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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2002

Engineering Management Capstone Project EM 697: Compare and Contrast Risk Management Implementation at NASA and the US Army

NASA at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and the U.S. Army at Redstone Arsenal were analyzed to determine whether they were successful in implementing their risk management program. Risk management implementation surveys were distributed to aid in this analysis. The scope is limited to NASA S&MA (Safety and Mission Assurance) at MSFC, including applicable support contractors, and the US Army Engineering Directorate, including applicable contractors, located at Redstone Arsenal. NASA has moderately higher risk management implementation survey scores than the Army. Accordingly, the implementation of the risk management program at NASA is considered good while only two of five of the survey categories indicated that the risk management implementation is good at the Army.

Brothers, Mary Ann↗
NASA NTRS2003

Improving the Agency's Software Acquisition Capability

External development of software has oftc n led to unsatisfactory results and great frustration for the assurE 7ce community. Contracts frequently omit critical assuranc 4 processes or the right to oversee software development activitie: At a time when NASA depends more and more on software to in plement critical system functions, combination of three factors ex; cerbate this problem: I ) the ever-increasing trend to acquire rather than develop software in-house, 2) the trend toward performance based contracts, and 3) acquisition vehicles that only state softwar 2 requirements while leaving development standards and assur! ince methodologies up to the contractor. We propose to identify specific methods at d tools that NASA projects can use to mitigate the adverse el ects of the three problems. TWO broad classes of methoddt ~ols will be explored. The first will be those that provide NASA p ojects with insight and oversight into contractors' activities. The st cond will be those that help projects objectively assess, and thus i nprwe, their software acquisition capability. Of particular interest is the Software Engineering Institute's (SEI) Software Acqt isition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMMO).

Hankinson, Allen↗
NASA NTRS2016

Ensuring Payload Safety in Missions with Special Partnerships

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) payload space flight missions involve cooperative work between NASA and partners including spacecraft (or payload) contractors, universities, nonprofit research centers, Agency payload organization, Range Safety organization, Agency launch service organizations, and launch vehicle contractors. The role of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate is typically fairly straightforward, but when a mission's partnerships become more complex, to realize cost and science benefits (e.g., multi-agency payload(s) or cooperative international missions), the task of ensuring payload safety becomes much more challenging. This paper discusses lessons learned from NASA safety professionals working multiple-agency missions and offers suggestions to help fellow safety professionals working multiple-agency missions.

Agency launch service organizations↗
NASA NTRS1992

Defining the performance gap: Conducting a self-assessment

This paper presents two different approaches to performing self-assessments of continuous improvement activities. Case Study 1 describes the activities performed by JSC to assess the implementation of continuous improvement efforts at the NASA Center. The JSC approach included surveys administered to randomly selected NASA personnel and personal interviews with NASA and contractor management personnel. Case Study 2 describes the continuous improvement survey performed by the JSC Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) organization. This survey consisted of a short questionnaire (50 questions) administered to all NASA and contractor SR&QA personnel. The questionnaire is based on the eight categories of the President's Award for Quality and Productivity Improvement. It is designed to objectively determine placement on the TQ benchmark and identify a roadmap for improvement.

Braymer, Susan A.↗
NASA NTRS1966

New developments in NASA quality assurance

The purpose of this talk is to examine and discuss NASA's basic quality concept, the policy and procedures which define and implement this concept and subsequently explore the NASA-Industry quality relationships which are essential to the success of NASA's quality assurance concept. It is important to emphasize that NASA's Quality Assurance program is predicated on the concept of an individually tailored quality program for each significant NASA procurement - particularly, large space systems. As a result, NASA's Quality Assurance program - to be effective - must be responsive to various technologies, hardware systems, and space missions. In addition, the program must be responsive to changing policies and practices in research, engineering and procurement. Key issues in the NASA-Contractor quality relationships in the framework of an over all NASA-Industry partnership include: (1) the necessity for NASA to effectively discharge its responsibility for providing clear and complete definition of quality requirements at all phases of the procurement cycle; (2) the right of the contractor to expect an explicit definition of NASA quality requirements in each RFP and contract and to request same if it is not provided; (3) the necessity for the contractor to have a dynamic and responsive quality program which is directed towards assuring that the hardware meets all technical requirements and to accomplish this in an effective and efficient manner; and (4) the critical need for investigation and study of the economic aspects of quality and an evaluation of our policies and practices based upon the results of such a study.

