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DOE OSTI2022

Integrating Cybersecurity with System Operations and Restoration

This presentation covers the interaction of the discipline of system operations with the discipline of cybersecurity. First, a common mental model for risk - both cybersecurity and all-hazards - is presented, followed by a discussion of high-level management strategies for different kinds of cyber harm facing system operators, based on the consequences and frequencies of the harm. The next section covers the importance of cybersecurity for a system operator organization and explains some general concepts to understand the relationships. Finally the role of system operators in the security of the grid as a larger system of systems is discussed over the framework of a resilience event.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Materials Process Modeling at the Y-12 National Security Complex

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) has implemented process modeling for various accountable nuclear materials operations that are performed throughout the plant. Using a discrete, event-based dynamic simulation program, key nuclear material streams are modeled, allowing Y-12 to effectively manage numerous points of interest within the plant’s production operations. Integration of the various material processes into a single, interdependent supply and demand model is one of the ongoing focuses within Y-12’s process modeling effort. The primary purpose of using dynamic simulation modeling is to allow for analysis of the nuclear materials inventories and forecasted supplies based on future demands. Analysis of these inventories includes capacity evaluation, bottleneck mitigation, and assessments of individual pieces of equipment to inform future facility investment decisions and associated project schedules. Modeling of the nuclear materials processes throughout the complex also allows for incorporation of changes relevant to production capabilities such as the upcoming transition of specific operations to the new Uranium Processing Facility. Prior to implementation of process modeling, Y-12 forecasted supply and demand of accountable nuclear materials streams using Microsoft Excel. With deterministic models such as Microsoft Excel, the annual forecasts, generated within data input condition parameters, can only provide a fixed point of data. Fixed data cannot simulate integrated material streams and account for the possibility of occurrences and other changes that dynamic simulations take into consideration. Y-12’s dynamic process modeling allows integrated simulations of multiple accountable nuclear materials processes, including supply and demand forecasting and analysis, and is a coordinated effort involving many steps of verification and validation (V&V), site briefings, testing, reporting, data mining, planning, and documentation that spans various programs throughout the Y-12 complex.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Integrating field observations and process-based modeling to predict watershed water quality under environmental perturbations

Watersheds play a critical role in supplying water resources needed for human use and ecosystem health. Understanding and predicting how, when, and where changes in the quantity and quality of water resources occur under different environmental stresses including extreme events is crucial for sustainable management of water resources under a changing environment. However, few studies have attempted to quantify or identify the factors and process interactions controlling the impact of extreme events across water-shed systems. Only few large-scale studies include coordinated monitoring and modeling efforts, which limits our ability to assess the large-scale impact of extreme events on water supply and quality. Methods are lacking to propagate uncertainty in process understanding through an integrated hydro-biogeochemical model framework and evaluate its importance, thus failing to take full advantage of the information potentially available through transformative advances in characterization technologies from high-resolution mass spectrometry to airborne and satellite-based remote sensing. There are consequent risks to our nations water security and to human and ecosystem health that may become exacerbated with the increasing frequency of extreme events that is projected for the coming decades. This paper reviews the current status of watershed science for both water quantity and quality and identifies critical gaps in our current knowledge and modeling capability in addressing the emergent needs in predicting watershed hydrologic and biogeochemical responses (i.e., water quantity and quality) under natural and anthropogenic perturbations. We highlight the need to (1) understand how environmental perturbations including extreme events like floods and droughts propagate through watershed systems and assess their short- and long-term impacts on watershed biogeochemistry, water quality and their recovery pathways; (2) develop and improve a watershed water quality model that reflects the state of scientific understanding gained from observations; and (3) construct a data-model fusion system for watershed characterization, process identification, and mechanistic model parameterization. A large base of modeling, monitoring and data capabilities have been built by various federal government agencies given the relevance of water to their critical missions. An emerging need is to build an integrated national capability for watershed water availability and quality that can address water-related missions across multiple federal agencies.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 68: Key EFCOG Actions: Risk Communication, Supply Chain Management, Human Capital and More

