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DOE OSTI2023

International Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Overview [Slides]

Innovations in clean energy technology are beginning to transform electric grids around the world. It is more important than ever to understand and improve the resiliency and security of the grid against natural and human disruptions as our energy systems become more distributed, intelligent, and interconnected. Through its advanced cybersecurity technical assistance portfolio, experts at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) work with international governments to support secure and resilient deployment of renewable energy assets and address grid interconnection challenges. Cybersecurity technical assistance is tailored to the needs of our international partners.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity Lessons Learned from Vehicle to Grid Engagement

As the transportation industry continues to become electrified, introduction of additional digital devices within associated actions such as recharging bring additional potential for cybersecurity attacks. Devices that are designed, implemented, and operated with cybersecurity as a crucial consideration exacerbate these concerns by failing to provide strict boundaries on access to and use of the equipment. Emerging use cases such as Vehicle to Grid (V2G) charging may expand the potential physical effects of a cybersecurity attack by providing indirect access to electrical components of a building microgrid or portions of the larger power grid. This paper serves as an overview of findings and recommendations based on cybersecurity testing performed at a V2G implementation site operated by a member of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Establish the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Collaboration [1]. The Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response is a signatory of the MOU, and has funded this research paper and associated body of work regarding V2X cybersecurity. Sandia has a large background of previous research focused on Electric Vehicle (EV) cybersecurity, such as reference [2], which includes an overall survey of EV infrastructure cybersecurity and recommendations based on those findings. This report seeks to expand knowledge of EV cybersecurity status and needs by focusing on a specific implementation of V2G charging, and providing recommendations based on the relevant findings. This report serves as a publicly available, sanitized description of applied vulnerability testing on an operational V2G implementation. A more in-depth technical version of the report is provided to the MOU partner, but not available at the time of writing due to inclusion of proprietary information. V2G charging comes with many research problems that must be solved before the technology can securely implemented in sites with unrestricted public access or where cybersecurity attacks could have increased consequences, such as government offices. V2G charging requires many stakeholders such as end users, host sites, equipment vendors, and integrators, which all rely on operational safety and security as well as security and trustworthiness of any associated financial transactions.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework and Cyber Range Integration

Distributed energy resource (DER) systems feature complex, data-driven communications networks that require careful system coordination and constant vigilance to ensure that grid assets are secure. Because DERs are an important component of the decarbonization strategy, agencies need to secure energy data that could implicate issues of national security if compromised. To help federal energy managers assess, monitor, and manage cybersecurity while achieving decarbonization, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL's) Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) offers a comprehensive, web-based assessment tool focusing on cyber governance or policies, technical management, and physical security. The DER-CF currently presents users with a series of pertinent cybersecurity questions that are used to generate a site-specific report and recommendations. This paper outlines a plan to integrate the DER-CF with another key asset-NREL's cyber range-to visualize cybersecurity resilience and compliance and to enhance the usability and accessibility of the DER-CF for federal facility energy managers and planners. This integration will result in a visualization environment to interpret and interact with compliance data. Its development will include regular conversations with stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of these efforts, refine the visualization capability, and ensure its value to our partners.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Distributed Energy Resource Visual Emulator: Phase 1

To help federal energy managers assess, monitor, and manage cybersecurity while achieving decarbonization, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) offers a comprehensive, web-based assessment tool focusing on cyber governance or policies, technical management, and physical security. The DER-CF currently presents users with a series of pertinent cybersecurity questions, which are used to generate a site-specific report and recommendations. This paper outlines a technical approach to integrate the DER-CF with another key asset—NREL's Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) Cyber Range—to visualize cybersecurity resilience and compliance and to enhance the usability and accessibility of the DER-CF. The result is a new tool called the Distributed Energy Resource Visual Emulator (DER-VE). Its development will include regular conversations with stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of these efforts, refine the visualization capability, and ensure its value to our partners. Phase 0 of the integration project was concluded in 2021. Phase 1, completed in 2022, has two components: The first is developing a working visualization of system compliance using the DER-CF, and the second is planning the design of a server application that takes input data from the DER-CF and creates a personal emulated environment of the user's system or a selected reference architect. Major components that were addressed in this phase are the DER-CF output, compliance visualization, data model, and compliance server design.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Standards for Distributed Energy Resources: Gaps and Harmonization Strategy

