illustrates the challenges of developing and fielding a modern integrated multi-disciplinary aerospace system. These development timelines are often preceded by significant research and development programs and followed by multiple increments, blocks, or spirals to reach planned operational capability. In the modern era of aerospace system acquisition, there is significant pressure to reduce system development timelines to meet system objectives and enable competitiveness in the current industry and landscape. Across the aerospace industry, a range of rapid acquisition and prototyping programs are seeking to achieve system development within timelines considerably less than 10 years. Notably, in September of 2019, NASA issued a solicitation for the development and demonstration of a Human Landing System (HLS) to deliver humans to the lunar surface by 2024 (5 years) and for the development and demonstration of a more sustainable HLS by 2026 (7 years). Lengthy product development cycle timelines are a product of multiple factors ranging from programmatic, sociological, technical, and systems engineering issues. New approaches in systems engineering provide new ways to enable these compressed development timelines. These approaches employ expanded application of advanced systems engineering methods and cross-cutting digital tools to accelerate system development, utilizing digital prototyping to connect maturing sub-system or component technologies into system or system-of-systems hardware prototypes. Approaches such as the use of system integrating physics relationships to reduce the number of design analysis cycle iterations and state analysis modeling to reduce necessary software testing (and improving coverage of system execution scenarios) represent steps forward in reducing the engineering time needed to field new systems. In addition to cost, schedule and performance benefits, expanded digital exploration and demonstration reduce risk in live system test and demonstration. This incremental demonstration approach, where digital prototyping and demonstration leads and informs full system test and demonstration, could be more important for space applications because of the increased difficulty of test and demonstration of space systems and architectures. The Advanced Concepts Office (ACO) at Marshall Space Flight Center merges traditional multi-disciplinary concept definition methods with modern, cross-cutting systems engineering concepts to enable iterative design and analysis of space architectures and systems through coordinated, strategic management of human capital, technical processes, and technology. This paper provides an overview of that approach, including recent examples and a strategic path forward to enabling continued reduction of aerospace system product development life cycles.

Michael D Watson↗

NASA NTRS2010

A Comparison Between Orion Automated and Space Shuttle Rendezvous Techniques

The Orion spacecraft will replace the space shuttle and will be the first human spacecraft since the Apollo program to leave low earth orbit. This vehicle will serve as the cornerstone of a complete space transportation system with a myriad of mission requirements necessitating rendezvous to multiple vehicles in earth orbit, around the moon and eventually beyond . These goals will require a complex and robust vehicle that is, significantly different from both the space shuttle and the command module of the Apollo program. Historically, orbit operations have been accomplished with heavy reliance on ground support and manual crew reconfiguration and monitoring. One major difference with Orion is that automation will be incorporated as a key element of the man-vehicle system. The automated system will consist of software devoted to transitioning between events based on a master timeline. This effectively adds a layer of high level sequencing that moves control of the vehicle from one phase to the next. This type of automated control is not entirely new to spacecraft since the shuttle uses a version of this during ascent and entry operations. During shuttle orbit operations however many of the software modes and hardware switches must be manually configured through the use of printed procedures and instructions voiced from the ground. The goal of the automation scheme on Orion is to extend high level automation to all flight phases. The move towards automation represents a large shift from current space shuttle operations, and so these new systems will be adopted gradually via various safeguards. These include features such as authority-to-proceed, manual down modes, and functional inhibits. This paper describes the contrast between the manual and ground approach of the space shuttle and the proposed automation of the Orion vehicle. I will introduce typical orbit operations that are common to all rendezvous missions and go on to describe the current Orion automation architecture and contrast it with shuttle rendezvous techniques and circumstances. The shuttle rendezvous profile is timed to take approximately 3 days from orbit insertion to docking at the International Space Station (ISS). This process can be divided into 3 phases: far-field, mid-field and proximity operations. The far-field stage is characterized as the most quiescent phase. The spacecraft is usually too far to navigate using relative sensors and uses the Inertial Measurement Units (IMU s) to numerically solve for its position. The maneuvers are infrequent, roughly twice per day, and are larger than other burns in the profile. The shuttle uses this opportunity to take extensive ground based radar updates and keep high fidelity orbit states on the ground. This state is then periodically uplinked to the shuttle computers. The targeting solutions for burn maneuvers are also computed on the ground and uplinked. During the burn the crew is responsible for setting the shuttle attitude and configuring the propulsion system for ignition. Again this entire process is manually driven by both crew and ground activity. The only automatic processes that occur are associated with the real-time execution of the burn. The Orion automated functionality will seek to relieve the workload of both the crew and ground during this phase