Overview on the Energy Facility Contractor Group's (EFCOG) most recent work in partnership with DOE to improve performance and EFCOG's mission is to ensure safety, security, and quality across the US DOE complex. Best practices were highlighted in discussions with US DOE/ NNSA leaders and key project executives. EFCOG's key priorities for 2020 were featured in the panel discussions to include: addressing human capital issues to ensure future mission needs can be met; addressing supply chain issues for nuclear projects; improving the data quality and performance assurance; and improving risk communication and stakeholder relations. EFCOG accomplishes its mission through working groups that provide forums to address common challenges and exchange proven techniques and other management and technical information among member contractors. Panelists with presentations: WM EFCOG Panel Slides (Morgan Smith); EFCOG DOE Supply Chain Initiative (SCI) - Enabling The DOE Mission - (Darrell Graddy); Data Quality and Performance Assurance (JD Dowell); Risk Communication - Different Events - Very Different Responses from the Community (Rick McLeod); Current State of Cybersecurity (Liz Porter)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2026

Best Practices for Resilience Hub Development and Management

The Carbon League and its community partners in East St. Louis, Illinois, have identified five facilities to serve as resilience hubs. These hubs are intended to support the local community through a range of services and resources during blue-sky (everyday), gray-sky (pre-event), and black-sky (emergency) conditions. Transforming these facilities into fully functional resilience hubs requires a broad operational improvement and programmatic planning roadmap. This memo outlines best practices to guide the development of these resilience hubs in East St. Louis, including recommendations for infrastructure services; safety and physical protection; community services; operational protocols; and a phased implementation strategy aligned with realistic funding and capacity constraints. Infrastructure recommendations include strengthening electric power, communications, water, sanitation, and transportation/logistics capabilities, all of which are essential for hubs that may serve as cooling and warming centers, distribution points, and information hubs during emergencies. Safety recommendations focus on accessibility, emergency action planning, indoor air quality, and secure storage of critical equipment. A phased roadmap provides guidance from immediate, low-cost readiness actions to long-term optimization and community integration. Performance metrics and maintenance protocols ensure continuous improvement and operational readiness. This guidance draws on best practices that can be used to support the development of resilient, community-centered hubs capable of enhancing public safety, health, and well-being during everyday operations and emergencies alike.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Power System Waveform Datasets for Machine Learning

The desire for increased visibility across the electricity grid will necessarily increase the deployment of sensing and measurement devices and associated data management needs to unprecedented levels. For the existing sensing and measurement infrastructure, there remains a great amount of “value” yet to be extracted through advanced data management and analytics. Availability of more data will not, by itself, lead to changes in grid visibility, security, and resiliency. To create the predictive and prescriptive environment required to enable new markets and transactions for customer revenue and a reliable grid, the data must be collected, organized, evaluated, and analyzed using sophisticated algorithms to provide actionable information allowing operators and customers to reliably manage an increasingly complex grid. Progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has been largely driven by large, publicly available datasets that can be used to train AI algorithms such as MNIST, a database of handwritten images of digits, and ImageNet, an image database of everyday objects. These types of publicly available databases of real-world training datasets have been largely credited for advancement of image processing, computer vision, and deep learning algorithms that these use cases deploy. However, in the power systems industry to date, there are few databases with proper event labeling, and data access to a publicly available collection of power system event waveforms that will allow users to interact with grid signature data. Publicly available datasets of power system event waveforms, such as the DOE/EPRI dataset, often lack critical metadata or contain limited examples of each event type, and data formats vary widely across these datasets.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2024

Supporting ARPA-E Power Grid Optimization (Final Report)

