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Technology Development for Dry Storage of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel - 20490

A candidate disposition pathway for the > 13 MTHM of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, is the drying and placement of the SNF into sealed-canister dry storage, with the ASNF-in- canisters 'road-ready' for transportation to and final direct disposal in a repository waste package. Technical information gaps in fuel drying, and fuel dry storage behavior, have previously challenged the declaration of technology readiness for drying and placement of this fuel into the DOE Standard Canister design for > 50 years of safe dry storage. The principal technical information gaps included: i) characterization and thermal dehydration behavior of aluminum (oxy)hydroxide films attendant on the cladding due to film formation during reactor operation and during post-discharge up to long-term wet storage histories; and ii) G-value data to enable estimation of the radiolytic gas generation from the cladding with its (oxy)hydroxide films. Thus, the oxide films on the ASNF challenged the safety of a sealed storage canister with thermal and radiolytic decomposition of the waters on the films that can lead to corrosion, pressurization, and flammability issues. These gaps in the technical information base have largely been closed. This paper discusses the investigations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and the Savannah River National laboratory (SRNL), and outlines the pending technology development work for input to an engineering design to enable a road-ready dry storage system for ASNF. The ASNF inventory considered for road-ready dry storage is stored at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) at the INL. The ASNF inventory in the SRS L Basin is from foreign and domestic research reactors (FRR and DRR), and is diverse in terms of design, irradiation, and post-reactor-discharge storage conditions; these factors yield a range of characteristics of cladding oxide films on ASNF. Mixed aluminum (oxy)hydroxide (boehmite and bayerite/gibbsite) films, non-uniform in thicknesses up to a maximum local thickness bounded by 25 μm, were observed on ASNF materials removed from wet storage in the L Basin and in non-sealed dry storage at the SRS following reactor service and a long-term (up to 40+ years) interim storage history. The ASNF inventory at INTEC, in both wet and vented dry storage, is predominantly from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), but it also includes DRR and FRR fuel. To address a profound behavior of these films, radiolysis testing of aluminum specimens with mixed type boehmite/bayerite oxide films was performed to develop basic data on G-values for production of radiolytic hydrogen under dry storage conditions with nominal relative humidity, temperature, and cover gas. Modeling and simulation of canister internal environments with postulated inventories of oxide films provides estimation of the evolution of the conditions of the canister loaded with ASNF. Simultaneous Thermal Analysis (TGA/DSC) of hydrated oxide powders, and laboratory-scale aluminum specimens with a bayerite film (∼10 μm) using TGA methods, inform drying time/temperature conditions to be used for the ASNF. A demonstration project is recommended for Verification and Validation of the drying and storage of the ASNF. Remaining major tasks leading up to the hot demonstration include scale-up radiolysis testing and scale-up drying testing. Engineering design with the information from the technology program will establish the safety basis and enable long-term (> 50 years) dry storage compatibility with ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister pending its transportation to and disposal in a repository. This full capability would show the ASNF-in-canister storage system to be road-ready. (authors)

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Used Fuel Disposition Campaign International Activities Implementation Plan

