Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “guidance document”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Moving from scientific research to consenting guidance for MRE environmental risk

Potential environmental effects from tidal and wave devices are of concern to regulators, advisors, and other stakeholders in many nations. Monitoring results from early deployments and the first commercial arrays, coupled with targeted research studies, are providing a growing base of knowledge of how components of tidal turbines and wave energy converters might interact with marine animals and habitats. Efforts are underway to organize and direct these findings towards facilitating consenting that allays concerns and allows the marine renewable energy (MRE) industry to move forward. The OES-Environmental international initiative has developed scientific evidence bases for several key interactions from MRE devices, organized around stressors (portions of MRE systems that may cause injury or stress to the marine ecosystem), and receptors (the animals, habitats, and ecosystem processes that may be affected). This paper summarizes the evidence bases for four stressors (underwater noise, electromagnetic fields, habitat change, and changes in oceanographic systems) and presents the process of moving from the scientific knowledge into guidance documents to support the regulatory process. The guidance documents will serve as a broad guide that can be used internationally to look at stressor-receptor interactions of interest within a regulatory context. The evidence bases and guidance documents aim to assist MRE developers, regulators, and advisors with project scoping, consenting, and licensing processes.

Copping, Andrea E.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Demonstrating Assurance of Model-Based Fault Diagnosis Systems on an Operational Mission

Developers of robotic scientific and commercial spacecraft are trending towards use of onboard autonomous capabilities for responding quickly to dynamic environments and rapidly changing situations. These capabilities need to know the state of the spacecraft’s health. Model-based fault diagnosis (MBFD) is an approach to estimating health by continuously verifying accurate behavior and diagnosing off-nominal behavior. Proper functioning of MBFD depends on 1) the quality of the diagnostic system model that is analyzed and compared to commands and onboard measurements to estimate a system’s health state, and 2) the correct functionality of the diagnosis engine interrogating the model and comparing its analyses to observed system behavior. Our goal is to develop Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques for MBFD to provide future missions sufficient confidence in its functionality and performance to deploy it on the systems they develop. Our work has been focused on infusing the techniques we developed earlier to an operational mission. First, we are constructing diagnostic models of a spacecraft attitude control system and updating our diagnostic engine so they can be demonstrated aboard the Arcsecond Space Telescope Enabling Research in Astrophysics (ASTERIA) mission, an operational spacecraft for which experiments in autonomy are being planned and executed, using the V&V techniques we have previously developed to assure they are both correct and complete. Since it is nearing the end of its life, ASTERIA provides a unique opportunity to demonstrate MBFD since the monitored components are expected to fail. Our demonstration will give system developers additional confidence to make timely, informed MBFD deployment decisions. Second, we will be completing performance assessments of the diagnostic engine/diagnostic model ensemble both on the flight system and ground-based testbeds to gain confidence in MBFD’s ability to run successfully in a spacecraft’s resource-constrained environment without adversely affecting other on-board activities. Finally, we are capturing our experience in preparing this demonstration in a set of checklists and guidance documents. Current practice includes high-level institutional guidance documents and standards, but at a high level of abstraction that does not necessarily address specific MBFD concerns. The purpose of the new checklists is to provide future mission developers clear, unambiguous, procedure-oriented guidance on assuring MBFD. This paper describes our work in these areas. For the first area, we describe the diagnostic models and updated diagnostic engine that will be used for the on-board demonstration. We describe how the V&V techniques we developed earlier are used to assure model and engine correctness and completeness. For the second area, we identify the performance measurement and assessment techniques used to characterize the diagnostic engine and diagnostic models, and discuss the effect of measured performance on overall mission operation. Finally, we present the checklist and guidance documents and describe how they meet the goals of providing system developers with clear, unambiguous, procedure-oriented guidance on MBFD assurance. We show how the techniques we have developed map into those artifacts.