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Arizona State University (ASU), Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Texas A&M University (TAMU), The University of Texas at Austin (UT), and the University of Wisconsin-Madison (UW-M) supported the ARPA-E Grid Optimization (GO) Competition by providing a common problem formulation, data format, datasets, evaluation mechanism, scoring, rules, and results that resulted in the awarding of $\$9.24$ million dollars to teams from academia, industry, and national labs for solving three sets of increasingly difficult non-linear, security- constrained AC Optimal Powerflow (AC-OPF) optimization problems in order to increase the efficiency of the US Electric Grid. It is estimated that a 1% increase in efficiency can save $\$1$ billion. Current industry practices typically use a linear DC model (DC-OPF) in order solve the OPF problem within the time constraints of the operation schedule. The GO Competition challenges the best power engineers, mathematicians, and computer scientists to make possible operational decisions based on accurate physical models. To accomplish this, the GO Competition created a series of Challenges and funded teams to produce the best solver. Challenge 1 was to solve the security constrained Alternating Current Optimal Power Flow (ACOPF) problem. Challenge 2 extended that to by adding adjustable transformer tap ratios, phase shifting transformers, switchable shunts, price-responsive demand, ramp rate constrained generators and loads, and fast-start unit commitment (UC). Furthermore, Challenge 2 was a maximization problem while Challenge 1 was a minimization problem. While Challenge 3 was being developed, the entrants were invited to find better solutions to the Challenge 2 synthetic datasets with no restrictions on time, hardware, or algorithms. The Challenge 2 solutions turned out to be very good. Challenge 3 expanded the Challenge 2 problem further by using multiperiod dynamic markets, including advisory models for extreme weather events, day-ahead markets, and the real-time markets with an extended look-ahead. These problems included active bid-in demand and topology optimization. Together the Challenges used nearly 30 million CPU hours. Since each team was working on the same problem, using the same data, and running on the same hardware, fair comparisons could be drawn as to the best solver. The datasets were varied enough, however, that the best solver for one dataset was not necessarily the best at another, so cumulative scores were used. The process was managed by the PNNL maintained website https://GOCompetition.energy.gov, where Entrants could find information about the problem, the data, the rules, submit their solver for evaluation, and see the scores of all the competing teams on a Leaderboard. Interest was world-wide but only American teams were eligible for prizes. The Competition has produced 34 journal articles 115 papers and been cited over 500 times in the literature, including 12 dissertations (4 from foreign countries; Columbia (2), Germany, and Italy) and 3 from the DOE ExaScale project. Software developed by Pearl Street Technologies for Challenges 1 and 2 is now deployed by Southwest Power Pool (SPP) and Midcontinent Independent Service Operator (MISO). Other teams have received inquiries from venture capitalists. Google DeepMind has thanked the Competition for making the datasets developed for the Competition public. They are using it to train machine learning models. The larger datasets have billions of unknowns to be solved for, but only a small percent matter in the final solution. Knowing what unknowns are important can dramatically speedup the solution.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Establishing a Technical Assistance Network to Build Capacity in Southwest Alaska (Southwest Alaska Energy Network - Final Report)

The Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference (SWAMC) is a non-profit regional membership economic development organization that represents the Aleutian/Pribilof Islands, Bristol Bay, and Kodiak regions of southwest Alaska. SWAMC applied for the DOE-OIE Establishment of an Inter-Tribal Technical Assistance Energy Providers Network grant FOA to work with our partners to provide energy planning and project development technical assistance. The project team was made up of SWAMC, three regional organizations, a management consulting firm, and a panel of technical consultants. SWAMC sub-contracted with the three Alaska Native regional non-profit organizations – Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association (APIA), Bristol Bay Native Association (BBNA), and Kodiak Area Native Association (KANA) – to fund full or partial Regional Energy Coordinator (REC) positions. The project period ran from September 2016 to March 2020. The project goal was to help southwest Alaska regional tribal partners and communities to develop efficient and financially sustainable structures for identifying and developing energy projects that enhance community resiliency and energy sustainability. This project established energy coordinators and management structures in the Aleutian, Bristol Bay, and Kodiak regions to expand technical assistance capacity of regional residents; demonstrate this capacity by advancing energy efficiency, heat, and power supply projects; and secure long-term funding commitments to establish a sustained technical assistance structure. The project team expanded technical assistance capacity of energy coordinators and regional stakeholders in several ways: by providing funding for the SWAMC project manager to attend three Office of Indian Energy trainings; for energy coordinators to attend numerous energy conferences; for utility clerks from several villages to receive one-on-one reporting training on Alaska’s Power Cost Equalization electric subsidy program; and for the Kodiak REC to complete the Arctic Remote Energy Networks Academy and NREL’s Executive Energy Leadership Academy. The energy coordinators demonstrated and shared their increased capacity by hosting several public events: SWAMC hosted two full-day energy workshops in February 2017 and 2018; the Kodiak REC hosted seven Energy Committee meetings for Kodiak stakeholders and gave several presentations at other events; and SWAMC and BBNA organized a Bristol Bay Regional Energy Visioning Session in May 2019. The project team created platforms to both share and request information to involve energy stakeholders in this project, including an energy website, a Facebook group, a periodic newsletter, surveys, mass emails, and paper mailers. An increase in regional capacity was demonstrated through several grant awards, including a $1.2 million USDA grant for Akhiok for an electric distribution infrastructure replacement; an AHFC Kickstarter grant for Aleknagik to audit 2 Tribal and 3 City buildings; and installation of an Air Source Heat Pump demonstration project in Atka. Two communities and one region – Ouzinkie (May 2017), Ugashik (July 2017), and the Bristol Bay region (May 2019) – utilized DOE’s technical assistance services to hold Strategic Energy Planning sessions with NREL and DOE facilitation assistance. And in early 2018, SWAMC established a parallel program, funded through a USDA Energy Audit and Renewable Energy Development grant to provide subsidized energy audits for small businesses in the region. SWAMC and partners have now completed energy audits of over 60 businesses (buildings and fishing vessels) and are currently operating a third round of the USDA program. Fifteen of those business owners have now received additional grant funding to cover 25% of the cost of the energy efficiency upgrades identified in the audit. This technical assistance structure will be sustained beyond DOE grant funding in several forms. As a sign of increased grant writing and project management capacity, the Kodiak Regional Energy Coordinator applied for and received a USDA Community Facilities Technical Assistance and Training grant to continue work begun under this program. Energy coordination tasks have been folded into existing economic development positions at SWAMC and at BBNA, ensuring long-term outreach and support in the region.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Lessons Learned for Responsible Use of Cloud in the Cirrus Project, Following the CrowdStrike Outage Event

