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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1994

Abort Options for Potential Mars Missions

Mars trajectory design options were examined that would accommodate a premature termination of a nominal manned opposition class mission for opportunities between 2010 and 2025. A successful abort must provide a safe return to Earth in the shortest possible time consistent with mission constraints. In this study, aborts that provided a minimum increase in the initial vehicle mass in low Earth orbit (IMLEO) were identified by locating direct transfer nominal missions and nominal missions including an outbound or inbound Venus swing-by that minimized IMLEO. The ease with which these missions could be aborted while meeting propulsion and time constraints was investigated by examining free return (unpowered) and powered aborts. Further reductions in trip time were made to some aborts by the addition or removal of an inbound Venus swing-by. The results show that, although few free return aborts met the specified constraints, 85% of each nominal mission could be aborted as a powered abort without an increase in propellant. Also, in many cases, the addition or removal of a Venus swing-by increased the number of abort opportunities or decreased the total trip time during an abort.

Tartabini, P. V.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Orion Guidance and Control Ascent Abort Algorithm Design and Performance Results

During the ascent flight phase of NASA s Constellation Program, the Ares launch vehicle propels the Orion crew vehicle to an agreed to insertion target. If a failure occurs at any point in time during ascent then a system must be in place to abort the mission and return the crew to a safe landing with a high probability of success. To achieve continuous abort coverage one of two sets of effectors is used. Either the Launch Abort System (LAS), consisting of the Attitude Control Motor (ACM) and the Abort Motor (AM), or the Service Module (SM), consisting of SM Orion Main Engine (OME), Auxiliary (Aux) Jets, and Reaction Control System (RCS) jets, is used. The LAS effectors are used for aborts from liftoff through the first 30 seconds of second stage flight. The SM effectors are used from that point through Main Engine Cutoff (MECO). There are two distinct sets of Guidance and Control (G&C) algorithms that are designed to maximize the performance of these abort effectors. This paper will outline the necessary inputs to the G&C subsystem, the preliminary design of the G&C algorithms, the ability of the algorithms to predict what abort modes are achievable, and the resulting success of the abort system. Abort success will be measured against the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) abort performance metrics and overall performance will be reported. Finally, potential improvements to the G&C design will be discussed.

Proud, Ryan W.↗
NASA NTRS1962

Some Abort Techniques and Procedures for Manned Spacecraft

This paper is concerned with our present state of knowledge on the procedures and effectiveness of aborts from manned orbital and lunar missions. By abort is meant a deliberate or unintentional termination of the primary mission followed by an expedient return to earth of the payload (spacecraft and crew). A deliberate abort may be initiated if a critical component failed and thus impaired the probability of mission success or the crew's safety. Examples of this kind of abort are failure of the launch guidance system or the oxygen and cabin pressure system. Also, an unintentional abort may occur during the launch phase due to the complete or partial failure of one of the launch-vehicle stages to operate. For each mission every conceivable set of circumstances must be considered and evaluated to see if an abort of the mission is called for and to determine what sequence of events should occur to bring the spacecraft and crew safely back to earth with the highest probability of success. Factors which must be considered are: how to specify and sense an abort condition, how much fuel should be put onboard the vehicle for abort purposes, what size and kind of rocket engines are best suited for each mission, and what compromise is incurred due to other mission requirements? If an abort occurs, the optimum time of application as well as the magnitude and direction of the velocity changes must be determined beforehand and the crew must be clearly informed of what action is required or what the situation is so that they can decide the proper action.