This report examines cybersecurity standards for Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) in light of their rapid growth and increasing integration into energy systems. It identifies critical gaps in existing frameworks, including inadequate coverage of DER-specific challenges, complexities in implementing comprehensive standards, integration issues with legacy systems, adoption hurdles for newer standards, and a lack of harmonization across regulatory landscapes. The analysis highlights vulnerabilities such as data integrity risks, unauthorized device control, and denial-of-service attacks across various DER technologies like solar PV, wind turbines, energy storage systems, and hydrogen fuel cells. The report proposes a harmonization strategy to address these deficiencies by developing unified cybersecurity requirements, certification programs, and training resources while fostering collaboration among stakeholders such as government agencies, industry groups, DER operators, manufacturers, and research institutions. A phased roadmap is outlined to refine and implement these measures through pilot testing and widespread adoption. Ultimately, the report underscores the urgent need for coordinated efforts to enhance DER cybersecurity and ensure the reliable operation of future energy systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2023

DER Cybersecurity R&D

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) conducted more than 30 assessments for utilities across the United States with a cybersecurity assessment tool based on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and focused on business process. With funding from the DOE Office of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Federal Energy Management Program, NREL modified the current cyber governance assessment tool to include an assessment process specifically for distributed energy resources (DERs). The Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) was developed to help federal agencies mitigate gaps in their cybersecurity posture for distributed energy systems.

cybersecurity valuation↗

DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2024

Lamellar: A Rust-based Asynchronous Tasking and PGAS Runtime for High Performance Computing

Cybersecurity is one of the largest concerns in modern computing, impacting and dictating how governments, private corporations, and individuals interact with and live in an increasingly digital world. The NSA has recently released a memo [ 1] on “Software Memory Safety” where they highlight that both Microsoft and Google have stated around 70% of software vulnerabilities were due to memory safety issues. Although languages such as C and C++ provide freedom and flexibility with memory management, guaran- teeing safety falls mostly on the developer. The NSA recommends using “memory safe” languages whenever possible. In this paper we introduce Lamellar, an asynchronous tasking and PGAS HPC runtime written in Rust, one such "memory safe" language. We describe the entire Lamellar stack, from network interfaces to high- level abstractions such as distributed LamellarArrays and Active Messages. We conclude by showing comparable performance to legacy PGAS runtimes (e.g. OpenSHMEM) on a subset of the BALE kernel suite while maintaining strong memory safety principles.

HPC Software Systems, Rust Programming Language, P↗

DOE OSTI2025

Threat Hunt Guide for BESS Environments

The rapid digitalization of the electric grid - driven by the integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), and advanced grid control platforms - has significantly enhanced grid efficiency, visibility, and flexibility. However, this evolution also introduces new cybersecurity risks, particularly through supply chain dependencies and operational blind spots at the grid edge. To address these challenges, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) Rapid Risk initiative, conducted a series of rapid risk assessment engagements with energy organizations across the United States. Drawing on lessons learned from these engagements, INL developed the following threat hunting guide for asset owners and operators (AOOs) to enhance their cybersecurity visibility within BESS and IBR systems. The guide demonstrates how to use passive network monitoring to baseline device behavior, detect adversarial activity, and investigate anomalies without disrupting operations. By implementing these practices, energy sector stakeholders can improve coordination between cybersecurity and operations teams and strengthen the resilience of distributed energy resources (DERs) within the modern power grid. Prior to implementing any network monitoring, packet capture, or threat hunting activity described in this guide, AOOs are strongly advised to review applicable governance frameworks, legal requirements, and organizational policies. This guide is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not replace compliance with any federal, state, or local cybersecurity mandates or industry standards. Implementation of described configurations, technologies, or analytic workflows is performed at the discretion and responsibility of the asset owner and operator.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2023