The management of used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste is required for any country using nuclear energy. This includes the storage, transportation, and disposal of low and intermediate level waste (LILW), used nuclear fuel (UNF), and high level waste (HLW). The Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC), within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology (FCT), is responsible for conducting research and development pertaining to the management of these materials in the U.S. Cooperation and collaboration with other countries would be beneficial to both the U.S. and other countries through information exchange and a broader participation of experts in the field. U.S. participation in international UNF and HLW exchanges leads to safe management of nuclear materials, increased security through global oversight, and protection of the environment worldwide. Such interactions offer the opportunity to develop consensus on policy, scientific, and technical approaches. Dialogue to address common technical issues helps develop an internationally recognized foundation of sound science, benefiting the U.S. and participating countries. The UNF and HLW management programs in nuclear countries are at different levels of maturity. All countries utilizing nuclear power must store UNF, mostly in wet storage, and HLW for those countries that reprocess UNF. Several countries either utilize or plan to utilize dry storage systems for UNF, perhaps for long periods of time (several decades). Geologic disposal programs are at various different states, ranging from essentially 'no progress' to selected sites and pending license applications to regulators. The table below summarizes the status of UNF and HLW management programs in several countriesa. Thus, the opportunity exists to collaborate at different levels ranging from providing expertise to those countries 'behind' the U.S. to obtaining access to information and expertise from those countries with more mature programs. The U.S. fuel cycle is a once through fuel cycle involving the direct disposal of UNF, as spent nuclear fuel, in a geologic repository (previously identified at Yucca Mountain, Nevada), following at most a few decades of storage (wet and dry). The geology at Yucca Mountain, unsaturated tuff, is unique among all countries investigating the disposal of UNF and HLW. The decision by the U.S. Department of Energy to no longer pursue the disposal of UNF at Yucca Mountain and possibly utilize very long term storage (approaching 100 years or more) while evaluating future fuel cycle alternatives for managing UNF, presents a different UNF and HLW management R&D portfolio that has been pursued in the U.S. In addition, the research and development activities managed by OCRWM have been transferred to DOE-NE. This requires a reconsideration of how the UFDC will engage in cooperative and collaborative activities with other countries. This report presents the UFDC implementation plan for international activities. The DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) has cooperated and collaborated with other countries in many different 'arenas' including the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and through bilateral agreements with other countries. These international activities benefited OCRWM through the acquisition and exchange of information, database development, and peer reviews by experts from other countries. DOE-NE cooperates and collaborates with other countries in similar 'arenas' with similar objectives and realizing similar benefits. However the DOE-NE focus has not typically been in the area of UNF and HLW management. This report will first summarize these recent cooperative and collaborative activities. The manner that the UFDC will cooperate and collaborate in the future is expected to change as R&D is conducted regarding long-term storage and the potential disposal of UNF and HLW in different geologic environments. While some continuation of on-going or recent cooperative and collaborative activities are expected to continue, the approach taken in these activities may be different than past activities given the changes in the U.S. waste management program. In addition, new cooperative and collaborative activities with different scope than in the past may be undertaken. Such potential future cooperative and collaborative activities will be discussed. The last part of the plan includes the implementation of the UFDC international activities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Amplicon Sequencing Reveals Microbiological Signatures in Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Basins

Water quality is an important determinant for the structural integrity of alloy cladded fuels and assemblies during long-term wet storage. Detailed characterization of a water filled storage basin for spent nuclear reactor fuel was performed following the formation and proliferation of an amorphous white flocculent. White precipitant was sampled throughout the storage basin for chemical and spectroscopic characterization, and eDNA was extracted for pyrosequencing of bacterial rRNA gene diversity. Accordingly, spectroscopic analyses indicated the precipitant to be primarily amorphous to crystalline aluminum (oxy) hydroxides with minor associated elemental components including Fe, Si, Ti, and U. High levels of dissolved carbon were co-localized with the precipitant relative to bulk water. Bacterial densities were highly variable between sampling locations and with depth; cell numbers (log scale) ranged from 5.6 to 4.89 cells / mL. Bacterial diversity that was physically associated with the aluminum (oxy) hydroxide complexes exceeded an estimated 4,000 OTUs / amplicon library (3% cutoff) and the greatest percent majority of sequences were aligned to the families Burkholderiales (23%), Nitrospiraceae (23%), Hyphomicrobiaceae (17%), and Comamonadaceae (6%). We surmise that episodic changes in the physical and chemical properties of the basin contribute to the polymerization of aluminum (oxy) hydroxides, which in turn can chemisorb nutrients, carbon ligands and bacterial cells from the surrounding bulk aqueous phase. As such, these precipitants should establish favorable microhabitats for bacterial colonization and growth. Comparative analyses of 16S rRNA gene amplicon libraries across diverse environmental landscapes were performed and microbiological signatures unique to the spent nuclear fuel storage basin environment were revealed. These insights could spur the development of tractable bioindicators that are specific of and diagnostic for water quality at discrete locations and finer scales of resolution, marking an important contribution for improved water quality and management of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities.

