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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2025

Converter Compressor Building, SWMU 089 Monitoring Well 21 Area Implementation Work Plan Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This Implementation Work Plan (IWP) was prepared by Tetra Tech, Inc., for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Contract 80KSC019D0011/80KSC019F0070, for the implementation of a bioremediation Interim Measure (IM) at the Converter Compressor Building (CCB) site located at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. The location of CCB within KSC is shown on Figure A-1. CCB has been designated as Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 089 under KSC’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Corrective Action Program. The overall Corrective Action Objective (CAO) for CCB is to reduce concentrations of trichloroethene (TCE), cis-1,2-dichloroethene (cDCE), trans-1,2-dichloroethene (tDCE), and vinyl chloride (VC) to less than State of Florida Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (GCTLs). The objective for the IM associated with this IM is to reduce groundwater concentrations for the contaminants of concern (COCs) to less than their Natural Default Attenuation Concentrations (NADCs) within the Monitoring Well 21 Area (herein referred to as MW21 Area) via bioremediation injections to support transition to long term monitoring (LTM). This IWP describes the activities that will be performed for the treatment of the MW21 Area. The Revision 1 CCB MW21 Area Interim Measure Work Plan (IMWP; NASA, 2024), which was approved by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) on December 26, 2024, was used as the design basis for this IWP.

Mark Jonnet↗
NASA NTRS1987

Flight problem evaluation for Space Shuttle Orbiter

The flight problems experienced with the reusable Space Shuttle Orbiter have decreased during subsequent flights of each vehicle. By comparison to first flights of previous vehicles, the problems encountered on the initial flight of each new vehicle entering the fleet decreased. This improvement in turn has reduced the turnaround time between flights significantly and thus greatly enhanced the increased Space Shuttle launch frequency. The reusable manned space vehicle concept necessitated the development of a flight problem recognition and resolution system which would enable a thorough and timely vehicle turnaround flow. Flight evaluation, testing, and repair of manned spacecraft to enhance reliability and to ensure mission success is a unique activity. Real-time recognition of the flight problem, prompt isolation of the cause, and timely implementation of the corrective action are the keys to maintaining an operational fleet. Examples of flight problems that have been encountered as well as the corrective actions implemented during the first 24 Space Shuttle missions are presented. The corrective actions taken to preclude problem recurrence include modifications of hardware designs, manufacturing processes, flight software, test methods, and operational procedures.

Mechelay, Joseph E.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Vibro-Acoustic Analysis of NASA's Space Shuttle Launch Pad 39A Flame Trench Wall

A vital element to NASA's manned space flight launch operations is the Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39's launch pads A and B. Originally designed and constructed In the 1960s for the Saturn V rockets used for the Apollo missions, these pads were modified above grade to support Space Shuttle missions. But below grade, each of the pad's original walls (including a 42 feet deep, 58 feet wide, and 450 feet long tunnel designed to deflect flames and exhaust gases, the flame trench) remained unchanged. On May 31, 2008 during the launch of STS-124, over 3500 of the. 22000 interlocking refractory bricks that lined east wall of the flame trench, protecting the pad structure were liberated from pad 39A. The STS-124 launch anomaly spawned an agency-wide initiative to determine the failure root cause, to assess the impact of debris on vehicle and ground support equipment safety, and to prescribe corrective action. The investigation encompassed radar imaging, infrared video review, debris transport mechanism analysis using computational fluid dynamics, destructive testing, and non-destructive evaluation, including vibroacoustic analysis, in order to validate the corrective action. The primary focus of this paper is on the analytic approach, including static, modal, and vibro-acoustic analysis, required to certify the corrective action, and ensure Integrity and operational reliability for future launches. Due to the absence of instrumentation (including pressure transducers, acoustic pressure sensors, and accelerometers) in the flame trench, defining an accurate acoustic signature of the launch environment during shuttle main engine/solid rocket booster Ignition and vehicle ascent posed a significant challenge. Details of the analysis, including the derivation of launch environments, the finite element approach taken, and analysistest/ launch data correlation are discussed. Data obtained from the recent launch of STS-126 from Pad 39A was instrumental in validating the design analysis philosophies outlined in this paper.

