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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Recommendations for Trust and Encryption in DER Interoperability Standards

Recently developed Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interoperability standards include communication and cyber security requirements. In 2018, the US national interconnection standard, IEEE 1547, was revised to require DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5 (Smart Energy Profile, SEP 2.0), or IEEE 1815 (DNP3) communication interface but does not include any normative overarching cybersecurity requirements. IEEE 2030.5 and associated implementation requirements for California, known as the California Smart Inverter Profile (CSIP), prescribe the greatest security features - including encryption, authentication, and key management requirements. Sun Spec Modbus and IEEE 1815 security requirements are not as comprehensive, leading to implementation questions throughout the industry. Further, while the security features in IEEE 2030.5 are commonly used in computing platforms, there are still questions of how well the technologies will scale in highly-distributed, computationally-limited inverter environments. In this paper, (a) the elements of IEEE 2030.5 encryption, authentication, and key management guidelines are analyzed, (b) potential scalability gaps are identified, and (c) alternative technologies are explored for possible inclusion in DER interoperability or cyber security standards.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Condenser Enclosure Vibration Isolation Mount Selection

A mini split cooling system will be used to maintain temperature requirements in a mobile secure transport system. While the split cooling system was designed to be used in static residential or commercial applications, it was selected for this transportation application due to a unique set of security requirements. However, the system’s ability maintain reliability and survive prolonged long-term shock and vibration is a significant concern. The mitigation strategy is to select vibration isolation mounts and perform lifetime shock and vibration testing to demonstrate survivability. The goal of this study is to generate a finite element model of the system and perform modal analysis to inform selection of vibration mounts to minimize the amount of vibrational energy transferred to the split cooling system. The scope of this report is limited to study of the condensing unit only, and geometric variation of the assembly will not be allowed.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Decomposable Formulation of Transmission Constraints for Decentralized Power Systems Optimization

One of the most complicating factors in decentralized solution methods for a broad range of power system optimization problems is the modeling of power flow equations. Existing formulations for direct current power flows either have limited scalability or are very dense and unstructured, making them unsuitable for large-scale decentralized studies. Here, in this work, we present a novel sparsified variant of the injection shift factors formulation, which has a decomposable block-diagonal structure and scales well for large systems. We also propose a decentralized solution method, based on the alternating direction multiplier method, that efficiently handles transmission line outages in N-1 security requirements. Benchmarks on multizonal security-constrained unit commitment problems show that the proposed formulation and algorithm can reliably and efficiently solve interconnection-level test systems with up to 6,515 buses with no convergence or numerical issues.

Alternating-method of multipliers (ADMM)↗
DOE OSTI2024

Tunable stochastic memristors for energy-efficient encryption and computing

Information security and computing, two critical technological challenges for post-digital computation, pose opposing requirements – security (encryption) requires a source of unpredictability, while computing generally requires predictability. Each of these contrasting requirements presently necessitates distinct conventional Si-based hardware units with power-hungry overheads. This work demonstrates Cu 0.3 Te 0.7 /HfO 2 (‘CuTeHO’) ion-migration-driven memristors that satisfy the contrasting requirements. Under specific operating biases, CuTeHO memristors generate truly random and physically unclonable functions, while under other biases, they perform universal Boolean logic. Using these computing primitives, this work experimentally demonstrates a single system that performs cryptographic key generation, universal Boolean logic operations, and encryption/decryption. Circuit-based calculations reveal the energy and latency advantages of the CuTeHO memristors in these operations. This work illustrates the functional flexibility of memristors in implementing operations with varying component-level requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS1985

Restricted access processor - An application of computer security technology

This paper describes a security guard device that is currently being developed by Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC). The methods used to provide assurance that the system meets its security requirements include the system architecture, a system security evaluation, and the application of formal and informal verification techniques. The combination of state-of-the-art technology and the incorporation of new verification procedures results in a demonstration of the feasibility of computer security technology for operational applications.

