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Technology Readiness Level (TRL) as the foundation of Human Readiness Level (HRL)

As space programs became more complex, it became evident to NASA that a means of defining a methodological way to evaluate the maturity of technologies for spacecraft design was needed for risk assessment that could affect technical, cost and schedule. NASA first saw that infusing technology intoNASA programs required some means to assess technology maturity like flight readiness for a mission. Hence, a seven-point technology readiness level scale was developed in the mid-70s by a NASA researcher and later formally defined in 1989 (Sadin et al., 1989) that comprised of seven levels (See Table 1). These levels provided a definitive meaning of what complexity a research and technology development program should be followed. NASA recognized the approach as a useful way of an effective assessment of,and communication regarding the maturity of new technologies, using a simplistic figure of merit, the state of maturity of a technology-particularly, critical technology necessary to meet a mission/application objective

George Salazar↗

Recent Experiences of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) GN and C Technical Discipline Team (TDT)

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), initially formed in 2003, is an independently funded NASA Program whose dedicated team of technical experts provides objective engineering and safety assessments of critical, high risk projects. The GN&C Technical Discipline Team (TDT) is one of fifteen such discipline-focused teams within the NESC organization. The TDT membership is composed of GN&C specialists from across NASA and its partner organizations in other government agencies, industry, national laboratories, and universities. This paper will briefly define the vision, mission, and purpose of the NESC organization. The role of the GN&C TDT will then be described in detail along with an overview of how this team operates and engages in its objective engineering and safety assessments of critical NASA projects. This paper will then describe selected recent experiences, over the period 2007 to present, of the GN&C TDT in which they directly performed or supported a wide variety of NESC assessments and consultations.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

Risk to the public from carbon fibers released in civil aircraft accidents

Because carbon fibers are strong, stiff, and lightweight, they are attractive for use in composite structures. Because they also have high electrical conductivity, free carbon fibers settling on electrical conductors can cause malfunctions. If released from the composite by burning, the fibers may become a hazard to exposed electrical and electronic equipment. As part of a Federal study of the potential hazard associated with the use of carbon fibers, NASA assessed the public risk associated with crash fire accidents of civil aircraft. The NASA study projected a dramatic increase in the use of carbon composites in civil aircraft and developed technical data to support the risk assessment. Personal injury was found to be extremely unlikely. In 1993, the year chosen as a focus for the study, the expected annual cost of damage caused by released carbon fibers is only $1000. Even the worst-case carbon fiber incident simulated (costing $178,000 once in 34,000 years) was relatively low-cost compared with the usual air transport accident cost. On the basis of these observations, the NASA study concluded that exploitation of composites should continue, that additional protection of avionics is unnecessary, and that development of alternate materials specifically to overcome this problem is not justified.

Source record↗

Evaluation of a Shuttle Derived Vehicle (SDV) for Cargo Transportation

In this new era of space exploration, a host of launch vehicles are being examined for possible use in transporting cargo and crew to low Earth orbit and beyond. Launch vehicles derived from the Space Shuttle Program (SSP), known as Shuttle Derived Vehicles (SDVs), are prime candidates for heavy-lift duty because of their potential to minimize non-recurring costs and because the Shuttle can leverage off proven high-performance flight systems with established ground and flight support. To determine the merits of SDVs, a detailed evaluation was performed. This evaluation included a trade study and risk assessment of options based on performance, safety reliability, cost, operations, and evolution. The purpose of this paper is to explain the approach, processes, and tools used to evaluate launch vehicles for heavy lift cargo transportation. The process included defining the trade space, characterizing the concepts, analyzing the systems, and scoring the options. The process also included a review by subject experts from NASA and industry to compare past and recent study data and assess the risks. A set of technical performance measures (TPMs) was generated based on the study requirements and constraints. Tools such as INTROS and POST were used to calculate performance, FIRST was used for prediction of reliability, and other software packages, both commercial and NASA-owned, were applied to study the trade space. By following a clear process and using the right tools a thorough assessment was performed. An SDV can be classified as either a side-mount vehicle (SMV) or an in-line vehicle OLV). An SMV is a Space Shuttle where the Orbiter is replaced by a cargo carrier. An ILV is comprised of a modified Shuttle External Tank (ET) with engines mounted to the bottom and cargo mounted atop. For both families of vehicles, Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) are attached to the ET. The first derivate of Shuttle is defined as the vehicle with minimum changes necessary to transform the Space Shuttle into an SDV. Deltas from the first derivate were also formulated to study more SDV options. Examples of deltas include replacing the SRBs with larger and/or more SRBs, adding an upper stage, increasing the size of the ET, changing the engines, and modifying the elements. Challenges for SDV range from tailoring infrastructure to meeting the exploration schedule. Although SDV is based on the Space Shuttle, it still includes development risk for designing and building a Cargo Carrier. There are also performance challenges in that Shuttle is not optimized for cargo-only missions, but it is a robust system built on reusability. Balancing the strengths and weaknesses of the Shuttle to meet Lunar and Mars mission objectives provides the framework for an informative trade study. SDV was carefully analyzed and the results of the study provide invaluable data for use in the new exploration initiative.