Condon, John E.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report provides findings, conclusions and recommendations regarding the National Space Transportation System (NSTS), the Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP), aeronautical projects and other areas of NASA activities. The main focus of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) during 1988 has been monitoring and advising NASA and its contractors on the Space Transportation System (STS) recovery program. NASA efforts have restored the flight program with a much better management organization, safety and quality assurance organizations, and management communication system. The NASA National Space Transportation System (NSTS) organization in conjunction with its prime contractors should be encouraged to continue development and incorporation of appropriate design and operational improvements which will further reduce risk. The data from each Shuttle flight should be used to determine if affordable design and/or operational improvements could further increase safety. The review of Critical Items (CILs), Failure Mode Effects and Analyses (FMEAs) and Hazard Analyses (HAs) after the Challenger accident has given the program a massive data base with which to establish a formal program with prioritized changes.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Solar Sails

The Solar Sail Propulsion investment area has been one of the three highest priorities within the In-Space Propulsion Technology (ISPT) Project. In the fall of 2003, the NASA Headquarters' Science Mission Directorate provided funding and direction to mature the technology as far as possible through ground research and development from TRL 3 to 6 in three years. A group of experts from government, industry, and academia convened in Huntsville, Alabama to define technology gaps between what was needed for science missions to the inner solar system and the current state of the art in ultra1ightweight materials and gossamer structure design. This activity set the roadmap for development. The centerpiece of the development would be the ground demonstration of scalable solar sail systems including masts, sails, deployment mechanisms, and attitude control hardware and software. In addition, new materials would be subjected to anticipated space environments to quantify effects and assure mission life. Also, because solar sails are huge structures, and it is not feasible to validate the technology by ground test at full scale, a multi-discipline effort was established to develop highly reliable analytical models to serve as mission assurance evidence in future flight program decision-making. Two separate contractor teams were chosen to develop the SSP System Ground Demonstrator (SGD). After a three month conceptual mission/system design phase, the teams developed a ten meter diameter pathfinder set of hardware and subjected it to thermal vacuum tests to compare analytically predicted structural behavior with measured characteristics. This process developed manufacturing and handling techniques and refined the basic design. In 2005, both contractor teams delivered 20 meter, four quadrant sail systems to the largest thermal vacuum chamber in the world in Plum Brook, Ohio, and repeated the tests. Also demonstrated was the deployment and articulation of attitude control mechanisms. In conjunction with these tests, the stowed sails were subjected to launch vibration and ascent vent tests. Other investments studied radiation effects on the solar sail materials, investigated spacecraft charging issues, developed shape measuring techniques and instruments, produced advanced trajectory modeling capabilities, and identified and resolved gossamer structure dynamics issues. Technology validation flight and application to a He1iophysics science mission is on the horizon.

Young, Roy↗
NASA NTRS2005

Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.

Huls, Dale Thomas↗
NASA NTRS1979

Safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle program

This publication establishes common safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle Program. NASA Centers shall use this publication both as the basis for negotiating safety, reliability, maintainability and quality requirements with Shuttle Program contractors and as the guideline for conduct of program safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities at the Centers. Centers shall assure that applicable provisions of the publication are imposed in lower tier contracts. Centers shall give due regard to other Space Shuttle Program planning in order to provide an integrated total Space Shuttle Program activity. In the implementation of safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities, consideration shall be given to hardware complexity, supplier experience, state of hardware development, unit cost, and hardware use. The approach and methods for contractor implementation shall be described in the contractors safety, reliability, maintainability and quality plans. This publication incorporates provisions of NASA documents: NHB 1700.1 'NASA Safety Manual, Vol. 1'; NHB 5300.4(IA), 'Reliability Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'; and NHB 5300.4(1B), 'Quality Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'. It has been tailored from the above documents based on experience in other programs. It is intended that this publication be reviewed and revised, as appropriate, to reflect new experience and to assure continuing viability.

M S Malkin↗
NASA NTRS1962

Development of techniques for forming segments of a parabolic solar concentrator

This report covers a comprehensive research study of Androforming, explosive forming, and stretch forming as applied to shaping a parabolic reflector segment for use in a solar furnace. Development efforts were directed toward attaining accurate part contour, and assurance of process reproducibility. The three forming processes mentioned above were investigated by qualified contractors. Three test segments formed by each method along with a detailed analysis were submitted to MSFC. It was concluded that optimum results could be obtained with the stretch forming process. The three test segments of the solar concentrator tha.t were produced by this method, and evaluated optically, revealed a maximum contour deviation of O. 76 degrees.