Ruiz, Jose O,↗

NASA NTRS2005

CRYOGENIC UPPER STAGE SYSTEM SAFETY

NASA s Exploration Initiative will require development of many new systems or systems of systems. One specific example is that safe, affordable, and reliable upper stage systems to place cargo and crew in stable low earth orbit are urgently required. In this paper, we examine the failure history of previous upper stages with liquid oxygen (LOX)/liquid hydrogen (LH2) propulsion systems. Launch data from 1964 until midyear 2005 are analyzed and presented. This data analysis covers upper stage systems from the Ariane, Centaur, H-IIA, Saturn, and Atlas in addition to other vehicles. Upper stage propulsion system elements have the highest impact on reliability. This paper discusses failure occurrence in all aspects of the operational phases (Le., initial burn, coast, restarts, and trends in failure rates over time). In an effort to understand the likelihood of future failures in flight, we present timelines of engine system failures relevant to initial flight histories. Some evidence suggests that propulsion system failures as a result of design problems occur shortly after initial development of the propulsion system; whereas failures because of manufacturing or assembly processing errors may occur during any phase of the system builds process, This paper also explores the detectability of historical failures. Observations from this review are used to ascertain the potential for increased upper stage reliability given investments in integrated system health management. Based on a clear understanding of the failure and success history of previous efforts by multiple space hardware development groups, the paper will investigate potential improvements that can be realized through application of system safety principles.

Smith, R. Kenneth↗

NASA NTRS2017

NASA's In-Space Manufacturing Project: Development of a Multimaterial, Multiprocess Fabrication Laboratory for the International Space Station

NASA's long term goal is to send humans to Mars. Over the next two decades, NASA will work with private industry to develop and demonstrate the technologies and capabilities needed to support exploration of the red planet by humans and ensure their safe return to earth. To accomplish this goal, NASA is employing a capability driven approach to its human spaceflight strategy. This approach will develop a suite of evolving capabilities which provide specific functions to solve exploration challenges. One challenge that is critical to sustainable and safer exploration is the ability to manufacture and recycle materials in space. This paper provides an overview of NASA's in-space manufacturing project, its past and current activities, and how technologies under development will ultimately culminate in a multimaterial, multiprocess fabrication laboratory ('FabLab') to be deployed on the International Space Station in the early 2020s. ISM is a critical capability for the long endurance missions NASA seeks to undertake in the coming decades. An unanticipated failure that can be adapted for in low earth orbit may result in a loss of mission in transit to Mars. In order to have a suite of functional ISM capabilities that are compatible with NASA's exploration timeline, ISM must be equipped with the resources necessary to develop these technologies and deploy them for testing prior to the scheduled de-orbit of ISS in 2024. The paper will discuss the phased approach to FabLab development, desired capabilities, and requirements for the hardware. The FabLab will move NASA and private industry significantly closer to changing historical paradigms for human spaceflight where all materials used in space are launched from earth. While the FabLab will be tested on ISS, the system is ultimately intended for use in a deep space habitat or transit vehicle.

Prater, T.↗

NASA NTRS2018

NASA's In-Space Manufacturing Project: Toward a Multimaterial Fabrication Laboratory for the International Space Station

uman space exploration to date has been limited to low Earth orbit and the moon. The International Space Station (ISS) provides a unique opportunity for NASA to partner with private industry for development and demonstration of the technologies needed to support exploration initiatives. One challenge that is critical to sustainable and safer exploration is the ability to manufacture and recycle materials in space. This paper provides an overview of NASA's in-space manufacturing (ISM) project, its past and current activities, and how technologies under development will ultimately culminate in a multimaterial fabrication laboratory ("ISM FabLab") to be deployed on the International Space Station in the early 2020s. ISM is a critical capability for the long endurance missions NASA seeks to undertake in the coming decades. An unanticipated failure that can be adapted for in low earth orbit, through a resupply launch or a return to earth, may instead result in a loss of mission while in transit to Mars. To have a suite of functional ISM capabilities that are compatible with NASA's exploration timeline, ISM must be equipped with the resources necessary to develop these technologies and deploy them for testing prior to the scheduled de-orbit of ISS in 2024. The paper provides a broad overview of ISM projects activities culminating with the Fabrication Laboratory for ISS. The FabLab will move NASA and private industry significantly closer to changing historical paradigms for human spaceflight where all materials used in space are launched from earth. While the current ISM FabLab will be tested on ISS, future systems are eventually intended for use in a deep space habitat or transit vehicle. The work of commercial companies funded under NASA's Small Business Innovative Research Program (SBIR) is also discussed, as these activities, from development of recyclable packaging for ISS to additive manufacturing capabilities for metals and electronics, could also potentially be infused into FabLab exploration capabilities as well.