Mcmahon, E. M.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Open Source Subtitle Editor Software Study for Section 508 Close Caption Applications

This paper will focus on a specific item within the NASA Electronic Information Accessibility Policy - Multimedia Presentation shall have synchronized caption; thus making information accessible to a person with hearing impairment. This synchronized caption will assist a person with hearing or cognitive disability to access the same information as everyone else. This paper focuses on the research and implementation for CC (subtitle option) support to video multimedia. The goal of this research is identify the best available open-source (free) software to achieve synchronized captions requirement and achieve savings, while meeting the security requirement for Government information integrity and assurance. CC and subtitling are processes that display text within a video to provide additional or interpretive information for those whom may need it or those whom chose it. Closed captions typically show the transcription of the audio portion of a program (video) as it occurs (either verbatim or in its edited form), sometimes including non-speech elements (such as sound effects). The transcript can be provided by a third party source or can be extracted word for word from the video. This feature can be made available for videos in two forms: either Soft-Coded or Hard-Coded. Soft-Coded is the more optional version of CC, where you can chose to turn them on if you want, or you can turn them off. Most of the time, when using the Soft-Coded option, the transcript is also provided to the view along-side the video. This option is subject to compromise, whereas the transcript is merely a text file that can be changed by anyone who has access to it. With this option the integrity of the CC is at the mercy of the user. Hard-Coded CC is a more permanent form of CC. A Hard-Coded CC transcript is embedded within a video, without the option of removal.

Murphy, F. Brandon↗
DOE OSTI2021

BioSecure Digital Twin: Manufacturing Innovation and Cybersecurity Resilience

U.S. national security, prosperity, economy, and well-being require secure, flexible, and resilient Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing. The COVID-19 pandemic reaffirmed that the biomedical production value-chain is vulnerable to disruption and has been under attack from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Current cyber defenses are inadequate, and the integrity of critical production systems and processes are inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, human error, and supply chain disruptions. The following chapter explores how a BioSecure Digital Twin will improve U.S. manufacturing resilience and preparedness to respond to these hazards by significantly improving monitoring, integrity, security, and agility of our manufacturing infrastructure and systems. The BioSecure Digital Twin combines a scalable manufacturing framework with a robust platform for monitoring and control to increase U.S. biopharma manufacturing resilience. Then, the chapter discusses some of the inherent vulnerabilities and challenges at the nexus of health and advanced manufacturing. Next, the chapter highlights that as the Pandemic evolves, we need agility and resilience to overcome significant obstacles. This section highlights an innovative application of Cyber Informed Engineering to developing and deploying a BioSecure Digital Twin to improve the resilience and security of the biopharma industrial supply chain and production processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with a process framework to complement the Digital Twin platform, called the Biopharma (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) OODA Loop Framework (BOLF), a four-step approach to decision-making outputs from the Digital Twin. The BOLF will help end users leverage twin technology by distilling the available information, focusing the data on context, and rapidly making the best decision while remaining cognizant of changes that can be made as more data becomes available.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Cyber security best practices for the nuclear industry

When deploying software based systems, such as, digital instrumentation and controls for the nuclear industry, it is vital to include cyber security assessment as part of architecture and development process. When integrating and delivering software-intensive systems for the nuclear industry, engineering teams should make use of a secure, requirements driven, software development life cycle, ensuring security compliance and optimum return on investment. Reliability protections, data loss prevention, and privacy enforcement provide a strong case for installing strict cyber security policies. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2014

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗
DOE OSTI2019

Physical Security Model Development of an Electrochemical Facility.

Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model up a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. One outsider theft scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work fits into a larger Virtual Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Nuclear Technology Research and Development Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Physical Security Model Development of an Electrochemical Facility

Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. Two theft scenarios (an outsider attack and insider diversion) as well as a sabotage scenario were examined in order to optimize the security design. Security metrics are presented. This work fits into a larger Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
NASA NTRS2015

Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) Prototype Radio - Generation 2 Security Architecture Lab Test Report

