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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1974

System safety checklist Skylab program report

Design criteria statement applicable to a wide variety of flight systems, experiments and other payloads, associated ground support equipment and facility support systems are presented. The document reflects a composite of experience gained throughout the aerospace industry prior to Skylab and additional experience gained during the Skylab Program. It has been prepared to provide current and future program organizations with a broad source of safety-related design criteria and to suggest methods for systematic and progressive application of the criteria beginning with preliminary development of design requirements and specifications. Recognizing the users obligation to shape the checklist to his particular needs, a summary of the historical background, rationale, objectives, development and implementation approach, and benefits based on Skylab experience has been included.

Mcnail, E. M.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Effects of checklist interface on non-verbal crew communications

The investigation looked at the effects of the spatial layout and functionality of cockpit displays and controls on crew communication. Specifically, the study focused on the intra-cockpit crew interaction, and subsequent task performance, of airline pilots flying different configurations of a new electronic checklist, designed and tested in a high-fidelity simulator at NASA Ames Research Center. The first part of this proposal establishes the theoretical background for the assumptions underlying the research, suggesting that in the context of the interaction between a multi-operator crew and a machine, the design and configuration of the interface will affect interactions between individual operators and the machine, and subsequently, the interaction between operators. In view of the latest trends in cockpit interface design and flight-deck technology, in particular, the centralization of displays and controls, the introduction identifies certain problems associated with these modern designs and suggests specific design issues to which the expected results could be applied. A detailed research program and methodology is outlined and the results are described and discussed. Overall, differences in cockpit design were shown to impact the activity within the cockpit, including interactions between pilots and aircraft and the cooperative interactions between pilots.

Segal, Leon D.↗
NASA NTRS1996

NAS Requirements Checklist for Job Queuing/Scheduling Software

The increasing reliability of parallel systems and clusters of computers has resulted in these systems becoming more attractive for true production workloads. Today, the primary obstacle to production use of clusters of computers is the lack of a functional and robust Job Management System for parallel applications. This document provides a checklist of NAS requirements for job queuing and scheduling in order to make most efficient use of parallel systems and clusters for parallel applications. Future requirements are also identified to assist software vendors with design planning.

Jones, James Patton↗
NASA NTRS2009

Severe Weather and Weak Waterspout Checklist in MIDDS

The goal of this task was to migrate the functionality of the AMU web-based Severe Weather Forecast Decision Aid and the 45 WS Weak Waterspout Checklist to MIDDS, the operational data ingest and display system of the 45 WS. Forecasting the occurrence and timing of warm season severe weather and weak waterspouts is challenging for 45 WS operational personnel. These interactive tools assist forecasters in determining the probability of issuing severe weather watches and warnings for the day. MIDDS is able retrieve many of the needed parameter values for the worksheet automatically. The AMU was able to develop user-friendly tools in MIDDS for both of these tools using McBASI coded programs. The tools retrieve needed values from MIDDS automatically, and require the forecaster to answer a few subjective questions. Both tools were tested and previewed to the 45 WS on MIDDS. In their previous forms, the forecasters enter values into both tools manually to output a threat index. Making these tools more automatic will reduce the possibility of human error and increase efficiency.

Wheeler, Mark M.↗
NASA NTRS2017

A Time-Out Checklist for Pediatric Regional Anesthetics

Although pediatric regional anesthesia has a demonstrated record of safety, adverse events, especially those related to block performance issues, still may occur. To reduce the frequency of those events, we developed a Regional Anesthesia Time-Out Checklist using expert opinion and the Delphi method.

Anesthesia, Conduction/methods/standards↗
NASA NTRS2002

Software security checklist for the software life cycle

A formal approach to security in the software life cycle is essential to protect corporate resources. However, little thought has been given to this aspect of software development. Due to its criticality, security should be integrated as a formal approach in the software life cycle.

software security checklist security tools securit↗
NASA NTRS1975

Skylab IMSS checklist application study for emergency medical care

A manual is presented that provides basic technical documentation to support the operation and utilization of the Portable Ambulance Module (PAM) in the field. The PAM is designed to be used for emergency resuscitation and victim monitoring. The functions of all the controls, displays, and stowed equipment of the unit are defined. Supportive medical and physiological data in those areas directly related to the uses of the PAM unit are presented.

