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At least 37 records · Page 2

Electromagnetic Pulse – Resilient Electric Grid for National Security: Research Program Executive Summary

Sandia National Laboratories sponsored a three-year internally funded Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) effort to investigate the vulnerabilities and mitigations of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) on the electric power grid. The research was focused on understanding the vulnerabilities and potential mitigations for components and systems at the high voltage transmission level. Results from the research included a broad array of subtopics, covered in twenty-three reports and papers, and which are highlighted in this executive summary report. These subtopics include high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) characterization, HEMP coupling analysis, system-wide effects, and mitigating technologies.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

From Ions to Wires to the Grid: The Transformational Science of LANL Research in High-Tc Superconducting Tapes and Electric Power Applications

The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) has been tasked to lead national efforts to modernize the electric grid, enhance security and reliability of the energy infrastructure, and facilitate recovery from disruptions to energy supplies. LANL has pioneered the development of coated conductors – high-temperature superconducting (HTS) tapes – which permit dramatically greater current densities than conventional copper cable, and enable new technologies to secure the national electric grid. Sustained world-class research from concept, demonstration, transfer, and ongoing industrial support has moved this idea from the laboratory to the commercial marketplace.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cybersecurity for the Future Electric Grid

As connectivity and distributed energy levels increase, so does the number of access points for potential cyber threats. With legacy systems that were not designed to protect against cyber vulnerabilities, the approach to securing the electric grid must change. Learn how the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) offers the ideal balance of expertise and infrastructure for cutting-edge research on cybersecurity and the future grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber Security of DC Fast Charging: Potential Impacts to the Electric Grid

Relevance of Cyber Security for High Power EV Charging Public Safety ? High voltage & high current charging infrastructure? Potential wide spread grid impact ? Intermittent high load:? Wide range of power (up to 350+ kW)? Short duration charge events? Increasing deployment of fast chargers to meet needs of increasing EV market adoption? ? Consumer confidence in charging infrastructure? Reliability and robustness required to reduce range anxiety

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Secure Information Exchange Gateway for Electric Grid Operations

The major objectives of the SIEGate project were to improve the security posture and minimize the cyber-attack surface of electric utility control centers and to reduce the cost of maintaining control-room-to-control-room information exchange. Major project goals included the design, development, testing, and commercialization of a single security-hardened appliance that could meet industry needs for resisting cyber-attacks while protecting the confidentiality and integrity of a growing volume of real-time information needed to ensure the reliability of the bulk electric system and interoperating with existing data formats and networking technologies. The SIEGate project has achieved its goals and objectives. The SIEGate Design Document, issued in March 2012, presented SIEGate use cases, provided SIEGate requirements, established SIEGate design principles, and prescribed design functionality of SIEGate as well as the components that make up SIEGate. SIEGate Release Version 1.0 was posted in January 2014. Release Version 1.0.83, which was posted on March 28, 2014, fixed many issues discovered by early adopters and added several new features. Release Candidate 1.1, which added additional improvements and bug fixes, was posted in June 2014. SIEGate executables have been downloaded more than 300 times. SIEGate has been tested at PJM, Entergy, TVA, and Southern. Security testing and analysis of SIEGate has been conducted at PNNL and PJM. Alstom has provided a summary of recommended steps for commercialization of the SIEGate Appliance and identified two deployment models with immediate commercial application.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A Scalable Quantum Cryptography Network for Protected Automation Communication (Final Report)

This is the final report for a CEDS-funded project aimed at developing a new quantum technology for securing utility communication networks used to control and monitor electrical grid equipment. Securing these control networks represents a unique challenge as the performance of the security solution has a direct impact on the stability and reliability of the electrical grid. Traditional, software-based solutions - developed for information networks - are not suitable for utility control networks because they introduce latency, require burdensome maintenance and upgrades, are often incompatible with legacy equipment, and introduce operational complexity that reduces grid reliability. Consequently, many U.S. utilities do not use existing solutions and, instead, protect their critical control networks through the careful isolation and obscuration of their networked equipment. With more utilities embracing grid automation, the attack surface that utilities must defend from hackers has grown to an unmanageable size. To address this situation, Qubitekk and its partners proposed and developed a hardware-based solution that can secure critical control networks without negatively impacting grid performance. This new solution is based on quantum key distribution (QKD) techniques that guarantee secure key generation and distribution across a utility control network. Through deployment and field testing of a prototype QKD system, we have shown that this solution delivers long-term network security, is technically feasible to implement and maintain on a utility’s distribution substation network and does not negatively impact grid operations. In addition, the project has identified and solved key challenges associated with generating, transmitting, and measuring coherent photonic quantum states on a real-world fiber optic network. These additional findings are playing a critical role in advancing quantum networks for quantum computing applications. An overview of the QKD prototype development effort, field testing activities and results, and additional findings relevant to emerging quantum networks are presented in this report.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Mississippi's Strategic Resilience: A multi-systems approach to secure, reliable, and adaptable electric grid infrastructure