Maneuver↗
NASA NTRS1961

Velocity Requirements for Abort From the Boost Trajectory of a Manned Lunar Mission

An investigation is made of the abort velocity requirements associated with failure of a propulsion system for a manned lunar mission. Two cases are considered: abort at less than satellite speed, which results in maximum decelerations in the following entry, and abort at greater than satellite speed with immediate return to earth. The velocity requirements associated with the latter problem are found to be substantial (several thousand feet per second) and are found to be even more severe if boost trajectories which lead to burnout at high altitudes or large flight-path angles are used. The velocity requirements associated with abort at less than satellite speed are found to be less severe than those for abort at greater than satellite speed except for nonlifting vehicles. It is found that abort rockets sufficient for abort at greater than satellite speed can be used to reduce maximum decelerations in entries following an abort at lower speeds. This reduction is accomplished by use of the abort rockets to decrease entry angle immediately prior to entry into the atmosphere.

Slye, Robert E.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Crew Exploration Vehicle Ascent Abort Overview

One of the primary design drivers for NASA's Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is to ensure crew safety. Aborts during the critical ascent flight phase require the design and operation of CEV systems to escape from the Crew Launch Vehicle and return the crew safely to the Earth. To accomplish this requirement of continuous abort coverage, CEV ascent abort modes are being designed and analyzed to accommodate the velocity, altitude, atmospheric, and vehicle configuration changes that occur during ascent. The analysis involves an evaluation of the feasibility and survivability of each abort mode and an assessment of the abort mode coverage. These studies and design trades are being conducted so that more informed decisions can be made regarding the vehicle abort requirements, design, and operation. This paper presents an overview of the CEV, driving requirements for abort scenarios, and an overview of current ascent abort modes. Example analysis results are then discussed. Finally, future areas for abort analysis are addressed.

Davidson, John B., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1980

STS-1 operational flight profile. Volume 6: Abort analysis

The abort analysis for the cycle 3 Operational Flight Profile (OFP) for the Space Transportation System 1 Flight (STS-1) is defined, superseding the abort analysis previously presented. Included are the flight description, abort analysis summary, flight design groundrules and constraints, initialization information, general abort description and results, abort solid rocket booster and external tank separation and disposal results, abort monitoring displays and discussion on both ground and onboard trajectory monitoring, abort initialization load summary for the onboard computer, list of the key abort powered flight dispersion analysis.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2005

Entry Abort Determination Using Non-Adaptive Neural Networks for Mars Precision Landers

The 2009 Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) will attempt the first precision landing on Mars using a modified version of the Apollo Earth entry guidance program. The guidance routine, Entry Terminal Point Controller (ETPC), commands the deployment of a supersonic parachute after converging the range to the landing target. For very dispersed cases, ETPC may not converge the range to the target and safely command parachute deployment within Mach number and dynamic pressure constraints. A full-lift up abort can save 85% of these failed trajectories while abandoning the precision landing objective. Though current MSL requirements do not call for an abort capability, an autonomous abort capability may be desired, for this mission or future Mars precision landers, to make the vehicle more robust. The application of artificial neural networks (NNs) as an abort determination technique was evaluated by personnel at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC). In order to implement an abort, a failed trajectory needs to be recognized in real time. Abort determination is dependent upon several trajectory parameters whose relationships to vehicle survival are not well understood, and yet the lander must be trained to recognize unsafe situations. Artificial neural networks (NNs) provide a way to model these parameters and can provide MSL with the artificial intelligence necessary to independently declare an abort. Using the 2009 Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission as a case study, a non-adaptive NN was designed, trained and tested using Monte Carlo simulations of MSL descent and incorporated into ETPC. Neural network theory, the development history of the MSL NN, and initial testing with severe dust storm entry trajectory cases are discussed in Reference 1 and will not be repeated here. That analysis demonstrated that NNs are capable of recognizing failed descent trajectories and can significantly increase the survivability of MSL for very dispersed cases. NN testing was then broadened to evaluate fully dispersed entry trajectories. The NN correctly classified 99.7% of descent trajectories as abort or nonabort and reduced the probability of an unsafe parachute deployment by 83%. This second, broader testing phase is discussed in this paper.

