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NASA NTRS1997

IV and V Issues in Achieving High Reliability and Safety in Critical Control System Software

Risk analysis and integrated verification and validation are two important elements in a plan for ensuring the safety of critical software systems. We describe an approach we are currently developing for integrating risk analysis, and metrics analysis, and propose a fault predictor that would integrate the results of these activities. Practical difficulties associated with our approach are also discussed, as are limitations of the proposed predictor. We conclude with a discussion of what as been learned to date, and with suggestions for future work.

validation software reliability software risk asse↗

NASA NTRS1993

Development of a methodology for assessing the safety of embedded software systems

A Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) based on an integrated approach to modeling and analyzing the behavior of software-driven embedded systems for assessing and verifying reliability and safety is discussed. DFM is based on an extension of the Logic Flowgraph Methodology to incorporate state transition models. System models which express the logic of the system in terms of causal relationships between physical variables and temporal characteristics of software modules are analyzed to determine how a certain state can be reached. This is done by developing timed fault trees which take the form of logical combinations of static trees relating the system parameters at different point in time. The resulting information concerning the hardware and software states can be used to eliminate unsafe execution paths and identify testing criteria for safety critical software functions.

Garrett, C. J.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Reducing Our Ignorance: Finding Answers to Certain Epistemic Questions for Software Systems

In previous papers, we asserted that software system safety is primarily concerned with epistemic questions, that is, questions concerning knowledge and the degree of confidence that can be placed in that knowledge. We also enumerated a set of 21 foundational epistemic questions, discussed some of the difficulties that exist in answering these questions adequately today, and speculated briefly on possible research that may provide improved confidence in the sufficiency of answers in the future. This paper focuses on three of the foundational questions. For each of these questions, current answers are discussed and potential research is proposed to help increase the justifiable level of confidence.

Holloway, C. Michael↗

NASA NTRS2007

A Software Safety Risk Taxonomy for Use in Retrospective Safety Cases

Safety standards contain technical and process-oriented safely requirements. The best time to include these requirements is early in the development lifecycle of the system. When software safety requirements are levied on a legacy system after the fact, a retrospective safety case will need to be constructed for the software in the system. This can be a difficult task because there may be few to no art facts available to show compliance to the software safely requirements. The risks associated with not meeting safely requirements in a legacy safely-critical computer system must be addressed to give confidence for reuse. This paper introduces a proposal for a software safely risk taxonomy for legacy safely-critical computer systems, by specializing the Software Engineering Institute's 'Software Development Risk Taxonomy' with safely elements and attributes.

Hill, Janice L.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Safety Characteristics in System Application Software for Human Rated Exploration

NASA and its industry and international partners are embarking on a bold and inspiring development effort to design and build an exploration class space system. The space system is made up of the Orion system, the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) system. All are highly coupled together and dependent on each other for the combined safety of the space system. A key area of system safety focus needs to be in the ground and flight application software system (GFAS). In the development, certification and operations of GFAS, there are a series of safety characteristics that define the approach to ensure mission success. This paper will explore and examine the safety characteristics of the GFAS development.

exploration↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Application of Software Safety to the Constellation Program Launch Control System

The application of software safety practices on the LCS project resulted in the successful implementation of the NASA Software Safety Standard NASA-STD-8719.138 and CxP software safety requirements. The GOP-GEN-GSW-011 Hazard Report was the first report developed at KSC to identify software hazard causes and their controls. This approach can be applied to similar large software - intensive systems where loss of control can lead to a hazard.

Kania, James↗

NASA NTRS2003

Building Safer Systems With SpecTRM

System safety, an integral component in software development, often poses a challenge to engineers designing computer-based systems. While the relaxed constraints on software design allow for increased power and flexibility, this flexibility introduces more possibilities for error. As a result, system engineers must identify the design constraints necessary to maintain safety and ensure that the system and software design enforces them. Safeware Engineering Corporation, of Seattle, Washington, provides the information, tools, and techniques to accomplish this task with its Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM). NASA assisted in developing this engineering toolset by awarding the company several Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts with Ames Research Center and Langley Research Center. The technology benefits NASA through its applications for Space Station rendezvous and docking. SpecTRM aids system and software engineers in developing specifications for large, complex safety critical systems. The product enables engineers to find errors early in development so that they can be fixed with the lowest cost and impact on the system design. SpecTRM traces both the requirements and design rationale (including safety constraints) throughout the system design and documentation, allowing engineers to build required system properties into the design from the beginning, rather than emphasizing assessment at the end of the development process when changes are limited and costly.System safety, an integral component in software development, often poses a challenge to engineers designing computer-based systems. While the relaxed constraints on software design allow for increased power and flexibility, this flexibility introduces more possibilities for error. As a result, system engineers must identify the design constraints necessary to maintain safety and ensure that the system and software design enforces them. Safeware Engineering Corporation, of Seattle, Washington, provides the information, tools, and techniques to accomplish this task with its Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM). NASA assisted in developing this engineering toolset by awarding the company several Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts with Ames Research Center and Langley Research Center. The technology benefits NASA through its applications for Space Station rendezvous and docking. SpecTRM aids system and software engineers in developing specifications for large, complex safety critical systems. The product enables engineers to find errors early in development so that they can be fixed with the lowest cost and impact on the system design. SpecTRM traces both the requirements and design rationale (including safety constraints) throughout the system design and documentation, allowing engineers to build required system properties into the design from the beginning, rather than emphasizing assessment at the end of the development process when changes are limited and costly.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1993