Implementation of an ICS Ransomware Testbed: Scenarios, Variants, and Evaluation Methods

Ransomware attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have emerged as a formidable threat to the United States’ critical infrastructure, eliciting grave concerns regarding national security. In March 2023, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) unveiled its 2022 Internet Crime Report, highlighting a concerning 870 complaints related to ransomware impacting U.S. critical infrastructure. Of the country's 16 critical infrastructure sectors, 14 encountered at least one ransomware attack. Notably, while the Healthcare and Public Health sector suffered the most, reporting 210 attacks, sectors pivotal to ICS networks and governmental organizations were also targeted: the Defense Industrial Base reported 1 attack, Water and Wastewater Systems 3, Chemical 19, Energy 15, Government Facilities 115, and Critical Manufacturing 157. For instance, a ransomware attack on a major chemical company could jeopardize not only its production but also pose environmental risks should systems controlling hazardous materials be compromised. In 2022, three ransomware variants predominantly targeted U.S. critical infrastructure: HIVE, with 87 attacks; ALPHV/BlackCat, with 114; and LOCKBIT, with 149. Several cyber-attacks, such as the MOVEit data breach in May 2023 and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021, have been so impactful that they commanded national attention. The DarkSide hacking group's assault on the Colonial Pipeline, initiated on May 6th, 2021, stands as one of the most substantial and publicly acknowledged cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. The group exploited an exposed Virtual Private Network (VPN) password, paving the way for initial intrusion and subsequent data theft. A mere day later, DarkSide unleashed a ransomware attack that compromised vital accounting and billing systems, prompting an immediate shutdown of the pipeline to mitigate further ransomware proliferation across its network. This crisis spurred a robust response from the U.S. president and regulators, culminating in a national emergency declaration related to the pipeline shutdown on May 9th, 2021. This incident mirrors the 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack that significantly impacted the shipping giant Maersk, highlighting an urgent need for fortified cybersecurity across various industries. Future incidents, akin to the Colonial Pipeline attack, could potentially be mitigated—or entirely averted—should government agencies and private entities scrutinize system vulnerabilities, exploring various ransomware types and entry points. Proactive measures, such as conducting experiments on VPN accounts or auditing passwords to pinpoint duplicate usage across diverse systems and software, might illuminate feasible entry points and vulnerability zones within an organization's systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

FY 2021 Mid-Year HPC Utilization Report M3UF-21IN0701018

Idaho National Laboratory (INL), supported by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) through the Nuclear Science User Facilities, provides access to supercomputer systems and data storage along with support staff for system management, software installation, cybersecurity and user support to the broader DOE-NE user community. Users include individuals at universities, industry, and government laboratories enabling a wide range of research and development and mission-supporting activities. The availability of high-performance computing (HPC) capabilities is a key foundation of collaboration and innovation in nuclear energy systems research. HPC resources and INL directly support the mission and objectives of DOE-NE. From October 2020 through March 2021, INL HPC capabilities were utilized by a diverse set of computing and applied researchers, for a wide range of research and engineering activities. This report focuses on current INL HPC systems and utilization from October 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

SECURED: Simulator-Enhanced Control and Understanding of Reactor systems for cyber-Event Defense

The study discusses a learning approach for analyzing cyber-events in reactor systems using integrated hardware and personal computer simulator models. Key points include the rise in cyber-attacks and their sophistication in industrial control systems (ICS), the necessity for awareness, understanding, resource allocation, and preparation to combat these threats, and the digital transformation of old and new nuclear plants, increasing their exposure to cyber threats. It highlights the cyber vulnerabilities of advanced reactor systems, which rely on digital instrumentation and control for operations and safety functions, making them susceptible to cyber-attacks. The approach involves demonstrating reactor system plant ICS cyber-attacks under various operational conditions utilizing tools like simulator models and hardware-based kits. A strategic solution approach tailored to critical infrastructure is emphasized, along with community engagement for public and government support, adopting effective learning approaches, and the preparation for anticipated future challenges. The presentation concludes with a call to action to address challenges, leverage opportunities, and advance through lesson learning in cybersecurity for nuclear energy systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity and Digital Components: Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment

