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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

L-SCIE and SUPCRTNE model and database development

This progress report (Level 3 Milestone Number M3SF-25LL010301052) summarizes research conducted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) within the Argillite Host Rock Properties & Processes Work Package SF-25LL01030105. The focus of this milestone is to create an initial SUPCRTNE database and extensively test the SUPCRTNE code. We prepared a draft manuscript describing our workflow and approach for developing a next-generation thermodynamic database for the Spent Fuel and High Level Waste Disposition campaign. The goal is to ease any future formal software qualification effort as was done on the Yucca Mountain Project for codes including SUPCRT92 and EQ3/6. We are attempting to extend the SUPCRTNE database to include more species, mainly from the NEA volumes. We can also take advantage of thermodynamic database activities that are ongoing at Thermochimie and as part of the EURADII program. However, our effort is limited by the funds available and the changes to program scope that was initiated in mid-FY25.

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DOE OSTI2025

Past Approaches for Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Waste Disposal in the United States—Part 1: Safety Criteria and Treatment of Uncertainty

The United States (US), with its 50-year experience in developing deep geologic disposal for transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and high-level radioactive waste (HLW), has much to share with other countries. Yet, other countries are better able to translate the US experience and corresponding policy decisions into solutions sensible for their country when they understand the compliance requirements in US laws and regulations. This paper presents past approaches in the generic and site-specific standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and implementing regulations of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) using the framework provided by (1) key questions of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, and (2) international consensus standards. Both the 1985 EPA generic standards, as updated in 1993 and applied at the operating Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in southern New Mexico for transuranic waste from atomic energy defense activities, and the EPA 2008 site-specific standards and implementing regulations, as applied at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository in southern Nevada for SNF and HLW, adopt the strategy of using quantitative, probabilistic analysis to assess performance and compliance.

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DOE OSTI2025

Past Approaches for Spent Nuclear Fuel, Transuranic, and High-Level Waste Disposal in the United States—Part 2: Siting Process, Staged Development, and Public Preferences

This report presents pertinent aspects of the ~50-year United States experience in siting a mined geologic disposal repository for spent nuclear fuel (SNF), transuranic (TRU) waste, and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) as related to site selection and the staged process for site investigations as specified in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and generic and site-specific regulations of the US Department of Energy (DOE), US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The roles of the Environmental Impact Statement and guidance in international consensus standards by the International Atomic Energy Agency are also mentioned. The focus is on siting and developing the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository for TRU waste from atomic energy defense activities, and the proposed Yucca Mountain repository for commercial SNF and HLW. In the social dimension, the role of institutional stakeholders is described. Past national surveys related to waste management options for storage and disposal provide insight on public preferences of other stakeholders. The descriptions are intended to help other countries more fully understand the stages adopted for siting and developing repositories in the United States.

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DOE OSTI2023

The role of international collaboration in the United States geologic disposal research program

Abstract. More than a decade ago, the United States disposal program discontinued all research activities focused on the unsaturated fractured tuff formation at Yucca Mountain as the geologic disposal site for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. A new research and development (R&D) program was initiated to provide a sound technical basis for alternative disposal options across clay, crystalline, and salt rocks. The goals of this broad program were (and still are) to (1) increase confidence in the robustness of generic disposal concepts, (2) develop the science and engineering tools needed to support disposal concept implementation, and (3) conduct R&D on the direct disposal of existing dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters. Recognizing the benefits of international collaboration toward the common goal of safely and efficiently managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the program emphasized international cooperation as an effective strategy for sharing information and knowledge. In a multi-laboratory effort coordinated by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) program established formal and informal cooperation partnerships with several international initiatives and institutions and developed a number of collaborative R&D activities in important research areas, such as engineered barrier integrity, near-field perturbations, radionuclide transport, performance assessment, and methods for characterization and monitoring of engineered and natural barriers. This presentation gives an overview of these R&D activities, with a specific focus on activities that improve our current understanding of the coupled thermal–hydrological–mechanical–chemical (THMC) processes occurring in engineered and natural barriers. We start with a brief review of selected international collaboration initiatives and then describe a few specific collaboration projects. We focus specifically on such studies that use experimental data sets provided by international research cooperation for joint modeling work to increase confidence in performance-relevant predictions of coupled processes. Overall, the focus on international collaboration has allowed deep engagement of US researchers with the international waste management R&D community in terms of best practices, new scientific advances, state-of-the-art simulation tools, new monitoring and performance confirmation approaches, and lessons learned. The joint R&D with international researchers, worldwide sharing of knowledge and experience, and access to relevant data and experiments from a variety of host rocks have helped our researchers to significantly improve their understanding of the current technical basis for disposal in a range of potential host rock environments. International collaboration also provides ample opportunity for training and educating junior staff that are well suited to move the United States disposal research program forward into the next decades, a promising avenue for developing a next-generation workforce of disposal scientists.