Analyzing Software Requirements Errors in Safety-Critical, Embedded Systems

This paper analyzes the root causes of safety-related software errors in safety-critical, embedded systems. The results show that software errors identified as potentially hazardous to the system tend to be produced by different error mechanisms than non- safety-related software errors. Safety-related software errors are shown to arise most commonly from (1) discrepancies between the documented requirements specifications and the requirements needed for correct functioning of the system and (2) misunderstandings of the software's interface with the rest of the system. The paper uses these results to identify methods by which requirements errors can be prevented. The goal is to reduce safety-related software errors and to enhance the safety of complex, embedded systems.

Lutz, Robyn R.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

Safety Standards contain technical and process-oriented safety requirements. Technical requirements are those such as "must work" and "must not work" functions in the system. Process-Oriented requirements are software engineering and safety management process requirements. Address the system perspective and some cover just software in the system > NASA-STD-8719.13B Software Safety Standard is the current standard of interest. NASA programs/projects will have their own set of safety requirements derived from the standard. Safety Cases: a) Documented demonstration that a system complies with the specified safety requirements. b) Evidence is gathered on the integrity of the system and put forward as an argued case. [Gardener (ed.)] c) Problems occur when trying to meet safety standards, and thus make retrospective safety cases, in legacy safety-critical computer systems.

Hill, Janice L.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Model Transformation for a System of Systems Dependability Safety Case

Software plays an increasingly larger role in all aspects of NASA's science missions. This has been extended to the identification, management and control of faults which affect safety-critical functions and by default, the overall success of the mission. Traditionally, the analysis of fault identification, management and control are hardware based. Due to the increasing complexity of system, there has been a corresponding increase in the complexity in fault management software. The NASA Independent Validation & Verification (IV&V) program is creating processes and procedures to identify, and incorporate safety-critical software requirements along with corresponding software faults so that potential hazards may be mitigated. This Specific to Generic ... A Case for Reuse paper describes the phases of a dependability and safety study which identifies a new, process to create a foundation for reusable assets. These assets support the identification and management of specific software faults and, their transformation from specific to generic software faults. This approach also has applications to other systems outside of the NASA environment. This paper addresses how a mission specific dependability and safety case is being transformed to a generic dependability and safety case which can be reused for any type of space mission with an emphasis on software fault conditions.

Murphy, Judy↗

NASA NTRS2004

A Tool for Verification and Validation of Neural Network Based Adaptive Controllers for High Assurance Systems

High reliability of mission- and safety-critical software systems has been identified by NASA as a high-priority technology challenge. We present an approach for the performance analysis of a neural network (NN) in an advanced adaptive control system. This problem is important in the context of safety-critical applications that require certification, such as flight software in aircraft. We have developed a tool to measure the performance of the NN during operation by calculating a confidence interval (error bar) around the NN's output. Our tool can be used during pre-deployment verification as well as monitoring the network performance during operation. The tool has been implemented in Simulink and simulation results on a F-15 aircraft are presented.

Gupta, Pramod↗

NASA NTRS1994

Analyzing Software Errors in Safety-Critical Embedded Systems

This paper analyzes the root causes of safty-related software faults identified as potentially hazardous to the system are distributed somewhat differently over the set of possible error causes than non-safety-related software faults.

