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At least 37 records · Page 2

Hazard Analysis for Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to prevent injury to personnel, and to prevent damage to facilities and equipment. The primary purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment and hardware. In fulfillment of the stated purposes, the goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel, damage the facility or its test systems or equipment, test articles, Government or personal property, or the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in Appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, "JSC Safety and Health Handbook" and JSC 17773 Rev D "Instructions for Preparation of Hazard Analysis for JSC Ground Operations".

Meginnis, Ian

Natural Hazard Risk Assessments at the Global Scale

Since 1990, natural hazards have led to over 1.6 million fatalities globally, and economic losses are estimated at an average of around USD 260–310 billion per year. The scientific and policy communities recognise the need to reduce these risks. As a result, the last decade has seen a rapid development of global models for assessing risk from natural hazards at the global scale. In this paper, we review the scientific literature on natural hazard risk assessments at the global scale, and we specifically examine whether and how they have examined future projections of hazard, exposure, and/or vulnerability. In doing so, we examine similarities and differences between the approaches taken across the different hazards, and we identify potential ways in which different hazard communities can learn from each other. For example, there are a number of global risk studies focusing on hydrological, climatological, and meteorological hazards that have included future projections and disaster risk reduction measures (in the case of floods), whereas fewer exist in the peer-reviewed literature for global studies related to geological hazards. On the other hand, studies of earthquake and tsunami risk are now using stochastic modelling approaches to allow for a fully probabilistic assessment of risk, which could benefit the modelling of risk from other hazards. Finally, we discuss opportunities for learning from methods and approaches being developed and applied to assess natural hazard risks at more continental or regional scales. Through this paper, we hope to encourage further dialogue on knowledge sharing between disciplines and communities working on different hazards and risk and at different spatial scales.

Philip J. Ward

Wildfire Emergency Response Hazard Extraction and Analysis of Trends (HEAT) through Natural Language Processing and Time Series

A methodology for Hazard Extraction and Analysis of Trends (HEAT) is proposed and conducted on a data set of wildfire incident response forms, known as ICS-209-PLUS.The HEAT processes: (1) extract a set of hazards from a data set, (2) calculate hazard-relevant metrics in a primary analysis, (3) analyze trends over time in metrics using timeseries, and (4) examine potential explanations for metric trends using a secondary analysis. Hazards are extracted from narrative data in the ICS-209-PLUS based on a framework previously developed by the authors, using natural language processing. Metrics examined for each hazard include operational time to occurrence, rate of occurrence, frequency, and severity. Primary results include a taxonomy of hazards present in the data set with relevant quantitative metrics. The most frequent hazards identified are environmental and include hazardous terrain. Most hazards occur on average between 35-55% containment. Incidents with hazards tend to have a higher average severity score when compared to the average score for all incidents. Time series of the metrics and relevant predictors, including fire characteristics, fire intensity, and operations, are created to facilitate further analysis. Secondary results used to determine which factors best predict hazard frequency include a correlation matrix and regression analysis. These findings are relevant to safety for current, as well as emerging wildfire operations, and are an exploratory first step in developing historical data-driven risk assessment models.

Sequoia R. Andrade

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson

NASA LaRC Hazardous Material Pharmacy

In 1993-1994 the Office of Environmental Engineering contracted SAIC to develop NASA Langley's Pollution Prevention (P2) Program. One of the priority projects identified in this contract was the development of a hazardous waste minimization (HAZMIN)/hazardous materials reutilization (HAZMART) program in the form of a Hazardous Materials Pharmacy. A hazardous materials pharmacy is designed to reduce hazardous material procurement costs and hazardous waste disposal costs. This is accomplished through the collection and reissue of excess hazardous material. Currently, a rarely used hazardous material may be stored in a shop area, unused, until it passes its expiration date. The material is then usually disposed of as a hazardous waste, often at a greater expense than the original cost of the material. While this material was on the shelf expiring, other shop areas may have ordered new supplies of the same material. The hazardous material pharmacy would act as a clearinghouse for such materials. Material that is not going to be used would be turned in to the pharmacy. Other users could then be issued this material free of charge, thereby reducing procurement costs. The use of this material by another shop prevents it from expiring, thereby reducing hazardous waste disposal costs.

