DOE OSTI2024
The United States and European countries are unlikely to collectively approve of sanctions against Russian exports of nuclear fuel assemblies and uranium in the near term despite the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Rather than bearing the costs that cutting off Russian imports would have on domestic nuclear energy production, the United States and European countries are more likely to prefer developing alternative supply chains of nuclear fuel and enriched uranium to reduce dependence on Russian resources. This outlook is primarily based on two areas of evaluation: (1) comparison of the Russian-made reactor fuel supply chain within the European Union (EU) in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea and in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine, and (2) the dependence of France and the United States on Russia’s exports of enriched uranium. Additionally, the potential impacts to Kazakh uranium exports if trade routes for nuclear resources through Russia became unavailable were considered as an additional factor in the push for disentanglement from Russian nuclear resources. This work utilized BACI, a database of harmonized international trade data at the product level drawn from the United Nations Comtrade Database and created by the French international economics research institute CEPII.1 Comparisons of imports and exports were based on the trade value in U.S. dollars as reported in BACI instead of the quantity of the traded product. This evaluation only considers import and export data up until 2021, since the trade data for 2022 is incomplete within the Comtrade Database for several of the key countries presented in this work, including Australia, Canada, Namibia, Niger, and Russia.