Prater, Tracie↗

NASA NTRS2012

Historical Evolution of NASA Standard Materials Testing with Hypergolic Propellants and Ammonia (NASA Standard 6001 Test 15)

The NASA Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) has performed testing of hazardous and reactive aerospace fluids, including hypergolic propellants, with materials since the 1960s with the Apollo program. Amongst other test activities, Test 15 is a NASA standard test for evaluating the reactivity of materials with selected aerospace fluids, in particular hydrazine, monomethylhydrazine, uns-dimethylhydrazine, Aerozine 50, dinitrogen tetroxide oxidizers, and ammonia. This manuscript provides an overview of the history of Test 15 over a timeline ranging from prior to its development and first implementation as a NASA standard test in 1974 to its current refinement. Precursor documents to NASA standard tests, as they are currently known, are reviewed. A related supplementary test, international standardization, and enhancements to Test 15 are also discussed. Because WSTF was instrumental in the development and implementation of Test 15, WSTF experience and practices are referred to in this manuscript.

Greene, Benjamin↗

NASA NTRS2011

An Overview of STS-132 MRM1 Cargo Element Thermal Model Development and Analyses

STS-132 was launched in May 2010 and delivered the Russian Mini Research Module 1 (MRM1) cargo element to the International Space Station as part of the ULF-4 assembly flight. The cargo element consisted of the module outfitted with externally mounted Multi-purpose Laboratory Module (MLM) Airlock, MLM radiator, Portable Work Platform (PWP), and a European Robotic Arm (ERA) spare elbow. Prior to every Shuttle flight, hardware developers are required to determine compatibility of their hardware to thermal environments experienced during the Shuttle mission and once the element is integrated with the ISS. Thermal models are provided to the Shuttle program to determine the impact of the payload on the Orbiter hardware, as well as the ISS program to determine impacts on other ISS payloads in the Orbiter. Historically the Russian International Partner (IP) develops models in formats not compatible with software used by Space Shuttle or ISS programs. This prompted NASA and Lockheed Martin to develop a unique set of thermal models for the MRM1 cargo element. Subsequent ULF-4 mission analyses performed with the models assessed the launch to activation response, identified operational criteria documented in flight rules, and ensured compliance with the mission timeline and no hazards to the crew, orbiter, or ISS. This presentation provides an overview of the work performed, depicts unique approaches in model development, discusses lessons learned, and issue resolution approaches. Though development and analysis efforts spanned over four years and presented various integration challenges it provided an example of successful collaboration with our International Partners.

Perez, Miguel Fernando↗

NASA NTRS2025

Time-Dependent Satellite Explosion Probabilities for Long-Term Orbital Debris Environment Modeling

On-orbit accidental explosions are a significant contributor to the growth of the orbital debris population. Certain types of satellites have been seen to exhibit different behaviors and timelines of explosions. Recent assessments of on-orbit explosions for three categories of satellites – Russian Sistema Obespecheniya Zapuska (SOZ, Proton 4th stage attitude and ullage motors) units, spacecraft, and rocket bodies – suggest that on-orbit explosions can be modeled using a continuous, time-dependent probability of explosion. This paper discusses the methodology for developing a time-dependent probability of explosion as a function of the satellite’s orbital lifetime based on historical explosions. The SOZ units are found to be best modeled by a modified Gaussian probability distribution, with the peak probability of explosion occurring around 10.4 years on-orbit. Spacecraft and rocket bodies both exhibit exponentially decaying explosion probabilities, with rocket bodies showing fast-, medium-, and slow-time modes of decay. Total cumulative probabilities of explosion are approximately 57% for SOZ units, 4% for spacecraft, and 2% for rocket bodies. Examples of implementation in a simulation of the orbital debris environment using NASA's long-term evolutionary model are given, showing the overall explosion behavior over two centuries is significantly different from that using a previously implemented constant-probability type-dependent explosion rate model and provides a better representation of the historical explosion record.