Roman, Jose M.↗

Learning from Experience Case Studies of the Hyper-X Project

The Hyper-X project (X-43A) provides a number of "lessons learned" which can be applied to other aerospace project. The specific areas examined were the selection of the goals of the Hyper-X. How the technical unknowns and assumptions were handled. The final lesson was the ambiguous nature of risk assessment, and how trying to remove a technical unknown can have unintended consequences.

Peebles, Curtis↗

TA-13: Ground and Launch Systems, 2015 NASA Technology Roadmaps

This presentation is a summary of new content contained in the 2015 update of Technology Area-13, Ground and Launch Systems technology roadmap beyond the content contained in the 2010 version. Also included are brief assessments of benefits, alignments, challenges, technical risk and reasonableness, sequencing and timing, and time and effort to achieve goals. This presentation is part of overall presentations of new content only for the 2015 update of the 15 NASA Technology Roadmaps that will be conducted in a public forum managed by the National Research Council on September 28-29, 2015. The 15 roadmaps have already been publically released via the STI process.

decision-making tools↗

Lessons Learned from Recent Space Flight Assessments

This paper highlights four space flight assessments, each with an important lesson. The first assessment points to the challenge of material substitution for weight saving. Space Shuttle’s external tank stringers were changed from Al 2024 to Al 2090 without comprehensive analysis. Lack of understanding the low Short-Transverse (S-T) strength associated with Al 2090 led to widespread cracking. The second assessment addresses the failure to understand that time-dependent relationships and loading interactions of multiple disciplines can lead to non-conservative results. An aerodynamic test article of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Launch Abort System (LAS) was analyzed for worst-case single discipline loads, showing positive structural margins. When disciplines were combined with time dependent loading, the analysis resulted in negative margins. The third assessment highlights the pitfalls of putting blind trust in historical architecture. The MPCV re-entry heat shield adopted the Apollo design approach despite fundamental differences between the two designs (e.g., the underlying substructure design, material differences, scale, and geometry). Manufacturing resulted in cracking along seams of the cured MPCV heat shield and produced lower mechanical properties of the Avcoat witness panels. Subsequently, the design was changed to a block architecture, which introduced unperceived technical, cost, and schedule risk. The fourth assessment shows how the lack of a comprehensive investigation of design modifications and inappropriate Finite Element Analyses (FEA) can lead to trouble. A mass reduction campaign eliminated highly critical internal struts on the ISS Node-1 pressurized module based on inadequate and uncorrelated FEA. High strains were noted and ignored as a modeling aberration. A system level high fidelity FEA discovered large plastic strains in the gussets of all four radial ports. These findings initiated a full-scale test campaign, new test correlated assembly-level FEA, and significant design modifications.

James P Smith↗

Aerospace Systems Design in NASA's Collaborative Engineering Environment

Past designs of complex aerospace systems involved an environment consisting of collocated design teams with project managers, technical discipline experts, and other experts (e.g. manufacturing and systems operations). These experts were generally qualified only on the basis of past design experience and typically had access to a limited set of integrated analysis tools. These environments provided less than desirable design fidelity, often lead to the inability of assessing critical programmatic and technical issues (e.g., cost risk, technical impacts), and generally derived a design that was not necessarily optimized across the entire system. The continually changing, modern aerospace industry demands systems design processes that involve the best talent available (no matter where it resides) and access to the best design and analysis tools. A solution to these demands involves a design environment referred to as collaborative engineering. The collaborative engineering environment evolving within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a capability that enables the Agency's engineering infrastructure to interact and use the best state-of-the-art tools and data across organizational boundaries. Using collaborative engineering, the collocated team is replaced with an interactive team structure where the team members are geographically distributed and the best engineering talent can be applied to the design effort regardless of physical location. In addition, a more efficient, higher quality design product is delivered by bringing together the best engineering talent with more up-to-date design and analysis tools. These tools are focused on interactive, multidisciplinary design and analysis with emphasis on the complete life cycle of the system, and they include nontraditional, integrated tools for life cycle cost estimation and risk assessment. NASA has made substantial progress during the last two years in developing a collaborative engineering environment. NASA is planning to use this collaborative engineering infrastructure to provide better aerospace systems life cycle design and analysis, which includes analytical assessment of the technical and programmatic aspects of a system from "cradle to grave." This paper describes the recent NASA developments in the area of collaborative engineering, the benefits (realized and anticipated) of using the developed capability, and the long-term plans for implementing this capability across the Agency.