aluminum↗

Evaluation of Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel during Drying and Dry Storage

The DOE SNF Working Group ASNF Subgroup and the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board have identified knowledge gaps regarding the management of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF).[1, 2] The objectives of this research are to observe, sample and analyze the nature of aluminum surface corrosion and corrosion layer chemistry relevant to the ASNF performance over the duration of the dry storage segment of the fuel life cycle. The primary goal is to build an understanding of ASNF behavior, from reactor service and wet storage through drying and dry storage, with parallel testing of surrogate materials. The premise is that residual water affiliated with the aluminum oxide from corrosion during reactor service and wet storage, continues to influence ASNF performance during dry storage, and that even after successful drying the surface conditions of ASNF have yet to be satisfactorily characterized. The initial scope collected and analyzed specimens from irradiated non-fuel components of aluminum-clad Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) fuel elements that are routinely removed at the end of reactor service life. Techniques have been developed for remote material sampling from ATR elements from vented dry storage at the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF). These techniques involve 1) nipping off a small corner of the aluminum near where the end box had been removed and 2) scraping the exterior (non-fueled) plate surface to collect an oxide sample. This second effort targets ATR elements expected to have seen the longest residence in storage, both in the CPP-603 pool (with poor water quality) and in dry storage at IFSF, within the fuel handling scheduled to consolidate ATR at IFSF and receive the remaining inventory at CPP-666. Follow on work has been proposed to nip corners and collect scrapings immediately following ATR fuel drying, before placement in dry storage. Sample analysis will use multiple techniques to understand the chemical composition and morphology of the surface oxides. A simultaneous effort is progressing to develop surrogate materials to enable rigorous controlled experiments. Consistently produced, these surrogate materials can then be used to demonstrate limitations inherent to remote sampling and to validate performance models under relevant constraints. The combined efforts will substantiate ASNF performance and fuel management decisions regarding drying and packaging over a more complete range of life cycle conditions. [1] DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Working Group, Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel: Technical Considerations and Challenges for Extended (>50 Years) Dry Storage, DOE/ID RPT#: 1575, prepared by Aluminum-Clad SNF Sub Working Group, June 2017. [2] U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Management and Disposal of U.S. Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel, A Report to the United States Congress and the Secretary of Energy, December 2017, p. 143.

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Modeling the Drying of a Mock Used Fuel Assembly with COBRA-SFS Cycle-4 - 18597

The processing and storage of nuclear fuel is an ever increasingly pressing issue. Around 70,000 tons of used fuel are currently in either dry or wet storage on site at nuclear power plants or at specified spent fuel storage facilities. Additionally, about 2,000 tons are added to that sum each year. To promote retrievability, limit degradation in the canister, and reduce potential for hydrogen generation, spent fuel that is initially in wet storage must be dried before moving to dry cask storage. Therefore, this research seeks to use a mock used fuel storage cask to replicate the conditions in the industry during the drying process of fuel being moved from storage pools. To simulate this, a mock storage cask has been constructed to closely resemble those used in industry such that any areas that tend to retain water are replicated effectively. It is able to hold one mock used fuel assembly. The assembly used is an AREVA 10A 10 x 10 assembly with 78 rods filled with depleted uranium, 12 heater rods to simulate decay heat, a 3 x 3 BWR water channel, and one interchangeable rod position for tests such as a simulated failed fuel rod, BWR water rod, and PWR guide tube tests. The industry standard procedure is used in drying the assembly which involves stepping the system pressure down and holding for certain periods until reaching 3 torr and holding for 30 minutes. This is believed to sufficiently dry the assembly. The goal is to record data throughout these tests that can provide the industry with a greater understanding of how well the process works. This data will also be used to develop and validate a computer model of the drying process. Mechanistic models are currently under development. Reduced order models are being investigated for incorporation into current related engineering codes such as COBRA-SFS. COBRA-SFS is a member of the COBRA family of codes which is mainly used in the evaluation of thermal hydraulic systems containing spent nuclear fuel. However, it does not currently have the capability to account for processes such as evaporation encountered during drying operations. Therefore, those physical models are to be added to the source code. At present a model of the experiment has been created using the COBRA-SFS Cycle-4 code. A number of steady state models along with transient models have been developed and presented. Each of these yield valuable results for comparison with the experiments conducted. In addition to comparison with experimental results, the data collected from COBRA-SFS is compared with that which has been generated from other computer models which utilize computational fluid dynamics. (authors)

