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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2002

The Aircraft Simulation Role in Improving Flight Safety Through Control Room Training

NASA Dryden Flight Research Center uses its six-degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) fixed-base simulations for mission control room training to improve flight safety and operations. This concept is applied to numerous flight projects such as the F-18 High Alpha Research Vehicle (HARV), the F-15 Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS), the X-38 Actuator Control Test (XACT), and X-43A (Hyper-X). The Dryden 6-DOF simulations are typically used through various stages of a project, from design to ground tests. The roles of these simulations have expanded to support control room training, reinforcing flight safety by building control room staff proficiency. Real-time telemetry, radar, and video data are generated from flight vehicle simulation models. These data are used to drive the control room displays. Nominal static values are used to complete information where appropriate. Audio communication is also an integral part of training sessions. This simulation capability is used to train control room personnel and flight crew for nominal missions and emergency situations. Such training sessions are also opportunities to refine flight cards and control room display pages, exercise emergency procedures, and practice control room setup for the day of flight. This paper describes this technology as it is used in the X-43A and F-15 IFCS and XACT projects.

Shy, Karla S.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Autonomous Flight Safety System - Phase III

The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility project that uses tracking and attitude data from onboard Global Positioning System (GPS) and inertial measurement unit (IMU) sensors and configurable rule-based algorithms to make flight termination decisions. AFSS objectives are to increase launch capabilities by permitting launches from locations without range safety infrastructure, reduce costs by eliminating some downrange tracking and communication assets, and reduce the reaction time for flight termination decisions.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2018

Range Flight Safety Requirements

The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to provide the technical requirements for the NPR 8715.5, Range Flight Safety Program, in regards to protection of the public, the NASA workforce, and property as it pertains to risk analysis, Flight Safety Systems (FSS), and range flight operations. This standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers, and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement. This standard may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory or to other contractors, grant recipients, or parties to agreements to the extent specified or referenced in their contracts, grants, or agreements, when these organizations conduct or participate in missions that involve range flight operations as defined by NPR 8715.5.1.2.2 In this standard, all mandatory actions (i.e., requirements) are denoted by statements containing the term “shall.”1.3 TailoringTailoring of this standard for application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or project requirements and approved by the responsible Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements.

Flight↗
NASA NTRS1989

Space Shuttle Orbiter main propulsion system flight safety enhancement

The Space Shuttle main propulsion system, like other major elements of the vehicle, has been part of an ongoing program to enhance the flight safety of the Space Transportation System. This activity, inherent in the basic program since its inception, has continued as part of a renewed review of failure modes and effects pertaining to flight-critical functions. Selected components were further evaluated, their potential for impacting flight safety was defined, and then the necessity for changing their design and/or operational practices was determined. Major examples of such components are the 17-inch disconnect and gaseous oxygen flow control valve. This paper summarizes that activity and provides examples of critical processes and components that have been or are being modified to enhance flight safety.

Cota, Phillip E.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Sounding rocket and balloon flight safety philosophy and methodologies

NASA's sounding rocket and balloon goal is to successfully and safely perform scientific research. This is reflected in the design, planning, and conduct of sounding rocket and balloon operations. The purpose of this paper is to acquaint the sounding rocket and balloon scientific community with flight safety philosophy and methodologies, and how range safety affects their programs. This paper presents the flight safety philosophy for protecting the public against the risk created by the conduct of sounding rocket and balloon operations. The flight safety criteria used to implement this philosophy are defined and the methodologies used to calculate mission risk are described.

Beyma, R. J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Nuclear Flight Safety – New Protocols for Safety and Mission Assurance

Over the past 4 years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. The recently-completed revision of the NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document for nuclear flight safety is a key step in the evolution of NASA policy and practice in this area. This paper will briefly describe the more significant changes in the new NASA NPR.

Donald Helton↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evolution of NASA’s Nuclear Flight Safety Program to Meet Changing Needs

Over the past 4 years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.

NASA↗
NASA NTRS2024

Evolution of NASA’s Nuclear Flight Safety Program to Infuse Risk Leadership and Assurance Framework Concepts

In recent years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.

Matthew J. Forsbacka↗
NASA NTRS2005

Autonomous Flight Safety System September 27, 2005, Aircraft Test

This report describes the first aircraft test of the Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS). The test was conducted on September 27, 2005, near Kennedy Space Center (KSC) using a privately-owned single-engine plane and evaluated the performance of several basic flight safety rules using real-time data onboard a moving aerial vehicle. This test follows the first road test of AFSS conducted in February 2005 at KSC. AFSS is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility (WEF) project that is in its third phase of development. AFSS is an independent subsystem intended for use with Expendable Launch Vehicles that uses tracking data from redundant onboard sensors to autonomously make flight termination decisions using software-based rules implemented on redundant flight processors. The goals of this project are to increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that do not have or cannot afford extensive ground-based range safety assets, to decrease range costs, and to decrease reaction time for special situations. The mission rules are configured for each operation by the responsible Range Safety authorities and can be loosely categorized in four major categories: Parameter Threshold Violations, Physical Boundary Violations present position and instantaneous impact point (TIP), Gate Rules static and dynamic, and a Green-Time Rule. Examples of each of these rules were evaluated during this aircraft test.