Birkholzer, Jens T.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Burnishing Techniques Strengthen Hip Implants

In the late 1990s, Lambda Research Inc., of Cincinnati, Ohio, received Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) awards from Glenn Research Center to demonstrate low plasticity burnishing (LPB) on metal engine components. By producing a thermally stable deep layer of compressive residual stress, LPB significantly strengthened turbine alloys. After Lambda patented the process, the Federal Aviation Administration accepted LPB for repair and alteration of commercial aircraft components, the U.S. Department of Energy found LPB suitable for treating nuclear waste containers at Yucca Mountain. Data from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration confirmed LPB to completely eliminate the occurrence of fretting fatigue failures in modular hip implants.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW PPT

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types, such as light- and heavy-water-moderated reactors, graphite-moderated reactors, and breeder reactors, with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and condition of SNF, a robust canister termed the DOE Standardized SNF Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard SNF Canister had four variations consisting of a 10- or 15-foot length and an 18- or 24-inch diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository these canisters were to be grouped with 24-inch diameter HLW canisters in a codisposal waste package. The 18-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The 24-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister would take the place of one the five HLW canister on the outer ring in the codisposal waste package. No DOE Standardized SNF Canisters have been loaded, and many fuel types can be loaded in multiple canisters. Depending on the selected diameter of the DOE Standardized SNF Canister for a particular fuel, the number of potential codisposal waste packages could vary. In addition, different types of DOE SNF may be able to be combined in a single canister. This could significantly change the number of DOE SNF canisters that are loaded and result in a decrease of the number of total potential codisposal waste packages. Ultimately, if too many HLW canisters need disposition, then a reduction in the number of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will change the final total of codisposal waste packages very little. Likewise, if the ratio of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters to HLW canister produced is too high, then DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will not have enough HLW canisters to surround them in the codisposal waste package. This paper examines the results of differing loading strategies for a few DOE SNFs. It also compares the ranges of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters that may be produced to the ranges of HLW canisters that may be produced in order to determine potential scenarios.

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DOE OSTI2020

DOE Standard Canister Loading Methodology Poster

Over 250 different types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) are managed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The current configuration of SNF at INL is not transportable off-site. In the Yucca Mountain Repository License Application, the SNF was to be loaded into DOE Standard Canisters which are capable of storage, transportation, and eventual disposal using the proper overpacks. The DOE Standard Canister will allow INL to place the SNF in a Road-Ready configuration in preparation for transportation off-site. The focus of this work is development of a general loading methodology for the DOE Standard Canister. This methodology is to be general enough that it will apply to all SNF to be loaded into the DOE Standard Canister. The main sections of the methodology to be outlined are prerequisites before loading (including any issues with materials such as inserts or baskets), loading of SNF, and canister closure and quality assurance (including welding and inspection). Each subsection will analyze and provide the bases for each step.

