A Solid-State Transformer for Electric Power Grid HEMP/GMD Mitigation
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Nunnikhoven, Aneeka Hope↗
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Results for “electric power grids”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Challenges of a Lunar Surface Electrical Power Grid
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Lunar Surface↗
A Survey of Preventive and Remediating Mitigations for High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Impacts on the United States Electric Power Grid.
Abstract not provided.
Garrett, Richard↗
A Solid State Transformer for Electric Power Grid HEMP/GMD Protection
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Donnelly, Timothy James↗
SEQUIN: A Network Science and Physics-based Approach to Identify Sequential N-k Attacks in Electric Power Grids
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
Multi-fluid, earth battery energy systems and methods
The present disclosure relates to a system for storing and time shifting at least one of excess electrical power from an electrical power grid, excess electrical power from the power plant itself, or heat from a heat generating source, in the form of pressure and heat, for future use in assisting with a production of electricity. An oxy-combustion furnace is powered by a combustible fuel source, plus excess electricity, during a charge operation to heat a reservoir system containing a quantity of a thermal storage medium. During a discharge operation, a discharge subsystem has a heat exchanger which receives heated CO 2 from the reservoir system and uses this to heat a quantity of high-pressure, supercritical CO 2 (sCO 2 ) to form very-high-temperature, high-pressure sCO 2 at a first output thereof. The very-high-temperature, high-pressure sCO 2 is used to drive a Brayton-cycle turbine, which generates electricity at a first output thereof for transmission to a power grid. The Brayton-cycle turbine also outputs a quantity of sCO 2 which is reduced in temperature and pressure to a heat recuperator subsystem. The heat recuperator subsystem circulates the sCO 2 and re-heats and re-pressurizes the sCO 2 before feeding it back to the heat exchanger to be even further reheated, and then output to the Brayton-cycle turbine as a new quantity of very-high-temperature, high-pressure sCO 2 , to assist in powering the Brayton-cycle turbine.
Buschek, Thomas A.↗
A Plug-and-Play Design Suite of Converters for the Electric Grid
Power electronic (PE) systems are increasingly being integrated into the electric grid in a distributed fashion. As the number of installations increases, the challenge of integration of these systems into the grid is also growing. Advanced control features of these systems are often overlooked or neglected due to the complex nature and novelty of these systems. This is also complicated from the vendor point of view as different converter topology integration is usually composed of single system designs with tight coupling and configurations. The presented work discusses a novel architecture for the integration of PE systems with other sources and loads to create a coordinated controllable resource for the grid. The presented work also describes a system level controller to coordinate these systems. 1 Testing results on a hardware in the loop (HIL) platform are provided to show the validity of the proposed architecture and framework.
Starke, Michael↗
Assessment of the Electrical Substation-Grid Testbed with Inside/Outside Devices and Distributed Ledger Technology
The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to integrate the GOOSE and/or DNP (Distributed Network Protocol) messages with time synchronized sources and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). The objective was to study the impact of faults and cyber-events at an electrical substation with inside (protective relays) and outside (power meters) substation devices. The electrical substation-grid testbed was based on the design of a 34.5/ 12.47 kV electrical substation (sectionalized bus configuration) with two power transformers, connected to radial power lines and load feeders. The electrical substation-grid testbed was installed at 252 lab space (Advanced Power System Protection), Grid Research Integration and Deployment Center (GRID-C), Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This testbed was created for Task 5, DarkNet project. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to simulate fault and/or cyber events that could potentially result in damage to the electrical infrastructure. In addition, tests were run that are usually not allowed to be performed in an operational electrical power grid, because these test scenarios could trip breakers and/or generate fault situations that could potentially damage equipment. The number of tests performed in the electrical substation-grid testbed were executed in a better way than in a real electrical substation and/or power grid, because multiple tests could be run in a short period of time, and complex permits, and safety/ schedule restrictions like in a real electrical substation environment were not needed. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created using real measurement, communication, and protection devices that are used by electrical utilities, to have same conditions that we could observe in a real power grid or electrical substation. The electrical substation-grid testbed was based on using a real time simulator and expansion box with amplifiers that were wired to electrical substation-grid devices. This hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) was provided by protective relays, power meters, ethernet switches, remote terminal units, synchronized timing network clock, DLT devices, workstations, and servers. This report includes the design, installation, and assessment of the electrical substation-grid testbed that was similar to an operational electrical substation, integrating the power system protection, communication, and control systems. The results for the electrical substation-grid testbed were based on:• verifying the analog signals for protective relays and power meters, • observing the synchronized time source frame at devices, • authenticating the GOOSE (IEC 61850) and DNP messages from power meters and protective relays, and • verifying the trip conditions of protective relays at fault tests with the power system fault event detection, using DLT devices. For future work, the electrical substation-grid testbed with protective relays and power meters, using DLT and synchronized time source from DarkNet, will be used to study the impact of cyber-events at inside and outside substation devices. Advanced algorithms for detecting cyber-events produced by non-desired protective relay settings will be studied, to improve the detection and reliability of protection, control, and communication systems at power grids.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Cyber risk assessment and investment optimization using game theory and ML-based anomaly detection and mitigation for wide-area control in smart grids