Graybeal, Sarah R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Orion Abort Flight Test

The purpose of NASA's Constellation project is to create the new generation of spacecraft for human flight to the International Space Station in low-earth orbit, the lunar surface, as well as for use in future deep-space exploration. One portion of the Constellation program was the development of the Orion crew exploration vehicle (CEV) to be used in spaceflight. The Orion spacecraft consists of a crew module, service module, space adapter and launch abort system. The crew module was designed to hold as many as six crew members. The Orion crew exploration vehicle is similar in design to the Apollo space capsules, although larger and more massive. The Flight Test Office is the responsible flight test organization for the launch abort system on the Orion crew exploration vehicle. The Flight Test Office originally proposed six tests that would demonstrate the use of the launch abort system. These flight tests were to be performed at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and were similar in nature to the Apollo Little Joe II tests performed in the 1960s. The first flight test of the launch abort system was a pad abort (PA-1), that took place on 6 May 2010 at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. Primary flight test objectives were to demonstrate the capability of the launch abort system to propel the crew module a safe distance away from a launch vehicle during a pad abort, to demonstrate the stability and control characteristics of the vehicle, and to determine the performance of the motors contained within the launch abort system. The focus of the PA-1 flight test was engineering development and data acquisition, not certification. In this presentation, a high level overview of the PA-1 vehicle is given, along with an overview of the Mobile Operations Facility and information on the White Sands tracking sites for radar & optics. Several lessons learned are presented, including detailed information on the lessons learned in the development of wind placards for flight. PA-1 flight data is shown, as well as a comparison of PA-1 flight data to nonlinear simulation Monte Carlo data.

Hayes, Peggy Sue↗
NASA NTRS2015

Dynamic Modeling of Ascent Abort Scenarios for Crewed Launches

For the last 30 years, the United States's human space program has been focused on low Earth orbit exploration and operations with the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. After nearly 50 years, the U.S. is again working to return humans beyond Earth orbit. To do so, NASA is developing a new launch vehicle and spacecraft to provide this capability. The launch vehicle is referred to as the Space Launch System (SLS) and the spacecraft is called Orion. The new launch system is being developed with an abort system that will enable the crew to escape launch failures that would otherwise be catastrophic as well as probabilistic design requirements set for probability of loss of crew (LOC) and loss of mission (LOM). In order to optimize the risk associated with designing this new launch system, as well as verifying the associated requirements, NASA has developed a comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the integrated ascent phase of the mission that includes the launch vehicle, spacecraft and ground launch facilities. Given the dynamic nature of rocket launches and the potential for things to go wrong, developing a PRA to assess the risk can be a very challenging effort. Prior to launch and after the crew has boarded the spacecraft, the risk exposure time can be on the order of three hours. During this time, events may initiate from either of the spacecraft, the launch vehicle, or the ground systems, thus requiring an emergency egress from the spacecraft to a safe ground location or a pad abort via the spacecraft's launch abort system. Following launch, again either the spacecraft or the launch vehicle can initiate the need for the crew to abort the mission and return to the home. Obviously, there are thousands of scenarios whose outcome depends on when the abort is initiated during ascent as to how the abort is performed. This includes modeling the risk associated with explosions and benign system failures that require aborting a spacecraft under very dynamic conditions, particularly in the lower atmosphere, and returning the crew home safely. This paper will provide an overview of the PRA model that has been developed of this new launch system, including some of the challenges that are associated with this effort. Key Words: PRA, space launches, human space program, ascent abort, spacecraft, launch vehicles

Bigler, Mark↗
NASA NTRS1993

Ascent abort capability for the HL-20

The HL-20 has been designed with the capability for rescue of the crew during all phases of powered ascent from on the launch pad until orbital injection. A launch-escape system, consisting of solid rocket motors located on the adapter between the HL-20 and the launch vehicle, provides the thrust that propels the HL-20 to a safe distance from a malfunctioning launch vehicle. After these launch-escape motors have burned out, the adapter is jettisoned and the HL-20 executes one of four abort modes. In three abort modes - return-to-launch-site, transatlantic-abort-landing, and abort-to-orbit - not only is the crew rescued, but the HL-20 is recovered intact. In the ocean-landing-by-parachute abort mode, which occurs in between the return-to-launch-site and the transatlantic-abort-landing modes, the crew is rescued, but the HL-20 would likely sustain damage from the ocean landing. This paper describes the launch-escape system and the four abort modes for an ascent on a Titan III launch vehicle.