Carl, J. G.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Procedural error monitoring and smart checklists

Human beings make and usually detect errors routinely. The same mental processes that allow humans to cope with novel problems can also lead to error. Bill Rouse has argued that errors are not inherently bad but their consequences may be. He proposes the development of error-tolerant systems that detect errors and take steps to prevent the consequences of the error from occurring. Research should be done on self and automatic detection of random and unanticipated errors. For self detection, displays should be developed that make the consequences of errors immediately apparent. For example, electronic map displays graphically show the consequences of horizontal flight plan entry errors. Vertical profile displays should be developed to make apparent vertical flight planning errors. Other concepts such as energy circles could also help the crew detect gross flight planning errors. For automatic detection, systems should be developed that can track pilot activity, infer pilot intent and inform the crew of potential errors before their consequences are realized. Systems that perform a reasonableness check on flight plan modifications by checking route length and magnitude of course changes are simple examples. Another example would be a system that checked the aircraft's planned altitude against a data base of world terrain elevations. Information is given in viewgraph form.

Palmer, Everett↗
NASA NTRS1995

Cuff-Mounted Electronic Checklist Display Unit

Portable electronic display unit developed to provide text and pictures to guide users through complex technical procedures in field. Touch screen divided into six areas; touching each area causes display of specific menu or page, or activates electronic stopwatch. Unit strapped onto user's wrist in manner of wristwatch, leaving user's hands free to carry out procedures while referring to displayed information. Intended originally for use by astronaut in space suit, unit also eases tasks of technicians on Earth by providing quick and easy access to information, without need to carry and thumb through massive service manuals.

Marmolejo, Jose A.↗
NASA NTRS1999

ISS Medical Checklist Procedures Validation and Training

The Health Maintenance System (HMS) hardware will be used to support a medical contingency for the International Space Station (ISS). During two test flights, the procedures for performing Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS) were evaluated to determine the required level of detail, assess the logic of the steps and division of tasks among crew members.

Tom Marshburn↗
NASA NTRS1988

Pilot factors guidelines for the operational inspection of navigation systems

A computerized human engineered inspection technique is developed for use by FAA inspectors in evaluating the pilot factors aspects of aircraft navigation systems. The short title for this project is Nav Handbook. A menu-driven checklist, computer program and data base (Human Factors Design Criteria) were developed and merged to form a self-contained, portable, human factors inspection checklist tool for use in a laboratory or field setting. The automated checklist is tailored for general aviation navigation systems and can be expanded for use with other aircraft systems, transports or military aircraft. The Nav Handbook inspection concept was demonstrated using a lap-top computer and an Omega/VLF CDU. The program generates standardized inspection reports. Automated checklists for LORAN/C and R NAV were also developed. A Nav Handbook User's Guide is included.

Sadler, J. F.↗
NASA NTRS1976

Ambulance Handbook

Johnson Space Center has devised a checklist for the skylab inflight medical support system that has been transferred for public emergencies. The checklist illustrates a procedure for diagnosis, treatment, and stabilization of a wide variety of emergencies. Handbook presents comprehensive ordered description of emergency medical equipment and its use in treating victims. Paramedics assigned to the Houston Fire Department are now using the checklist.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2008

Are Current SEE Test Procedures Adequate for Modern Devices and Electronics Technologies?

Believe it or not, this has been a simplistic look at starting a checklist for SEE testing. Given a memory that has 68 operating modes, when a SEU occurs that changes the mode, just how do you determine what's going on? Laser and microbeam tests can help, but not easily for modern packaged devices. Expanding this approach to other more complex devices such as ADCs or processors as well as analog devices should be considered. The recommendation is to use the existing text standards as the starting point. Just make your own checklist for the device/technology/issues being considered. At HEART 2007, we presented some of the burgeoning challenges associated with single event effect(SEE) testing of modern commercial memories: a) Package, device complexity, test fixture, and data analysis issues were discussed; b) "Complete" SEE Characterization would take 15 years; c) Qualification test costs have a greater than 4 times increase over the last decade. In this talk, we continue to explore the roles of technology with an emphasis on the existing SEE Test Procedures and some of the concerns related to modern devices. The primary objective of the briefing is to provide some overarching guidance concerning the many considerations involved in the formulation of a SEE test plan provided in a " Checklist" format.we note that there is no such thing as a complete check list and that the best approach is to develop a flexible test plan that takes into account the device type and functions, the device technology, circuit and package design, and, of course, test facility and beam characteristics.

LaBel, Kenneth A.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling in Space Launch Vehicles

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2019

Space Research Project Management Can Benefit from Engineering Technology Selection Methods

