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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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30 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Multiplex base editing to convert $\mathrm{TAG}$ into $\mathrm{TAA}$ codons in the human genome

Whole-genome recoding has been shown to enable nonstandard amino acids, biocontainment and viral resistance in bacteria. Here we take the first steps to extend this to human cells demonstrating exceptional base editing to convert TAG to TAA for 33 essential genes via a single transfection, and examine base-editing genome-wide (observing ~40 C-to-T off-target events in essential gene exons). We also introduce GRIT, a computational tool for recoding. This demonstrates the feasibility of recoding, and highly multiplex editing in mammalian cells.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

A swapped genetic code prevents viral infections and gene transfer

Engineering the genetic code of an organism has been proposed to provide a firewall from natural ecosystems by preventing viral infections and gene transfer. However, numerous viruses and mobile genetic elements encode parts of the translational apparatus, potentially rendering a genetic-code-based firewall ineffective. Here we show that such mobile transfer RNAs (tRNAs) enable gene transfer and allow viral replication in Escherichia coli despite the genome-wide removal of 3 of the 64 codons and the previously essential cognate tRNA and release factor genes. We then establish a genetic firewall by discovering viral tRNAs that provide exceptionally efficient codon reassignment allowing us to develop cells bearing an amino acid-swapped genetic code that reassigns two of the six serine codons to leucine during translation. This amino acid-swapped genetic code renders cells resistant to viral infections by mistranslating viral proteomes and prevents the escape of synthetic genetic information by engineered reliance on serine codons to produce leucine-requiring proteins. As these cells may have a selective advantage over wild organisms due to virus resistance, we also repurpose a third codon to biocontain this virus-resistant host through dependence on an amino acid not found in nature. Furthermore, our results may provide the basis for a general strategy to make any organism safely resistant to all natural viruses and prevent genetic information flow into and out of genetically modified organisms.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Synthetic overlapping genes stabilize genetic systems

Overlapping genes—wherein two different proteins are translated from alternative reading frames of the same DNA sequence—provide a means to stabilize an engineered gene by directly linking its evolutionary fate with that of an overlapping gene. However, creating overlapping gene pairs is challenging, as it requires redesigning both protein products to accommodate overlap constraints. Here, we present a new “overlapping, alternate-frame insertion” (OAFI) method for creating synthetic overlapping genes by inserting an “inner” gene, encoded in an alternate frame, into a flexible region of an “outer” gene. Using OAFI, we create new overlapping gene pairs of genetic reporters and bacterial toxins within an antibiotic resistance gene. We show that both the inner and outer genes retain function despite redesign, with translation of the inner gene influenced by its overlap position in the outer gene. Importantly, we show that, despite these inner gene sequences not contributing to outer gene function, selection for the outer gene alters the permitted inactivating mutations in the inner gene, and that overlapping toxins can restrict horizontal gene transfer of the antibiotic resistance gene. Overall, OAFI offers a versatile tool for synthetic biology, expanding the applications of overlapping genes in gene stabilization and biocontainment.

Biological and medical sciences↗
DOE OSTI2022

Development of HEK-293 Cell Lines Constitutively Expressing Flaviviral Antigens for Use in Diagnostics

Flaviviruses are important human pathogens worldwide. Diagnostic testing for these viruses is difficult because many of the pathogens require specialized biocontainment. To address this issue, we generated 39 virus-like particle (VLP)- and nonstructural protein 1 (NS1)-secreting stable cell lines in HEK-293 cells of 13 different flaviviruses, including dengue, yellow fever, Japanese encephalitis, West Nile, St. Louis encephalitis, Zika, Rocio, Ilheus, Usutu, and Powassan viruses. Antigen secretion was stable for at least 10 cell passages, as measured by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays and immunofluorescence assays. Thirty-five cell lines (90%) had stable antigen expression over 10 passages, with three of these cell lines (7%) increasing in antigen expression and one cell line (3%) decreasing in antigen expression. Antigen secretion in the HEK-293 cell lines was higher than in previously developed COS-1 cell line counterparts. These antigens can replace current antigens derived from live or inactivated virus for safer use in diagnostic testing.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Plant-Enhanced Degradation Of Munitions by Engineered TERrestrial microbes (PEDOMETER) (Final Report)