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DOE OSTI2020

The Influence of Aqueous Dispersivity on Transport of Radiological Material at LANL MDA G - 20450

Aqueous dispersivity is a phenomenon by which a solute moving in groundwater mixes with water that does not contain the solute and becomes diluted. Solutes take paths of varying lengths through pore networks or experience slower velocities due to interactions with pore walls. Aqueous dispersivity leads to breakthrough curves with earlier arrival than expected in purely advective systems and persistent 'tails,' or late-arriving, dilute concentrations of the solute. Dispersivity can be longitudinal (in the direction of flow) or transverse (orthogonal to flow). LANL has disposed of radioactive material at Material Disposal Area (MDA) G since the late 1950's. Most of the disposed materials at MDA G are low-level waste (LLW), but other types of radioactive wastes are disposed or stored at the site. For example, there is a collection of remote-handled transuranic waste (RH-TRU) waste in 33 shafts, which were intended to be stored retrievably. Aqueous-phase radionuclides included in models of contaminant transport at MDA G are subject to dispersive processes in porous media of the vadose zone and saturated zone. To model dispersivity at MDA G probabilistically, we created site-specific distributions of aqueous dispersivity. First, we performed a comprehensive review of peer-reviewed publications, reports from other performance assessments of MDA G, and documentation from sites that were considered similar based on expert opinion, such as Yucca Mountain. Data were included from a wide range of sources, so that distributions developed based on the data reflect the current state of knowledge in properties of the subsurface environment. Data were grouped based on value type (e.g., determined via experiment or used in a different model), rock type, zone type (saturated or unsaturated), and site, and were weighted in the distributions according to their relevance to the site and zone type. We combined Monte Carlo simulation and bootstrapping techniques to produce approximate distributions of mean aqueous dispersivity. Distributions of dispersivity for saturated and unsaturated zone transport are differentiated by data weight and the length scales over which transport occurs. We find that underestimating or disregarding transverse dispersivity may lead to overstating simulated well capture in the saturated zone at MDA G. Neglecting transverse dispersivity is a common assumption due in part to use of one-dimensional transport models that do not consider solute spreading orthogonal to flow. Also, we find that variability in longitudinal dispersivity is associated with substantial travel time alterations in the MDA G unsaturated zone and in simulated contaminant breakthrough times at a downstream observation plane in the MDA G saturated zone. Finally, at large scales (>1000 m), a linear trend between the dispersivity coefficient and length over which transport occurs may overestimate the dispersivity coefficient. Future modeling work with application to solute spreading could include interacting advective and diffusive zones in the highly fractured basalt below MDA G. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

A Perspective on the Successes of the NNSS Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity - 20221

Between 1951 and 1992, 828 underground nuclear tests were performed at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Underground testing was done in five major testing areas, which included (1) Frenchman Flat, (2) Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, (3) Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (4) Central Pahute Mesa, and (5) Western Pahute Mesa. About one third of the underground tests were detonated near, at or below the water table, and thus radioactive contamination was introduced to the groundwater system. The U.S. Department of Energy's Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity was established in the late 1990's to address the fate and movement of residual radioactivity in groundwater, and characterize the risk that it may pose to NNSS workers and the offsite public. It has accomplished this goal through a process of iterative groundwater sampling and numerical groundwater flow and transport modeling, and long-term monitoring. The UGTA Activity draws on the expertise of scientists in the fields of geology, hydrology, radiochemistry, and risk assessment from the U.S. DOE staff, the lead contractor (currently Navarro) and many other organizations, in cooperation with the governing regulatory body, the State of Nevada's Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is one of the participating research organizations involved with the UGTA Activity. Under the direction of DOE and the lead contractor, LANL's role in UGTA has evolved over time from an initial focus on geologic characterization, to conducting field and laboratory experiments, and finally to its current role of providing modeling and geochemistry expertise to characterize the rates and directions of groundwater and radionuclide movement. In its current role, LANL has either developed or provided the numerical tools for developing flow and transport models in each of the four major testing areas. In addition, LANL has provided an independent assessment of future groundwater flow and transport behavior through the analysis of naturally-occurring geochemical and isotopic tracers in groundwater. The five major testing areas are now in different stages of investigation or closure: (1) Frenchman Flat is in its fifth year of post closure modeling; (2) The Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain Closure Report has been submitted to NDEP and is awaiting approval; (3) The Yucca Flat/Climax Mine Closure Report is under development; and (4) Central and (5) Western Pahute Mesa is still undergoing investigation and flow and transport model development. The success of the UGTA Activity in reaching or approaching closure in three of the five major testing areas is primarily due to the DoE's focus on regulatory closure requirements, but also is in part attributable to a rigorous internal review process and the involvement of NDEP and Nye County water professionals as participants and observers in the reviews. County and state involvement in the internal review process has promoted trust that the U.S. DOE is deeply committed to ensuring the present and future safely of NNSS workers and the surrounding communities. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2021