Naftel, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Crew Exploration Vehicle Ascent Abort Coverage Analysis

An important element in the design of NASA's Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is the consideration given to crew safety during various ascent phase failure scenarios. To help ensure crew safety during this critical and dynamic flight phase, the CEV requirements specify that an abort capability must be continuously available from lift-off through orbit insertion. To address this requirement, various CEV ascent abort modes are analyzed using 3-DOF (Degree Of Freedom) and 6-DOF simulations. The analysis involves an evaluation of the feasibility and survivability of each abort mode and an assessment of the abort mode coverage using the current baseline vehicle design. Factors such as abort system performance, crew load limits, thermal environments, crew recovery, and vehicle element disposal are investigated to determine if the current vehicle requirements are appropriate and achievable. Sensitivity studies and design trades are also completed so that more informed decisions can be made regarding the vehicle design. An overview of the CEV ascent abort modes is presented along with the driving requirements for abort scenarios. The results of the analysis completed as part of the requirements validation process are then discussed. Finally, the conclusions of the study are presented, and future analysis tasks are recommended.

Abadie, Marc J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Dynamic Modeling of Ascent Abort Scenarios for Crewed Launches

For the last 30 years, the United States' human space program has been focused on low Earth orbit exploration and operations with the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. After over 40 years, the U.S. is again working to return humans beyond Earth orbit. To do so, NASA is developing a new launch vehicle and spacecraft to provide this capability. The launch vehicle is referred to as the Space Launch System (SLS) and the spacecraft is called Orion. The new launch system is being developed with an abort system that will enable the crew to escape launch failures that would otherwise be catastrophic as well as probabilistic design requirements set for probability of loss of crew (LOC) and loss of mission (LOM). In order to optimize the risk associated with designing this new launch system, as well as verifying the associated requirements, NASA has developed a comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the integrated ascent phase of the mission that includes the launch vehicle, spacecraft and ground launch facilities. Given the dynamic nature of rocket launches and the potential for things to go wrong, developing a PRA to assess the risk can be a very challenging effort. Prior to launch and after the crew has boarded the spacecraft, the risk exposure time can be on the order of three hours. During this time, events may initiate from either the spacecraft, the launch vehicle, or the ground systems, thus requiring an emergency egress from the spacecraft to a safe ground location or a pad abort via the spacecraft's launch abort system. Following launch, again either the spacecraft or the launch vehicle can initiate the need for the crew to abort the mission and return home. Obviously, there are thousands of scenarios whose outcome depends on when the abort is initiated during ascent and how the abort is performed. This includes modeling the risk associated with explosions and benign system failures that require aborting a spacecraft under very dynamic conditions, particularly in the lower atmosphere, and returning the crew home safely. This paper will provide an overview of the PRA model that has been developed of this new launch system, including some of the challenges that are associated with this effort.

Bigler, Mark↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Innovative Assembly and Integration Operations of the Launch Abort Systemat KSC