The electric power grid is increasingly becoming susceptible to cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the smart grid control, information, and physical layers. Successful cyber attacks can have catastrophic impacts on the social and economic well-being of any nation all over the globe. It has, thus, become imperative to secure the smart grid against such adversarial actions to ensure stable, secure, and reliable operation of the grid. The existing research and industry practices prove to be inadequate in terms of providing pragmatic and effective defense methodologies and measures for long-term cybersecurity planning and real-time cybersecurity for grid operation. For example, existing works lack models that incorporate uncertain behavior of cyber-attackers and pragmatic defense measures for cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity investment optimization which often provide unreliable and strictly qualitative solutions to these problems. At the same time, with the growing number of cyber incidents in the grid, there still exists a need to develop attack-resilient algorithms for wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) applications like the wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) for Flexible AC Transmissions Systems (FACTS) that lack in scalable and feasible solutions from the cybersecurity perspective. This dissertation proposes novel models and methodologies for: (1) Cybersecurity planning, and (2) Cybersecurity for system operation. The cybersecurity planning is achieved through cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity resource investment optimization for long-term cybersecurity of the grid using game theory and attack-defense trees. Cybersecurity for system operation consists of development of cyber anomaly detection and mitigation algorithms for flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) controller-based wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) using machine learning (ML), and software defined networking-based moving target defense network routing for achieving real-time cyber-physical security for grid operations. This is followed by hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) implementation and evaluation of these attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies showcasing their feasibility in a close to real-world environment. For cybersecurity planning, a novel approach involving a combination of game theory and attack defense trees (ADT) for optimal cybersecurity resource allocation in the smart grid is proposed. This methodology involves modeling of the cyber-physical smart grid substations as ADTs, defining attacker costs, defense costs, and attack probabilities for attack access points. Using game theoretical formulation, optimal defense strategies for the defender of the system to invest cybersecurity resources in the grid are obtained. Additionally, a game-theoretic framework is developed for quantitative cyber-physical risk assessment of the grid under a dynamically changing cyber threat space and uncertain behavior of cyber attackers which is further used to optimize investments in the smart grid's cybersecurity resources. The attacker, defender, and the smart grid system are modeled while incorporating attacker-stochasticity and federal guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity. This allows quantification of threat, vulnerabilities, and attack impact of the grid for quantitative risk assessment. The defender's budget to invest in the security resources in the grid is optimized based on the strategies leading to minimum system risk. The evaluation of the proposed solutions highlight the feasibility for practical implementation of these methodologies and algorithms in the smart grid, while taking the federal requirements and guidelines for smart grid security into consideration. For achieving cybersecurity for system operation, attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies are developed specifically for FACTS-based WAVCS. Anomaly detection and mitigation in the WAVCS are achieved using algorithms based on machine learning which involves offline training and testing of ML models with CPS datasets incorporating physics-based features that allow accurate distinction between system faults and cyber attacks. For attack prevention, a methodology based on software defined network (SDN)-based moving target defense (MTD) network routing is proposed that enables prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks on the smart grid communication system. Subsequently, these methodologies and algorithms are implemented and evaluated on an HIL testbed that allows for real-time attack prevention, detection, and mitigation of emulated cyber attacks on the WAVCS in a close to real-world environment. The results show highly accurate and efficient performance of the implemented algorithms and methodologies with the smart grid system operating within the NERC's system operation limits even in the presence of DoS and data integrity cyber attacks. This work opens up future research opportunities in other directions such as (1) Expanding cybersecurity planning methodologies to real-time cyber contingency analysis with different game formulations; and (2) Applying the cybersecurity for system operation algorithms to broader categories of wide-area control applications.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Enabling Universal Access to Power on the Lunar Surface