A disruption in CrowdStrike’s Falcon cybersecurity platform on July 19th, 2024, caused worldwide chaos. This event highlights the imperative need for cloud security measures for networks that are critically reliant on cloud technology. This incident negatively impacted air travel, government networks, and critical infrastructure sectors such as hospitals and financial institutions. While no electric utilities had a physical impact, and few had an IT impact, there were issues created by loss of cloud services, and other interrelated industries. For utilities and energy distribution organizations, understanding and mitigating these risks is essential. The Cirrus tool offers a strategic solution engineered to weave cloud integration seamlessly into the fabric of operational management, thereby enhancing resilience and streamlining efficiency in the face of digital challenges.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2022

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

NIRP Core Software Suite v.5.1

SAND2023-06610O The Nuclear Incident Response Program (NIRP) Core Software Suite is a set of code that supports multiple applications. It includes miscellaneous base code for data objects, mathematic equations, and user interface components that are used for developing large applications, including those used for data management. Among the types of applications: • Analyst Manager is used for managing contact information, which is also often included in reports and identifies the owners of calculations. • Radionuclide Viewer provides access to the Dose Coefficient File Package (DCFPAK) radiological data, and it complements the Mixture Manager tool. • Mixture Manager creates and manages radionuclides mixtures that are commonly used in other applications. • High Explosive Manager manages explosives and properties. • Chart Viewer is used for data charts such as meteorology charts and other charts specific to data needs. • Unit Converter converts numeric values to/from different units. This package includes object-oriented base code such as data objects describing the date, time, and location of an event; weather conditions; data types that support predefined ranges of values; a unit library, and others. The package also includes mathematic equations such as determining the distance between two points; erf functions; factorial functions; incidence fractions of probit curves; and others. Other features are customized user interface components for text fields; unit selectors (combo boxes); menus; panels; bug-tracking; and automated checks for software updates. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Collins, Ian↗
DOE OSTI2021