Mississippi’s electric grid resilience challenges are linked to an intersection of complex socioeconomic, ecological, technological, historical, and political challenges, exacerbated by increasing severe weather like flooding and tornado events. The state’s legacy of underinvestment in critical energy infrastructure, particularly in rural areas and vulnerable floodplains, have stressed an aging grid, creating long-lasting disruptions in electric service during weather-related outages. Effective emergency management and preparedness is further hampered by a lack of coordination across local, county, and regional scales. Using the TASTI-GRID platform and partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Mississippi is developing a comprehensive regional resilience strategy to overcome energy security and reliability challenges, mitigating the impacts of natural hazards, and positioning Mississippi as a resilient and premier destination for residents, businesses, and economic development.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber-Security Considerations for the Smart Grid

The electrical power grid is evolving into the “smart grid”. The goal of the smart grid is to improve efficiency and availability of power by adding more monitoring and control capabilities. These new technologies and mechanisms are certain to introduce vulnerabilities into the power grid. In this paper we provide an overview of the cyber security state of the electrical power grid. We highlight some of the vulnerabilities that already exist in the power grid including limited capacity systems, implicit trust and the lack of authentication. We also address challenges of complexity, scale, added capabilities and the move to multipurpose hardware and software as the power grid is upgraded. These changes create vulnerabilities that did not exist before and bring increased risks. We conclude the paper by showing that there are a number mitigation strategies that can help keep the risk at an acceptable level.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Virtual Control Systems Environment (VCSE)

Will Atkins, a Sandia National Laboratories computer engineer discusses cybersecurity research work for process control systems. Will explains his work on the Virtual Control Systems Environment project to develop a modeling and simulation framework of the U.S. electric grid in order to study and mitigate possible cyberattacks on infrastructure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Dragonstone Strategy – State of Cybersecurity in the Oil & Natural Gas Sector

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system touches every corner of the nation and increased communications & control capabilities have not only allowed for greater efficiency of system operation, but have also created a massive target for adversaries to launch cyber-attacks. Like any other heavy industrial process, the ONG system relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. The current state of cyber-preparedness across the ONG industry varies from organization to organization. Among the most common challenges that ONG companies face are remote locations, longlived field assets, and lacking capabilities to find and track malware on their systems. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. Various industry and government organizations are performing research and development activities to address some of these challenges, but in many cases industry stakeholders are not aware of solutions that already exist. It is clear that a need exists for a coherent, comprehensive, multi-layered strategy for assuring the security and resilience of the nation's pipeline infrastructure against cyber threats. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cyber-security within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cyber-security of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: The sheer number of differing regulatory bodies and trade groups offering both standards and best-practice recommendations for ONG cyber-security makes it difficult to create a comprehensive, directed, and coherent strategy that is applicable to all players within the ONG industry. The ONG industry is unaware of potentially useful technologies that have been developed for ensuring cyber-security of other infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid. Leveraging these technologies—and the science and engineering behind them—can provide some low-hanging fruit that can greatly improve cyber-security in the ONG industry without significant investments in terms of time and money. In the months following this report, LLNL will continue to perform outreach to key oil & gas industry stakeholders in a continual effort to identify the most pressing cyber-resilience issues in the industry. This outreach will be supplemented with LLNL’s threat intelligence capabilities to begin painting a clearer picture of the overall threat landscape faced by this sector. This assessment will be threat-informed and while the strategy itself will not be classified we will leverage intelligence analysis and adversary capabilities to identify gaps in current cybersecurity practices for oil & gas pipeline systems. Recommended efforts will be compiled into a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, in which LLNL will highlight priority activities to immediately improve the state of cyber-resilience in the industry.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Achieving Cyber-Resilience for Power Systems using a Learning, Model-Assisted Blockchain Framework

