US DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Borehole Heater Test at WIPP on Coupled Processes.
Abstract not provided.
Kuhlman, Kristopher L↗
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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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Low-Cost Environment-Friendly Critical Materials Recovery from Produced Water, US DOE SBIR Phase I Final Report, DOE_DE-SC0022939_I_Final_OSTI
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02 PETROLEUM↗
Battery Grade Graphite Production from Biomass, US DOE SBIR Phase I Final Report, DOE_DE-SC0024994_I_Final_OSTI
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02 PETROLEUM↗
Enhanced Biochar for Soil Reclamation Co-Produced by a Drop-In Biofuels Process, US DOE SBIR Phase II Final Report, DOE_DE-SC0022445_II_Final_OSTI
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09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW PPT
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Co-Disposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW - 20331
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act Title II DOE Due Diligence and Lessons Learned from a Previous Site Transfer - 20352
Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) established that a government agency will provide perpetual care for closed uranium and thorium ore-processing sites that were operating under an NRC source material license in 1978 or were licensed thereafter. Commercial owners (licensees) operating under an NRC or agreement state specific license when UMTRCA was passed are responsible for conducting reclamation of any byproduct material remaining from uranium-ore processing operations in accordance with an NRC or agreement state approved reclamation plan. Reclamation includes both surface and groundwater remedies. Upon completion of reclamation and approval by NRC, the site is required to be transferred to either the host state or the DOE for long-term surveillance and maintenance. Since UMTRCA's enactment, six Title II sites have been transferred to DOE; an additional 24 Title II sites are anticipated to be transferred before 2050. DoE's role mandated under UMTRCA Title II as the long-term care custodian is to perform 'monitoring, maintenance, and emergency measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.' UMTRCA requires that the licensee pay a long-term surveillance charge 'sufficient to cover the annual costs of site surveillance.' However, at some sites such as the Bluewater, New Mexico, Disposal Site, this mandate has required additional effort and expense by DOE, beyond the originally anticipated and intended scope within UMTRCA, but within the authority of DOE under UMTRCA. In 1997, the Bluewater site became the second UMTRCA Title II site to be transferred to DOE. The site was the location of a uranium mill operated from 1953 until 1982. The specific licensee began site reclamation in 1991, and by 1995 all tailings and contaminated materials were encapsulated in two tailings disposal cells and other disposal areas. In addition to surface contamination, milling activities impacted groundwater in the two upper aquifers. In 1989, the specific licensee attempted active groundwater remediation; however, no significant reduction in contaminant concentrations was observed. As a result, the specific licensee applied to NRC for alternate concentration limits (ACLs) in 1990, which were approved in 1996 as being protective, after additional corrective actions were performed. Since transfer of the Bluewater site to DOE, unforeseen challenges have occurred, requiring additional actions. The first challenge is the occurrence of surface depressions located on the northern section of the main tailings disposal cell. The depressions were first observed during DoE's initial inspection in 1998; however, evidence of these can be observed on satellite images taken prior to transfer. Since being first observed, the depressions have continued to grow both in depth and areal extent. Due to the design of the main tailings disposal cell, the depressions impede storm water from being effectively shed off the 101- hectare (250-acre) top slope of the main tailings disposal cell. Instead, storm water accumulates in the depressions, forming a large ephemeral pond that has stored up to 16.3 x 10{sup 6} liters (4.3 million gallons) of stormwater. The ponding poses a potential risk to the integrity of the main tailings disposal cell in the case of a large storm event, with the potential to cause the pond to overtop and erode the cover material and underlying waste. DOE has taken a number of short-term actions to monitor, measure, and reduce the ponding and is currently working with the US Army Corps of Engineers to design and construct a repair. Additional challenges are associated with groundwater at the Bluewater site. Nine wells were present on the 1335-hectare (3300-acre) site upon transfer. Groundwater compliance was called into question after the State of New Mexico reduced its uranium groundwater standard from 5.0 to 0.03 milligrams per liter in 2004, and when an ACL for uranium was exceeded in a site monitoring well in 2010. Acquiring historical groundwater data and subsequent evaluations as well as additional DOE groundwater monitoring led to installing 10 new monitoring wells and performing additional site hydrogeology recharacterization. DOE continues to evaluate groundwater conditions at the site and works with the NRC to determine regulatory requirements and a path forward. As a result of lessons learned at the