Net-Zero Carbon Microgrids

The microgrid concept has been effective in creating aggregations of distributed energy resources—generation, storage and loads—for resiliency, in the form of energy security. The success of microgrids in bringing energy security to a wide range of customers—from individual residences to commercial and industrial installations to military bases—has been exemplified during power disruptions and extended outages due to extreme weather events, cybersecurity attacks, and equipment failures. Now microgrids have an opportunity to meet the challenges of climate change and contribute to a carbon-free power delivery system. The transition to net-zero starts within microgrids themselves. In fact, today’s microgrids are largely dominated by generators using fossil fuels, natural gas and diesel, with high greenhouse gas emissions. In short, the transition to net-zero means replacing fossil fueled generators with renewable generation in microgrids. This transition is extended by including new dispatchable generation technologies that are 100% carbon-free and that offer additional advantage of a more-dependable and sustainable source of energy and power. Basically, the decarbonization of microgrids requires three elements: 1) maximizing generation from renewable energy resources, 2) management of storage and flexible loads to balance the variability and intermittency of renewable energy resources, and 3) introducing new clean power sources, including hydrogen-based generation and small modular reactors. This report affirms a need for specific focus by governmental agencies at national, regional, and local levels to establish technology, policy, and investment in this area. The intention of the Net-Zero Microgrid (NZM) Program is to inform these constituencies with cross-cutting research and tools for the reduction of GHG in microgrids – to net-zero in the near term eventually to zero in the longer term. The NZM Program is committed to achieving decarbonization for resiliency and for providing clean energy at the local or distribution level, from remote communities to underserved communities, and large industrial and military facilities. The NZM Planning and Design Platform is a core tool to be developed as an early deliverable of the NZM Program because only a fully integrated microgrid-design approach will ensure maximum carbon reduction in energy production.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Method for Measuring Coupled Individual and Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards

Although models of social vulnerability to environmental hazards are commonly developed to support policy interventions in emergencies and disasters, their utility is hindered by a lack of contextual information on individuals exposed to and affected by hazards. We develop a novel approach to model social vulnerability that couples individuals and their varying forms of protective capacity with the social fabric of the communities in which they reside. The backbone of our model is the Public-Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), a product of the U.S. Census Bureau that preserves a representative sample of completed responses to the American Community Survey (ACS). The PUMS enables us to understand the full range of individual protective capacities against a hazard in an exposed area, which we term individual vulnerability profiles (IVPs). In this case, we examine IVPs in the Coney Island-Brighton Beach section of New York City, which suffered severe impacts during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. To manage the large number of unique IVPs in Coney Island-Brighton Beach, we perform a segmentation analysis to generalize them into thematic cohort vulnerability profiles (CVPs) representing a typology of vulnerable people in Coney Island-Brighton Beach during Sandy. From synthetic populations of CVPs, we then estimate how individuals in varying housing types were coexposed to Sandy at the census tract level by classifying these areas into community social vulnerability profiles (SVPs). Our results provide a topology of social vulnerability that simultaneously links individual, community, and population-wide concerns, enabling a more holistic understanding of resources and interventions beneficial to human security during events like Sandy than is attainable with area-level metrics.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

The evolution of the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory in nuclear power research

The events at Three Mile Island in the United States brought about fundamental changes in the ways that simulation would be used in nuclear operations. The need for research simulators was identified to scientifically study human-centered risk and make recommendations for process control system designs. This paper documents the human factors research conducted at the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) since its inception in 2010 at Idaho National Laboratory. The facility’s primary purposes are to provide support to utilities for system upgrades and to validate modernized control room concepts. In the last decade, however, as nuclear industry needs have evolved, so too have the purposes of the HSSL. Thus, beyond control room modernization, human factors researchers have evaluated the security of nuclear infrastructure from cyber adversaries and evaluated human-in-the-loop simulations for joint operations with an integrated hydrogen generation plant. Lastly, our review presents research using human reliability analysis techniques with data collected from HSSL-based studies and concludes with potential future directions for the HSSL, including severe accident management and advanced control room technologies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Facilitating Data Collection of Maintenance Events to Populate the Hydrogen Component Reliability Database (HyCReD)

