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At least 37 records · Page 2

Verification and Implementation of Operations Safety Controls for Flight Missions

There are several engineering disciplines, such as reliability, supportability, quality assurance, human factors, risk management, safety, etc. Safety is an extremely important engineering specialty within NASA, and the consequence involving a loss of crew is considered a catastrophic event. Safety is not difficult to achieve when properly integrated at the beginning of each space systems project/start of mission planning. The key is to ensure proper handling of safety verification throughout each flight/mission phase. Today, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) operations engineers continue to conduct these flight product reviews across all open flight products. As such, these reviews help ensure that each mission is accomplished with safety requirements along with controls heavily embedded in applicable flight products. Most importantly, the S&MA operations engineers are required to look for important design and operations controls so that safety is strictly adhered to as well as reflected in the final flight product.

Smalls, James R.↗

Shear Thickening Electrolytes for High Impact Resistant Batteries

In this paper, we demonstrate a shear thickening electrolyte that stiffens into a solid-like barrier during a high energy event, like a car crash. This barrier prevents the electrodes from shorting during an impact, reducing the risk of fire or catastrophic safety events. In addition, we have demonstrated the ability to cycle NMC/graphite lithium ion cells over 200 cycles with no loss of capacity after formation. Finally, this chemistry introduces multifunctionality to a material previously feared due to its flammability.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Validating a Dynamic PWR Safety and Security Model?

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are assessed for safety and security using separate models that cannot capture how an attacker's decisions and a plant's response unfold together in real time, leaving regulators and operators without a complete picture of true plant vulnerability. Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods treat adversarial events as fixed initiators with predetermined outcomes, and are structurally incapable of representing the time-dependent interplay between physical security events, safety system response, and operator mitigative actions. At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), I contributed to the development and validation of Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). Where static PRA relies on event-tree logic that cannot evolve mid-scenario, MASS-DEF couples a time-dependent dynamic PRA tool EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams) with attack simulation software, allowing attacker behavior, plant system states, and operator actions to interact across time. My work focused on validating a general Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model. I traced model logic against PWR plant to identified errors in logic and confirm accuracy. I then built and tested attack scenarios against a general PWR model to verify that the model produced expected outcomes across all logical pathways. I also contributed a section to a related technical paper applying the same EMRALD platform to radiation dose modeling. Results show that MASS-DEF can quantitatively demonstrate that many plants exceed their regulatory security thresholds. This demonstrated margin provides a technically defensible basis for reducing the number of guards without compromising regulatory compliance. Physical security costs represent roughly 10% of annual operating budgets, making such reductions directly meaningful to INL's mission of sustaining existing commercial NPPs. This internship strengthened my understanding of nuclear systems, probabilistic modeling, and technical writing, and has solidified my pursuit of a career at a national laboratory.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Mitigation of Severe Accident Consequences Using Inherent Safety Principles

Sodium-cooled fast reactors are designed to have a high level of safety. Events of high probability of occurrence are typically handled without consequence through reliable engineering systems and good design practices. For accidents of lower probability, the initiating events are characterized by larger and more numerous challenges to the reactor system, such as failure of one or more major engineered systems and can also include a failure to scram the reactor in response. As the initiating conditions become more severe, they have the potential for creating serious consequences of potential safety significance, including fuel melting, fuel pin disruption and recriticality. If the progression of such accidents is not mitigated by design features of the reactor, energetic events and dispersal of radioactive materials may result. For severe accidents, there are several approaches that can be used to mitigate the consequences of such severe accident initiators, which typically include fuel pin failures and core disruption. One approach is to increase the reliability of the reactor protection system so that the probability of an ATWS event is reduced to less than 1 x 10-6 per reactor year, where larger accident consequences are allowed, meeting the U.S. NRC goal of relegating such accident consequences as core disruption to these extremely low probabilities. The main difficulty with this approach is to convincingly test and guarantee such increased reliability. Another approach is to increase the redundancy of the reactor scram system, which can also reduce the probability of an ATWS event to a frequency of less than 1 x 10-6 per reactor year or lower. The issues with this approach are more related to reactor core design, with the need for a greater number of control rod positions in the reactor core and the associated increase in complexity of the reactor protection system. A third approach is to use the inherent reactivity feedback that occurs in a fast reactor to automatically respond to the change in reactor conditions and to result in a benign response to these events. This approach has the advantage of being relatively simple to implement, and does not face the issue of reliability since only fundamental physical phenomena are used in a passive manner, not active engineered systems. However, the challenge is to present a convincing case that such passive means can be implemented and used. The purpose of this paper is to describe this third approach in detail, the technical basis and experimental validation for the approach, and the resulting reactor performance that can be achieved for ATWS events.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A safety and licensing roadmap to identify the research and development gaps of commercial molten salt reactors