Esquenet, Remy

Hazard Analysis for Pneumatic Flipper Suitport/Z-1 Manned Evaluation, Chamber B, Building 32

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to protect our personnel from injury and our equipment from damage. The purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Z1 Suit Port Test in Chamber B located in building 32, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments, and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment, and hardware. The goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel and/or damage facility equipment, flight hardware, property, or harm the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, JSC Safety and Health Handbook.

Source record

Lidar Sensor Performance in Closed-Loop Flight Testing of the Morpheus Rocket-Propelled Lander to a Lunar-Like Hazard Field

For the first time, a suite of three lidar sensors have been used in flight to scan a lunar-like hazard field, identify a safe landing site, and, in concert with an experimental Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) system, guide the Morpheus autonomous, rocket-propelled, free-flying test bed to a safe landing on the hazard field. The lidar sensors and GN&C system are part of the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project which has been seeking to develop a system capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The 3-D imaging flash lidar is a second generation, compact, real-time, air-cooled instrument developed from a number of cutting-edge components from industry and NASA and is used as part of the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) to scan the hazard field and build a 3-D Digital Elevation Map (DEM) in near-real time for identifying safe sites. The flash lidar is capable of identifying a 30 cm hazard from a slant range of 1 km with its 8 cm range precision at 1 sigma. The flash lidar is also used in Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN) to provide position updates down to a 250m slant range to the ALHAT navigation filter as it guides Morpheus to the safe site. The Doppler Lidar system has been developed within NASA to provide velocity measurements with an accuracy of 0.2 cm/sec and range measurements with an accuracy of 17 cm both from a maximum range of 2,200 m to a minimum range of several meters above the ground. The Doppler Lidar's measurements are fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The Laser Altimeter, also developed within NASA, provides range measurements with an accuracy of 5 cm from a maximum operational range of 30 km down to 1 m and, being a separate sensor from the flash lidar, can provide range along a separate vector. The Laser Altimeter measurements are also fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The flight tests served as the culmination of the TRL 6 journey for the lidar suite and included launch from a pad situated at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway, a lunar-like descent trajectory from an altitude of 250m, and landing on a lunar-like hazard field of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe sites 400m down-range just off the North end of the runway. The tests both confirmed the expected performance and also revealed several challenges present in the flight-like environment which will feed into future TRL advancement of the sensors. The flash lidar identified hazards as small as 30 cm from the maximum slant range of 450 m which Morpheus could provide, however, it was occasionally susceptible to an increase in range noise due to heated air from the Morpheus rocket plume which entered its Field-of-View (FOV). The flash lidar was also susceptible to pre-triggering on dust during the HRN phase which was created during launch and transported by the wind. The Doppler Lidar provided velocity and range measurements to the expected accuracy levels yet it was also susceptible to signal degradation due to air heated by the rocket engine. The Laser Altimeter, operating with a degraded transmitter laser, also showed signal attenuation over a few seconds at a specific phase of the flight due to the heat plume generated by the rocket engine.

Roback, Vincent E.

Lidar Sensor Performance in Closed-Loop Flight Testing of the Morpheus Rocket-Propelled Lander to a Lunar-Like Hazard Field

For the first time, a suite of three lidar sensors have been used in flight to scan a lunar-like hazard field, identify a safe landing site, and, in concert with an experimental Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) system, help to guide the Morpheus autonomous, rocket-propelled, free-flying lander to that safe site on the hazard field. The lidar sensors and GN&C system are part of the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project which has been seeking to develop a system capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The 3-D imaging Flash Lidar is a second generation, compact, real-time, aircooled instrument developed from a number of components from industry and NASA and is used as part of the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) to scan the hazard field and build a 3-D Digital Elevation Map (DEM) in near-real time for identifying safe sites. The Flash Lidar is capable of identifying a 30 cm hazard from a slant range of 1 km with its 8 cm range precision (1-s). The Flash Lidar is also used in Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN) to provide position updates down to a 250m slant range to the ALHAT navigation filter as it guides Morpheus to the safe site. The Navigation Doppler Lidar (NDL) system has been developed within NASA to provide velocity measurements with an accuracy of 0.2 cm/sec and range measurements with an accuracy of 17 cm both from a maximum range of 2,200 m to a minimum range of several meters above the ground. The NDLâ€"TM"s measurements are fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The Laser Altimeter (LA), also developed within NASA, provides range measurements with an accuracy of 5 cm from a maximum operational range of 30 km down to 1 m and, being a separate sensor from the Flash Lidar, can provide range along a separate vector. The LA measurements are also fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The flight tests served as the culmination of the TRL 6 journey for the ALHAT system and included launch from a pad situated at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway, a lunar-like descent trajectory from an altitude of 250m, and landing on a lunar-like hazard field of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe sites 400m down-range just off the North end of the runway. The tests both confirmed the expected performance and also revealed several challenges present in the flight-like environment which will feed into future TRL advancement of the sensors. Guidance provided by the ALHAT system was impeded in portions of the trajectory and intermittent near the end of the trajectory due to optical effects arising from air heated by the rocket engine. The Flash Lidar identified hazards as small as 30 cm from the maximum slant range of 450 m which Morpheus could provide; however, it was occasionally susceptible to an increase in range noise due to scintillation arising from air heated by the Morpheus rocket engine which entered its Field-of-View (FOV). The Flash Lidar was also susceptible to pre-triggering, during the HRN phase, on a dust cloud created during launch and transported down-range by the wind. The NDL provided velocity and range measurements to the expected accuracy levels yet it was also susceptible to signal degradation due to air heated by the rocket engine. The LA, operating with a degraded transmitter laser, also showed signal attenuation over a few seconds at a specific phase of the flight due to the heat plume generated by the rocket engine.