Nikora, Allen↗
DOE OSTI2017

Development of Criticality Safety Validation Guidance for NRC-Regulated Activities

Some guidance documents support validation of criticality safety evaluations for many system types, and some accommodate different regulators or regulatory requirements. While these reports address specific applications, no single document applies to all systems and incorporates both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based validation techniques. Oak Ridge National Laboratory will develop a single reference report for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that provides modern examples and suggested recommendations for a uniform approach for performing and documenting k eff calculation validations applicable to any system containing fissile material. The project will include a literature review and development of a new, comprehensive NUREG/CR document on nuclear criticality safety validation. The NUREG will address the following experiences from recent reviews: 1. Inappropriate critical experiment selection 2. Insufficient trending analysis 3. Incorrectly calculated 95/95 uncertainties 4. Failure to address how validation applies to safety analysis 5. Lack of goodness-of-fit testing in trending analyses 6. Incorrect use of commercial reactor critical data 7. Failure to meet bias determination methodology prerequisites 8. Inappropriate extrapolation of bias and uncertainty 9. Failure to identify validation analysis gaps and weaknesses 10. Inadequate validation analysis documentation the final report will provide guidance on use of trending analysis results, acceptable confidence levels for normality testing and trending analysis, management of validation analysis gaps and weaknesses, use of sensitivity and uncertainty analysis in validation analysis, and potential impact of correlations among critical experiments used in validation. It will also consolidate existing guidance documents using both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based approaches. This document will support NRC-regulated activities, as well as validation used in criticality safety within other regulatory frameworks.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2017

Development of criticality safety validation guidance for NRC-regulated activities

Some guidance documents support validation of criticality safety evaluations for many system types, and some accommodate different regulators or regulatory requirements. While these reports address specific applications, no single document applies to all systems and incorporates both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based validation techniques. Oak Ridge National Laboratory will develop a single reference report for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that provides modern examples and suggested recommendations for a uniform approach for performing and documenting k{sub eff} calculation validations applicable to any system containing fissile material. The project will include a literature review and development of a new, comprehensive NUREG/CR document on nuclear criticality safety validation. The NUREG will address the following experiences from recent reviews: 1) Inappropriate critical experiment selection; 2) Insufficient trending analysis; 3) Incorrectly calculated 95/95 uncertainties; 4) Failure to address how validation applies to safety analysis; 5) Lack of goodness-of-fit testing in trending analyses; 6) Incorrect use of commercial reactor critical data; 7) Failure to meet bias determination methodology prerequisites; 8) Inappropriate extrapolation of bias and uncertainty; 9) Failure to identify validation analysis gaps and weaknesses; and 10) Inadequate validation analysis documentation. The final report will provide guidance on use of trending analysis results, acceptable confidence levels for normality testing and trending analysis, management of validation analysis gaps and weaknesses, use of sensitivity and uncertainty analysis in validation analysis, and potential impact of correlations among critical experiments used in validation. It will also consolidate existing guidance documents using both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based approaches. This document will support NRC-regulated activities, as well as validation used in criticality safety within other regulatory frameworks. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2019

EM Program Expectations on Implementation of DOE O 458: Radiation Protection of Public/Environment - 19553

DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment, was issued in 2011. DOE sites were given 18 months to implement. The revised Order promulgates requirements for property clearance actions and independent verification. DOE Order 458.1 allows for preapproved authorized limits for the clearance of property. However, when property with the potential to contain residual radioactive material does not meet preapproved authorized limits, an authorized limits package must be developed. The Order contains a range of requirements for demonstrating with reasonable assurance that dose constraints are met for any actual or likely future use of the property to be released. EM has developed a draft guidance document that provides the elements of an authorized limits package. These elements are used to review all authorized limits packages that are submitted to EM. Expected elements include property description and process knowledge documentation, current and likely future use, the conceptual site model, dose modeling methodologies, specific authorized limits, dose- or concentration-based constraints, collective dose estimate to the potentially exposed population, stakeholder communications, description of the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) analysis, implementation plan, evaluation of difficult to assess surfaces, and independent verification plan. The draft guidance document also provides further explanation of the desired elements of an independent verification (IV) plan. An IV plan should describe the planning phase, implementation phase, assessment phase, and decision phase of an activity. The planning phase includes scope and cost, concurrent with cleanup contractor procurement, and review and approval of site radiological survey clearance program and IV program plans. The implementation phase assures sufficient collection of data and adjustment can be made as necessary. During the assessment phase, data and reports are reviewed, and coordination between the clean-up contractor and IV personnel occurs. A decision of whether or not the clearance actions need to be altered occurs during the decision phase. IV certification that the clearance action is complete also occurs during the decision phase. Issuance of the final guidance document is meant to improve the consultation process and minimize iterative interactions with EM. Standardizing and formalizing property clearance and IV actions also helps assure that cleanup actions are transparent and sustainable for future scrutiny. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Better Climate Challenge: Greenhouse Gas Reporting Guidance