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Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) Material Test Reactor (MTR) (Fuel Inspection Program Report)

The AMCAP MTR Fuel Inspection Program, a special inspection program comprised of four inspection campaigns, examined a total of ten (10) pre-selected aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel core spent nuclear fuel assemblies (ASNF) stored in the L Area Disassembly Basin (L Basin) at the Savannah River Site. A full description of the inspections and the results are reported. The fuel had been stored in bundled-tube storage (Vertical Tube Storage) for periods of 18 to 21 years. The prior service experience of the individual 10 assemblies varies, but all included irradiation followed by wet storage at international research reactor sites prior to shipment to the US and storage in L Basin. The 10 assemblies were expected to be among the “worst"’ in terms of prior corrosion damage of the entire inventory of the direct-bundle-stored ASNF in L Basin. The inventory of MTR ASNF in L Basin will continue to be stored in the bundled-tube configuration or in slug-storage buckets with inserts pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The MTR fuel inspections focused on collecting information for characterization of the material condition of the ASNF considering various types of aluminum fuel corrosion degradation of its assembled materials in water storage. A custom-designed Fuel Inspection Table was used to stage the fuel for remote, enhanced visual examination (close-up video imaging & recording) with controlled lighting and positioning that enables reproducibility of imaging conditions. The inspections were conducted by fuel subject matter expert staff from Spent Fuel Project Engineering (SFPE) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). Stills captured from the video records were used to compare the corrosion evolution from previous records, as available. This evaluation of the inspection results including the comparison to the previous inspection results demonstrate that the water quality and the storage configuration of ASNF in L Basin do not cause aggressive corrosion degradation of the fuel; mitigation of the prior corrosion degradation of the fuel also appears to have been achieved with the good water quality conditions of L Basin. Recommendations are made for future inspection of the fuel to trend corrosion degradation and demonstrate continued safe wet storage of the ASNF in L Basin. The next fuel examination is recommended to be performed in 5 years.

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Oxyhydroxides on aluminum spent nuclear fuel: formation studies and removal practices to prevent radiolytic gas production

Aluminum-clad nuclear fuel has been at the forefront in research and commercial reactors. After being removed from the reactor, the spent nuclear fuel is placed in large-volume water basins (wet storage) that are constantly monitored for water quality to minimize corrosion/deterioration. The water provides both radiation shielding and cooling for the freshly removed fuel. It is highly desired to have a pathway for fuel to be transitioned to dry storage in sealed casks, so that spent nuclear fuel can be safely transported and dispositioned in a permanent repository, and basin capacity can be made available for temporary wet storage of fresher spent fuel. A challenge for safe, road-ready dry storage is the hydrated aluminum oxides (oxyhydroxides) that are prevalent on aluminum spent nuclear fuel that has been stored under water for years. If water is released from the oxyhydroxides during dry storage, it can create corrosion within the storage canister, and hydrogen can be generated through radiolysis of the oxyhydroxides, causing pressurization and flammability risks. The focus of this project is to develop knowledge of the oxyhydroxide growth and production of gases through radiolysis and to apply empirical models for predicting these phenomena. The expertise developed will be used to formulate conditions and parameters for oxyhydroxide removal/dehydration from fuel cladding through vacuum or forced-air gas drying, to prevent problems during permanent dry storage.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Optimizing Transmission of Acoustic Signals to Monitor Internal Conditions of Canisters for Dry Storage of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