Monell, Donald W.↗

Aerospace Systems Design in NASA's Collaborative Engineering Environment

Past designs of complex aerospace systems involved an environment consisting of collocated design teams with project managers, technical discipline experts, and other experts (e.g., manufacturing and systems operation). These experts were generally qualified only on the basis of past design experience and typically had access to a limited set of integrated analysis tools. These environments provided less than desirable design fidelity, often lead to the inability of assessing critical programmatic and technical issues (e.g., cost, risk, technical impacts), and generally derived a design that was not necessarily optimized across the entire system. The continually changing, modern aerospace industry demands systems design processes that involve the best talent available (no matter where it resides) and access to the the best design and analysis tools. A solution to these demands involves a design environment referred to as collaborative engineering. The collaborative engineering environment evolving within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a capability that enables the Agency's engineering infrastructure to interact and use the best state-of-the-art tools and data across organizational boundaries. Using collaborative engineering, the collocated team is replaced with an interactive team structure where the team members are geographical distributed and the best engineering talent can be applied to the design effort regardless of physical location. In addition, a more efficient, higher quality design product is delivered by bringing together the best engineering talent with more up-to-date design and analysis tools. These tools are focused on interactive, multidisciplinary design and analysis with emphasis on the complete life cycle of the system, and they include nontraditional, integrated tools for life cycle cost estimation and risk assessment. NASA has made substantial progress during the last two years in developing a collaborative engineering environment. NASA is planning to use this collaborative engineering engineering infrastructure to provide better aerospace systems life cycle design and analysis, which includes analytical assessment of the technical and programmatic aspects of a system from "cradle to grave." This paper describes the recent NASA developments in the area of collaborative engineering, the benefits (realized and anticipated) of using the developed capability, and the long-term plans for implementing this capability across Agency.

Monell, Donald W.↗

Aggregate Risk Tool for Human Space Flight

This tool utilizes Data fusion capabilities developed from the 2020-2022 Information Fusion (IFDA) IRAD to enhance functionality of a Human Spaceflight (HSF) Aggregate Risk Product developed by the JSC Flight Safety Office. The tool compiles and present risk data from multiple Program and Commercial Provider sources to provide a holistic assessment for Program Managers and Technical Authorities to evaluate residual risk prior to HSF Launches. The aggregation, or coupling of risks from multiple sources (Ex: PRA, variances, anomaly data bases, CRM data, technical review board minutes, Hazard Analysis, etc.) identifies areas of elevated risk in components, systems or mission phases that would otherwise be undetected by non-integrated program risk management tools and possesses. Data is then displayed in an interactive user interface/dashboard that enables users to see potential areas of concern requiring more in-depth analysis.

Patrick M Huckaby↗

NASA Earned Value Management (EVM) Update

Earned Value Management (EVM) is an integrated management control system for assessing, understanding and qualifying what a project is achieving with the resoures. EVM integrates technical cost and schedules with risk management. It allows objective assessment and quantification of current project performance, and helps predict future performance-based trents.

Kerby, Jerald↗

Risk Management of NASA Projects

Various NASA Langley Research Center and other center projects were attempted for analysis to obtain historical data comparing pre-phase A study and the final outcome for each project. This attempt, however, was abandoned once it became clear that very little documentation was available. Next, extensive literature search was conducted on the role of risk and reliability concepts in project management. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are being used with increasing regularity both in and outside of NASA. The value and the usage of PRA techniques were reviewed for large projects. It was found that both civilian and military branches of the space industry have traditionally refrained from using PRA, which was developed and expanded by nuclear industry. Although much has changed with the end of the cold war and the Challenger disaster, it was found that ingrained anti-PRA culture is hard to stop. Examples of skepticism against the use of risk management and assessment techniques were found both in the literature and in conversations with some technical staff. Program and project managers need to be convinced that the applicability and use of risk management and risk assessment techniques is much broader than just in the traditional safety-related areas of application. The time has come to begin to uniformly apply these techniques. The whole idea of risk-based system can maximize the 'return on investment' that the public demands. Also, it would be very useful if all project documents of NASA Langley Research Center, pre-phase A through final report, are carefully stored in a central repository preferably in electronic format.