Better Climate Challenge Greenhouse Gas Reporting Guidance document can help you define the scope of your commitment, set your goal and base year, and annually report progress toward your goal for Better Climate Challenge Program. You will share GHG emissions and energy data across your building/plant portfolio with DOE, including owned and operated fleets. This document provides instructional guidance on how to quantify GHG emissions across your organization. Establishing an accurate GHG inventory is a critical first step to developing a plan to reduce emissions across your organization.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Assessment of Survey Results from Advanced Reactor Industry Domain Experts on Nonlinear Soil-Structure Interaction Analysis Software Verification and Validation

The seismic load case has a significant impact on the design and cost of nuclear power plants. Given the need to substantially reduce cost, advanced reactor designers are looking to leverage numerical tools that enable seismic analysis of an integrated vessel/support/structure/soil system. Modern nonlinear analysis tools provide a solution, capturing dynamic coupling between components (including soil-structure interaction (SSI)) concurrent with nonlinear behavior in one or more parts of the system. Although these methods have a rich history of technical development and implementation, software quality assurance (SQA) following nuclear industry standards remains a significant burden for those wishing to adopt such methods for advanced reactor design and licensing. To reduce the SQA burden, this project will develop the guidance for SQA verification and validation (V&V) of coupled nonlinear SSI analysis tools, to include a test matrix of software features and test problems to support commercial grade dedication (CGD). The guidance is intended to be technology-neutral: supporting designers of all advanced reactors. To maximize the value of the project to reactor designers, the project team performed focused surveys of and interviews with advanced reactor designers. Additionally, the project surveyed members of the broader industry involved in reactor design and licensing. The aggregated industry feedback consists of written survey responses, live polling responses, focused interviews, and informal feedback provided after outreach presentations, collectively referred to as “survey results”. Herein, the survey results are reported, reviewed, and assessed to inform follow-on project activities. The survey results confirmed the familiarity of the industry with the coupled nonlinear SSI analysis. They also affirm the project need based upon the expressed intent to (1) incorporate nonlinear features and (2) pursue the coupled nonlinear SSI analysis to reduce seismic demands and construction costs. All reactor designers indicated their intent to incorporate two or more nonlinear features, and all reactor designer respondents opined that the coupled nonlinear SSI analysis would allow for the optimization of the reactor design and construction. However, the programmatic challenges, whether real or perceived, present a significant barrier to reactor designers. The barrier most commonly identified by the reactor designer population was regulatory risk, with 70% citing this as a reason not to pursue the approach. The perceived regulatory risk identified by the reactor designers underscores the importance of regulator engagement and dialogue in this project. Additionally, half of the reactor designers identified cost and lack of guidance as a deterrent. The survey results also provide insights to tailor specific aspects of the guidance document and test matrix. The project plans to prepare both a formal referenceable guidance document and a collaborative, web-based test matrix and problem set. The project will focus on more complete test problem definitions for the prioritized nonlinear features over shallower problem descriptions for a larger set of features. The nonlinearities prioritized as high based upon survey feedback include fluid-structure interaction and seismic isolation and energy dissipation devices. The nonlinearities prioritized as intermediate include nonlinear geomaterials, nonlinear concrete, nonlinear steel, and interface/contact nonlinearity. Deep embedment and the associated nonlinear phenomena are assigned the lowest priority based upon survey feedback.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1974

Targetting and guidance program documentation

A FORTRAN computer program was developed which automatically targets two and three burn rendezvous missions and performs feedback guidance using the GUIDE algorithm. The program was designed to accept a large class of orbit specifications and to automatically choose a two or three burn mission depending upon the time alignment of the vehicle and target. The orbits may be specified as any combination of circular and elliptical orbits and may be coplanar or inclined, but must be aligned coaxially with their perigees in the same direction. The program accomplishes the required targeting by repeatedly converging successively more complex missions. It solves the coplanar impulsive version of the mission, then the finite burn coplanar mission, and finally, the full plane change mission. The GUIDE algorithm is exercised in a feedback guidance mode by taking the targeted solution and moving the vehicle state step by step ahead in time, adding acceleration and navigational errors, and reconverging from the perturbed states at fixed guidance update intervals. A program overview is presented, along with a user's guide which details input, output, and the various subroutines.