This paper describes the Artemis program assembly and integration approach that enables affordable and low risk processing operations for the Launch Abort System at KSC. NASA is currently developing the Artemis 1 spacecraft to meet the test objectives of an uncrewed orbital mission to the moon and return to earth in 2021. The Artemis Orion spacecraft consists of a Crew Module (CM), a Service Module (SM), and a Launch Abort System (LAS) to safely transport a crew of 4 to the moon and return to earth. The LAS enables the CM to have an abort capability for the crew during the launch phase of the mission from the launch pad throughout the ascent phase. The LAS includes motor elements for abort, attitude control, and stage separation is assembled at the Launch Abort System Facility (LASF) adjacent to the CM/SM (CSM) assembly operations in the Neil Armstrong Operations and Checkout Building (O&C) at KSC. The LAS integration to the CSM is completed in the LASF and the completed Artemis spacecraft is integrated to the Space Launch System (SLS) in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at KSC. A significant LAS development flight test milestone was recently completed in 2019 for the Ascent Abort (AA-2) flight test at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station where a high-altitude abort test was successfully achieved using a Peacekeeper booster stage exercising all of the LAS systems including propulsion, avionics, and pyrotechnics demonstrating he LAS readiness for crewed flight. The first operational flight of the LAS will be for the Artemis 2 mission which is the first crewed mission for the Orion program planned in 2023.

William J Koenig↗
NASA NTRS2015

The Orion Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) Flight Test: A Propulsion Success

This poster provides a concise overview of the highly successful Orion Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) flight test, and the three rocket motors that contributed to this success. The primary purpose of the Orion PA-1 flight was to help certify the Orion Launch Abort System (LAS), which can be utilized in the unlikely event of an emergency on the launchpad or during mission vehicle ascent. The PA-1 test was the first fully integrated flight test of the Orion LAS, one of the primary systems within the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). The Orion MPCV is part of the architecture within the Space Launch System (SLS), which is being designed to transport astronauts beyond low-Earth orbit for future exploration missions. Had the Orion PA-1 flight abort occurred during launch preparations for a real human spaceflight mission, the PA-1 LAS would have saved the lives of the crew. The PA-1 flight test was largely successful due to the three solid rocket motors of the LAS: the Attitude Control Motor (ACM); the Jettison Motor (JM); and the Abort Motor (AM). All three rocket motors successfully performed their required functions during the Orion PA-1 flight test, flown on May 6, 2010 at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, culminating in a successful demonstration of an abort capability from the launchpad.

JM↗
NASA NTRS2002

Five-Segment Booster (FSB) Abort to Orbit (ATO) Studies

The Five Segment Booster (FSB) concept has been evolving for a number of years as a means to enhance the overall safety and reliability of the Space Shuttle system by minimizing the need to fly the more challenging Return to Launch Site (RTLS) and Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) abort profiles. The initial evaluation of the FSB concept was conducted in 1996 to determine the feasibility of the FSB in achieving transatlantic abort leading TAL from the pad, thus eliminating the return to launch site (RTLS) abort mode. The initial study was conducted by ATK Thiokol and did show the potential for the FSB to eliminate the RTLS abort mode. Later Rockwell (now Boeing) conducted a similar study utilizing FSB performance characteristics and verified that the FSB could indeed achieve TAL from the pad, thereby eliminating the necessity for the RTLS abort. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the details of the enhancements achieved through the internally funded study conducted by Boeing and ATK Thiokol. To better understand the enhancements that were addressed as part of this follow-on study, some background on what was achieved in the Phase A study is appropriate.

Tobias, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2005

Shuttle Orbiter Contingency Abort Aerodynamics: Real-Gas Effects and High Angles of Attack

