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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Delay Tolerant, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID )-enabled Sensing

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology offers a completely passive method to transmit fixed data sequences from an RFID tag, which typically doesn’t have its own power supply, to an interrogator. Radio frequency (RF) energy harvested from the interrogator is rectified by the tag and used to charge an integrated circuit (IC). The IC then modulates the received signal with the data stored on the tag and reflects the energy back to the interrogator. RFID has seen great proliferation in terrestrial inventory management applications, and it has recently made the jump to spaceflight applications onboard the International Space Station, augmenting an existing optical bar‐code infrastructure for tracking supplies. A number of advanced automated logistics management (ALM) concepts employing RFID are currently being developed and evaluated, including so‐called “smart” shelves, cubbies, and trash receptacles using low‐power, embeddable RFID interrogators. An infrastructure where both crew members and robotic assistants, such as autonomous free flyers, are similarly equipped with small RFID interrogators seems likely. It therefore behooves us to consider extending this infrastructure beyond ALM to applications such as low power, embedded sensing. Typically, data on an RFID tag can only be written by an RFID interrogator, using interrogator energy. In recent years, however, a few efforts have focused on using that energy to drive data acquisition from the tag IC, allowing the tag to modify its stored data sequence with sensor data before replying to an interrogator. In this way, the tag can act as a completely passive sensing device. One problem exists with this approach, however: the tag cannot gather data when an interrogator is not present. Thus, strictly passive RFID sensing tags cannot gather data at regular intervals, in the manner of a typical wireless sensor network, without careful, and impractical, planning of mobile interrogator movements. To address this shortcoming, we look to a recent advance in RFID technology which allows an external microprocessor to power the tag IC and write directly into its RFID memory using a wired serial interface. In this paradigm, data gathering is driven by a small, on‐board power supply (using batteries or harvested energy), and data transfer is provided passively through the RFID interrogation service. Since communication typically consumes the lion’s share of power in WSNs, such a technique has the potential to enable extremely long‐lived, embedded wireless sensing when used with extremely low‐current microcontrollers. Since the communication channel is only open when an interrogator is present and actively interrogating the RFID sensing tag, transport of periodically‐sampled sensor data presents itself as a delay/disruption‐tolerant networking (DTN) problem. In this paper, we present the design of a DTN‐like overlay on the common EPC Global, Class 1, Generation 2 RFID standard. This overlay allows seamless, guaranteed data transfer using the EPC Global protocol, supporting extremely low‐power, embedded sensing using an infrastructure likely to be already in place for ALM applications. We evaluate a prototype implementation of a complete end‐to‐end system using a robotic RFID interrogation agent, and we present future directions for the development of this sensing technique.

Raymond S. Wagner↗
DOE OSTI2023

Detecting and characterizing special nuclear material for nuclear nonproliferation applications

Abstract There is an urgent need for new, better instrumentation and techniques for detecting and characterizing special nuclear material (SNM), i.e., highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The development of improved instruments and techniques requires experiments performed with the SNM itself, which is of limited availability. This paper describes the findings of experiments performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center conducted using new instruments and techniques on unclassified, kg-quantity SNM objects. These experiments, performed in the framework of the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Consortium for Monitoring, Technology, and Verification, focused on detecting, characterizing, and localizing SNM samples with masses ranging from 3.3 to 13.8 kg, including plutonium and highly enriched uranium using prototype detectors and techniques. The work demonstrates SNM detection and characterization using recently-developed prototype detection systems. Specifically, we present new results in passive detection and imaging of plutonium and uranium objects using gamma-ray and dual particle (fast neutron and gamma-ray) imaging. We also present a new analysis of the delayed neutron emissions during active interrogation of uranium using a neutron generator.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Validation and demonstration of the AEFC as a practical safeguards tool for inventory verification

The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) instrument designed to determine the residual fissile mass in irradiated fuel assemblies for safeguards verification purposes. This is done by actively interrogating an assembly with a neutron source and measuring the total (Singles) and correlated (Doubles) neutron count rates resulting from induced fissions in the irradiated nuclear fuel and relating those rates to the residual fissile mass using calibration curves. Comprehensive NDA measurements of the irradiated fuel inventory at Israeli Research Reactor 1 (IRR-1) were taken with the AEFC to validate a set of previously developed calibration curves. During the campaign, measurements were acquired of 32 standard fuel assemblies and three control assemblies in just nine days. This is a significant majority of the research reactor's irradiated fuel inventory and the largest data set gathered by the AEFC to date. Many of the fuel assemblies measured during the campaign had much shorter cooling times than those assemblies previously measured with the instrument. Calibration curves developed from previous AEFC deployments were used to determine the residual 235 U mass in the measured standard fuel assemblies. The results of the campaign demonstrated that the AEFC can be used to estimate the 235 U mass remaining in a large number of irradiated fuel assemblies with 1%–5% uncertainty in a reasonable amount of time despite operating in a high dose environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

