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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1991

Explaining patterns in the ratification of global environmental treaties

A study was made of the ratification behavior of 160 countries with respect to 38 global environmental treaties. The study identifies and explains patterns in the ratification of treaties, providing two means of assessing the likelihood that any given country will support global environmental treaties. National ratification totals reveal a pattern of high ratification by countries in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. A country's standing within the range of high to low ratification rates can be explained by the statistical model developed in the study. This research allows one to identify countries likely to support global environmental treaties.

Cook, David W.↗
DOE OSTI2014

EXAMINING THE ROLE AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL FOR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL TREATY VERIFICATION

Traditional arms control treaty verification activities typically involve a combination of technical measurements via physical and chemical sensors, state declarations, political agreements, and on-site inspections involving international subject matter experts. However, the ubiquity of the internet, and the electronic sharing of data that it enables, has made available a wealth of open source information with the potential to benefit verification efforts. Open source information is already being used by organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the verification of state-declared information, prepare inspectors for in-field activities, and to maintain situational awareness . The recent explosion in social media use has opened new doors to exploring the attitudes, moods, and activities around a given topic. Social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, offer an opportunity for individuals, as well as institutions, to participate in a global conversation at minimal cost. Social media data can also provide a more data-rich environment, with text data being augmented with images, videos, and location data. The research described in this paper investigates the utility of applying social media signatures as potential arms control and nonproliferation treaty verification tools and technologies, as determined through a series of case studies. The treaty relevant events that these case studies touch upon include detection of undeclared facilities or activities, determination of unknown events recorded by the International Monitoring System (IMS), and the global media response to the occurrence of an Indian missile launch. The case studies examine how social media can be used to fill an information gap and provide additional confidence to a verification activity. The case studies represent, either directly or through a proxy, instances where social media information may be available that could potentially augment the evaluation of an event. The goal of this paper is to instigate a discussion within the verification community as to where and how social media can be effectively utilized to complement and enhance traditional treaty verification efforts. In addition, this paper seeks to identify areas of future research and development necessary to adapt social media analytic tools and techniques, and to form the seed for social media analytics to aid and inform arms control and nonproliferation policymakers and analysts. While social media analysis (as well as open source analysis as a whole) will not ever be able to replace traditional arms control verification measures, they do supply unique signatures that can augment existing analysis.

nonproliferation, arms control, social media↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Arms Control Treaties with Resonance Phenomena

Nuclear disarmament treaties remain insufficient to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. Here we present a review of concepts involving isotope-specific resonance processes, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) [1] and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [2, 3], used to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain by the addition of an encrypting filter to the target, leading to measurements with an outcome similar to an equation with two unknowns. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments we show that the measurements readily detect hoaxing attempt, while no vital isotopic or geometric information about the weapon is released. These nuclear techniques can be used to dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Treaties and Arms Control [Slides]

This presentations provides an overview of arms control including aims and methods of arms control, the treaty process, treaties, new START inspections, and future treaty considerations: strategic vs. nonstrategic.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Portal Monitoring Considerations for Treaty Verification Applications

Portal monitoring is one method in a suite of options for treaty verification and can assist in verification of treaty accountable items (TAIs). Portal monitor technology spans a wide range of sensors, including radiation detectors, break-beams, or weight sensors. For radiation-detecting portal monitors, they are able to confirm absence / presence of a radiological signature and to track TAI direction of motion. Portal monitoring uses measurements from strategically placed sensors (e.g., radiation detectors) to record the entry or egress of TAIs. The implementation of portal monitoring relies on three key elements: perimeter definition, portal locations, and sensor technology, and can be implemented in either time-bound or continuous operations depending on what is permitted by the Treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Linear models to perform treaty verification tasks for enhanced information security

Linear mathematical models were applied to binary-discrimination tasks relevant to arms control verification measurements in which a host party wishes to convince a monitoring party that an item is or is not treaty accountable. These models process data in list-mode format and can compensate for the presence of variability in the source, such as uncertain object orientation and location. The Hotelling observer applies an optimal set of weights to binned detector data, yielding a test statistic that is thresholded to make a decision. The channelized Hotelling observer applies a channelizing matrix to the vectorized data, resulting in a lower dimensional vector available to the monitor to make decisions. We demonstrate how incorporating additional terms in this channelizing-matrix optimization offers benefits for treaty verification. We present two methods to increase shared information and trust between the host and monitor. The first method penalizes individual channel performance in order to maximize the information available to the monitor while maintaining optimal performance. Second, we present a method that penalizes predefined sensitive information while maintaining the capability to discriminate between binary choices. Data used in this study was generated using Monte Carlo simulations for fission neutrons, accomplished with the GEANT4 toolkit. Custom models for plutonium inspection objects were measured in simulation by a radiation imaging system. Model performance was evaluated and presented using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty seismic monitoring: 2012 USNAS report and recent explosions, earthquakes, and other seismic sources