Safe storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is critical to the nuclear fuel cycle and the future of nuclear energy. In the United States, SNF is stored primarily via two methods regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: wet storage in SNF pools and dry storage in dry cask storage systems (DCSSs). After about five years of cooling in spent fuel pools, the fuel assemblies are transferred into DCSSs, and the systems are filled with helium and sealed by welding. Deterioration of conditions inside of a DCSS is reflected in changes in the internal gas properties; this motivates the development of acoustic techniques to monitor internal gas properties, over extended storage periods, using sensors mounted on the exterior of the storage packages. However, a major challenge in collecting acoustic signals is the impedance mismatch between the steel canister shell and the gas. Only a small fraction of the ultrasonic signal can be transmitted through the gas medium. This paper documents experimental studies conducted on a full-scale canister mock-up to capture the gas-borne signals. Damping materials were pasted on the outside, and blocking and unblocking tests were conducted to identify the gas-borne signal. The results show that the excitation frequency plays an important role in maximizing the gas-borne signals. The gas-borne signal was successfully detected at around the theoretical time-of-flight. A high signal-to-noise ratio was achieved in the measurements. Next, the acoustic impedance matching layers were introduced, and the gas signal was drastically improved compared with that using no AIM layers.

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF), Canisters, Internal cond↗

The Strategic Benefit of Self Shielded Boxes for Storage and Disposal of Metallic Uranic Material-18141

Sellafield Ltd, on behalf of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), is responsible for the management of a number of facilities whose inventories include a range of metallic uranic material. Additional fuel and fuel bearing materials exist in the NDA estate, some of which are similar to the Sellafield-managed inventory and others present different management challenges. Whilst UK Government policy directs that some of these materials are assets and are therefore managed with eventual future use in mind, there remains a large quantity of material, principally either out-of-scope for reprocessing or which derives from legacy facilities, which is likely to be disposed of to a future Geological Disposal Facility (GDF). The majority of this material is stored under wet conditions to facilitate dose shielding and heat dissipation and will therefore require removal from wet storage, consolidation and conditioning, prior to transfer to GDF. In order to accelerate high hazard and risk reduction by sooner retrieval of legacy material from wetted storage, one of the legacy storage facilities has led technical work to develop the design of Self Shielded Boxes (SSBs) and to substantiate their use for interim storage of the materials in question. Use of the SSBs would represent a change of strategy on the Sellafield Site: historically, timescales for retrieval of material have been reliant upon a waste treatment and storage/disposal route being available. SSBs provide the opportunity to retrieve uranic materials from aging legacy storage facilities for immediate buffer storage, by decoupling the timing of retrieval from the availability of an onward route. An understanding was required of the scope for defining optimal routes for each metallic uranic fuel and fuel bearing material group for safe transport and storage commensurate with current final disposal assumptions and risks, taking into account international best practice. A study is underway to understand options for transfer of material into SSBs, buffer/interim storage locations, treatment/conditioning processes and transport to the GDF. This work forms the basis of a prioritised road-map for the development of routes for study material groups aligned with ongoing and existing planned technical work, which is a pre-requisite to strategy development. The ultimate output of the study will be identification of full life cycle management strategies for metallic uranic material from an enterprise perspective. The combination of this strategic work and ongoing technical work will underpin a series of decisions to divert sub-groups of uranic material away from currently assumed baseline routes in support of earliest practicable hazard and risk reduction. Hence, each decision will reduce the scope of a placeholder future uranic fuel treatment capability, which will diminish the associated British Pound 1 bn capital cost. To date, a technical case for interim storage of uranic material in SSBs has been substantiated for around two thirds of the study materials. The requirement for a new strategy at Sellafield was driven by technical development of SSBs in response to the needs of one programme, but this prompted the study into the potential utilisation of SSBs in order to derive benefit for the wider enterprise and across the NDA estate. (authors)

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Anaerobic Storage and Conversion of Microalgal Biomass to Manage Seasonal Variation in Cultivation