P.H. Schuerer↗
NASA NTRS2013

NASA Software Engineering Benchmarking Study

To identify best practices for the improvement of software engineering on projects, NASA's Offices of Chief Engineer (OCE) and Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) formed a team led by Heather Rarick and Sally Godfrey to conduct this benchmarking study. The primary goals of the study are to identify best practices that: Improve the management and technical development of software intensive systems; Have a track record of successful deployment by aerospace industries, universities [including research and development (R&D) laboratories], and defense services, as well as NASA's own component Centers; and Identify candidate solutions for NASA's software issues. Beginning in the late fall of 2010, focus topics were chosen and interview questions were developed, based on the NASA top software challenges. Between February 2011 and November 2011, the Benchmark Team interviewed a total of 18 organizations, consisting of five NASA Centers, five industry organizations, four defense services organizations, and four university or university R and D laboratory organizations. A software assurance representative also participated in each of the interviews to focus on assurance and software safety best practices. Interviewees provided a wealth of information on each topic area that included: software policy, software acquisition, software assurance, testing, training, maintaining rigor in small projects, metrics, and use of the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) framework, as well as a number of special topics that came up in the discussions. NASA's software engineering practices compared favorably with the external organizations in most benchmark areas, but in every topic, there were ways in which NASA could improve its practices. Compared to defense services organizations and some of the industry organizations, one of NASA's notable weaknesses involved communication with contractors regarding its policies and requirements for acquired software. One of NASA's strengths was its software assurance practices, which seemed to rate well in comparison to the other organizational groups and also seemed to include a larger scope of activities. An unexpected benefit of the software benchmarking study was the identification of many opportunities for collaboration in areas including metrics, training, sharing of CMMI experiences and resources such as instructors and CMMI Lead Appraisers, and even sharing of assets such as documented processes. A further unexpected benefit of the study was the feedback on NASA practices that was received from some of the organizations interviewed. From that feedback, other potential areas where NASA could improve were highlighted, such as accuracy of software cost estimation and budgetary practices. The detailed report contains discussion of the practices noted in each of the topic areas, as well as a summary of observations and recommendations from each of the topic areas. The resulting 24 recommendations from the topic areas were then consolidated to eliminate duplication and culled into a set of 14 suggested actionable recommendations. This final set of actionable recommendations, listed below, are items that can be implemented to improve NASA's software engineering practices and to help address many of the items that were listed in the NASA top software engineering issues. 1. Develop and implement standard contract language for software procurements. 2. Advance accurate and trusted software cost estimates for both procured and in-house software and improve the capture of actual cost data to facilitate further improvements. 3. Establish a consistent set of objectives and expectations, specifically types of metrics at the Agency level, so key trends and models can be identified and used to continuously improve software processes and each software development effort. 4. Maintain the CMMI Maturity Level requirement for critical NASA projects and use CMMI to measure organizations developing software for NASA. 5.onsolidate, collect and, if needed, develop common processes principles and other assets across the Agency in order to provide more consistency in software development and acquisition practices and to reduce the overall cost of maintaining or increasing current NASA CMMI maturity levels. 6. Provide additional support for small projects that includes: (a) guidance for appropriate tailoring of requirements for small projects, (b) availability of suitable tools, including support tool set-up and training, and (c) training for small project personnel, assurance personnel and technical authorities on the acceptable options for tailoring requirements and performing assurance on small projects. 7. Develop software training classes for the more experienced software engineers using on-line training, videos, or small separate modules of training that can be accommodated as needed throughout a project. 8. Create guidelines to structure non-classroom training opportunities such as mentoring, peer reviews, lessons learned sessions, and on-the-job training. 9. Develop a set of predictive software defect data and a process for assessing software testing metric data against it. 10. Assess Agency-wide licenses for commonly used software tools. 11. Fill the knowledge gap in common software engineering practices for new hires and co-ops.12. Work through the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) program with universities in strengthening education in the use of common software engineering practices and standards. 13. Follow up this benchmark study with a deeper look into what both internal and external organizations perceive as the scope of software assurance, the value they expect to obtain from it, and the shortcomings they experience in the current practice. 14. Continue interactions with external software engineering environment through collaborations, knowledge sharing, and benchmarking.