A comprehensive ban on nuclear explosive testing is briefly characterized as an arms control initiative related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The work of monitoring for nuclear explosions uses several technologies of which the most important is seismology-a physics discipline that draws upon extensive and ever-growing assets to monitor for earthquakes and other ground-motion phenomena as well as for explosions. This paper outlines the basic methods of seismic monitoring within that wider context, and lists web-based and other resources for learning details. It also summarizes the main conclusions, concerning capability to monitor for test-ban treaty compliance, contained in a major study published in March 2012 by the US National Academy of Sciences.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2011

Measurement of 37Ar to support technology for On-site Inspection under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

On-Site Inspection (OSI) is a key component of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Measurements of radionuclide isotopes created by an underground nuclear explosion are a valuable signature of a Treaty violation. Argon-37 is produced from neutron interaction with calcium in soil, 40Ca(n,α)37Ar. For OSI, the 35-day half-life of 37Ar provides both high specific activity and sufficient time for completion of an inspection before decay limits sensitivity. This paper presents a low-background internal-source gas proportional counter with an 37Ar measurement sensitivity level equivalent to 45.1 mBq/SCM in whole air.

CTBT On-site Inspection↗
DOE OSTI2024

Passive high explosive neutron inspection (PHENIX): a new method to confirm the presence or absence of high explosives for nuclear treaty verification

Advanced instruments and methods need to be developed now to create a technical basis to support the negotiation of future nuclear arms control treaties. One new capability that is anticipated is the ability to confirm either the declared presence or declared absence of high explosive (HE) material in the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Towards this goal, Passive HE Neutron Inspection (PHENIX) has been developed and demonstrated as a method for confirming the presence or absence of HE in the presence of plutonium. The method exploits the inherent presence of neutrons associated with the decay of plutonium as an internal probe source for performing prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA), searching for the presence of HE as revealed by the emission of characteristic gamma rays following neutron absorption in hydrogen and nitrogen which are building blocks of present-day, military-grade HE. Tests using stoichiometrically-correct hemishells of mock HE with plutonium show that a system can be expected to positively confirm the presence or absence of these signatures, supporting determination of HE presence or absence with Pu, in a few hours. To protect other potentially sensitive gamma-ray signatures from a treaty accountable item, an analog information barrier has been conceptualized and tested which physically prevents the collection of gamma-ray spectral data outside of user selected energy windows strategically chosen to view only narrow spectral regions corresponding to the hydrogen (2223.2 keV) and nitrogen (9807.2 keV, 10,318.2 keV, and 10,829.2 keV) PGNAA signatures.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2018

Spectroscopic fast neutron transmission imaging in a treaty verification setting

Measurements of the geometric configuration of objects and their material composition are needed for nuclear treaty verification purposes. We experimentally demonstrate a simple method based on monoenergetic fast neutron transmission to realize crude imaging of the geometric configuration of special nuclear material, confirm its fissionable content, and obtain information on its approximate fissile mass. In the experiment, we used monoenergetic neutrons from D(d, n)3He and T(d, n)4He reactions and a linear array of liquid scintillation detectors to perform spectroscopic neutron imaging of up to 13.7 kg of highly enriched uranium in a spherical geometry. We also show an example of detection of material diversion and confirm the presence of fissionable material based on the measurement of high-energy prompt fission neutrons, including estimating the quantity of material from the comparison of measured and predicted fission neutron emission rate. The combination of crude imaging and fissionable material detection and quantification in a simple approach may be attractive in certain treaty verification scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Book Review: Monitoring compliance with the comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Contributions by the German national data centre edited by Christoph Pilger, Lars Ceranna and Christian Bönnemann