LLNL led two major Technical Areas (TAs) within the PEDOMETER program: TA3 focused on biocontainment and TA4 focused on developing electrochemical TNT degradation sensors and testbeds. A key takeaway from our work is the importance of chassis host strain choice for kill switch design and actuator choice. Genetic instability of the kill switch circuit is a major barrier toward establishing a kill switch, which is host dependent. Addition of a host down-selection step to regulator and actuator screening stages would be beneficial to hasten kill switch development.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Transiently Transfected Mammalian Cell Cultures: An Adaptable and Effective Platform for Virus-like Particle-Based Vaccines against Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus

RNA viruses, such as foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV), have error-prone replication resulting in the continuous emergence of new viral strains capable of evading current vaccine coverage. Vaccine formulations must be regularly updated, which is both costly and technically challenging for many vaccine platforms. In this report, we describe a plasmid-based virus-like particle (VLP) production platform utilizing transiently transfected mammalian cell cultures that combines both the rapid response adaptability of nucleic-acid-based vaccines with the ability to produce intact capsid epitopes required for immunity. Formulated vaccines which employed this platform conferred complete protection from clinical foot-and-mouth disease in both swine and cattle. This novel platform can be quickly adapted to new viral strains and serotypes through targeted exchanges of only the FMDV capsid polypeptide nucleic acid sequences, from which processed structural capsid proteins are derived. This platform obviates the need for high biocontainment manufacturing facilities to produce inactivated whole-virus vaccines from infected mammalian cell cultures, which requires upstream expansion and downstream concentration of large quantities of live virulent viruses.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS1999

Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol Workshop

The Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol (QP) Workshop was convened to deal with three specific aspects of the initial handling of a returned Mars sample: 1) biocontainment, to prevent uncontrolled release of sample material into the terrestrial environment; 2) life detection, to examine the sample for evidence of live organisms; and 3) biohazard testing, to determine if the sample poses any threat to terrestrial life forms and the Earth's biosphere. During the first part of the Workshop, several tutorials were presented on topics related to the workshop in order to give all participants a common basis in the technical areas necessary to achieve the objectives of the Workshop.

DeVincenzi, Donald L.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2

Numerous NASA reports and studies have identified Planetary Protection (PP) as an important part of any Mars sample return mission. The mission architecture, hardware, on-board experiments, and related activities must be designed in ways that prevent both forward- and back-contamination and also ensure maximal return of scientific information. A key element of any PP effort for sample return missions is the development of guidelines for containment and analysis of returned sample(s). As part of that effort, NASA and the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) have each assembled experts from a wide range of scientific fields to identify and discuss issues pertinent to sample return. In 1997, the SSB released its report on recommendations for handling and testing of returned Mars samples. In particular, the NRC recommended that: a) samples returned from Mars by spacecraft should be contained and treated as potentially hazardous until proven otherwise, and b) rigorous physical, chemical, and biological analyses [should] confirm that there is no indication of the presence of any exogenous biological entity. Also in 1997, a Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol workshop was convened at NASA Ames Research Center to deal with three specific aspects of the initial handling of a returned Mars sample: 1) biocontainment, to prevent 'uncontrolled release' of sample material into the terrestrial environment; 2) life detection, to examine the sample for evidence of organisms; and 3) biohazard testing, to determine if the sample poses any threat to terrestrial life forms and the Earth's biosphere. In 1999, a study by NASA's Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) addressed three other specific areas in anticipation of returning samples from Mars: 1) sample collection and transport back to Earth; 2) certification of the samples as non-hazardous; and 3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened an additional series of workshops beginning in March 2000. The overall objective of these workshops was to develop comprehensive protocols to assess whether the returned materials contain any biological hazards, and to safeguard the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This document is the report of the second Workshop in the Series. The information herein will ultimately be integrated into a final document reporting the proceedings of the entire Workshop Series along with additional information and recommendations.

Rummel, John D.↗