Rarick, Heather L.↗
DOE OSTI2022

2021 Idaho National Laboratory Site Environmental Report

The INL Site’s operations, as well as the ongoing cleanup, necessarily involve a commitment to environmental stewardship and full compliance with environmental protection laws. As part of this commitment, the INL Site Environmental Report is prepared annually to inform the public, regulators, stakeholders, and other interested parties of the INL Site’s environmental performance during the year. This report is published for the DOE-ID in compliance with DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to: • Present the INL Site, mission, and programs • Report compliance status with applicable federal, state, and local regulations • Describe the INL Site environmental programs and activities • Summarize results of environmental monitoring • Discuss potential radiation doses to the public residing in the vicinity of the INL Site • Report on ecological monitoring and research conducted by contractors and affiliated agencies and by independent researchers through the Idaho National Environmental Research Park • Describe quality assurance methods used to ensure confidence in monitoring data • Provide supplemental technical data and reports that support the INL Site Environmental Report (https://idahoeser.inl.gov/publications.html).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1979

Earthquake Testing

During NASA's Apollo program, it was necessary to subject the mammoth Saturn V launch vehicle to extremely forceful vibrations to assure the moonbooster's structural integrity in flight. Marshall Space Flight Center assigned vibration testing to a contractor, the Scientific Services and Systems Group of Wyle Laboratories, Norco, California. Wyle-3S, as the group is known, built a large facility at Huntsville, Alabama, and equipped it with an enormously forceful shock and vibration system to simulate the liftoff stresses the Saturn V would encounter. Saturn V is no longer in service, but Wyle-3S has found spinoff utility for its vibration facility. It is now being used to simulate earthquake effects on various kinds of equipment, principally equipment intended for use in nuclear power generation. Government regulations require that such equipment demonstrate its ability to survive earthquake conditions. In upper left photo, Wyle3S is preparing to conduct an earthquake test on a 25ton diesel generator built by Atlas Polar Company, Ltd., Toronto, Canada, for emergency use in a Canadian nuclear power plant. Being readied for test in the lower left photo is a large circuit breaker to be used by Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina. Electro-hydraulic and electro-dynamic shakers in and around the pit simulate earthquake forces.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2023

2022 Site Environmental Report: Idaho National Laboratory

The INL Site’s operations, as well as the ongoing cleanup mission involve a commitment to environmental stewardship and full compliance with environmental protection laws. As part of this commitment, the INL Site Environmental Report is prepared annually to inform the public, regulators, stakeholders, and other interested parties of the INL Site’s environmental performance during the year. This report is published for U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID) in compliance with DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” The purpose of the report is to provide the following: (1) Present the INL Site, mission, and programs, (2) Report compliance status with applicable federal, state, and local regulations, (3) Describe the INL Site environmental programs and activities, (4) Summarize results of environmental monitoring, (5) Discuss potential radiation doses to the public residing in the vicinity of the INL Site, (6) Report on ecological monitoring and research conducted by contractors and affiliated agencies and by independent researchers through the Idaho National Environmental Research Park, (7) Describe quality assurance methods used to ensure confidence in monitoring data, and (8) Provide supplemental technical data and reports that support the INL Site Environmental Report (https://idahoeser.inl.gov/publications.html).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2018

Safety and Mission Assurance Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Definitions

This NASA Technical Handbook compiles into a single volume safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance and risk management terms defined and used in NASA safety and mission assurance directives and standards. The purpose of this handbook is to support effective communication within NASA and with its contractors. The definitions in this handbook are updated when the definition of the acronym or term is updated in the originating document.

Colon, Alfredo E.↗
NASA NTRS1993

NASA Automatic Information Security Handbook

This handbook details the Automated Information Security (AIS) management process for NASA. Automated information system security is becoming an increasingly important issue for all NASA managers and with rapid advancements in computer and network technologies and the demanding nature of space exploration and space research have made NASA increasingly dependent on automated systems to store, process, and transmit vast amounts of mission support information, hence the need for AIS systems and management. This handbook provides the consistent policies, procedures, and guidance to assure that an aggressive and effective AIS programs is developed, implemented, and sustained at all NASA organizations and NASA support contractors.

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