Simpson, James C.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Development of U.S. Government General Technical Requirements for UAS Flight Safety Systems Utilizing the Iridium Satellite Constellation

This slide presentation reviews the development of technical requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) utilization of the Iridium Satellite Constellation to provide flight safety. The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) required an over-the-horizon communication standard to guarantee flight safety before permitting widespread UAS flights in the National Air Space (NAS). This is important to ensure reliable control of UASs during loss-link and over-the-horizon scenarios. The core requirement was to utilize a satellite system to send GPS tracking data and other telemetry from a flight vehicle down to the ground. Iridium was chosen as the system because it is one of the only true satellite systems that has world wide coverage, and the service has a highly reliable link margin. The Iridium system, the flight modems, and the test flight are described.

Murray, Jennifer↗
NASA NTRS2020

Architecture and Information Requirements to Assess and Predict Flight Safety Risks During Highly Autonomous Urban Flight Operations

As aviation adopts new and increasingly complex operational paradigms, vehicle types, and technologies to broaden airspace capability and efficiency, maintaining a safe system will require recognition and timely mitigation of new safety issues as they emerge and before significant consequences occur. A shift toward a more predictive risk mitigation capability becomes critical to meet this challenge. In-time safety assurance comprises monitoring, assessment, and mitigation functions that proactively reduce risk in complex operational environments where the interplay of hazards may not be known (and therefore not accounted for) during design. These functions can also help to understand and predict emergent effects caused by the increased use of automation or autonomous functions that may exhibit unexpected non-deterministic behaviors. The envisioned monitoring and assessment functions can look for precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs) by applying model-based and data-driven methods. Outputs would then drive downstream mitigation(s) if needed to reduce risk. These mitigations may be accomplished using traditional design revision processes or via operational (and sometimes automated) mechanisms. The latter refers to the ‘in-time’ aspect of the system concept. This report comprises architecture and information requirements and considerations toward enabling such a capability within the domain of low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This domain may span, for example, public-use surveillance missions flown by small unmanned aircraft (e.g., infrastructure inspection, facility management, emergency response, law enforcement, and/or security) to transportation missions flown by larger aircraft that may carry passengers or deliver products. Caveat: Any stated requirements in this report should be considered initial requirements that are intended to drive research and development (R&D). These initial requirements are likely to evolve based on R&D findings, refinement of operational concepts, industry advances, and new industry or regulatory policies or standards related to safety assurance.

Young, Steven↗
NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety During Dual Generator Failure

Accident statistics cite flight crew error in over 60% of accidents involving transport category aircraft. Yet, a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system. No data currently exists that quantifies the contribution of the flight crew in this role. Neither does data exist for how often the flight crew handles non-normal procedures or system failures on a daily basis in the National Airspace System. A pilot-in-the-loop high fidelity motion simulation study was conducted by the NASA Langley Research Center in partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to evaluate the pilot's contribution to flight safety during normal flight and in response to aircraft system failures. Eighteen crews flew various normal and non-normal procedures over a two-day period and their actions were recorded in response to failures. To quantify the human's contribution, crew complement was used as the experiment independent variable in a between-subjects design. Pilot actions and performance when one of the flight crew was unavailable were also recorded for comparison against the nominal two-crew operations. This paper details diversion decisions, perceived safety of flight, workload, time to complete pertinent checklists, and approach and landing results while dealing with a complete loss of electrical generators. Loss of electrical power requires pilots to complete the flight without automation support of autopilots, flight directors, or auto throttles. For reduced crew complements, the additional workload and perceived safety of flight was considered unacceptable.

Etherington, Timothy J.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Flight safety programs and enhancements for sounding rockets at Wallops Flight Facility

Sounding rocket programs are becoming larger and more complex, thus range safety personnel are required to be central to vehicle and mission design and operations planning. In response to this, the Wallops Flight Facility (VA), is upgrading range facilities, tracking systems, mobile systems and real-time safety systems. These enhancements will improve safety and reliability while augmenting mission success. Flight safety requirements and responsibilities are summarized, and the range safety's future upgrades for wind weighting, real-time analysis and displays, and the mobile safety systems for rocket programs, are considered.

Balach, Dean↗