Harrold, E. F.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Carbon Conversion Technologies - NETL Techno-Economic Analysis Guidelines

This presentation was delivered as part of the Global CO2 Initiative and NETL sponsored workshop, 2022 CCU TEA and LCA Guidance - A Harmonized Approach. The presentation highlights the intent and content of forthcoming NETL guidance documents and toolsets on conducting techno-economic analysis on carbon conversion technologies. Specifically discussed are the "Performing a TEA for Carbon Conversion Technologies" guidance document, the "Cost Scaling Methodology Specific to Carbon Conversion Technologies," and brief highlights of upcoming work products.

Henry, Samuel↗
DOE OSTI2021

TCR Input to NUREG-1537 Process for Advanced Nuclear Technologies Derived from Additive Manufacturing

There has been a renewed interest by several advanced reactor developers to use NUREG-1537 “Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors” as a basis for their safety analysis report content and organization. Recently, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC (SHINE), which is a non-power, Aqueous Homogenous Reactor design radioisotope production facility, received a construction permit based around their NUREG-1537 safety evaluation report (ADAMS No. ML16229A140). Advanced reactor developers are interested in using NUREG-1537 as a basis for their safety analysis report content and organization because of its successful application towards research reactors, graded approach, and simplicity in structure and requirements. However, NUREG-1537 is still largely geared toward light water reactors (LWRs) and many improvements could be made or supported through guidance documents for advanced reactors. For nuclear power to play a role in the future zero-carbon energy portfolio, a supportive regulatory structure is needed to lower regulatory uncertainty and barriers to deployment. At the time of this report, no such document or pathway exists for advanced nuclear technologies, including those derived from nontraditional technology such as advanced manufacturing technology (AMT) and, specifically, additive manufacturing. This report will explore and provide recommendations as to how advanced nuclear technologies derived from additive manufacturing technologies could employ the use of an ISG, other guidance document, or revisions to NUREG-1537 to lower the regulatory uncertainty and barriers for adoption.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2018

CWA 15793 2011 Planning and Implementation Tool

This software, built on an open source platform called Electron (runs on Chromium and Node.js), is designed to assist organizations in the implementation of a biorisk management system consistent with the requirements of the international, publicly available guidance document CEN Workshop Agreement 15793:2011 (CWA 15793). The software includes tools for conducting organizational gap analysis against CWA 15793 requirements, planning tools to support the implementation of CWA 15793 requirements, and performance monitoring support. The gap analysis questions are based on the text of CWA 15793, and its associated guidance document, CEN Workshop Agreement 16393:2012. The authors have secured permission from the publisher of CWA 15793, the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), to use language from the document in the software, with the understanding that the software will be made available freely, without charge.

Gross, Alan↗
DOE OSTI2012

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2012

Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel

Introduction and Purpose The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on prismatic fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC. For the nuclear industry to reap the benefits of SBD (i.e. avoid cost overruns and construction schedule slippages), nuclear facility designers and operators should work closely with the State Regulatory Authority and IAEA as soon as a decision is taken to build a new nuclear facility. Ideally, this interaction should begin during the conceptual design phase and continue throughout construction and start-up of a nuclear facility. Such early coordination and planning could influence decisions on the design of the nuclear material processing flow-sheet, material storage and handling arrangements, and facility layout (including safeguards equipment), etc.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2012

Overview of Green and Sustainable Remediation for Soil and Groundwater Remediation - 12545