Margasahayam, Ravi N.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Integrated Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A). Performance Verification Report: METSAT Phase Locked Oscillator Assembly, P/N 1334360-1, S/N's F03 and F04

Two Flight Model AMSU-A Phase Locked Oscillators (P/N 1348360-1, S/Ns F03 and F04) have been tested per AES Test Procedure AE-26758. The tests included vibration testing, thermal cycle testing, AM/FM Noise testing, and full functional testing. EMI/REO 2 Testing was not performed. (See test data for S/N F01). Both AMSU-A Phase Locked Oscillators satisfactorily passed all performance requirements of the AE-26633 Product specification. During thermal cycling of PLO serial number F03, the oven and data logger momentarily lost power, including a loss of data. The unit did not experience any thermal stress. TAR 003134 describes the corrective action. Prior to testing PLO serial number FO4, power was applied to the unit. (+15v,-15v) the unit did not display the proper phase lock. Upon test equipment check out a connector was found to be defective. TAR 003133 describes the corrective action. After completion of testing of PLO serial number F04 was installed into Receiver Assembly F02. Upon testing F02 Receiver Assembly the unit was found not to phase lock at ambient temperature. Removal of PLO Assembly F04 was required. R2 was the real issue. Solithane was secondary. Troubleshooting revealed excessive solithane on inner PLL Assembly cover inhibiting optimum grounding. Also, R2 was reselected which increased the lock range from -30 C to +60 C. TAR 002737 describes the corrective action.

Pines, D.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Cultural Variability in Crew Communication

In this study we examined what linguistic strategies pilots use when they have to challenge the actions of a colleague, and how their communications balance the need for informativeness with the need for assuring the other's cooperation. Two strategies emerged for captains. They either gave commands or they made suggestions that referred to actions of the crew. Both strategies explicitly state what action should be taken but they differ in their social implications. Commands are direct insofar as they entail a strong obligation for the listener to comply with the speaker' s request. Suggestions are less direct in this respect. However, by using the collegial "Let's do," speakers appeal to the solidarity between themselves and their listeners and seek compliance in this way. Commands, in contrast, are inherently authoritative and imply an asymmetry in status. Speakers by giving a command, express their belief that they are socially more powerful than their listeners and that they are thus licensed to command. That is, speakers seek listener compliance by appeal to their status. Status-based commands were more frequent among male captains than among female captains. Female captains instead were likely to shift the motivation for their commands away from their status to some objective necessity by referring to some problem or goal It remains to be seen, however, how captains' strategies were affected by the severity of a problem situation. Results in a preliminary study involving only male participants, suggests that pilots increased the directness of their utterances in situations that they perceived to be risky. Thus the observation that male captains used complex communications half of the time while female captains did so 75% of the time, could indicate that male captains were more likely than female captains to change their strategies with the severity of situations. Both male and female first officers in this study were less direct than captains. The most common strategy of first officers was to point to some problem or to remind the captain of a given goal. What corrective action should be taken and by whom was not explicitly stated but implied and left to the captain. In their other strategies, permission seeking and confirmation-seeking questions, first officers were more explicit about a corrective action. In the first case, they volunteered to do some course of action but left the final decision to the captain. In the latter case, they inquired or confirmed whether the captain wanted some action. Although all three strategies seek the compliance of the listener by appeal to his authority, there are important differences: By asking permission seeking and confirmation-seeking questions, first officers specify the action for which they want the captain's compliance. Compliance, however, is not demanded but requested. By alerting to a problem or to a goal, in contrast, first of officers seek the captain's compliance only with their assessment of the situation but not with a particular course of action. That is, they place the captain under no explicit obligation to initiate a corrective action but do so only indirectly by assuming that a course of action is self-evident once the problem has been acknowledged.