Post-Closure Monitoring Letter Report for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine; CAU 98: Frenchman Flat; and CAU 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 1, May 2021)

This letter serves as the annual post-closure letter for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (YF/CM); CAU 98, Frenchman Flat (FF); and CAU 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM) for calendar year (CY) 2020. This letter will discuss the post-closure monitoring activities that occurred during CY 2020, identify any triggers reached, and summarize water usage on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and surrounding hydrographic basins at the three CAUs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Pahute Mesa-Oasis Valley Hydrostratigraphic Framework Model for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada (Rev. 0)

A new, revised three-dimensional (3-D) hydrostratigraphic framework model (HFM) for the Central and Western Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Units 101 and 102 was completed in 2019. The initial (Phase I) model was completed in 2002 and was documented in A Hydrostratigraphic Model and Alternatives for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada (BN, 2002). Subsequent flow and transport modeling revealed the need to collect additional data to reduce uncertainties. The Phase II data collection and characterization effort included extensive well drilling and testing activities, and rebuilding of the Phase I 3-D HFM, resulting in the Phase II HFM (NSTec, 2014). Further drilling (Well ER-20-12), data collection, and interpretive work (e.g., Thirsty Canyon Lineament [Wurtz and Day, 2018]) were incorporated into the Pahute Mesa-Oasis Valley (PM-OV) HFM. The PM-OV HFM incorporates the area of interest from the Phase II HFM and adds additional areas, primarily to the north and west with minor additions to the south and east. The new, expanded area matches the PM-OV groundwater basin as defined in Fenelon et al. (2016) and includes Pahute Mesa, a former nuclear testing area at the Nevada National Security Site; and Oasis Valley, a groundwater discharge area downgradient from contaminant source areas on Pahute Mesa. The data and information necessary to build the PM-OV HFM are provided in Navarro (2019). The PM-OV HFM will be used by hydrologic modelers who are tasked with developing a model to determine how contaminants are transported by groundwater flow in an area of complex geology. The model area is large (more than 6,250 square kilometers) and geologically complex, including Paleozoic- to Mesozoic-age structures (e.g., thrust faults, Thirsty Canyon Lineament), at least seven Tertiary-age calderas, several intrusive bodies, and many relatively recent basin-and-range normal faults. Investigators from the U.S. Geological Survey; National Security Technologies, LLC; National Laboratories; and U.S. Department of Energy contractors have organized the more than 300 volcanic units and other rocks in the model area into 77 hydrostratigraphic units (HSUs). The volcanic rocks are subdivided into 42 aquifers, 11 confining units, and 9 composite units (containing both aquifer and confining unit rocks). The underlying pre-Tertiary rocks were divided into 5 HSUs, comprising 2 aquifers and 3 confining units. The model also includes 1 alluvial aquifer unit, 8 intrusive confining units, and 1 granite confining unit. The model depicts the thickness, extent, and geometric relationships of these HSUs (“layers” in the model) along with all the major structural features that control them, including calderas and faults. The most substantive differences between the Phase II HFM and the PM-OVHFM include (1) addition of the new data and resulting revised interpretations from the additional area encompassed by the PM-OV groundwater basin; (2) incorporation of 16 new faults; (3) 12 boreholes from the northern extension; (4) 2 additional caldera-collapse collars; and (5) correlation of the simulated faulting and hydrostratigraphy in the eastern part of the model domain with the delineations represented in the neighboring Rainier Mesa-Shoshone Mountain HFM-Prime and Yucca Flat-Climax Mine HFM. All PM-OV HFM delineations were based on published and unpublished data from geophysical investigations, surface geologic maps, and drill-hole records. Phase II approached model uncertainty using the model-building software to test model configurations and hydrologic consequences using a range of values for parameters such as fault offset amounts and HSU elevations. The PM-OV HFM expands on this approach to encompass the entire PM-OV groundwater basin.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Subsurface microbial communities as a tool for characterizing regional-scale groundwater flow