Bluewater site and other Title II sites, improved processes have been implemented at a programmatic level to increase due diligence before site transfer and prevent similar issues from occurring at other UMTRCA Title II sites under long-term management. DoE's due diligence process is documented in the Process for Transition of UMTRCA Title II Disposal Sites to DOE for Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance and is designed to ensure that DOE has no technical or compliance concerns with regulatory decisions that might compromise protectiveness following site transfer to DOE. Implementation of the due diligence process has increased DoE's role prior to site transfer and has been effective in identifying potential issues. Actions by NRC and specific licensees, in response to enhanced due diligence efforts by DOE, are expected to minimize, if not totally prevent, the need for unanticipated actions by DOE pertaining to the surface and groundwater remedies after site transfer. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Evolution of Stakeholder Relations at the Mound Laboratory-End of DoE's Mission to the Present - 19551
In November 1989, the same month the Berlin Wall fell, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) placed the Mound Laboratory (Mound Plant or Mound site) in Ohio on the National Priorities List (NPL) due to volatile organic compound contamination in the groundwater. As a result of the Cold War ending, the United States sought to greatly reduce the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal, consolidate the US Department of Energy's (DOE) mission, and close many DOE facilities. In 1991, the City of Miamisburg learned that DOE was planning to close the Mound Laboratory. The city spent two years lobbying in Washington, DC, to keep the facility open; however, that effort was not successful. By 1993, DOE, EPA, and Ohio EPA had signed a Federal Facility Agreement that formalized EPA and Ohio EPA oversight of the DOE environmental cleanup of the Mound NPL site under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). The decontamination and cleanup of the Mound site fell under two federal laws, CERCLA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. DOE, EPA, Ohio EPA, the City of Miamisburg, and other local stakeholders all agreed that the Mound site should be cleaned up to an industrial/commercial land use standard. This would allow the site to transition into a privately owned business park. In 1994, the City of Miamisburg created the nonprofit Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation (MMCIC) that would own, market, and redevelop the site. The City also chartered the Mound Reuse Committee to act as an independent advisory organization, composed of representatives from the local community and business, government, education, and special interest groups. In 1994, DOE and the MMCIC entered into a lease agreement that facilitated immediate reuse of site buildings that were no longer required by DOE and did not require remediation. In 1995, DOE, EPA, and Ohio EPA developed the Mound 2000 Process to more effectively use CERCLA Removal Action authority to evaluate and remediate, as necessary, disparate areas of the Mound site. The Mound 2000 process divided the site into smaller, more manageable areas that accelerated cleanup and allowed areas to be reused more quickly. All areas of the Mound site were cleaned up to meet the EPA standard for industrial/commercial land use. The CERCLA process included opportunities for the public to review proposed cleanup strategies. Public input on cleanup and reuse included that from local citizens, businesses, Miamisburg City Council, local schools and financial institutions, Ohio EPA, Montgomery County, and the State of Ohio. In 1998, while site cleanup was still in process, DOE agreed to sell the entire Mound property to the MMCIC for $10.00. The site sales agreement accelerated reuse by allowing DOE to offer ownership of discrete land parcels to MMCIC as soon as EPA confirmed those areas met CERCLA standards for property transfer. This allowed the Mound site to become one of the first former DOE weapons sites to transition to reuse as a privately owned and operated community asset. Many other former DOE production facilities require continued federal ownership to protect the integrity of the environmental cleanup. In 2011, the MMCIC changed its name to the Mound Development Corporation (MDC) and continued to transition the site for reuse as part of the Mound Business Park. The MMCIC/MDC is a nonprofit economic development arm of the City of Miamisburg. DOE supported the economic development efforts with grants and matching funds. Individual land parcels were transferred from DOE to the MDC according to the DOE Mound Land Transfer Process. Ownership of parcels was transferred to the MDC via quitclaim deeds with no repair, replacements, or rebuild of areas. Each parcel's quitclaim deed contains the CERCLA institutional controls. To reduce the property tax burden, the Miamisburg City Council passed an ordinance that allowed the City to accept temporary ownership of specific parcels and hold ownership until the MDC could either lease or sell them. With the exception of one 23-acre parcel that includes the Operable Unit 1 area (site of former sanitary landfill), the entire site has been transferred to the MDC. Today, the former Mound Laboratory site is home to the vibrant Mound Business Park operated by the MDC. The site contains numerous buildings with active businesses and multiple areas suitable for new construction. Private companies continue cutting-edge work that carries forward the legacy of more than 50 years of DOE research, development, production, and inspiration from the former Mound Laboratory scientists, engineers, technicians, and support personnel. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types, such as light- and heavy-water-moderated reactors, graphite-moderated reactors, and breeder reactors, with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and condition of SNF, a robust canister termed the DOE Standardized SNF Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard SNF Canister had four variations consisting of a 10- or 15-foot length and an 18- or 24-inch diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository these canisters were to be grouped with 24-inch diameter HLW canisters in a codisposal waste package. The 18-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The 24-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister would take the place of one the five HLW canister on the outer ring in the codisposal waste package. No DOE Standardized SNF Canisters have been loaded, and many fuel types can be loaded in multiple canisters. Depending on the selected diameter of the DOE Standardized SNF Canister for a particular fuel, the number of potential codisposal waste packages could vary. In addition, different types of DOE SNF may be able to be combined in a single canister. This could significantly change the number of DOE SNF canisters that are loaded and result in a decrease of the number of total potential codisposal waste packages. Ultimately, if too many HLW canisters need disposition, then a reduction in the number of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will change the final total of codisposal waste packages very little. Likewise, if the ratio of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters to HLW canister produced is too high, then DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will not have enough HLW canisters to surround them in the codisposal waste package. This paper examines the results of differing loading strategies for a few DOE SNFs. It also compares the ranges of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters that may be produced to the ranges of HLW canisters that may be produced in order to determine potential scenarios.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Innovative Strategies for Long-Term Monitoring of Complex Groundwater Plumes at DOE’s Legacy Sites (Workshop Report)
Most remaining Department of Energy (DOE) sites will require extended periods of institutional control, especially at complex groundwater sites where attenuation-based strategies have been implemented to facilitate closure. The current practice of monitoring—obtaining and analyzing contaminant concentration in groundwater samples at numerous wells—will account for a large portion of the projected life-cycle at these DOE sites unless a new approach is adopted. State-of-the-art technologies are being developed, including in situ sensors, geophysics, radiation mapping, numerical modeling and AI/ML. These technologies can optimize monitoring strategies in space and time, provide spatially extensive information at vulnerable regions and/or provide more continuous monitoring at lower cost. As part of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM’s) efforts to advance long-term monitoring systems, an in-person/virtual hybrid workshop was hosted by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) on January 24 and 25, 2023, in Augusta, Georgia. Because DOE-EM’s complex sites will eventually be transferred to DOE’s Office of Legacy Management (DOE-LM), representatives of DOE-LM were important participants in the workshop. The purpose of the workshop was to identify challenges and opportunities for deploying advanced technologies for long-term monitoring at DOE sites. The key questions during the workshop were: 1) the regulatory acceptance of replacing a process that traditionally has used laboratory sampling and analysis of groundwater samples, and 2) the application of this strategy to the southwestern arid sites that include many of the remaining DOE-EM and DOE-LM complex groundwater plumes. Characteristics common to most arid sites present both limitations and opportunities for advanced technologies. DOE-EM has funded a National Laboratory team from SRNL, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to establish the overarching framework of long-term monitoring by systematically combining advanced hardware and software technologies. This project is titled “Advanced Long-Term Environmental Monitoring Systems (ALTEMIS)” and is sponsored by the DOE-EM Technology Development Program. The multi-laboratory team is currently developing and testing innovative monitoring strategies, including the use of in situ groundwater sensors, geophysics, drone/satellite-based remote sensing, reactive transport modeling, and artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML). The project’s demonstration testbed is at the Savannah River Site (SRS) F-Area Seepage Basins, where a well-characterized complex groundwater plume composed of uranium and other radionuclides is in the latter stages of remediation. The workshop included more than 70 participants, presentations, a field visit to F-Area, breakout working groups, and large group discussion. Participants developed recommendations on five topics: in situ sensors, spatially integrative tools, challenges to regulatory acceptance, AI/ML strategies, and transitioning sites to DOE-LM.