Fischer, Ute↗
NASA NTRS2007

Independent Review Support for Phoenix Mars Mission Robotic Arm Brush Motor Failure

The Phoenix Project requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) perform an independent peer review of the Robotic Arm (RA) Direct Current (DC) motor brush anomalies that originated during the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) Project and recurred during the Phoenix Project. The request was to evaluate the Phoenix Project investigation efforts and provide an independent risk assessment. This includes a recommendation for additional work and assessment of the flight worthiness of the RA DC motors. Based on the investigation and findings contained within this report, the IRT concurs with the risk assessment Failure Cause / Corrective Action (FC/CA) by the project, "Failure Effect Rating "3"; Major Degradation or Total Loss of Function, Failure Cause/Corrective Action Rating Currently "4"; Unknown Cause, Uncertainty in Corrective Action."

McManamen, John P.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Supervisory Control of a Humanoid Robot in Microgravity for Manipulation Tasks

Teleoperation is the dominant form of dexterous robotic tasks in the field. However, there are many use cases in which direct teleoperation is not feasible such as disaster areas with poor communication as posed in the DARPA Robotics Challenge, or robot operations on spacecraft a large distance from Earth with long communication delays. Presented is a solution that combines the Affordance Template Framework for object interaction with TaskForce for supervisory control in order to accomplish high level task objectives with basic autonomous behavior from the robot. TaskForce, is a new commanding infrastructure that allows for optimal development of task execution, clear feedback to the user to aid in off-nominal situations, and the capability to add autonomous verification and corrective actions. This framework has allowed the robot to take corrective actions before requesting assistance from the user. This framework is demonstrated with Robonaut 2 removing a Cargo Transfer Bag from a simulated logistics resupply vehicle for spaceflight using a single operator command. This was executed with 80% success with no human involvement, and 95% success with limited human interaction. This technology sets the stage to do any number of high level tasks using a similar framework, allowing the robot to accomplish tasks with minimal to no human interaction.

Farrell, Logan C.↗
NASA NTRS1975

FORTRAN Automated Code Evaluation System (faces) system documentation, version 2, mod 0

A system is presented which processes FORTRAN based software systems to surface potential problems before they become execution malfunctions. The system complements the diagnostic capabilities of compilers, loaders, and execution monitors rather than duplicating these functions. Also, it emphasizes frequent sources of FORTRAN problems which require inordinate manual effort to identify. The principle value of the system is extracting small sections of unusual code from the bulk of normal sequences. Code structures likely to cause immediate or future problems are brought to the user's attention. These messages stimulate timely corrective action of solid errors and promote identification of 'tricky' code. Corrective action may require recoding or simply extending software documentation to explain the unusual technique.

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NASA NTRS2006

Elimination of Potential Electrical Stress During EMC (CS01) Testing

This viewgraph presentation reviews possible ways to eliminate electrical stress during Electromagneticic Compatibility (EMC) testing. The presentation reviews tests that have had problems due to electrical stress. On December 5, 1995 Cassini Radar instrument failed a functional test in preparation for EMC conducted susceptibility (CSO 1 ) testing. The instrument power supply did not turn on as required, and failure occurred prior to injection of CS test stimulus. A investigation of the failure was conducted. A PSPICE simulation of Cassini Radar 30V line using the EMC test setup was performed; the result of the simulation was an oscillation on the 30V input of the power supply. In another case: on December 28, 1999 an oscillation occurred on the input power line of the SlRTF Infrared Array Camera (IRAC) while preparing to perform CSOI testing, Resulted in damage to flight hardware. Subsequent to failure, JPL provided GSFC history and corrective action from Cassini Radar CSOI test failure GSFC implemented the same corrective action as JPL, except that the value of the resistor connected across the isolation transformer primary winding is 2.5 ohms instead of 50 ohms. Three recommendations are made: (1) Make EMC test community aware of the problem and potential solutions by presenting papers at major environmental test conferences (2) Include warnings and safeguards in EMC test requirements and procedures (3) Try to convince EMC test equipment suppliers to design a CSOl test fixture similar to fixture shown in the diagram