Seasonal variation in microalgal biomass production is a well-known challenge when optimizing economics for algal fuel conversion, especially given the fluctuation in biomass production between winter and summer. Wet storage offers significant potential for cost and energy savings compared to dewatering and dry storage. This study demonstrates the feasibility of preserving harvested Scenedesmus acutus biomass through wet anaerobic storage for use in biochemical conversion. Anaerobic storage effectively preserved biomass with minimal degradation of carbohydrates and preservation of lipids and proteins. Screening experiments identified optimal pretreatment conditions for stored biomass. Scale-up of pretreatment enabled fermentation of the hydrolysate to butyric acid and indicated no observable difference in conversion between unstored and stored biomass. Lipid extraction improved by a relative 12% for stored biomass. These results suggest that wet anaerobic storage can effectively manage seasonal variation in biomass production and is compatible with biochemical approaches for biofuel production.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Development of a novel ultrasonic temperature probe for long-term monitoring of dry cask storage systems

With the recent cancellation of the Yucca Mountain repository and the limited availability of wet storage utilities for spent nuclear fuel (SNF), more attention has been directed toward dry cask storage systems (DCSSs) for long-term storage of SNF. Consequently, more stringent guidelines have been issued for the aging management of dry storage facilities that necessitate monitoring of the conditions of DCSSs. Continuous health monitoring of DCSSs based on temperature variations is one viable method for assessing the integrity of the system. In the present work, a novel ultrasonic temperature probe (UTP) is being tested for long-term online temperature monitoring of DCSSs. Its performance was evaluated and compared with type N thermocouple (NTC) and resistance temperature detector (RTD) using a small-scale dry storage canister mockup. Our preliminary results demonstrate that the UTP system developed at Argonne is able to achieve better than 0.8 Degree-Sign C accuracy, tested at temperatures of up to 400 Degree-Sign C. The temperature resolution is limited only by the sampling rate of the current system. The flexibility of the probe allows conforming to complex geometries thus making the sensor particularly suited to measurement scenarios where access is limited.

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Safety Aspects of Dry Spent Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Management - 13559

Dry storage systems are characterized by passive and inherent safety systems ensuring safety even in case of severe incidents or accidents. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of such passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more and more obvious. As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Following safety aspects must be achieved throughout the storage period: - safe enclosure of radioactive materials, - safe removal of decay heat, - securing nuclear criticality safety, - avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. Furthermore, transport capability must be guaranteed during and after storage as well as limitation and control of radiation exposure. The safe enclosure of radioactive materials in dry storage casks can be achieved by a double-lid sealing system with surveillance of the sealing system. The safe removal of decay heat must be ensured by the design of the storage containers and the storage facility. The safe confinement of radioactive inventory has to be ensured by mechanical integrity of fuel assembly structures. This is guaranteed, e.g. by maintaining the mechanical integrity of the fuel rods or by additional safety measures for defective fuel rods. In order to ensure nuclear critically safety, possible effects of accidents have also to be taken into consideration. In case of dry storage it might be necessary to exclude the re-positioning of fissile material inside the container and/or neutron moderator exclusion might be taken into account. Unnecessary radiation exposure can be avoided by the cask or canister vault system itself. In Germany dry storage of SF in casks fulfills both transport and storage requirements. Mostly, storage facilities are designed as concrete buildings above the ground, but due to regional constraints, one storage facility has also been built as a rock tunnel. The decay heat is always removed by natural air flow; further technical equipment is not needed. The removal of decay heat and shielding had been modeled and calculated by state-of-the-art computer codes before such a facility has been built. TueV and BAM present their long experience in the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Different storage systems and facilities in Germany, Europe and world-wide are compared with respect to the safety aspects mentioned above. Initial points are the safety issues of wet storage of SF, and it is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. The German storage concept for dry storage of SF and HLW is presented and discussed. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Vacuum drying of spent fuel storage canisters/casks - 'just how much water could be left in there, anyway?' - 15233