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
The DOE Unreviewed Safety Question Process, Addressing New Information For Credible Nuclear Accidents
The Department of Energy (DOE) Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process is in use for hazardous nuclear facilities operated within the DOE nuclear complex. DOE, which is the federal nuclear safety regulator for its nuclear facilities, requires that each nuclear facility have a Documented Safety Analysis that defines the controls for each credible accident based on a detailed accident analysis. The DOE USQ process provides key mechanisms for formally identifying to the regulator potential accident analysis issues at operating nuclear facilities including those that stem from emergent or new information on hazards. The DOE USQ process provides for formal evaluation of those emergent issues and for determining the need for formal regulator (DOE) review and approval of any resulting immediate or long-term actions. Regarding the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, lessons learned on the evaluation and disposition of new information have been noted by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and the National Research Council. These organizations noted that: - when new information indicates the potential for conditions that could significantly reduce safety margins or exceed current design assumptions, a timely, formal, and comprehensive assessment of the potential for substantial consequences should be conducted, and - if the new information analysis results in substantial changes to the risk profile or could impact the function of important safety systems, then compensatory actions or countermeasures need to be established without delay. The objective of this paper is to raise awareness regarding the salient requirements and guidance of the DOE USQ process used at DOE's operating nuclear facilities that bear on handling of emergent or new information on hazards and that address the lessons learned noted above by INPO and the National Research Council. There is no analysis or intent to make any implications regarding how use of the DOE USQ process might have affected events at Fukushima. The DOE USQ process, when applied as intended at DOE nuclear facilities, addresses lessons learned identified by INPO and the National Research Council regarding use of emergent or new information on hazards. The DOE USQ process ensures a timely, formal, and comprehensive assessment of the potential for substantial consequences resulting from new information on hazards. When the new information analysis results in substantial changes to the risk profile or shows an impact to the function of important safety systems, the DOE USQ process calls for compensatory actions or countermeasures to be established in a timely manner. The DOE USQ process ensures a formal evaluation by the regulator and approval of the planned actions addressing the vulnerabilities made know by new information on hazards. (authors)
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Considerations for Managing DOE Standard Canisters within an Over-canister as Part of an Integrated Waste Management System PPT
To better enable informed decision making regarding the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management Program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring research into a comprehensive integrated waste management system (IWMS) that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). An important aspect of the IWMS is DOE-managed Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated, transported, received, stored, and reprocessed SNF at DOE facilities nationwide, and DOE is responsible for managing the SNF currently in its possession. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types that employ various cladding materials, fuel materials, and enrichments. To enable interim, road-ready dry storage (RRDS) of the wide variety of SNF types found in the DOE inventory, a standardized canister system (i.e., the DOE Standard Canister) was proposed for the packaging demonstration. This robust, welded canister system is designed to confine radionuclides, prevent criticality by precluding content moderation, and satisfy other requirements as part of a larger storage, transportation, and disposal system. While SNF has yet to be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister, DOE Standard Canister designs were included in past storage facility and disposal facility design licensing endeavors. In a renewed effort to evaluate packaging SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a RRDS configuration, researchers are planning the RRDS Packaging Demonstration. This demonstration is supplemented by analytical structural, criticality, and material compatibility evaluations that support management of SNF in DOE Standard Canisters, taking advantage of past analysis work to the extent possible. One of the largest differences between the current Packaging Demonstration and past analytical evaluations is the inclusion of an over-canister containing multiple DOE Standard Canisters. For the Packaging Demonstration, DOE Standard Canisters loaded with SNF are planned to be placed in a larger diameter over-canister. The sealed over-canister could then be placed in a storage overpack for onsite storage, or in a transportation overpack for shipment to an offsite storage location or disposal site once one becomes available. This paper examines the relevant considerations and provides a preliminary evaluation of integrating the over-canister configuration into the storage, transportation, and disposal processes of the overall waste management system. For storage and transportation, the over-canister can be considered analogous to a multi-purpose canister (MPC) for commercial SNF. For disposal, the DOE Standard Canisters could be removed from the over-canister and placed in a co-disposal waste package with canisters containing vitrified high-level radioactive waste (HLW) similar to configurations examined previously, or the sealed over-canisters might be capable of direct disposal in a waste package.