Cassini radar↗
NASA NTRS2008

External Tank (ET) Bipod Fitting Bolted Attachment Locking Insert Performance

Following STS-107, the External Tank (ET) Project implemented corrective actions and configuration changes at the ET bipod fitting. Among the corrective actions, the existing bolt lock wire which provided resistance to potential bolt rotation was removed. The lock wire removal was because of concerns with creating voids during foam application and potential for lock wire to become debris. The bolts had been previously lubricated to facilitate assembly but, because of elimination of the lock wire, the ET Project wanted to enable the locking feature of the insert. Thus, the lubrication was removed from bolt threads and instead applied to the washer under the bolt head. Lubrication is necessary to maximize joint pre-load while remaining within the bolt torque specification. The locking feature is implemented by thread crimping in at four places in the insert. As the bolt is torqued into the insert the bolt threads its way past the crimped parts of the insert. This provides the locking of the bolt, as torque is required to loosen the joint after clamping.

Larsen, Curtis E.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Pogo summary report main propulsion test static firings 1-7 for shuttle development flight instrumentation

Problems concerning the shuttle main propulsion system Polar Orbit Geophysical Observatory (POGO) instrumentation and the actions taken to correct them are summarized. Investigations and analyses appear to be providing solutions to correct the majority of questionable measurements. Corrective action in the handling of cables and connectors should increase the POGO measurement quality. Unacceptable levels of very low frequency noise and data level shifts may be related to test stand grounding configuration, but further investigation is required.

Haddick, C. M., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1990

NASA Audit Follow-up Handbook

This NASA Audit Follow-up Handbook is issued pursuant to the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-50, Audit Follow-up, dated September 29, 1982. It sets forth policy, uniform performance standards, and procedural guidance to NASA personnel for use when considering reports issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG), other executive branch audit organizations, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), and the General Accounting Office (GAO). It is intended to: specify principal roles; strengthen the procedures for management decisions (resolution) on audit findings and corrective action on audit report recommendations; emphasize the importance of monitoring agreed upon corrective actions to assure actual accomplishment; and foster the use of audit reports as effective tools of management. A flow chart depicting the NASA audit and management decision process is in Appendix A. This handbook is a controlled handbook issued in loose-leaf form and will be revised by page changes. Additional copies for internal use may be obtained through normal distribution channels.

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NASA NTRS1985

Government review of the Mod-2 wind turbine (as-built)

The findings and recommendations of the Government committee formed to conduct an as-built review of the three Mod-2 wind turbine units at Goldendale, Washington are given. The purpose of the review was to identify any critical deficiencies in machine components that could result in failure, and to recommend any necessary corrective action before resuming safe machine operation. The review concluded that one of the deficiencies identified would preclude planned attended or unattended operation, provided that certain corrective actions were implemented.

Johnson, W. R.↗
NASA NTRS2003

A Predictive Safety Management System Software Package Based on the Continuous Hazard Tracking and Failure Prediction Methodology

The goal of this research was to integrate a previously validated and reliable safety model, called Continuous Hazard Tracking and Failure Prediction Methodology (CHTFPM), into a software application. This led to the development of a safety management information system (PSMIS). This means that the theory or principles of the CHTFPM were incorporated in a software package; hence, the PSMIS is referred to as CHTFPM management information system (CHTFPM MIS). The purpose of the PSMIS is to reduce the time and manpower required to perform predictive studies as well as to facilitate the handling of enormous quantities of information in this type of studies. The CHTFPM theory encompasses the philosophy of looking at the concept of safety engineering from a new perspective: from a proactive, than a reactive, viewpoint. That is, corrective measures are taken before a problem instead of after it happened. That is why the CHTFPM is a predictive safety because it foresees or anticipates accidents, system failures and unacceptable risks; therefore, corrective action can be taken in order to prevent all these unwanted issues. Consequently, safety and reliability of systems or processes can be further improved by taking proactive and timely corrective actions.