Many engineering methods have been developed to help management select technology for a system design or further research. The simplest way to compare technologies is to use a checklist containing all the more or less important selection criteria, so that nothing is overlooked. The criteria usually include cost, safety, reliability and maintainability, and potential problems such as noise generation and microgravity sensitivity. The next step typically is to weight and score all the criteria. The process of weighting and scoring is helpful in bringing out different priorities and reaching a shared point of view. Group technology selection methods are designed to highlight initial disagreements and produce a shared consensus. Often a frank discussion led by management rather than decision analysts can be more effective. The final selection depends on management and engineering judgment and may include programmatic and organizational factors that are beyond the engineering checklist. The objective of engineering technology selection methods is to provide engineering information to assist management in making sound decisions. Project management and technology selection are assumed to use rational engineering analytic methods, but they often do not. The reason is that human insight, intuition, and “gut feel,” rather than logic, more frequently determine our decisions. Project selection and management are strongly influenced by nonrational psychological influences, which can produce unjustified confidence and determination. Nevertheless, there is a strong need for space projects to do rational project analysis and selection. Demonstrating a rational spirit is necessary for a scientific and technical organization. Professional ethics at its best requires an open, honest, and fair process, without damaging politics. Rational analysis can help improve good projects and avoid selecting bad ones. A sanity check using rational analysis guided by a checklist can help avoid egregious and damaging errors.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Information Management to Mitigate Loss of Control Airline Accidents

Loss of control inflight continues to be the leading contributor to airline accidents worldwide and unreliable airspeed has been a contributing factor in many of these accidents. Airlines and the FAA developed training programs for pilot recognition of these airspeed events and many checklists have been designed to help pilots troubleshoot. In addition, new aircraft designs incorporate features to detect and respond in such situations. NASA has been using unreliable airspeed events while conducting research recommended by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team. Even after significant industry focus on unreliable airspeed, research and other evidence shows that highly skilled and trained pilots can still be confused by the condition and there is a lack of understanding of what the associated checklist(s) attempts to uncover. Common mode failures of analog sensors designed for measuring airspeed continue to confound both humans and automation when determining which indicators are correct. This paper describes failures that have occurred in the past and where/how pilots may still struggle in determining reliable airspeed when confronted with conflicting information. Two latest generation aircraft architectures will be discussed and contrasted. This information will be used to describe why more sensors used in classic control theory will not solve the problem. Technology concepts are suggested for utilizing existing synoptic pages and a new synoptic page called System Interactive Synoptic (SIS). SIS details the flow of flight critical data through the avionics system and how it is used by the automation. This new synoptic page as well as existing synoptics can be designed to be used in concert with a simplified electronic checklist (sECL) to significantly reduce the time to configure the flight deck avionics in the event of a system or sensor failure.

Etherington, Timothy J.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Demonstrating Assurance of Model-Based Fault Diagnosis Systems on an Operational Mission

Developers of robotic scientific and commercial spacecraft are trending towards use of onboard autonomous capabilities for responding quickly to dynamic environments and rapidly changing situations. These capabilities need to know the state of the spacecraft’s health. Model-based fault diagnosis (MBFD) is an approach to estimating health by continuously verifying accurate behavior and diagnosing off-nominal behavior. Proper functioning of MBFD depends on 1) the quality of the diagnostic system model that is analyzed and compared to commands and onboard measurements to estimate a system’s health state, and 2) the correct functionality of the diagnosis engine interrogating the model and comparing its analyses to observed system behavior. Our goal is to develop Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques for MBFD to provide future missions sufficient confidence in its functionality and performance to deploy it on the systems they develop. Our work has been focused on infusing the techniques we developed earlier to an operational mission. First, we are constructing diagnostic models of a spacecraft attitude control system and updating our diagnostic engine so they can be demonstrated aboard the Arcsecond Space Telescope Enabling Research in Astrophysics (ASTERIA) mission, an operational spacecraft for which experiments in autonomy are being planned and executed, using the V&V techniques we have previously developed to assure they are both correct and complete. Since it is nearing the end of its life, ASTERIA provides a unique opportunity to demonstrate MBFD since the monitored components are expected to fail. Our demonstration will give system developers additional confidence to make timely, informed MBFD deployment decisions. Second, we will be completing performance assessments of the diagnostic engine/diagnostic model ensemble both on the flight system and ground-based testbeds to gain confidence in MBFD’s ability to run successfully in a spacecraft’s resource-constrained environment without adversely affecting other on-board activities. Finally, we are capturing our experience in preparing this demonstration in a set of checklists and guidance documents. Current practice includes high-level institutional guidance documents and standards, but at a high level of abstraction that does not necessarily address specific MBFD concerns. The purpose of the new checklists is to provide future mission developers clear, unambiguous, procedure-oriented guidance on assuring MBFD. This paper describes our work in these areas. For the first area, we describe the diagnostic models and updated diagnostic engine that will be used for the on-board demonstration. We describe how the V&V techniques we developed earlier are used to assure model and engine correctness and completeness. For the second area, we identify the performance measurement and assessment techniques used to characterize the diagnostic engine and diagnostic models, and discuss the effect of measured performance on overall mission operation. Finally, we present the checklist and guidance documents and describe how they meet the goals of providing system developers with clear, unambiguous, procedure-oriented guidance on MBFD assurance. We show how the techniques we have developed map into those artifacts.

Nikora, Allen↗