For decades, the nuclear weapons capability of different countries was tracked in part via the interpretation of signals from more than 2000 nuclear test explosions that were conducted in programs of weapons development. The first such explosion took place in July 1945 (in New Mexico, USA, prior to the use of nuclear weapons in World War 2 against Japan). The last nuclear test, prior to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) becoming open for signature in September 1996, was in July 1996 (in China). This treaty, which took nearly forty years to negotiate, has been signed by 184 states as of December 2018, but a few key additional signatures and ratifications are still needed before nuclear tests are banned under international law. The evidence that a nuclear test explosion has occurred can come from electromagnetic, seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasonic waves; and from unusual radionuclides— which can be present in particulate matter and/or as noble gases. Of course there is a vast infrastructure associated with military programs of nuclear weapons development in a limited number of countries. Less well-known, is the existence of a large infrastructure involving national and international efforts to monitor for the possible occurrence of nuclear test explosions, and thus to support CTBT verification. This book does a very good job of explaining much of that work, as it is conducted in practice by a western nation with sophisticated facilities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Optimal Imaging for Treaty Verification

Future arms control treaty verification regimes may use radiation imaging measurements to confirm and track nuclear warheads or other treaty accountable items (TAIs). This project leverages advanced inference methods developed for medical and adaptive imaging to improve task performance in arms control applications. Additionally, we seek a method to acquire and analyze imaging data of declared TAIs without creating an image of those objects or otherwise storing or revealing any classified information. Such a method would avoid the use of classified-information barriers (IB).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2019

Improving prediction of radioactive gas seepage for nuclear testing treaty verification

The length of time it takes for radioactive gases to seep from an underground nuclear test to the ground surface is crucial for verification of nuclear testing treaties, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The identification of short-lived radioactive gases emanating from the ground surface at a suspected nuclear test location could provide “smoking gun” type evidence of a nuclear test. Accurate predictions of radioactive gas arrival time and detection window (duration of time gas concentration is above its detection threshold) are critical for procuring this type of evidence. LANL researchers are working toward improving such predictions in support of the Global Security mission and Information Science & Technology science pillar.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

Policy and Technical Issues Facing a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty. Chapter 14

We report the largest obstacle to creating nuclear weapons, starting with the ones that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has been to make sufficient quantities of fissile materials – highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium – to sustain an explosive fission chain reaction.1 Recognition of this fact has, for more than fifty years, underpinned both the support for and the opposition to adoption of an international treaty banning at a minimum the production of more fissile materials for nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

The Global Diffusion of Societal Verification Tools: A Quantitative Assessment of the Public’s Ability to Engage Nonproliferation Treaty Monitoring

The spread of nuclear and dual-use technologies and the need for more robust, effective and efficient nonproliferation and arms control treaties has led to an increasing need for innovative verification approaches and technologies. This need, paired with advancements in online computing, mobile devices, commercially available satellite imagery and the evolution of online social networks, has led to a resurgence of the concept of societal verification for arms control and nonproliferation treaties. In the event a country accepts its citizens’ assistance in supporting transparency, confidence-building and societal verification, the host government will need a population that is willing and able to participate. While scholarly interest in societal verification continues to grow, social scientific research on the topic is lacking. The aim of this paper is to begin the process of understanding public societal verification capabilities, extend the availability of quantitative research on societal verification and set in motion complementary research to increase the breadth and depth of knowledge on this topic. This paper presents a potential framework and outlines a research roadmap for the development of such a societal verification capability index.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

Five reasons why the US should not withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty

In October 2019, reports emerged that the Trump administration was considering a withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. According to media sources, President Trump has already signed a memorandum to leave the treaty, but the United States has not yet officially initiated the six-month withdrawal process. This article discusses 5 reasons why the U.S. should not withdraw.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2014

Verifying the INF and START treaties

The INF and START Treaties form the basis for constraints on nuclear weapons. Their verification provisions are one of the great success stories of modern arms control and will be an important part of the foundation upon which the verification regime for further constraints on nuclear weapons will be constructed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Optimal imaging for treaty verification FY2014 annual report

FY2014 technical report of our project funded by DNN R&D that leverages advanced inference methods developed for medical and adaptive imaging to address arms control applications. We seek a method to acquire and analyze imaging data of declared treaty-accountable items without creating an image of those objects or otherwise storing or revealing any classified information. Such a method would avoid the use of classified-information barriers. We present our progress on FY2014 tasks defined in our life-cycle plan. We also describe some future work that is part of the continuation of this project in FY2015 and beyond as part of a venture that joins ours with a related PNNL project.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