Software errors↗

NASA NTRS2010

The Role and Quality of Software Safety in the NASA Constellation Program

In this study, we examine software safety risk in the early design phase of the NASA Constellation spaceflight program. Obtaining an accurate, program-wide picture of software safety risk is difficult across multiple, independently-developing systems. We leverage one source of safety information, hazard analysis, to provide NASA quality assurance managers with information regarding the ongoing state of software safety across the program. The goal of this research is two-fold: 1) to quantify the relative importance of software with respect to system safety; and 2) to quantify the level of risk presented by software in the hazard analysis. We examined 154 hazard reports created during the preliminary design phase of three major flight hardware systems within the Constellation program. To quantify the importance of software, we collected metrics based on the number of software-related causes and controls of hazardous conditions. To quantify the level of risk presented by software, we created a metric scheme to measure the specificity of these software causes. We found that from 49-70% of hazardous conditions in the three systems could be caused by software or software was involved in the prevention of the hazardous condition. We also found that 12-17% of the 2013 hazard causes involved software, and that 23-29% of all causes had a software control. Furthermore, 10-12% of all controls were software-based. There is potential for inaccuracy in these counts, however, as software causes are not consistently scoped, and the presence of software in a cause or control is not always clear. The application of our software specificity metrics also identified risks in the hazard reporting process. In particular, we found a number of traceability risks in the hazard reports may impede verification of software and system safety.

Layman, Lucas↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Growing the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Workforce of Tomorrow

The NASA Safety Center (NSC) was established in2006 in response to Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendations to strengthen NASA’s safety program. The NSC supports all NASA centers and facilities. The NSC fosters world-class Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) support for NASA programs and projects through professional development activities and the advancement of the following SMA technical disciplines: - Aviation Safety - Operational Safety - Quality Engineering - Reliability and Maintainability - SMA Technical Leadership - Software Assurance - System Safety The NSC’s Technical Excellence Office (TEO) is charged with encouraging technical excellence in NASA’s SMA community primarily through professional development products and services. TEO’s first initiative was the SMA Technical Excellence Program (STEP). STEP is a career-oriented, professional development roadmap for safety professionals, which is designed for the employee to learn specific knowledge and skills to improve performance in their current role.

Safety and Mission Assurance↗

NASA NTRS2007

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Certification of COTS Software in NASA Human Rated Flight Systems

Adoption of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in safety critical systems has been seen as a promising acquisition strategy to improve mission affordability and, yet, has come with significant barriers and challenges. Attempts to integrate COTS software components into NASA human rated flight systems have been, for the most part, complicated by verification and validation (V&V) requirements necessary for flight certification per NASA s own standards. For software that is from COTS sources, and, in general from 3rd party sources, either commercial, government, modified or open source, the expectation is that it meets the same certification criteria as those used for in-house and that it does so as if it were built in-house. The latter is a critical and hidden issue. This paper examines the longstanding barriers and challenges in the use of 3rd party software in safety critical systems and cover recent efforts to use COTS software in NASA s Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) project. It identifies some core artifacts that without them, the use of COTS and 3rd party software is, for all practical purposes, a nonstarter for affordable and timely insertion into flight critical systems. The paper covers the first use in a flight critical system by NASA of COTS software that has prior FAA certification heritage, which was shown to meet the RTCA-DO-178B standard, and how this certification may, in some cases, be leveraged to allow the use of analysis in lieu of testing. Finally, the paper proposes the establishment of an open source forum for development of safety critical 3rd party software.

Goforth, Andre↗

NASA NTRS1997

Verification and Validation in a Rapid Software Development Process

The high cost of software production is driving development organizations to adopt more automated design and analysis methods such as rapid prototyping, computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools, and high-level code generators. Even developers of safety-critical software system have adopted many of these new methods while striving to achieve high levels Of quality and reliability. While these new methods may enhance productivity and quality in many cases, we examine some of the risks involved in the use of new methods in safety-critical contexts. We examine a case study involving the use of a CASE tool that automatically generates code from high-level system designs. We show that while high-level testing on the system structure is highly desirable, significant risks exist in the automatically generated code and in re-validating releases of the generated code after subsequent design changes. We identify these risks and suggest process improvements that retain the advantages of rapid, automated development methods within the quality and reliability contexts of safety-critical projects.

Callahan, John R.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Verification and Validation for Flight-Critical Systems (VVFCS)

On March 31, 2009 a Request for Information (RFI) was issued by NASA s Aviation Safety Program to gather input on the subject of Verification and Validation (V & V) of Flight-Critical Systems. The responses were provided to NASA on or before April 24, 2009. The RFI asked for comments in three topic areas: Modeling and Validation of New Concepts for Vehicles and Operations; Verification of Complex Integrated and Distributed Systems; and Software Safety Assurance. There were a total of 34 responses to the RFI, representing a cross-section of academic (26%), small & large industry (47%) and government agency (27%).

Graves, Sharon S.↗