LaBr 3 : Ce self-activation analysis for measuring fast neutron fields

Measurement of the fast neutron production rate in deuterium–tritium (D–T) fusion reactions is important for applications such as active interrogation, fusion diagnostics, and borehole logging. Such measurements are typically performed by neutron activation analysis of metal foils, especially copper. Copper foil activation analysis requires efficiency and energy calibrations of the detector used to measure the foil, and it relies on the detection of 511 keV gamma rays, which are prominent in the active background when neutrons are being produced. Alternatives, such as 79m Br produced by inelastic neutron scattering on 79 Br, are limited by short half-life, low-energy gamma emission, and inability to selectively measure D–T neutrons. This work describes a novel alternative approach to measure ≳10 MeV neutron fields based on self-activation analysis of a LaBr 3 :Ce detector. The activity of 78 Br, the activation product of the 79 Br(n,2n) 78 Br reaction, is used to determine the neutron flux and infer the neutron production rate. We experimentally demonstrate the method with a cylindrical LaBr 3 :Ce crystal with a diameter and height of 3.81 cm that was placed at an ~18 cm distance from the neutron production point, at a 90° angle with respect to the deuteron beam in a D–T neutron generator. Operating voltage and current of the generator were adjusted to evaluate the technique’s performance over a nominal generator output range of approximately (1 - 9) x 10 7 n/s. The neutron output obtained from LaBr 3 :Ce activation agrees to within three standard deviations of the output obtained using copper activation. The self-activation technique can be conveniently employed in a variety of applications to simplify measurements of fast neutrons produced in D–T fusion reactions.

Active interrogationLaBr3↗
DOE OSTI2025

New NDA Methods for Thorium Fuel Cycle Safeguards (Final Report)

This project developed portable Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (pNRTA) as a new non-destructive assay (NDA) method for thorium fuel cycles safeguards and other applications where multiple isotopes must be measured when present together. pNRTA leverages epithermal neutron resonances to assay multiple safeguards-relevant isotopes (e.g., 233 U and 235 U) when they are present together in a sample. Existing techniques are challenged by this task, driving the need for new active interrogation methods. With selected detectors, pNRTA works in high gamma-ray backgrounds from fission and activation products and 232 U progeny expected in thorium fuel cycle samples. This project leveraged a pNRTA system developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and collaboration with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The system uses a commercially available deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron generator at short standoff (2 m). Key achievements in this project included: first-of-a-kind pNRTA quantitative measurements of 233 U oxide samples, an assessment of neutron detector technologies suitable for pNRTA in high gamma-ray background environments, experimentally demonstrating quantitative assay of samples containing 233 U and 235 U, and modeling studies showing the applicability of pNRTA to a wide range of material forms. Further, a custom algorithm was developed at MIT, which provided mean bias of 9% and relative standard deviation of 36% in assaying 233 U, 235 U, 238 U, and 232 Th content in eight measured samples. These outcomes form a solid technical basis for pNRTA as a new promising capability for international safeguards verification that is portable, non-destructive, quantitative, and isotopic specific.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Comparison of NMC estimates with trans-stilbene, EJ-309, and He-3 detection systems

Neutron multiplicity counting (NMC) is a technique for the assay of fissile material. In this work, three detection systems are utilized for active interrogation assay of shells of the Rocky Flats shells (highly enriched uranium, 93% 235U) stacked from 13.25-54.92 kg assemblies. The singles ($R_1$) and doubles ($R_2$) rates are calculated with each system to estimate two sample parameters: $M_L$- the leakage multiplication and F - the sample fission rate. The estimated mass, m, is found by dividing F by a constant activity per unit mass. Since we are interrogating HEU, the α ratio of (α; n) to fission neutrons is taken to be zero. The system of equations to calculate these quantities was originally derived. The Neutron Multiplicity 3 He Array Detector (NOMAD) consists of 15 3 He tubes inside polyethylene and is the traditional, capture-based detection system for NMC. The polyethylene moderates incoming neutrons for thermal capture in individual tubes. The low gamma background, discrete capture signals, and high efficiency of the NOMAD are beneficial for NMC. However, the time to slow down neutrons to thermal energies leads to a system die away time on the scale of microseconds. Comparatively, the Rossi-alpha Measurements – Rapid Organic (n, γ) Discrimination Detector (RAMRODD) and the Organic Scintillator Array (OSCAR) are scatter-based detection systems. RAMRODD consists of 8, 5.08 by 5.08 cm EJ-309 liquid scintillators in 4 pairs, evenly-spaced with 90 degrees separation about the center of each assembly. OSCAR consists of a single array of 12, 5.08 by 5.08 cm trans-stilbene crystals aligned with the center of the assembly. Scatter-based systems detect fast neutrons without any moderation, leading to system die away times on the scale of tens of nanoseconds. This allows much shorter timing gate widths compared to thermal systems, thus increasing counting statistics of true correlated fission events. However, scatter-based systems are susceptible to neutron cross-talk when an incident neutron scatters off one detector and interacts in an adjacent detector, causing two seemingly correlated detection signals. The equations developed adjust for cross-talk to conduct NMC with scatter-based systems.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2026