Roback, V. Eric

On the Moral Hazard of Autonomy

This paper describes the concept of moral hazard as applied to technologies that incorporate automation and autonomy. Moral hazard is said to exist when a party to a transaction feels more comfortable taking undue risks because another party will bear the costs if things go badly. As opposed to regular physical hazards, a moral hazard comes from within a person. In this paper, we reveal two categories of moral hazards related to autonomy. The first category of moral hazard occurs when the owner of the autonomy introduces an autonomous system without accepting the full responsibility for improper operation thereby shifting the risks from one party to another party. This category of moral hazard is similar to moral hazards experienced in other industries and can often be addressed through appropriate policy and establishing liability for irresponsible behavior. The issue becomes more complicated in cases where the operator of the autonomy may not have a full understanding of the system behavior. In the second category of moral hazard, risks are shifted from people to autonomy. In this category, the humans in proximity to the autonomous system begin to trust its behavior. Their behavior may change in that they may believe they are more insulated from harm and subsequently exhibit more risky behavior towards increasingly autonomous technologies. Mitigating this type of moral hazard may require the autonomy to possess certain design features to discourage this type of harmful human behavior so that humans do not suffer needlessly in their interactions with autonomous systems by placing inappropriate trust where that trust is neither warranted nor deserved.

Cybernetics

Preliminary Approach to Assess the Seismic Hazard on a Lunar Site

The passive seismic network deployed on the Moon during the Apollo missions operated for eight years and allowed the observation of seismic activity. More than 12500 seismic events were registered, where 28 were classified as shallow moonquakes with moment magnitudes up to 4.1. Seismic events of this nature pose a significant risk to future long-term lunar habitats; thus, these events must be carefully studied and considered in the seismic design of these structures. This paper proposes a preliminary seismic hazard assessment imposed by shallow moonquakes. The hazard assessment is performed using the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) methodology, considering previous studies and theories regarding the seismic environment of the Moon. The study zone covers ~860 km2 of the Taurus-Littrow Valley, containing the Apollo 17 landing site and the Lee-Lincoln lobate scarp as the considered seismic source. The seismic hazard is quantified in terms of peak ground acceleration (PGA) and spectral acceleration (5% damped pseudo-acceleration, PSA). Seismic hazard deaggregation scenarios, Uniform Hazard Spectra (UHS) for different hazard levels, and a Conditional Mean Spectrum (CMS) for a target period of 0.2 s are obtained to quantify the seismic hazard on a specific site on the Moon. The developed seismic hazard assessment provides a preliminary approach for realistic scenarios to conduct structural designs that ensure the seismic performance of fully operational long-term lunar structures.

Moonquake

Lunar mission safety and rescue: Hazards analysis and safety requirements

The results are presented of the hazards analysis which was concerned only with hazards to personnel and not with loss of equipment or property. Hazards characterization includes the definition of a hazard, the hazard levels, and the hazard groups. The analysis methodology is described in detail. The methodology was used to prepare the top level functional flow diagrams, to perform the first level hazards assessment, and to develop a list of conditions and situations requiring individual hazard studies. The 39 individual hazard study results are presented in total.