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Panel Session 82: Shareholder Engagement with DOE Associate Undersecretary's Environment, Health, Safety, and Security
This panel discussed the mission of the US DOE Office of the Associate Under Secretary for the Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security (AU) and its functional support to the overall mission of the DOE, DOE Office of Environmental Management, and the contractor partners that support that overall mission. Participation in this panel helps achieve one of AU's strategic plan goals - to engage stakeholders to ensure AU's Environment, Health, Safety and Security (EHS and S) policy and support activities align with DOE mission needs. The Panel included stakeholders to discuss their perspectives on AU stakeholder engagement as well as representatives from four policy and support offices from AU. This panel was an important implementation of the DOE Office of the Associate Under Secretary for the Office of EHS and S (AU) strategic plan goals - to engage stakeholders to ensure AUs Environment, Health, Safety and Security (EHS and S) policy and support activities align with DOE mission needs. The panel included stakeholders to discuss their perspectives on AU stakeholder engagement as well as representatives from four policy and support offices from AU including the Office of Health and Safety (AU-10); Office of Environmental Protection and ES and H Reporting (AU-20); Office of Nuclear Safety (AU-30); and Office of Security (AU-50). Presentations proposed include: 1 - Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security (AU) - Stakeholder Engagement (Matthew Moury, US DOE, Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security (USA)); 2 - Environment, Health, Safety, and Security Policy Making: Rules, Directives, Technical Standards and Programs (Patricia Worthington, US DOE, Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security (USA)); 3 - Environment, Health, Safety, and Security: Corporate Programs (Josh Silverman, US DOE, Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security (USA)); 4 - Environment, Health, Safety and Security: Technical Assistance (Marc Brooks, US DOE, Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security (USA)); 5 - Environment, Health, Safety and Security: Goals and Initiatives (Tom Hiltz, US DOE, Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security (USA)); 6 - Shareholder Engagement with DOE Associate Undersecretary's Environment, Health, Safety, and Security (Greg Sosson, US DOE (USA)); 7 - Nuclear Safety Center of Excellence (Chip Lagdon, Bechtel National, Inc (USA)); 8 - EFCOG Safety Working Group (Jan Preston, Fluor Corporation (USA))
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Considerations for Managing DOE Standard Canisters within an Over-canister as Part of an Integrated Waste Management System
To better enable informed decision making regarding the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management Program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring the research into a comprehensive integrated waste management system (IWMS) that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). An important aspect of the IWMS is DOE-managed SNF. DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated, transported, received, stored, and reprocessed SNF at DOE facilities nationwide, and DOE is responsible for managing the SNF currently in its possession. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types that employ various cladding materials, fuel materials, and enrichments. To enable interim, road-ready dry storage (RRDS) of the wide variety of SNF types found in the DOE inventory, a standardized canister system (i.e., the DOE Standard Canister) was proposed. This robust, welded canister system is designed to confine radionuclides, prevent criticality by precluding content moderation, and satisfy other requirements as part of a larger storage, transportation, and disposal system. While SNF has yet to be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister, DOE Standard Canister designs were included in past storage facility and disposal facility design licensing endeavors. In a renewed effort to evaluate packaging SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a RRDS configuration, researchers are planning the RRDS Packaging Demonstration. This demonstration is supplemented by analytical structural, criticality, and material compatibility evaluations that support management of SNF in DOE Standard Canisters, taking advantage of past analysis work to the extent possible. One of the largest differences between the current Packaging Demonstration and past analytical evaluations is the inclusion of an over-canister containing multiple DOE Standard Canisters. For