NASA Glenn Research Center, in cooperation with Rockwell Collins, is working to develop a prototype Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) radio platform as part of NASA Integrated Systems Research Program's (ISRP) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. A primary focus of the project is to work with the FAA and industry standards bodies to build and demonstrate a safe, secure, and efficient CNPC architecture that can be used by industry to evaluate the feasibility of deploying a system using these technologies in an operational capacity. GRC has been working in conjunction with these groups to assess threats, identify security requirements, and to develop a system of standards-based security controls that can be applied to the current GRC prototype CNPC architecture as a demonstration platform. The security controls were integrated into a lab test bed mock-up of the Mobile IPv6 architecture currently being used for NASA flight testing, and a series of network tests were conducted to evaluate the security overhead of the controls compared to the baseline CNPC link without any security. The aim of testing was to evaluate the performance impact of the additional security control overhead when added to the Mobile IPv6 architecture in various modes of operation. The statistics collected included packet captures at points along the path to gauge packet size as the sample data traversed the CNPC network, round trip latency, jitter, and throughput. The effort involved a series of tests of the baseline link, a link with Robust Header Compression (ROHC) and without security controls, a link with security controls and without ROHC, and finally a link with both ROHC and security controls enabled. The effort demonstrated that ROHC is both desirable and necessary to offset the additional expected overhead of applying security controls to the CNPC link.

Communication Networks↗
NASA NTRS2015

Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) Prototype Radio - Generation 2 Security Flight Test Report

NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC), in cooperation with Rockwell Collins, is working to develop a prototype Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) radio platform as part of NASA Integrated Systems Research Program's (ISRP) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. A primary focus of the project is to work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and industry standards bodies to build and demonstrate a safe, secure, and efficient CNPC architecture that can be used by industry to evaluate the feasibility of deploying a system using these technologies in an operational capacity. GRC has been working in conjunction with these groups to assess threats, identify security requirements, and to develop a system of standards-based security controls that can be applied to the GRC prototype CNPC architecture as a demonstration platform. The proposed security controls were integrated into the GRC flight test system aboard our S-3B Viking surrogate aircraft and several network tests were conducted during a flight on November 15th, 2014 to determine whether the controls were working properly within the flight environment. The flight test was also the first to integrate Robust Header Compression (ROHC) as a means of reducing the additional overhead introduced by the security controls and Mobile IPv6. The effort demonstrated the complete end-to-end secure CNPC link in a relevant flight environment.

Communication Networks↗
DOE OSTI2024

Synergies Between Nuclear Security and Critical Infrastructure: National Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

Nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities are part of a nation's critical infrastructure assets. Key cross-sector interdependencies, in relation to energy, transportation systems, communications, emergency services, water, information technologies and others, result in inevitable synergies between legal frameworks for the security of nuclear facilities and legal frameworks for the protection of critical infrastructure. The protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage and other malicious acts is paramount in ensuring energy security and thus ensuring uninterrupted energy supply. The protection of other sectors, such as uninterrupted communications, secure water supply, and others, supports a safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. Some countries rely on broader critical infrastructure frameworks to impose security requirements on nuclear facilities, or to achieve robust cybersecurity systems. This paper will analyze the interdependencies and synergies between the legal and regulatory frameworks for critical infrastructure protection and nuclear facilities' security by comparing various national frameworks. The paper will also propose modalities to leverage the best practices and requirements from each framework towards energy security goals and stronger national nuclear security regimes.

Man, Madalina-Anca↗
DOE OSTI2012

Classified Component Disposal at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) has added the capability needed for the safe, secure disposal of non-nuclear classified components that have been declared excess to national security requirements. The NNSS has worked with U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration senior leadership to gain formal approval for permanent burial of classified matter at the NNSS in the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex owned by the U.S. Department of Energy. Additionally, by working with state regulators, the NNSS added the capability to dispose non-radioactive hazardous and non-hazardous classified components. The NNSS successfully piloted the new disposal pathway with the receipt of classified materials from the Kansas City Plant in March 2012.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Classified Component Disposal at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 13454

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) has added the capability needed for the safe, secure disposal of non-nuclear classified components that have been declared excess to national security requirements. The NNSS has worked with U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration senior leadership to gain formal approval for permanent burial of classified matter at the NNSS in the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex owned by the U.S. Department of Energy. Additionally, by working with state regulators, the NNSS added the capability to dispose non-radioactive hazardous and non-hazardous classified components. The NNSS successfully piloted the new disposal pathway with the receipt of classified materials from the Kansas City Plant in March 2012. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