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Missions will return human astronauts to the lunar surface, demonstrate technologies that establish a sustained presence on the lunar surface and enable human missions to Mars, and help create a lunar commercial economy. Creating a sustained permanent presence on the lunar surface will require access to continuous and highly reliable power to support mission needs. During Artemis, lunar surface operations will evolve and grow over time (years), requiring an increase in the amount of power needed (100s of kW) and distance that the power must be transmitted (up to 10 km during early Artemis missions). A lunar commercial economy is likely to exceed this power demand to the MW level and distance in the 100s of km. This increased distance and demand for highly reliable power drives the need to create an electric power grid by connecting localized lunar power systems (e.g., habitats, in-situ resource utilization plants, etc.), each containing one or more loads and/or sources. Developing a lunar surface power grid will allow lunar surface operations to resemble electrical utility operations on Earth; it allows power to be generated where it is convenient and allows power to be consumed where it is convenient and required. A lunar surface electric power grid will facilitate the growth of a lunar commercial economy because it provides a means to connect new loads to an existing electrical power system. A common standardized interface to the grid and a set of standardized voltages is required to take full advantage of the benefits of an electric power grid, similar to the terrestrial power grid. NASA Glenn Research Center is leading an effort to create universal access to power through the development of the Universal Modular Interface Converter (UMIC). The UMIC is designed to have a common interface that connects sources and loads compliant with the International Space Power System Interoperability Standard (ISPSIS) to a higher voltage AC transmission system or power grid. This presentation will further discuss the evolution of power during the Artemis missions, challenges associated with creating a sustained presence on the lunar surface, progress made on the UMIC, and future opportunities for technology development and standards.
space power systems↗
Integrated Resource and System Plannning Based on Energy Costs and Emission Analysis for a Sustainable Future
Efficient integration of renewable energy sources (RES) - such as wind, solar, geothermal, tidal, and wave - into the electric power grids can help improve energy security and contribute toward a sustainable energy future. To date, however, electric power grids are critically dependent on conventional sources, such as fossil fuels. Given the increasing penetration of RES and dynamic loads, there is a need to thoroughly reanalyze the performance of power grids in terms of cost, efficiency, and energy security. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis in terms of energy costs and emissions estimates of dynamic power grids incorporating various power-generating sources.
distributed energy resources↗
Understanding the Computing and Analysis Needs for Resiliency of Power Systems from Severe Weather Impacts
As the frequency and intensity of severe weather has increased, its effect on the electric grid has manifested in the form of significantly more and larger outages in the United States. This has become especially true for regions that were previously isolated from weather extremes. In this paper, we analyze the weather impacts on the electric power grid across a variety of weather conditions, draw correlations, and provide practical insights into the operational state of these systems. High resolution computational modeling of specific meteorological variables, computational approaches to solving power system models under these conditions, and the types of resiliency needs are highlighted as goal-oriented computing approaches are being built to address grid resiliency needs. An example analysis correlating outages to 1km day-ahead weather from two historical winter storms, calculated on a large cluster using a combination of interpolated and extrapolated inputs from multiple instrumented sites to workflows that produce primary meteorological outputs, is shown as initial proof of concept.
analysis↗
Emerging Trends and Systemic Issues Influencing Today’s U.S. Electric Grid
With increasing shifts from vertically integrated to horizontally structured operations and from centralized to distributed electric power delivery, today’s electric power grid (the “grid”) operators and designers face the challenge of creating an architecture that accommodates a host of diverse requirements. The grid’s modes of operation must address concerns of reliability and stability, new deployments of renewable energy sources, threats from cyber-attacks and natural disasters, and increasingly distributed system operations. Grid modernization calls for a reliable, affordable, sustainable, agile, secure, and resilient grid. However, the modernization of the U.S. power grid is hampered by mounting complexity and diverging objectives from owners and operators and is consequently risky and fraught with potential missteps. Flawed architecture, design, and implementation will lead to stranded investments and lost opportunities. A principled approach to minimize risk and develop a robust grid of the future is to begin with a sound architecture for the grid to inform the design process. Architecture development starts with the context of influencing factors that provide constraints as well as driving goals. This report provides the context of emerging trends and cross-cutting systemic issues in the U.S. electric power grid and serves as a vital input for grid architecture development.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
FREQUENCY REGULATION WITH CONNECTED LIGHTING SYSTEMS
The management of end-use energy resources, e.g., commercial buildings, has been investigated as a promising source of services for the electric power grid. Lighting consumes about 17% electricity of U.S. commercial buildings; however, it may contribute significantly to services that improve the reliability and resilience of the grid due to its rapid speed of response. Connected lighting systems (CLS), which build upon solid-state lamp technology, can change their power demand more quickly than most other building electricity end uses. But the potential of CLS to provide grid services has not been considerably investigated. In this paper, we describe initial research to evaluate the potential of CLS for the grid service of frequency regulation. Frequency regulation is a reliability product that corrects in a matter of seconds for short-term changes in the balance between supply and demand in the balancing area that might affect the stability of the power system. Frequency regulation signals for a medium office building are generated from the normalized test signals for the PJM Interconnection Reg-A and Reg-D regulations services. Control of the CLS locally to follow the Reg-A or Reg-D signal is used to provide contributions to the corresponding frequency regulation service. The performance of CLS for frequency regulation is evaluated using the PJM 40-Minute Performance Score Template. The performance scores obtained for all CLS categories for both Reg-A and Reg-D signals far exceed the minimum score for the qualification, a very promising result for CLS to provide frequency regulation service.