Alyssa P Manis↗

NASA NTRS2017

NASA's In-Space Manufacturing Project: A Roadmap for a Multimaterial Fabrication Laboratory in Space

Human space exploration to date has been limited to low Earth orbit and the moon. The International Space Station (ISS) provides a unique opportunity for NASA to partner with private industry for development and demonstration of the technologies needed to support exploration initiatives. One challenge that is critical to sustainable and safer exploration is the ability to manufacture and recycle materials in space. This paper provides an overview of NASA's in-space manufacturing (ISM) project, its past and current activities (2014-2017), and how technologies under development will ultimately culminate in a multimaterial fabrication laboratory ("ISM FabLab") to be deployed on the International Space Station in the early 2020s. ISM is a critical capability for the long endurance missions NASA seeks to undertake in the coming decades. An unanticipated failure that can be adapted for in low earth orbit, through a resupply launch or a return to earth, may instead result in a loss of mission while in transit to Mars. To have a suite of functional ISM capabilities that are compatible with NASA's exploration timeline, ISM must be equipped with the resources necessary to develop these technologies and deploy them for testing prior to the scheduled de-orbit of ISS in 2024. The presentation provides a broad overview of ISM projects activities culminating with the Fabrication Laboratory for ISS. In 2017, the in-space manufacturing project issued a broad agency announcement for this capability. Requirements of the Fabrication Laboratory as stated in the solicitation will be discussed. The FabLab will move NASA and private industry significantly closer to changing historical paradigms for human spaceflight where all materials used in space are launched from earth. While the current ISM FabLab will be tested on ISS, future systems are eventually intended for use in a deep space habitat or transit vehicle. The work of commercial companies funded under NASA's Small Business Innovative Research Program (SBIR) is also discussed, as these activities, from development of recyclable packaging for ISS to additive manufacturing capabilities for metals and electronics, could also potentially be infused into future exploration capabilities. Key data from ISM projects to date will also be summarized.

Prater, Tracie↗

NASA NTRS2022

The Cooling Loop A Anomaly of 2013: A Case Study in Human-Systems Resilience

Throughout the history of human spaceflight, NASA has employed an operational paradigm of 24/7 dependence on experts in Mission Control Center (MCC). In addition to nominal flight control and mission operations, these 85+ experts per shift manage anomaly detection, diagnosis, and response, and support the crew in real-time in performing maintenance and repair, procedure execution, and other complex mission operations. Future long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs) beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) will not operate successfully using this same Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) where crew rely on ground controllers, have ready access to resupply, and have a fallback plan of evacuation. As distance from Earth increases and the communication delay grows, crews will need to respond independently and adequately to time-critical vehicle malfunctions. It will not always be sufficient or even possible to ‘safe the system’ and then wait upon ground intervention. A new and radically different HSIA is needed to accommodate the paradigm shift of deep-space travel. Historical International Space Station (ISS) data show that for a 30-day mission, the likelihood of a high-consequence vehicle anomaly of uncertain origin that requires rapid response is greater than 10%. The likelihood of such an event is 50% by the fourth month of the mission, and it grows exponentially with time. Our team has conducted in-depth investigations into these events and their corresponding anomaly resolution activities. Using MCC and Mission Evaluation Room (MER) anomaly resolution artifacts (including meeting summaries, caution and warning data, and ISS daily summaries), we created timelines detailing ground actions and in-orbit events for two significant anomalies. We then mapped these timelines onto Mars transit conditions, introducing a ground-crew communications time delay and shifting immediate response, time-critical task execution, and vehicle commanding to the crew. In detailing successful anomaly resolution in transit to Mars, the timelines highlight where effective resolution requires drastically evolved onboard capabilities. Though this research has yielded a rich data set based on ground response in past missions, there is still insufficient knowledge to assess the potential impact of inflight anomalies on a small autonomous crew on future LDEMs beyond LEO. To begin building an evidence base that will inform future HSIA standards and requirements, we are developing an approach to systematically capture crew anomaly response and procedure execution during early Artemis missions. Being the first human spaceflight beyond LEO since Apollo, early Artemis missions provide a rare and unique opportunity to serve as a testbed for Mars missions. Our work aims to capitalize on planned data collection to derive crew operational responses to anomalous events in real-time. Our team is also researching the level of simulation fidelity required for empirically validating proposed HSIA standards and evaluating HSIA implementations for LDEMs beyond LEO. This work will produce a trade space study of HSIA simulation objectives and fidelity requirements. Ultimately, these research efforts will assist in developing the standards and technologies needed to build a next-generation HSIA for LDEMs beyond LEO.