Quintana, Rolando↗
NASA NTRS2024

2023 Land Use Control Inspections Report

2023 Land Use Control (LUC) Inspections Report for John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. This letter report documents the quarterly LUC inspections the KSC Remediation Group conducts at Remediation Sites. No LUC findings occurred in 2023. A Corrective Action to address arsenic-impacted soil at the KSC Child Development Center was performed in July 2023. This letter report provides a summary and documents the field activities for that Corrective Action. Copies of the formal LUC Implementation Plans (LUCIPs) for 71 Remediation Sites at KSC are presented in this letter report. For the Remediation Sites that do not have formal LUCIPs, the report documents that informal LUCs that the Remediation Group has implemented at these sites.

Christopher Adkison↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Engine Cutoff System (ECO) Anomalies

The Space Shuttle Orbiter's main engine cutoff (ECO) system first failed ground checkout in April, 2005 during a first tanking test prior to Return-to-Flight. Despite significant troubleshooting and investigative efforts that followed, the root cause could not be found and intermittent anomalies continued to plague the Program. By implementing hardware upgrades, enhancing monitoring capability, and relaxing the launch rules, the Shuttle fleet was allowed to continue flying in spite of these unexplained failures. Root cause was finally determined following the launch attempts of STS-122 in December, 2007 when the anomalies repeated, which allowed drag-on instrumentation to pinpoint the fault (the ET feedthrough connector). The suspect hardware was removed and provided additional evidence towards root cause determination. Corrective action was implemented and the system has performed successfully since then. This white paper presents the lessons learned from the entire experience, beginning with the anomalies since Return-to-Flight through discovery and correction of the problem. To put these lessons in better perspective for the reader, an overview of the ECO system is presented first. Next, a chronological account of the failures and associated investigation activities is discussed. Root cause and corrective action are summarized, followed by the lessons learned.

Martinez, Hugo E.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Grading NASA's Solar System Exploration Program: A Midterm Report

The Committee on Assessing the Solar System Exploration Program has reviewed NASA's progress to date in implementing the recommendations made in the National Research Council's (NRC's) solar system exploration decadal survey covering the period 2003-2013, New Frontiers in the Solar System, and in its Mars Architecture report, Assessment of NASA s Mars Architecture 2007-2016. The committee assessed NASA's progress with respect to each individual recommendation in these two reports, assigning an academic-style grade, explaining the rationale for the grade and trend, and offering recommendations for improvement. The committee generally sought to develop recommendations in cases where it determined that the grade, the trend, or both were worrisome and that the achievement of a decadal survey recommendation would require some kind of corrective action on NASA's part. This usually meant that the committee sought to offer a recommendation when the grade was a "C" or lower. However, the committee did offer recommendations in connection with some higher grades when it believed that minor corrective action was possible and desirable. More importantly, the committee did not offer recommendations for some of the activities given lower grades, particularly in the enabling technologies area (Chapter 6), because the committee determined that only the restoration of funding and the development of a strategic technology development program would solve these problems.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2018

Resolution of a Reflector Shroud Fatigue Failure

Two cracks were observed on a reflector shroud for a space program after previously being subjected to the protoflight test campaign and several regression tests. After extensive analysis and investigations, the failure mechanism was identified to be fatigue as a result of the numerous vibration tests imposed on the unit. Two feasible corrective actions were proposed: first, a notched vibration profile which possesses sufficient margin from the anticipated acoustic and launch loads, while maintaining adequate fatigue life through launch and on-orbit operations, and second, a re-design of the shroud to strengthen the fatigue-susceptible areas. In this paper, we present the inspections, testing, and analysis performed to establish that the cracks were a result of fatigue failure. We discuss the conservative fatigue analysis methodology used in the development of both corrective action options. Finally, we review the lessons learned and the actions incorporated into the rework, subsequent regression testing, and the test plans to minimize the risk of recurrence in future units.

response limiting↗