An important element of the Space Shuttle Orbiter safety improvement plan is the improved understanding of its aerodynamic performance so as to minimize the "black zones" in the contingency abort trajectories [1]. These zones are regions in the launch trajectory where it is predicted that, due to vehicle limitations, the Orbiter will be unable to return to the launch site in a two or three engine-out scenario. Reduction of these zones requires accurate knowledge of the aerodynamic forces and moments to better assess the structural capability of the vehicle. An interesting aspect of the contingency abort trajectories is that the Orbiter would need to achieve angles of attack as high as 60deg. Such steep attitudes are much higher than those for a nominal flight trajectory. The Orbiter is currently flight certified only up to an angle of attack of 44deg at high Mach numbers and has never flown at angles of attack larger than this limit. Contingency abort trajectories are generated using the data in the Space Shuttle Operational Aerodynamic Data Book (OADB) [2]. The OADB, a detailed document of the aerodynamic environment of the current Orbiter, is primarily based on wind-tunnel measurements (over a wide Mach number and angle-of-attack range) extrapolated to flight conditions using available theories and correlations, and updated with flight data where available. For nominal flight conditions, i.e., angles of attack of less than 45deg, the fidelity of the OADB is excellent due to the availability of flight data. However, at the off-nominal conditions, such as would be encountered on contingency abort trajectories, the fidelity of the OADB is less certain. The primary aims of a recent collaborative effort (completed in the year 2001) between NASA and Boeing were to determine: 1) accurate distributions of pressure and shear loads on the Orbiter at select points in the contingency abort trajectory space; and 2) integrated aerodynamic forces and moments for the entire vehicle and the control surfaces (body flap, speed brake, and elevons). The latter served the useful purpose of verification of the aerodynamic characteristics that went into the generation of the abort trajectories.

Prabhu, Dinesh K.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Open-Loop Pitch Table Optimization for the Maximum Dynamic Pressure Orion Abort Flight Test

NASA has scheduled the retirement of the space shuttle orbiter fleet at the end of 2010. The Constellation program was created to develop the next generation of human spaceflight vehicles and launch vehicles, known as Orion and Ares respectively. The Orion vehicle is a return to the capsule configuration that was used in the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. This configuration allows for the inclusion of an abort system that safely removes the capsule from the booster in the event of a failure on launch. The Flight Test Office at NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center has been tasked with the flight testing of the abort system to ensure proper functionality and safety. The abort system will be tested in various scenarios to approximate the conditions encountered during an actual Orion launch. Every abort will have a closed-loop controller with an open-loop backup that will direct the vehicle during the abort. In order to provide the best fit for the desired total angle of attack profile with the open-loop pitch table, the table is tuned using simulated abort trajectories. A pitch table optimization program was created to tune the trajectories in an automated fashion. The program development was divided into three phases. Phase 1 used only the simulated nominal run to tune the open-loop pitch table. Phase 2 used the simulated nominal and three simulated off nominal runs to tune the open-loop pitch table. Phase 3 used the simulated nominal and sixteen simulated off nominal runs to tune the open-loop pitch table. The optimization program allowed for a quicker and more accurate fit to the desired profile as well as allowing for expanded resolution of the pitch table.

Stillwater, Ryan A.↗
NASA NTRS2003

A Dynamic Risk Model for Evaluation of Space Shuttle Abort Scenarios

The Space Shuttle is an advanced manned launch system with a respectable history of service and a demonstrated level of safety. Recent studies have shown that the Space Shuttle has a relatively low probability of having a failure that is instantaneously catastrophic during nominal flight as compared with many US and international launch systems. However, since the Space Shuttle is a manned. system, a number of mission abort contingencies exist to primarily ensure the safety of the crew during off-nominal situations and to attempt to maintain the integrity of the Orbiter. As the Space Shuttle ascends to orbit it transverses various intact abort regions evaluated and planned before the flight to ensure that the Space Shuttle Orbiter, along with its crew, may be returned intact either to the original launch site, a transoceanic landing site, or returned from a substandard orbit. An intact abort may be initiated due to a number of system failures but the highest likelihood and most challenging abort scenarios are initiated by a premature shutdown of a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The potential consequences of such a shutdown vary as a function of a number of mission parameters but all of them may be related to mission time for a specific mission profile. This paper focuses on the Dynamic Abort Risk Evaluation (DARE) model process, applications, and its capability to evaluate the risk of Loss Of Vehicle (LOV) due to the complex systems interactions that occur during Space Shuttle intact abort scenarios. In addition, the paper will examine which of the Space Shuttle subsystems are critical to ensuring a successful return of the Space Shuttle Orbiter and crew from such a situation.

Henderson, Edward M.↗