human-systems integration architecture↗

NASA NTRS2000

Evaluation of Hardware and Procedures for Astronaut Assembly and Repair of Large Precision Reflectors

A detailed procedure is presented that enables astronauts in extravehicular activity (EVA) to efficiently assemble and repair large (i.e., greater than 10m-diameter) segmented reflectors, supported by a truss, for space-based optical or radio-frequency science instruments. The procedure, estimated timelines, and reflector hardware performance are verified in simulated 0-g (neutral buoyancy) assembly tests of a 14m-diameter, offset-focus, reflector test article. The test article includes a near-flight-quality, 315-member, doubly curved support truss and 7 mockup reflector panels (roughly 2m in diameter) representing a portion of the 37 total panels needed to fully populate the reflector. Data from the tests indicate that a flight version of the design (including all reflector panels) could be assembled in less than 5 hours - less than the 6 hours normally permitted for a single EVA. This assembly rate essentially matches pre-test predictions that were based on a vast amount of historical data on EVA assembly of structures produced by NASA Langley Research Center. Furthermore, procedures and a tool for the removal and replacement of a damaged reflector panel were evaluated, and it was shown that EVA repair of this type of reflector is feasible with the use of appropriate EVA crew aids.

Lake, Mark S.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Humanity hopes to perform extravehicular activities (EVAs) on the surface of Mars; however, several technical and operational challenges must first be overcome. Foremost among these challenges is managing a significant communication latency between Earth and Mars. Current and historical paradigms of EVA operations have required near-real-time communication between the crewmember(s) and Earth-based mission control. Nextgeneration operational paradigms for supporting deep space exploration will necessitate a distributed decision authority system, including delayed Earth-based mission control, the onplanet extravehicular crewmember(s), and intermediate mission support from intravehicular (IV) crewmember(s) within real-time communication range. This latter group is of particular interest: they must provide operations support without the plentiful resources available to mission control on Earth. Thus, NASA is developing the Personalized EVA Informatics and Decision Support (PersEIDS) software platform. PersEIDS is designed to bolster operator situational awareness and offload operator workload by automatically tracking and projecting consumables usage over an EVA timeline, providing real-time probabilistic safety assessments and recommending alternative EVA timeline(s) when the active timeline is not expected to be completed under consumables limits. The PersEIDS concept of operations, use cases, and models will be presented. A limited version of PersEIDS was demonstrated during a three-day-long study where each day a roughly four-hour-long simulated Martian EVA was performed in virtual reality at the NASA Johnson Space Center. The first day was a control trial without PersEIDS support; the second and third days represented different levels of decision support provided by PersEIDS to the IV crewmember acting as mission control. With PersEIDS support, the IV crewmember was able to manage the mission to completion faster and with more remaining consumables; however, additional testing is required to understand confounding factors, e.g., training bias.

Mars↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

PersEIDS: A Biomedical Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Mars↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Within the next few decades, humanity hopes to perform extravehicular activities (EVAs) on the surface of Mars; however, several technical and operational challenges must first be overcome. Foremost among these challenges is managing a significant two-way communication latency between Earth and Mars. Current and historical paradigms of EVA operations have required near-real-time communication between the crewmember(s) performing an EVA and an Earth-based mission control. Next-generation operational paradigms for supporting deep space exploration will necessitate a distributed decision authority system, including delayed Earth-based mission control, the on-planet extravehicular crewmember(s), and intermediate mission support from intravehicular crewmember(s) within real-time communication range. This latter group is of particular interest: they must provide operations support without the plentiful resources available to mission control on Earth. For this purpose, NASA is developing the Personalized EVA Informatics and Decision Support (PersEIDS) software platform. PersEIDS is designed to bolster operator situational awareness and offload operator workload by automating the tracking and projection of consumables usage over an EVA timeline, providing real-time probabilistic safety assessments of an EVA timeline given consumables constraints, and recommending alternative EVA timeline(s) when the active timeline is not expected to be completed under consumables limits. The PersEIDS concept of operations, use cases, and models will be presented. A limited version of PersEIDS was demonstrated during a three-day-long study where each day a roughly four-hour-long simulated Martian EVA was performed in virtual reality at the NASA Johnson Space Center. The first day was a control trial without PersEIDS support; the second and third days represented different levels of decision support provided by PersEIDS to the intravehicular crewmember acting as mission control. With PersEIDS support, the IV crewmember was able to manage the mission to completion faster and with more remaining consumables; however, additional testing is required to understand confounding factors, e.g. training bias.

Mars↗