Sarper, Hueseyin↗

The Role of Independent Assessment in the International Space Station Program

This paper presents the role of Independent Assessment in the International Space Station (ISS) Program. Independent Assessment is responsible for identifying and specifying technical and programmatic risks that may impact development, launch, and on-orbit assembly and operations of the ISS. The various phases of the assessment process are identified and explained. This paper also outlines current and future participation by Independent Assessment in Human Exploration and Development of Space projects including the X-38 Space Plane, Mars mission scenarios, and applications of Nanotechnology. This paper describes how Independent Assessment helps the shuttle, ISS, and other programs to safely achieve mission goals now and into the next century.

Strachan, Russell L.↗

Use of System Safety Risk Assessments for the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)

This paper discusses the System Safety approach used to assess risk for the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). Previous to the first RSRM flight in the fall of 1988, all systems were analyzed extensively to assure that hazards were identified, assessed and that the baseline risk was understood and appropriately communicated. Since the original RSRM baseline was established, Thiokol and NASA have implemented a number of initiatives that have further improved the RSRM. The robust design, completion of rigorous testing and flight success of the RSRM has resulted in a wise reluctance to make changes. One of the primary assessments required to accompany the documentation of each proposed change and aid in the decision making process is a risk assessment. Documentation supporting proposed changes, including the risk assessments from System Safety, are reviewed and assessed by Thiokol and NASA technical management. After thorough consideration, approved changes are implemented adding improvements to and reducing risk of the Space Shuttle RSRM.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.↗

Technology Readiness Assessment for Stirling Power Convertor

Stirling-based power conversion system could represent a critical enabling technology for future NASA missions, offering significantly enhanced power efficiency over traditional thermoelectric systems. To ensure the successful infusion of this technology into deep space and planetary surface missions, a rigorous evaluation of its maturity and associated risks is essential. The objective of this Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) is to determine the current technology readiness level (TRL) of the Stirling power convertor and identify key technical risks and challenges associated with its maturation and potential infusion into a targeted flight system. The evaluation process will rigorously follow the NASA TRA procedure: (1) determining the requirements that underpin the design, function, and performance; (2) finding and listing all new technology elements (NTEs) and critical technology elements (CTEs); (3) identifying the level of integration assumed for the assessment; and (4) assessing the TRL for each NTE and CTE. The overall subassembly TRL will then be determined via a roll-up using the “weakest link” criterion, culminating in a final (5) assessment of risks to further progression of maturity. This paper will present the results of a comprehensive technology readiness assessment (TRA) conducted on the Stirling-based dynamic power conversion subassembly, excluding the radioisotope heat source. The paper will also describe a detailed breakdown of the TRL roll-up and a matrix of identified risks and recommended mitigation paths, along with identified key technical risks and challenges to achieve the required long-duration performance. Key Words: Radioisotope Power Conversion, Technology Readiness Assessment

Radioisotope Power Conversion↗

Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking Conference, volume 2

Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking (ARD) will be a requirement for future space programs. Clear examples include satellite servicing, repair, recovery, and reboost in the near term, and the longer range lunar and planetary exploration programs. ARD will permit more aggressive unmanned space activities, while providing a valuable operational capability for manned missions. The purpose of the conference is to identify the technologies required for an on-orbit demonstration of ARD, assess the maturity of those technologies, and provide the necessary insight for a quality assessment of programmatic management, technical, schedule, and cost risks.

Source record↗

Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking Conference, volume 3

This document consists of the presentation submitted at the Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking (ARD) Conference. The document contains three volumes: ARD hardware technology; ARD software technology; and ARD operations. The purpose of this conference is to identify the technologies required for an on orbit demonstration of ARD, assess the maturity of these technologies, and provide the necessary insight for a quality assessment of programmatic management, technical, schedule, and cost risks.

Source record↗

NASA's Gravitational-Wave Mission Concept Study

With the conclusion of the NASA/ESA partnership on the Laser interferometer Space Antenna (LISA) Project, NASA initiated a study to explore mission concepts that will accomplish some or all of the LISA science objectives at lower cost. The Gravitational-Wave Mission Concept Study consists of a public Request for Information (RFI), a Core Team of NASA engineers and scientists, a Community Science Team, a Science Task Force, and an open workshop. The RFI yielded 12 mission concepts, 3 instrument concepts and 2 technologies. The responses ranged from concepts that eliminated the drag-free test mass of LISA to concepts that replace the test mass with an atom interferometer. The Core Team reviewed the noise budgets and sensitivity curves, the payload and spacecraft designs and requirements, orbits and trajectories and technical readiness and risk. The Science Task Force assessed the science performance. Three mission concepts have been studied by Team-X, JPL's concurrent design facility, to refine the conceptual design, evaluate key performance parameters, assess risk and estimate cost and schedule. The status of the Study are reported.

Stebbins, Robin↗