Source record

GO/NO-GO - When is medical hazard mitigation acceptable for launch?

Medical support of spaceflight missions is composed of complex tasks and decisions that dedicated to maintaining the health and performance of the crew and the completion of mission objectives. Spacecraft represent one of the most complex vehicles built by humans, and are built to very rigorous design specifications. In the course of a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) or a mission itself, the flight surgeon must be able to understand the impact of hazards and risks that may not be completely mitigated by design alone. Some hazards are not mitigated because they are never actually identified. When a hazard is identified, it must be reduced or waivered. Hazards that cannot be designed out of the vehicle or mission, are usually mitigated through other means to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. This is possible in most engineered systems because failure modes are usually predictable and analysis can include taking these systems to failure. Medical support of space missions is complicated by the inability of flight surgeons to provide "exact" hazard and risk numbers to the NASA engineering community. Taking humans to failure is not an option. Furthermore, medical dogma is mostly comprised of "medical prevention" strategies that mitigate risk by examining the behaviour of a cohort of humans similar to astronauts. Unfortunately, this approach does not lend itself well for predicting the effect of a hazard in the unique environment of space. This presentation will discuss how Medical Operations uses an evidence-based approach to decide if hazard mitigation strategies are adequate to reduce mission risk to acceptable levels. Case studies to be discussed will include: 1. Risk of electrocution risk during EVA 2. Risk of cardiac event risk during long and short duration missions 3. Degraded cabin environmental monitoring on the ISS. Learning Objectives 1.) The audience will understand the challenges of mitigating medical risk caused by nominal and off-nominal mission events. 2.) The audience will understand the process by which medical hazards are identified and mitigated before launch. 3.) The audience will understand the roles and responsibilities of all the other flight control positions in participating in the process of reducing hazards and reducing medical risk to an acceptable level.

Hamilton, Douglas R.

Hazard Analysis for the Mark III Space Suit Assembly (SSA) Used in One-g Operations

This Hazard Analysis document encompasses the Mark III Space Suit Assembly (SSA) and associated ancillary equipment. It has been prepared using JSC17773, "Preparing Hazard Analyses for JSC Ground Operation", as a guide. The purpose of this document is to present the potential hazards involved in ground (23 % maximum O2, One-g) operations of the Mark III and associated ancillary support equipment system. The hazards listed in this document are specific to suit operations only; each supporting facility (Bldg. 9, etc.) is responsible for test specific Hazard Analyses. A "hazard" is defined as any condition that has the potential for harming personnel or equipment. This analysis was performed to document the safety aspects associated with manned use of the Mark III for pressurized and unpressurized ambient, ground-based, One-g human testing. The hazards identified herein represent generic hazards inherent to all standard JSC test venues for nominal ground test configurations. Non-standard test venues or test specific configurations may warrant consideration of additional hazards analysis prior to test. The cognizant suit engineer is responsible for the safety of the astronaut/test subject, space suit, and suit support personnel. The test requester, for the test supported by the suit test engineer and suited subject, is responsible for overall safety and any necessary Test Readiness Reviews (TRR).

Mitchell, Kate

Idaho Wildfires II: Assessing the Relationship Between Drought Indicators and Wildfire Risk to Enhance Hazard Modeling and Inform Mitigation Planning

The western United States has experienced twenty years of increased and prolonged drought which have exacerbated wildfire hazards. These jeopardize population centers through increased risks to ecosystem services, local economies, and livelihoods. The Idaho Office of Emergency Management, Water Resources, and Department of Lands are seeking methods to dynamically monitor these conditions and update models that inform hazard mitigation planning and resource allocation. Towards this, these agencies partnered with NASA DEVELOP to produce drought-enhanced wildfire hazard models. Part of a two-term project, the two teams revised the state’s static wildfire hazard model with refined data layers and remotely-sensed data to reflect dynamic ecosystem responses to drought conditions and wildfire potential. Our team distinguished between rangeland and forestland ecosystems, and investigated relationships between drought metrics and vegetation condition using TerrSet Earth Trends Modeler. This analysis determined that total precipitation at a 5-month lag interval (r 2 = 0.72) along with the Evaporative Stress Index (r 2 = 0.69); and precipitation at a 5-month interval (r 2 = 0.42) were important drivers in rangeland and forestland, respectively. These driver variables were incorporated into a temporally dynamic wildfire hazard map. Our team used linear regression to correlate hazard ratings with wildfire frequency. For the year 2020, neither the enhanced hazard model (p < 0.10, r 2 = 0.01) nor the state’s static model (p < 0.05, r 2 = 0.03) were strongly correlated with actual wildfire frequency as they expressed an inverse relationship between wildfire hazard and frequency. This suggests wildfire occurrence is complex and not necessarily driven by the variables used.