Making remediation efforts more 'sustainable' or 'green' is a topic of great interest in the remediation community. It has been spurred on by Executive Orders from the White House, as well as Department of Energy (DOE) sustainability plans. In private industry, it is motivated by corporate sustainability goals and corporate social responsibility. It has spawned new organizations, areas of discussion, tools and practices, and guidance documents around sustainable remediation or green remediation. Green remediation can be thought of as a subset of sustainable remediation and is mostly focused on reducing the environmental footprint of cleanup efforts. Sustainable remediation includes both social and economic considerations, in addition to environmental. Application of both green and sustainable remediation (GSR) may involve two primary activities. The first is to develop technologies and alternatives that are greener or more sustainable. This can also include making existing remediation approaches greener or more sustainable. The second is to include GSR criteria in the evaluation of remediation alternatives and strategies. In other words, to include these GSR criteria in the evaluation of alternatives in a feasibility study. In some cases, regulatory frameworks allow the flexibility to include GSR criteria into the evaluation process (e.g., state cleanup programs). In other cases, regulations allow less flexibility to include the evaluation of GSR criteria (e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)). New regulatory guidance and tools will be required to include these criteria in typical feasibility studies. GSR provides a number of challenges for remediation professionals performing soil and groundwater remediation projects. Probably the most significant is just trying to stay on top of the ever changing landscape of products, tools, and guidance documents coming out of various groups, the US EPA, and states. However, this process also provides new opportunities to think differently and look at the bigger picture of the overall benefit we are providing with our remediation projects. The opportunities from the move towards GSR are very real. They will help us make remedial actions truly more beneficial to the environment and to society. They will also allow (or force) remediation practitioners to think outside of the usual realm of approaches to find newer and more beneficial technologies. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

TableCalculator: a Transparent Public Tool to Replicate US NRC LLW Classification Table Calculations - 19395

Classification of Low-Level Waste (LLW) as Class A, B, C, or Greater than Class C (GTCC) is based on tables provided in Section 61.55 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Those tables were developed from model projections of dose to an inadvertent intruder in agricultural and construction scenarios at different times after closure of a LLW land disposal site. The calculations were performed with two FORTRAN codes, which are documented in US NRC guidance documents published in the early 1980's. Although the equations and parameter values used in the codes are publicly available, no modern, user-friendly implementation of the codes is known to US NRC staff. Because Very Low-Level Waste (VLLW) and GTCC waste disposal are related to the low end and high end of the existing LLW waste classifications, respectively, recent interest in options for disposal of VLLW and GTCC waste have generated public interest in the original assumptions made during the development of the LLW classification tables. Certain stakeholder analyses have recommended alternatives to the existing LLW concentration limits by calculating a projected intruder dose under different conditions than were evaluated in the original development of 10 CFR Part 61 (e.g., using more modern dosimetry or assuming deeper disposal) and comparing the radionuclide concentrations that result in a projected annual dose of 5 milliSieverts (mSv) (500 millirem (mrem)) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to the concentrations in the waste classification tables. However, beginning with the 10 CFR Part 61 LLW classification limits and modifying only one or two assumptions to generate a proposed concentration limit could lead to misleading results without a thorough analysis of whether other assumptions made in the original development of the waste classification tables remain valid. In particular, the US NRC made adjustments to the 10 CFR 61.55 table values during the rulemaking process based on qualitative considerations. Those adjustments mean that many of the values in the final tables cannot simply be assumed to quantitatively represent a 5 mSv (500 mrem) projected inadvertent intruder dose without an assessment of whether the technical bases used to develop the adjustments are applicable to the new analysis. Furthermore, the waste classification limits were based on the limiting critical organ dose rather than a TEDE. Therefore, any calculation based on the assumption that the waste classification limits correspond to 5 mSv (500 mrem) TEDE could benefit from consideration of how differences in exposure pathways could affect the limiting critical organ dose differently from the TEDE. To facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the calculations used to develop the waste classification tables, the US NRC staff has developed a user-friendly tool to replicate the original calculations. Results were verified against output from the FORTRAN codes and the classification table values. The tool, TableCalculator, is expected to be made publicly available and will allow the user to trace the original calculations and to observe the effects of changes in disposal assumptions and other parameter values. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2022

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Tool for Understanding the NASA Human Spaceflight System Risks - Human System Risk Board

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.

Erik L. Antonsen↗
NASA NTRS2005

Human Systems Integration: Unmanned Aircraft Control Station Certification Plan Guidance

This document provides guidance to the FAA on important human factors considerations that can be used to support the certification of a UAS Aircraft Control Station (ACS). This document provides a synopsis of the human factors analysis, design and test activities to be performed to provide a basis for FAA certification. The data from these analyses, design activities, and tests, along with data from certification/qualification tests of other key components should be used to establish the ACS certification basis. It is expected that this information will be useful to manufacturers in developing the ACS Certification Plan,, and in supporting the design of their ACS.

Source record↗