Performance evaluation of neutron noise analysis in detecting special nuclear materials

Reliable and rapid inspection techniques play a vital role in preventing illicit trafficking of special nuclear materials. Active interrogation systems using neutrons produced by portable, high-flux deuterium-deuterium or deuterium-tritium neutron generators are being actively developed as a secondary scanning tool for this purpose. In this study, a neutron noise analysis-based approach for detecting unshielded and shielded special nuclear materials by using a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator was evaluated. Here, this approach analyzes the fluctuation of neutron counts. Its performance was quantified with regard to time-to-detection to achieve a minimum probability of detection of 99% and a probability of false alarm of less than 1% considering various amounts of special nuclear materials and different shielding configurations. It was demonstrated that this approach could detect 17 uranium slugs in 5 s given a neutron generator yield of 8.1 × 10 7 n/s. These slugs could be detected within a reasonable time frame (200 s) when they were shielded by 10.16 cm of high-density polyethylene. The results obtained using the neutron noise analysis approach were compared with those obtained using the commonly used differential die-away analysis technique, a sensitive technique for detecting the presence of fissile materials by utilizing the prompt fission neutrons produced when the source neutrons from a neutron generator are completely diminished. For example, the time to detect 2 unshielded uranium slugs was 2.1 s when using the differential die-away analysis technique; it increased to 93 s for the neutron noise analysis approach. Although the noise analysis-based approach exhibits an overall performance which is not as good as that of differential die-away, neutron noise provides an alternative method for effective detection of special nuclear materials.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

System, algorithm, and method using short pulse interrogation with neutrons to detect and identify matter

A system, method, and algorithm for detecting and identifying special nuclear material (SNM) (including fissionable material), explosives, or drugs is disclosed. This material detection system relies on active interrogation of material using a short, intense neutron pulse, and characterization of the resulting prompt gamma response in two short time windows, the first concurrent with and the second immediately following the end of the neutron pulse, optionally subject to a total transit delay time of the neutrons from the neutron source to the target and from the target to the gamma detector. A high data rate analysis system implements data stream analysis and statistical correlations of the two short time window gamma responses to rapidly detect or identify SNM, explosives, or drugs. The duration of the neutron pulse is so short that minimal dose results. Various shields help to minimize the background signal falling on the gamma detector to improve sensitivity.

Derzon, Mark S.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Configuration and impurity quantification of AmLi sources using radiography and gamma spectroscopy

This paper presents the non-destructive assay of two AmLi sources used for detector characterization and active interrogation at PNNL, identified as MRC-101 and MRC-103. First, a detailed description of the internal configuration of 2724-BT encapsulated MRC sources is established. X-ray radiographs of the AmLi sources are reported for the first time to verify the dimensions and orientation of the encapsulation. Notably, a density variation was observed as a contrast change across the height of the source cavities. Contrary to commonly made assumptions in literature, it is indirectly observed that the AmLi source/target material only occupies a portion of the source cavity. The intensity of the prompt gamma-rays resulting from the inelastic scatter of alpha particles on 7Li was used to calculate the mass ratios of LiH:AmO2. The gamma-ray spectra revealed the presence of numerous impurities in both source and target material (243Am, 237Np, 154Eu, 23Na, and 9Be). Neutron-gamma production ratios were applied to the intensity of the Doppler-broadened peaks from alpha-induced reactions with 7Li, 9Be, and 23Na to calculate neutron rates for both sources. A neutron/alpha production yield (derived in this work) was then related to the atomic concentration of these isotopes to find the approximate masses within each source. Ultimately, the AmLi source density was estimated with prompt gamma analysis based on partial source volumes as 0.45±0.08 g/cm^3.