Wang, Peng↗
A Guide to Current Limiting and Stability with Grid-Forming Inverters
The electric power grid is changing. For many decades, the synchronous generator - an electromechanical device invented in 1887 - has been the workhorse and backbone of power grids across the globe. Our entire infrastructure is built around it. But times change, and so does the power grid. Since the early 21st century, we have seen a gradual shift in modern power grids away from synchronous generators to ones dominated by power electronic inverter-based resources (IBRs). Sources such as photovoltaics, wind turbines, battery storage, fuel cells, and other technologies like high-voltage DC transmission interconnections all rely on an inverter to connect and interface with the grid. They are increasingly being installed on the grid to augment, or even replace, traditional energy sources. This change is a fundamental shift that brings tremendous technical challenges and questions: Can a power grid remain stable with many more inverter-based resources? How do we avoid more blackouts on the grid? How do we keep the grid secure and resilient during disturbances? After all, power electronic inverters are nothing like the big, rotating, iron-and-copper machines that the grid heavily relies on. Many of these questions can be answered by using grid-forming (GFM) inverters, yet many research challenges remain. This document explores GFM inverters and how they can help stabilize the future grid, especially during disturbances and contingencies. It summarizes a two-year research and development fellowship program at NREL. We point interested readers to more detailed works developed during the project along the way. Let's dive in
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
An Analysis of Post-Attack Impacts and Effects of Learning Parameters on Vulnerability Assessment of Power Grid
This poster provides an overview of post-attack impacts and effects of learning parameters on a vulnerability assessment of the electric power grid.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Inertia estimation for power grids: A review of methods, challenges, and future prospects
The electric power grid is undergoing a significant transformation, shifting from traditional synchronous generators to inverter-based resources (IBRs) such as solar photovoltaics, wind turbines, and energy storage systems. This evolution leads to a reduction in system inertia, a critical attribute for maintaining frequency stability in response to disturbances. Consequently, the ability to monitor and estimate system inertia has become increasingly essential. This paper provides a comprehensive review of existing inertia estimation methodologies, analyzing them from multiple perspectives, including the types of data utilized, underlying estimation principles, operational modes, and system-wide applicability. A comparative summary table is included to distill commonalities and key characteristics across various studies. In addition, the paper examines practical implementations of inertia estimation across several major power systems worldwide, including the U.S. interconnections, the Nordic power system, and the U.K. grid. Key challenges are identified, particularly in estimating contributions from virtual inertia sources and load-induced inertia in increasingly converter-dominated networks. To address these emerging challenges, the paper proposes an integrated framework for real-time inertia estimation and monitoring. This framework encompasses critical components such as data acquisition, inertia estimation from both synchronous and non-synchronous sources, load-induced effects, optimization techniques, forecasting, and virtual inertia scheduling. Collectively, these elements enable dynamic, system-wide monitoring and adaptive control of grid inertia.
Inertia estimation↗
An Analysis of Post Attack Impacts and Effects of Learning Parameters on Vulnerability Assessment of Power Grid
Due to the increasing number of heterogeneous devices connected to electric power grid, the attack surface increases the threat actors. Game theory and machine learning are being used to study the power system failures caused by external manipulation. Most of existing works in the literature focus on one-shot process of attacks and fail to show the dynamic evolution of the defense strategy. In this paper, we focus on an adversarial multistage sequential game between the adversaries of the smart electric power transmission and distribution system. We study the impact of exploration rate and convergence of the attack strategies (sequences of action that creates large scale blackout based on the system capacity) based on the reinforcement learning approach. We also illustrate how the learned attack actions disrupt the normal operation of the grid by creating transmission line outages, bus voltage violations, and generation loss. This simulation studies are conducted on IEEE 9 and 39 bus systems. The results show the improvement of the defense strategy through the learning process. The results also prove the feasibility of the learned attack actions by replicating the disturbances created in simulated power system.
attack impacts↗