The process of moving spent fuel assemblies from wet storage in the spent fuel pool to dry storage in an inert gas environment within a canister or cask typically involves two main stages. In the first stage, the bulk of the water is removed by a draining or siphoning operation, conducted with pressure inside the canister maintained at 1.3 to 2 atm. This process removes most of the water in the cask cavity, but residual water can be left behind, in three main regions. The largest region, typically, is the bottom of the cavity below the end of the siphon tube. A second general class of locations, also located at the bottom of the cask cavity, consists of the 'dashpots' at the ends of the various non-fuel tubular structures within the fuel assemblies. For PWR assemblies, these are the control rod guide sleeve tubes and instrumentation thimbles. For BWR assemblies, these are the water rods of various designs and control blade ends in some configurations. A third class of locations consists of porous material within the cavity that can absorb water, such as thin ceramic neutron poison plates, and ostensibly intact fuel rods that nevertheless might have pinholes or fine cracks in the cladding that could allow pool water to creep inside the fuel rod. To remove residual water from these locations, the second stage of drying operations utilizes vacuum drying, by reducing the pressure sufficiently to convert the water to vapor that can then be pumped out of the canister cavity. In this operation, the cask cavity pressure is slowly reduced from the nominal condition of (1.3-2.0 atm (1000-1520 torr), to a final target pressure below 3 torr (0.004 atm). This is typically accomplished in three to five stages, with prescribed 'hold' points defined in procedures or in the Technical Specifications, to preclude sudden pressure spikes due to flashing of water to steam, or development of large local temperature gradients in the fuel rods or other cask internal components. This paper discusses the various locations in the system where residual water may 'hang up' in the cask, and presents a discussion of the physical basis for the effectiveness of vacuum drying for removing it. Results and conclusions based on realistic qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the transient heat transfer behavior of the system are presented, based on detailed modeling of a range of spent fuel canister designs and decay heat loads, most notably the 24P Dry Shielded Canisters (DSCs) stored at the Rancho Seco Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), the NAC-MPC modules at Maine Yankee, the 24P DSCs stored at Calvert Cliffs, and the Holtec HI-STORM modules at Hope Creek. The evaluations presented here show that ice formation within a spent fuel canister is highly unlikely, due to the availability of a large thermal source term in the form of the decay heat load of the spent fuel. The formation of ice is an operational concern, since it mainly affects operation of equipment external to the canister (i.e., the hoses, valves, and fittings of the vacuum drying equipment.) Evaluations are presented for quantifying the amount of residual water that could remain in the cask cavity, even after successful drying operations, since vacuum drying is a limit process, and by definition, cannot remove all of the water from the cavity, no matter how long the operation goes on, even if all of it is in vapor form. (authors)

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The united kingdom's changing requirements for spent fuel storage

The UK is adopting an open fuel cycle, and is necessarily moving to a regime of long term storage of spent fuel, followed by geological disposal once a geological disposal facility (GDF) is available. The earliest GDF receipt date for legacy spent fuel is assumed to be 2075. The UK is set to embark on a programme of new nuclear build to maintain a nuclear energy contribution of 16 GW. Additionally, the UK are considering a significant expansion of nuclear energy in order to meet carbon reduction targets and it is plausible to foresee a scenario where up to 75 GW from nuclear power production could be deployed in the UK by the mid 21. century. Such an expansion, could lead to spent fuel storage and its disposal being a dominant issue for the UK Government, the utilities and the public. If the UK were to transition a closed fuel cycle, then spent fuel storage should become less onerous depending on the timescales. The UK has demonstrated a preference for wet storage of spent fuel on an interim basis. The UK has adopted an approach of centralised storage, but a 16 GW new build programme and any significant expansion of this may push the UK towards distributed spent fuel storage at a number of reactors station sites across the UK.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Update on Parallel Process Execution in the Next Generation System Analysis Model

As of the end of 2021, 88,880 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) (44,741 MTHM in dry storage; 44,139 MTHM in wet storage) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) were stored at various reactor sites across the United States [1]. The Office of Storage and Transportation in the Department of Energy is planning for the transportation, storage, and eventual disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). To aid in this effort and inform decision-makers about the backend of the spent fuel cycle, systems analysis tools capable of analyzing the various options with respect to SNF and HLW management are being used as well as continuously improved to meet the evolving needs of the program. System analysts typically use these tools to vary underlying assumptions (shipping rates, allocation priority, available facilities, start dates, etc.) and study the implications of these changes on site clearance schedules, campaign costs, transportation infrastructure acquisition, etc.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safety of interim storage solutions of used nuclear fuel during extended term