Wildfire

Wake-Vortex Hazards During Cruise

Even though the hazard posed by lift-generated wakes of subsonic transport aircraft has been studied extensively for approach and departure at airports, only a small amount of effort has gone into the potential hazard at cruise altitude. This paper reports on a studio of the wake-vortex hazard during cruise because encounters may become more prevalent when free-flight becomes available and each aircraft, is free to choose its own route between destinations. In order to address the problem, the various fluid-dynamic stages that vortex wakes usually go through as they age will be described along with estimates of the potential hazard that each stage poses. It appears that a rolling-moment hazard can be just as severe at cruise as for approach at airports, but it only persists for several minutes. However, the hazard posed by the downwash in the wake due to the lift on the generator aircraft persists for tens of minutes in a long narrow region behind the generating aircraft. The hazard consists of severe vertical loads when an encountering aircraft crosses the wake. A technique for avoiding vortex wakes at cruise altitude will be described. To date the hazard posed by lift-generated vortex wakes and their persistence at cruise altitudes has been identified and subdivided into several tasks. Analyses of the loads to be encounter and are underway and should be completed shortly. A review of published literature on the subject has been nearly completed (see text) and photographs of vortex wakes at cruise altitudes have been taken and the various stages of decay have been identified. It remains to study and sort the photographs for those that best illustrate the various stages of decay after they are shed by subsonic transport aircraft at cruise altitudes. The present status of the analysis and the paper are described.

Rossow, Vernon J.

Applications of a Forward-Looking Interferometer for the On-board Detection of Aviation Weather Hazards

The Forward-Looking Interferometer (FLI) is a new instrument concept for obtaining measurements of potential weather hazards to alert flight crews. The FLI concept is based on high-resolution Infrared (IR) Fourier Transform Spectrometry (FTS) technologies that have been developed for satellite remote sensing, and which have also been applied to the detection of aerosols and gases for other purposes. It is being evaluated for multiple hazards including clear air turbulence (CAT), volcanic ash, wake vortices, low slant range visibility, dry wind shear, and icing, during all phases of flight. Previous sensitivity and characterization studies addressed the phenomenology that supports detection and mitigation by the FLI. Techniques for determining the range, and hence warning time, were demonstrated for several of the hazards, and a table of research instrument parameters was developed for investigating all of the hazards discussed above. This work supports the feasibility of detecting multiple hazards with an FLI multi-hazard airborne sensor, and for producing enhanced IR images in reduced visibility conditions; however, further research must be performed to develop a means to estimate the intensities of the hazards posed to an aircraft and to develop robust algorithms to relate sensor measurables to hazard levels. In addition, validation tests need to be performed with a prototype system.

West, Leanne

Using remotely sensed information to support landslide hazard and exposure assessment throughout the disaster lifecycle

The global coverage and temporal frequency that satellites provide offers a unique opportunity to estimate landslide hazard and exposure throughout the disaster lifecycle, from pre-event planning and forecasting to post-event mapping and impact assessment, and finally to recovery and mitigation. The relevance of satellite-derived data and model products is largely contingent on the spatiotemporal sampling, the hazard characteristics, and the needs from the research or applications community. This work presents an advanced Landslide Hazard Assessment for Situational Awareness (LHASA) framework that brings together satellite and model products with new machine learning techniques and global inventory data to better model landslide hazard and exposure. We present several new ways to map, model, and assess landslide hazard using a range of satellite data. Two new thrusts of this work are to better account for the exacerbating impacts of fires and to provide a multi-day forecast of potential hazard. Together, these additional components blend information from a suite of satellite and model sources to improve early warning of potentially hazardous areas, identify landslide occurrence and impacts in near real-time, and better characterize the spatiotemporal patterns of landslide hazard and exposure more broadly for future awareness and planning. This suite of tools and products is open to the public and provides information to better assess the potential occurrence and impacts of landslides within different regions of the world. This presentation explores both the architecture behind this framework and examples of how the model components and products have been used by different stakeholders around the world.

Thomas Stanley