DTRA, AmLi, neutron↗
DOE OSTI2026

Enabling event-by-event precision in γ-ray cascades for neutron-induced reactions

Neutron-induced γ-ray spectra provide key inputs for modern active interrogation applications. A precise modeling of the nuclear reaction and subsequent emission of γ rays is challenging and often impossible due to limitations on evaluated data file formats and nuclear transport simulation codes. We present a framework that addresses these challenges by combining experimental data and reaction-model calculation outputs into an extended candidate version of the Generalized Nuclear Data Structure (GNDS) file, the successor format for the legacy Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF-6). This proposed GNDS hierarchical format contains all the necessary ingredients for inline γ-ray cascade reproduction with event-by-event precision, including continuum–continuum and continuum–discrete transitions following neutron-capture and inelastic neutron scattering reactions. Cascade-event generation based on our approach demonstrates improved energy conservation on an event-by-event basis and permits the use of γ-γ coincidences in applications. This work offers, for the first time, a method to generate neutron-capture and inelastic neutron-scattering γ-ray cascades where energy conservation, correlations, and experimental primaries are fully accounted for.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Discriminating Uranium Isotopes Based on Fission Signatures Induced by Delayed Neutrons

The use of active interrogation to induce delayed neutron emission is a well-established technique for the characterization of special nuclear materials. Delayed neutrons have isotope-characteristic spectral and temporal signatures, which provide the basis for isotope identification. However, in bulk materials that contain an appreciable fissile (e.g., 235 U or 233 U) fraction, such as highly enriched uranium (HEU), delayed neutrons have a high probability of inducing additional fissions. As a result, the overall delayed neutron signature consists of two distinct components: the “primary” delayed neutrons (emitted directly by fission fragments) and the “secondary prompt” fission neutrons produced in fission induced by primary delayed neutrons. These prompt products differ from “primary” delayed neutrons both in their energy spectra and in the presence of coincident radiation released by the parent fission event. The presence and relative quantity of prompt products from delayed fission depend on the cross section of the material in the energy range of delayed neutrons, which may differ significantly between isotopes, thus providing an exploitable means for isotope differentiation. Here, we demonstrate two experimental approaches for discriminating between 235 U and 238 U isotopes based on the measurement of delayed neutron-induced fission products. First, HEU and depleted uranium objects are differentiated through the detection of high-energy prompt neutrons from delayed fission using both recoil-based organic liquid scintillators and thermalization spectra from a custom-built capture-gated composite detector. Secondly, coincident radiation measurements are used as the basis for discrimination by comparing the overall rates and time evolution of fission events when delayed neutrons are present.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Prompt Photofission Neutron Detection in Depleted Uranium

The detection of prompt photofission neutrons during active interrogation is a strong indication of the presence of special nuclear materials. However, the high-energy photons used for interrogation create a very challenging radiation environment for the detection of prompt fission signatures. These challenges include detector saturation and pulse pile-up. Additionally, there is an elevated neutron background that further challenges the detection of prompt fission neutrons. This background is produced because of (γ, Xn) photonuclear reactions in the surrounding high-Z materials. Here, we demonstrate the detection of prompt photofission neutrons in these challenging environments. Depleted uranium (DU) and lead targets are interrogated with bremsstrahlung photons produced by a 9-MV electron linear accelerator. Fast neutrons are detected with trans-stilbene organic detectors, and scintillation pulses are analyzed using a previously developed and demonstrated artificial neural network system. We observe a 5 times higher photoneutron count rate when the lead target is replaced with the DU target. Additionally, we observe a difference in the photoneutron light-output distributions of lead and DU. Here, this difference in the measured distributions is due to the difference in the photoneutron-energy spectra; DU photoneutrons are emitted with (γ, n) and watt-energy spectra, whereas lead photoneutrons are emitted with only the (γ, n) spectrum.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Flash Neutron Imaging [Poster]

The NNSS has extensive historical experience with high-fidelity flash neutron imaging which may be applicable to the needs of NA-22. In recent neutron imaging tests, a dense plasma focus (DPF) discharges a capacitor bank across a hydrogen-filled diode to create a flash of fusion neutrons emitted from a point, which can be used for active interrogation. Object inspection may include both radiography transmission imaging as well as emission imaging of the subject via an aperture. A scintillator screen (coupled to a low-Z converter when necessary) converts deposited energy to visible light, which is relayed through optics to an ultra-sensitive visible imager contained in a light-tight box. Flash photon imaging, utilizing bremsstrahlung emission instead of fusion neutrons, is also available and is more mature.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Automated Fissile Mass Estimation Python Script for the Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC)

The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a non-destructive assay (NDA) instrument developed to quantify the residual fissile mass in research reactor spent fuel assemblies. The system is installed in a spent fuel pool and measurements are acquired underwater. A calibration curve relates the totals and coincidence counting signal from active interrogation of the spent fuel assemblies to the fissile mass remaining in the fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