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) both inherently and through good design possess highly desirable safety attributes. Successful commercial deployment of MSRs is heavily dependent on establishing their safety characteristics in a well-coordinated licensing requirements program. The approach outlined is based on adapting the MSR licensing process to the current LWR–based NRC process that exists today, which has been the traditional approach used by new technologies such as the Pebble Bed Reactor licensing application, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor licensing application, and more recently the NuScale licensing application. NRC has recognized some of the unique passively safe aspects of advanced non-LWR reactors and has introduced an advanced reactor strategic plan which will address policy issues that need to be addressed to accommodate advanced reactor concepts within the existing regulatory framework. Examples of some of these policy issues are the use of functional containment, the use of mechanistic source terms, and more reliance on performance-based and risk-informed regulatory processes, such as the Licensing Modernization Project, which emphasizes the use of risk-informed processes to select licensing basis events, safety categorization of SSC, and well-defined defense-in-depth systems. Applying performance-based, risk-informed regulatory processes is, consequently, vital to substantially decreasing the cost, time, and uncertainty of commercial MSR reactor licensing while providing for the health and safety of the public and protecting the environment. This document is intended to provide a roadmap for the MSR licensing and safety activities necessary to provide a success path to commercialization.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Lithium Plating Characteristics in High Areal Capacity Li-Ion Battery Electrodes

Li-ion battery degradation and safety events are often attributed to undesirable metallic lithium plating. Since their release, Li-ion battery electrodes have been made progressively thicker to provide a higher energy density. However, the propensity for plating in these thicker pairings is not well understood. Herein, we combine an experimental plating-prone condition with robust mesoscale modeling to examine electrode pairings with capacities ranging from 2.5 to 6 mAh/cm 2 and negative to positive (N/P) electrode areal capacity ratio from 0.9 to 1.8 without the need for extensive aging tests. Using both experimentation and a mesoscale model, we identify a shift from conventional high state-of-charge (SOC) type plating to high overpotential (OP) type plating as electrode thickness increases. Further, these two plating modes have distinct morphologies, identified by optical microscopy and electrochemical signatures. We demonstrate that under operating conditions where these plating modes converge, a high propensity of plating exists, revealing the importance of predicting and avoiding this overlap for a given electrode pairing. Further, we identify that thicker electrodes, beyond a capacity of 3 mAh/cm 2 or thickness >75 μm, are prone to high OP, limiting negative electrode (NE) utilization and preventing cross-sectional oversizing the NE from mitigating plating. Here, it simply contributes to added mass and volume. The experimental thermal gradient and mesoscale model either combined or independently provide techniques capable of probing performance and safety implications of mild changes to electrode design features.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Preliminary Nuclear Containment Vessel Modeling for Multi-Hazard Probabilistic Risk Assessment under Seismic Hazards and Concrete Degradation