Subsurface microbial community distribution patterns are influenced by biogeochemical and groundwater fluxes and may inform hydraulic connections along groundwater-flow paths. This study examined the regional-scale microbial community of the Death Valley Regional Flow System and evaluated whether subsurface communities can be used to identify groundwater-flow paths between recharge and discharge areas. Samples were collected from 36 sites in three groundwater basins: Pahute Mesa–Oasis Valley (PMOV), Ash Meadows (AM), and Alkali Flat–Furnace Creek Ranch (AFFCR). Microbial diversity within and between communities varied by location, and communities were separated into two overall groups that affiliated with the AM and PMOV/AFFCR basins. Network analysis revealed patterns between clusters of common microbes that represented groundwaters with similar geochemical conditions and largely corroborated hydraulic connections between recharge and discharge areas. Null model analyses identified deterministic and stochastic ecological processes contributing to microbial community assemblages. Most communities were more different than expected and governed by dispersal limitation, geochemical differences, or undominating processes. However, certain communities from sites located within or near the Nevada National Security Site were more similar than expected and dominated by homogeneous dispersal or selection. Overall, the (dis)similarities between the microbial communities of DVRFS recharge and discharge areas supported previously documented hydraulic connections between: (1) Spring Mountains and Ash Meadows; (2) Frenchman and Yucca Flat and Amargosa Desert; and (3) Amargosa Desert and Death Valley. However, only a portion of the flow path between Pahute Mesa and Oasis Valley could be supported by microbial community analyses, likely due to well-associated artifacts in samples from the two Oasis Valley sites. This study demonstrates the utility of combining microbial data with hydrologic, geologic, and water-chemistry information to comprehensively characterize groundwater systems, highlighting both strengths and limitations of this approach.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Calendar Year 2022 Post-Closure Monitoring Letter Report (Rev. 1)

This letter serves as the annual post-closure letter for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat; CAU 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine; and CAU 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain for calendar year 2022. This letter will discuss the post-closure monitoring activities that occurred during CY 2022, identify any triggers reached, and summarize water usage on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and surrounding hydrographic basins at the three CAUs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Submittal of The Final Calendar Year (Cy) 2025 Post-Closure Monitoring Letter Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1, April 2026

This letter serves as the annual post-closure letter for CAU 98, Frenchman Flat; CAU 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine; and CAU 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain for calendar year 2025. This letter will discuss the post-closure monitoring activities that occurred during CY 2025, identify any triggers reached, and summarize water usage on the Nevada National Security Site and surrounding hydrographic basins at the three CAUs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Final Calendar Year 2024 Post-Closure Monitoring Letter, Revision 1 with ROTC-1

This letter serves as the annual post-closure letter for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat (FF); CAU 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (YF/CM); and CAU 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM) for calendar year (CY) 2024. This letter will discuss the post-closure monitoring activities that occurred during CY 2024, identify any triggers reached, and summarize water usage on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and surrounding hydrographic basins at the three CAUs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Calendar Year 2021 Post-Closure Monitoring Letter Report (Rev. 1)

This letter serves as the annual post-closure letter for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (YF/CM); CAU 98, Frenchman Flat (FF); and CAU 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM) for calendar year (CY) 2021. This letter will discuss the post-closure monitoring activities that occurred during CY 2021, identify any triggers reached, and summarize water usage on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and surrounding hydrographic basins at the three CAUs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