In 2013, the total amount of stored used nuclear fuel (UNF) in the world will reach 225,000 T HM. The UNF inventory in wet storage will take up over 80% of the available total spent fuel pool (SFP) capacity. Interim storage solutions are needed. They give flexibility to the nuclear operators and ensure that nuclear reactors continue to operate. However, we need to keep in mind that they are also an easy way to differ final decision and implementation of a UNF management approach (recycling or final disposal). In term of public perception, they can have a negative impact overtime as it may appear that nuclear industry may have significant issues to resolve. In countries lacking an integrated UNF management approach, the UNF are being discharged from the SFPs to interim storage (mostly to dry storage) at the same rate as UNF is being discharged from reactors, as the SFPs at the reactor sites are becoming full. This is now the case in USA, Taiwan, Switzerland, Spain, South Africa and Germany. For interim storage, AREVA has developed different solutions in order to allow the continued operation of reactors while meeting the current requirements of Safety Authorities: -) Dry storage canisters on pads, -) Dual-purpose casks (dry storage and transportation), -) Vault dry storage, and -) Centralized pool storage.

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Technical basis for extending storage of the UK's advanced gas-cooled reactor fuel

The UK Nuclear Decommissioning Agency has recently declared a date for cessation of reprocessing of oxide fuel from the UK's Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs). This will fundamentally change the management of AGR fuel: from short term storage followed by reprocessing to long term fuel storage followed, in all likelihood, by geological disposal. In terms of infrastructure, the UK has an existing, modern wet storage asset that can be adapted for centralised long term storage of dismantled AGR fuel under the required pond water chemistry. No AGR dry stores exist, although small quantities of fuel have been stored dry as part of experimental programmes in the past. These experimental programmes have shown concerns about corrosion rates.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Dry Storage of Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel - 13321

Spent fuel from domestic and foreign research reactors is received and stored at the Savannah River Site's L Area Material Storage (L Basin) Facility. This DOE-owned fuel consists primarily of highly enriched uranium in metal, oxide or silicide form with aluminum cladding. Upon receipt, the fuel is unloaded and transferred to basin storage awaiting final disposition. Disposition alternatives include processing via the site's H Canyon facility for uranium recovery, or packaging and shipment of the spent fuel to a waste repository. A program has been developed to provide a phased approach for dry storage of the L Basin fuel. The initial phase of the dry storage program will demonstrate loading, drying, and storage of fuel in twelve instrumented canisters to assess fuel performance. After closure, the loaded canisters are transferred to pad-mounted concrete overpacks, similar to those used for dry storage of commercial fuel. Unlike commercial spent fuel, however, the DOE fuel has high enrichment, very low to high burnup, and low decay heat. The aluminum cladding presents unique challenges due to the presence of an oxide layer that forms on the cladding surface, and corrosion degradation resulting from prolonged wet storage. The removal of free and bound water is essential to the prevention of fuel corrosion and radiolytic generation of hydrogen. The demonstration will validate models predicting pressure, temperature, gas generation, and corrosion performance, provide an engineering scale demonstration of fuel handling, drying, leak testing, and canister backfill operations, and establish 'road-ready' storage of fuel that is suitable for offsite repository shipment or retrievable for onsite processing. Implementation of the Phase I demonstration can be completed within three years. Phases II and III, leading to the de-inventory of L Basin, would require an additional 750 canisters and 6-12 years to complete. Transfer of the fuel from basin storage to dry storage requires integration with current facility operations, and selection of equipment that will allow safe operation within the constraints of existing facility conditions. Examples of such constraints that are evaluated and addressed by the dry storage program include limited basin depth, varying fuel lengths up to 4 m, (13 ft), fissile loading limits, canister closure design, post-load drying and closure of the canisters, instrument selection and installation, and movement of the canisters to storage casks. The initial pilot phase restricts the fuels to shorter length fuels that can be loaded to the canister directly underwater; subsequent phases will require use of a shielded transfer system. Removal of the canister from the basin, followed by drying, inerting, closure of the canister, and transfer of the canister to the storage cask are completed with remotely operated equipment and appropriate shielding to reduce personnel radiation exposure. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