the Packaging Demonstration, DOE Standard Canisters loaded with SNF are planned to be placed in a larger diameter over-canister. The sealed over-canister could then be placed in a storage overpack for onsite storage, or in a transportation overpack for shipment to an offsite storage location or disposal site once one becomes available. This paper examines the relevant considerations and provides a preliminary evaluation of integrating the over-canister configuration into the storage, transportation, and disposal processes of the overall waste management system. For storage and transportation, the over-canister can be considered analogous to a multi-purpose canister (MPC) for commercial SNF. For disposal, the DOE Standard Canisters could be removed from the over-canister and placed in a co-disposal waste package with canisters containing vitrified HLW similar to configurations examined previously, or the sealed over-canisters might be capable of direct disposal in a waste package.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Application of Field Evaluations of Ecological Resources at Hanford and Other DOE Sites for Consistency of Resource Protection and Sustainability - 16404
Remediation and management of contaminated facilities, soil, sediment and biota is an essential element of the DOE-EM mission for site completion, contaminant footprint reduction, and protection of human health and the environment. Protecting ecological resources is an integral part of protecting human health because people are part of the ecosystem and rely on ecological resources for food, fiber, clean air and water, recreational, aesthetic, and cultural values. Evaluation and management require understanding the past and current conditions, as well as protecting, preserving, and enhancing ecological resources. Understanding past and current resources includes evaluation of individual and population health within a local and regional context. The objective of this research is to describe a field method of evaluating ecological resources, based on work at the Hanford Site, which can be applied to sustainability of ecological resources as another mandate of DOE. This requires objective methods to characterize and evaluate resources spatially, within a context of local and regional importance. The DOE complex is large, diverse, and multi-state. The habitats and ecological resources are diverse, and the relative importance of ecological resources to the local ecosystem, region, and human communities varies. Large and diverse sites such as Hanford, Idaho National Laboratory, Los Alamos, hold resources of substantial importance to local and regional ecosystems, as well as to the ecology and cultural values of Tribes and other residents. However, other smaller sites (e.g. Oak Ridge, Brookhaven) also hold key ecological resources to local and regional ecosystems, cultures, and economics. Understanding the relative importance of ecological resources on each remediation site at different spatial scales, within and among DOE-EM sites is critical to management, stewardship, and ensuring sustainability for generations to come. Without a standardized methodology it is difficult to develop sound remediation and management plans to protect human health and the environment. The Ecological Evaluation of Resources described in this paper is part of the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation's (CRESP) Risk Review Project on the Hanford Site. It is an independent assessment based of on-site field evaluations that encompasses evaluations of site resources in comparison to the Columbia Basin Ecosystem prior evaluations made by DOE, the States of Washington and Oregon, Nature Conservancy and Tribes. The on-site field evaluations are the focus of the current paper. The on-site field evaluation methodology was developed to update existing information on habitat values in light of changing landscape features (edge, patch size and shape, connectivity) and the current presence of invasive species. Both aspects change with time, especially given that remediation of remediation units changes the landscape. That is, every time there is a remediation and restoration of an operable unit (remediation site) on a DOE site, it changes the adjacent landscape (and ecological resources). The changes are greater where new roads were built to access a remediation site, staging areas constructed, and as a function of the size and time-frame for the remediation. Since ecological resources form a continuum across the landscape, and activities from remediation on a given site can affect those on adjacent areas, we evaluated resources both on the remediation site itself, and on a buffer equal to the largest diameter of the remediation site. The field evaluation methodology developed at Hanford Site makes use of existing resource level maps (DOE/RL-96-32 2013) and field surveys and measurements of current vegetation and habitat conditions to evaluate potential ecological impacts associated with cleanup activities at the evaluation unit. Additional information used in the ecological resource evaluations include current Endangered and Threatened Species distribution data (both state and federal), aerial imagery, locations of waste sites and infrastructure, and species and habitats of special concern. We suggest that the field methodology developed for the Hanford Site could be used across the DOE complex to evaluate ecological resources. This would provide DOE-EM with a common data base to make long-term decisions about the protection and sustainability of resources on the DOE complex, and would provide Tribes and the public with information on ecological resources on DOE sites. Such information could be provided in a web-based format which DOE, regulators, Tribes, and the public could easily access. (authors)