The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The Evolution of the Internet Community and the"Yet-to-Evolve" Smart Grid Community: Parallels and Lessons-to-be-Learned

The Smart Grid envisions a transformed US power distribution grid that enables communicating devices, under human supervision, to moderate loads and increase overall system stability and security. This vision explicitly promotes increased participation from a community that, in the past, has had little involvement in power grid operations -the consumer. The potential size of this new community and its member's extensive experience with the public Internet prompts an analysis of the evolution and current state of the Internet as a predictor for best practices in the architectural design of certain portions of the Smart Grid network. Although still evolving, the vision of the Smart Grid is that of a community of communicating and cooperating energy related devices that can be directed to route power and modulate loads in pursuit of an integrated, efficient and secure electrical power grid. The remaking of the present power grid into the Smart Grid is considered as fundamentally transformative as previous developments such as modern computing technology and high bandwidth data communications. However, unlike these earlier developments, which relied on the discovery of critical new technologies (e.g. the transistor or optical fiber transmission lines), the technologies required for the Smart Grid currently exist and, in many cases, are already widely deployed. In contrast to other examples of technical transformations, the path (and success) of the Smart Grid will be determined not by its technology, but by its system architecture. Fortunately, we have a recent example of a transformative force of similar scope that shares a fundamental dependence on our existing communications infrastructure - namely, the Internet. We will explore several ways in which the scale of the Internet and expectations of its users have shaped the present Internet environment. As the presence of consumers within the Smart Grid increases, some experiences from the early growth of the Internet are expected to be informative and pertinent.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering (CCE)

The Idaho National Lab (INL) is leading a high-impact, national security-level initiative to reprioritize the way the nation looks at high-consequence risk within the industrial control systems (ICS) environment of the country’s most critical infrastructure and other national assets. The Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) effort provides both private and public organizations with the steps required to examine their own environments for high-impact events/risks; identify implementation of key devices and components that facilitate that risk; illuminate specific, plausible cyber attack paths to manipulate these devices; and develop concrete mitigations, protections, and tripwires to address the high-consequence risk. The ultimate goal of the CCE effort is to help organizations take the steps necessary to thwart cyber attacks from even top-tier, highly resourced adversaries that would result in a catastrophic physical effect. CCE participants are encouraged to work collaboratively with each other and with key U.S. Government (USG) contributors to establish a coalition, maximizing the positive effect of lessons-learned and further contributing to the protection of critical infrastructure and other national assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Provably secure time distribution for the electric grid

We demonstrate a quantum time distribution (QTD) method that combines the precision of optical timing techniques with the integrity of quantum key distribution (QKD). Critical infrastructure is dependent on microprocessor- and programmable logic-based monitoring and control systems. The distribution of timing information across the electric grid is accomplished by GPS signals which are known to be vulnerable to spoofing. We demonstrate a method for synchronizing remote clocks based on the arrival time of photons in a modifed QKD system. This has the advantage that the signal can be veried by examining the quantum states of the photons similar to QKD.

Smith, IV, Amos M↗

The Use of Embedded Electric Grid Storage for Resilience, Operational Flexibility, and Cyber-Security

In recent years, bulk energy storage has been applied to electric power systems as an auxiliary device for the support of grid reliability via grid services. This approach is useful but only extracts value from storage on a marginal basis because grid services involve only a tiny fraction of the power flowing in a grid. While storage is flexible enough to perform many services, assessing its value on a stacked-services basis obscures its real value: storage is a buffer for electric energy flows. All of its capabilities stem from this one fundamental property. Limiting storage to use as an ancillary services device leaves this primary value untapped. The real value of storage is as a means to provide a key characteristic missing from power grids: the ability to absorb stresses with little or no loss of performance – the essence of resilience. Storage applied systematically throughout the grid can provide the missing “shock absorber” springiness that the grid is missing. To provide this value, storage must be incorporated into the grid as core infrastructure and must be deeply integrated into grid operations. Doing so will provide far-reaching benefits to users of electricity at all levels, including vastly increased system resilience, expanded system operational flexibility, support for critical lifeline functions during critical events, and even improved cyber security.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