The report “America’s Strategy to Secure the Supply Chain for a Robust Clean Energy Transition” lays out the challenges and opportunities faced by the United States in the energy supply chain as well as the federal government plans to address these challenges and opportunities. It is accompanied by several issue-specific deep dive assessments, including this one, in response to Executive Order 14017 “America’s Supply Chains,” which directs the Secretary of Energy to submit a report on supply chains for the energy sector industrial base. The Executive Order is helping the federal government to build more secure and diverse U.S. supply chains, including energy supply chains. As the energy sector has become more globalized and increasingly complex, digitized, and even virtualized, its supply chain risk for digital components – the software, virtual platforms and services, and data – in energy systems has evolved and expanded. All digital components in U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable and may be subject to cyber supply cha in risks stemming from a variety of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts. This includes digital components in all systems within the ESIB, namely those systems operated by asset owners across different energy subsectors (e.g., electricity, oil and natural gas, and renewables) and the systems operated by a worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and development and design, produce, operate, and maintain energy sector systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet U.S. energy requirements. Supply chain risks for digital components including software, virtual platforms and services, and data have grown in recent years as increasingly sophisticated cyber adversaries have targeted exploiting vulnerabilities in these digital assets. Supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Lessons Learned for Responsible Use of Cloud in the Cirrus Project, Following the CrowdStrike Outage Event

A disruption in CrowdStrike’s Falcon cybersecurity platform on July 19th, 2024, caused worldwide chaos. This event highlights the imperative need for cloud security measures for networks that are critically reliant on cloud technology. This incident negatively impacted air travel, government networks, and critical infrastructure sectors such as hospitals and financial institutions. While no electric utilities had a physical impact, and few had an IT impact, there were issues created by loss of cloud services, and other interrelated industries. For utilities and energy distribution organizations, understanding and mitigating these risks is essential. The Cirrus tool offers a strategic solution engineered to weave cloud integration seamlessly into the fabric of operational management, thereby enhancing resilience and streamlining efficiency in the face of digital challenges.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Center of Excellence for Operational Technology

The Center of Excellence for Operational Technology Traditional Presentation Abstract 2025 National Laboratories Information Technology Summit | Denver, CO Traditional Presentation Session Managing cybersecurity risk in Operational Technology (OT) presents a significant challenge across the Department, and critically, at many of the national laboratories. This includes IT-OT convergence, aging OT systems, cost of updating OT systems, and increased Advanced Persistent Threat efforts against OT including the 16 critical infrastructure sectors as listed in Presidential Policy Directive 21. DoE’s Office of Science and NNSA’s Office of the Chief Information Officer are taking the lead in addressing this challenge to include critical systems, by establishing the Center of Excellence (CoE) for Operational Technology. Championed by NNSA Deputy Chief Information Officer Steven McAndrews and the Office of Science Chief Information Officer Shila Cooch, the CoE for OT was chartered in February 2025 to address the challenges of OT cybersecurity and compliance. The CoE for OT will create partnerships and leverage expertise from across the NNSA National Security Enterprise and DOE Labs, Plants and Sites. The CoE will also collaborate with colleagues in other government agencies, industry partners and academia. The CoE for OT discussion at the National Laboratories Information Technology Summit ’25 will include the genesis of the CoE, stated goals, organizational structure, and the effort to attract OT subject matter experts to join the CoE effort to share knowledge and expertise. The discussion will include opportunities to get involved and contribute to this important effort. This session will be led by CoE for OT Co-Chairs Matt Kwiatkowski, Fermi National Laboratory Chief Information Security Officer, and Steven Weldon, Savannah River National Laboratory Cyber Program Director at the Georgia Cyber Center. The session will be of particular interest to CIOs, CTOs, CISOs, as well as IT and OT practitioners.

Kwiatkowski, Matt [Fermilab]↗