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Panel Session 2: 30 Year Anniversary of US DOE-Environmental Management-EM Update
This panel focused on Senior US DOE Managers from Washington, D.C. speaking on the pressing issues facing US DOE EM sites and the 30 year anniversary of DOE - EM. The panel was moderated by Martin Schneider, Longenecker and Associates. Presentations proposed include: 1 - DOE Environmental Management Update From EM-2 (Mark Gilbertson, US DOE EM (USA)); 2 - DOE Environmental Management Update From EM-3 (Jeffrey Griffin, US DOE EM (USA)); 3 - DOE Environmental Management Update From EM-4 (Betsy Connell, US DOE EM (USA)); 4 - DOE Environmental Management Update From EM-5 (Steve Trischman, US DOE EM (USA))
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Panel Session 73: DOE-EM End-State Contracting
US DOE-EM's new end-state contracting model, the ID/IQ (Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quality) approach, is intended to give EM the flexibility to better define discrete scopes of work for site closure or end states. This is the result of several years of dialogue between industry and DOE about the way to collectively improve the way to do business more safely, quickly and cost effectively. This model requires a fine balance between incentives and clearly defined end states, with the ability for contractors and DOE to react quickly to respond to changes. By March 6, DOE and industry were one month into the new end-state contracting model with two requests for proposals issued and contractors responding. The purpose of the panel was to hear from DOE and industry about the status so far. DOE and the contractor community are generally supportive of the new model, but it will require closer partnership and a new mindset and approach among DOE, contractors, regulator and the workforce. This panel focused on the implementation of DOE EM's new End State Contracting Model, which uses a single-award ID/IQ approach to give EM the flexibility to better define discrete scopes of work for site closure or end states. The panelists provided their perspective on the initial implementation of the new approach and the path forward for upcoming opportunities utilizing this model. Presentation proposed: DOE EM End State Contracting (Tamara Miles, US DOE (USA))
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Criticality Analysis of FSV Spent Nuclear Fuel in the DOE Standard Canister
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). To manage this large variety of fuel types, DOE plans to employ standardized canisters for the transportation, long-term storage, and eventual disposal of SNF. Idaho National Laboratory is currently supporting DOE’s SNF Packaging Demonstration Project, in which Fort Saint Vrain (FSV) fuel assemblies will be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper presents criticality calculations demonstrating that all four or five FSV fuel assemblies loaded into the DOE Standard Canister will remain subcritical in any expected normal or credible abnormal conditions. Previous criticality analyses were performed for one FSV fuel assembly and 12 Peach Bottom Core 2 fuel elements loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper covers the criticality analysis performed for loading both four and five FSV fuel assemblies into a DOE Standard Canister. Various intact and degraded mode configurations were modeled in conducting the criticality calculations. This analysis encompassed three different configurations: (1) a single DOE Standard Canister loaded into a concrete storage overpack, (2) seven DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack, and (3) nine DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack. The overpack dimensions were varied for each of the three configurations, and transport, storage, and disposal scenarios were analyzed for each configuration. For transport scenarios, a pair of degradation cases was analyzed. In the first case, the fuel compacts became degraded and were removed from the fuel block, then deposited at the bottom of a horizontally placed canister, thereby simulating a drop event. The canister was considered to remain intact. In the second case, the spacing between horizontally placed canisters in a nine-canister overpack was reduced such that the canisters were piled on top of each other, simulating a drop event. For this case, no degradation of the canister internals or fuel was considered. For storage scenarios, the water moderator location in the system was varied to enable identification of the most reactive configurations. Dry and wet conditions were analyzed for the fuel materials, canister, and overpack. For disposal scenarios, two degradation cases were analyzed. In the first, the stainless-steel internals of the canister degraded to either hematite or goethite under both dry and wet conditions. In the second case, degraded FSV fuel formed a uranium-water slurry that filled the coolant/void holes. None of the cases presented exceeded the application specific upper subcritical limit.
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