The Hydrogen Component Reliability Database (HyCReD) is a collaborative project between the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, the University of Maryland, and hydrogen stakeholders to improve safety and reliability for hydrogen facilities by implementing component reliability data taxonomies that support hydrogen infrastructure failure rate analysis. The project aims to quantify failure rates of hydrogen components through high-quality data collection and analysis on root causes and maintenance needed. HyCReD provides a common database for cataloging hydrogen component failures which exists for reliability research in many other mature industries [2]. The database fills a gap for the hydrogen community by providing a scientifically rigorous approach to quantitative risk assessment (QRA), prognostic health management (PHM), and reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) analysis. High level results will be aggregated and anonymized to protect company sensitive information; detailed results will be used to help address issues of hydrogen components. These advanced analytics will support accelerated deployment of hydrogen infrastructure by enabling better: design and safety of projects (safety codes and standards development), infrastructure reliability and cost (component failure rates, maintenance protocols), and component R&D needs (robust supply chain). A key to a successful HyCReD implementation is facilitating the ease of reporting and data quality in the database that can be used for analysis. Maintenance data was a previously identified gap in initial efforts to populate and validate the database taxonomies [3]. Collection of maintenance data will be instrumental in identifying failure modes and rates, identifying incipient component failures or reduced performance, cataloging best practices for maintenance routines and methods for prognostic health management, and quantifying the risk and effect of different failure modes. Several key priorities are identified for streamlined data collection to achieve quality and detailed failure data: Applicability, Ease of Use, Accessibility, and Information Security. The HyCReD team has now begun deployment of the database to several companies and groups that have signed non-disclosure agreements to facilitate the data collection of failures in industry hydrogen refueling station infrastructure. This paper will provide an update into the process of HyCReD deployment including the development of a coding guide for facility personnel to reference and ensure data quality and consistency from one station to another as well as implementation of contextually dependent data fields of system taxonomy and formatted entries to provide ease of use. The goal is to communicate the lessons learned from the roll-out to technicians and engineers in the field, and the addition of need for high level of security to protect all stakeholders.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity for Distance Relay Protection

This project is a DOE follow-up effort on the CREDC workshop held on September 13, 2018 in Cambridge, MA to discuss cybersecurity of distance relays, which considered the benefits, vulnerabilities and risk mitigations for the use of communication systems in power system protection. The objectives of this project are to define the taxonomy of relay protection and associated communications; define use cases describing approaches to reduce the cyber-attack surface on those protective relays; and evaluate the loss of operational functional capability from changes to communication coverage. Mitigating controls will also be evaluated to understand if there are other approaches to reduce attack surfaces while maintaining communications or partial communications. Distance relays are used to protect transmission lines of approximately 10 to 300 miles in length, by detecting short circuits (i.e., faults) on the lines and then tripping circuit breakers in the substation. Such protection systems are a subset of the power system and they incorporate sensing, logic and communication functions. Protection system exposure to cyberattack could be drastically limited by disconnecting relays from all vulnerable communication systems, but this may adversely impact overall power system performance in the absence of cyberattack. This project began with a use case analysis of protection systems with communications, as summarized in this report. It continued with modeling, testing and evaluation in a miniature power system (MPS), located in the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) Electric Power Training Center (EPTC). The project also incorporated feedback from two industry meetings held in February and September 2019. The suggested next steps account for and complement the work already underway with DOE/CESER funding: 1. Study the performance of LCD and PC vs. PUTT, which is less reliant on communication system performance and GPS timing references. The PUTT scheme could prove to be more resilient to cyberattack or communications-related disruption. It could also be more tolerant of message re-routing with SDN/SDR communication systems. On the other hand, it will be more vulnerable to false tripping during dynamic events or to loss of the voltage signal. The optimum choice of scheme may depend on the specific power system and risk assessment. This study could provide a new template for evaluation based on business functions. 2. Research and develop new methods to detect and monitor distributed physical attacks, possibly using drones, video sensors, thermal sensors, machine learning and other advanced techniques. This will help mitigate the impact of cyberattack on the protection system, and will also help mitigate the impact of wild fires. 3. Implement a scalable PKI for use in electric utility protection systems. This will encourage widespread adoption of secure authentication methods that are already available, but not widely used at present. This will help secure engineering access to the relays. 4. Investigate the use of SDN in combination with SDR to achieve better cybersecurity and electromagnetic security of the network, incorporating path variability. This would help secure both engineering access and peer-to-peer GOOSE messaging. 5. Perform additional testing, with operator evaluation of “red button” scenarios, PUTT vs. LCD, relay mis-operations, and other cyberattacks in the EPTC. This is an important advantage of testing in the EPTC rather than by computer simulation or even hardware-in-the-loop simulation; the EPTC is already dedicated to managing the situational awareness, operator response times and other human impacts. One of the project objectives was to settle on a common nomenclature for this problem space. We have concluded that the OSI layer model, supplemented by ANSI device numbers and other IEEE standards, is already well-accepted by the industry. The IEEE PSRC knowledge base provides a great deal of public information

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