The current practice for natural phenomena hazards (NPH) risk assessment of nuclear facilities is to compute the risk for each hazard independently and then compound the total risk as a combination of single hazard risks. This state of practice does not consider correlations between hazards and the cascading impacts to structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and could thus underestimate the NPH risk or overestimate the nuclear facility safety. Events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident have highlighted the importance of multi-hazard risk considerations to nuclear power plants (NPPs) that quantify the cascading damage effects to SSCs in the risk models. Moreover, the current fleet of NPPs in the United States is aging; these NPPs are now expected to operate well beyond their initially planned design life. Aging-related deterioration can potentially decrease the capacity of critical structures such as containment vessels to withstand NPH. Such aging considerations may not be adequately accounted for by the current NPH risk assessment guidelines. This paper presents a preliminary modeling and simulation of a representative reinforced concrete containment vessel subjected to seismic mainshock and aftershock considering concrete degradation due to alkali silica reaction. The broader aim is to develop multi-hazard time-dependent fragility functions that could be subsequently used in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model. The multi-hazard component comes into play due to the consideration of damage to the containment vessel under seismic loads and concrete degradation. Consideration of concrete degradation also brings into play the time-dependent nature of the containment vessel response. The response of the containment vessel under varying degrees of concrete degradation to seismic loads is investigated. The results presented are simulated using the Multi-hazard Analysis for STOchastic time-DOmaiN phenomena (MASTODON) software for seismic analysis and the Blackbear software for concrete degradation and damage modeling. Both software are open source and developed within the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Ulysses mission design after Challenger

The delay of the Ulysses launch from May 1986 to October 1990, because of the Challenger disaster, has altered both the constraints under which the mission must be designed and the timing of several mission critical events. Safety and launch reliability concerns from the Shuttle have increased the effective launch window to durations greater than one hour. Fortuitously high declinations of the launch asymptote (DLA), of the order of the launch site latitude, ameliorate the impact of the new constraints on the launch window. Target overlays in the first hour of the launch window provide higher departure energies that improve mission performance and avoid a science schedule conflict at second opposition near the time of closest Jupiter approach. The mission design starts with the maximum earth departure energy that the upper stage can deliver within the launch constraints. The Jupiter arrival asymptotes are chosen from the optimal point of mission performance in the mission space defined in the Jupiter B-plane by contours mapped by the science and spacecraft constraints. More than half the orbital energy of the earth-to-Jupiter transfer orbit is lost in the Jupiter flyby, and the Jupiter gravitational assist rotates the orbit plane out of the ecliptic to an inclination of about 80 degrees.

Luthey, Joe L.↗

Identification of Scenarios for System Interface Design Evaluation: CAST SE-210 Output 2 Report 5 of 6

This report is one in a series of reports describing research to develop enhanced approaches to design and evaluation of flight deck interaction. The research was conducted to support the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) response to incidents and accidents caused by failure of the flight crew to maintain aircraft attitude or energy state awareness. This report partially responds to Safety Enhancement (SE) 210.2 (CAST, 2014) by describing development of operational scenarios for evaluation of flight crew interaction. Evaluations of human performance with an interface rely on asking humans to perform operational tasks in an appropriate operational context. The report includes the major sources of material for developing operational scenarios—which include system state, operational tasks, operational context, and safety events—and a method for developing an appropriate set of operational scenarios for interface evaluation.

commercial aviation↗

Adaptive Stress Testing of Collision Avoidance Systems for Small UASs with Deep Reinforcement Learning

The next-generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System for smaller UASs (ACAS sXu) is currently being developed and tested by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to provide detect-and-avoid capability for small unmanned aircraft operating beyond line-of-sight. Due to the complexity and safety-critical nature of the system, safety validation is important not only for the certification of the final system, but also for informing changes during the iterative development process. In this paper, we analyze a prototype of ACAS sXu in simulated aircraft encounters to discover scenarios of small near mid-air collisions (sNMACs), an important safety event in which two aircraft come closer than 50 feet horizontally and 15 feet vertically. Due to the size and complexity of the system as well as rarity of sNMAC events, traditional methods such as Monte Carlo testing often require informed setup and targeting to elicit failures. However, such a dependence on domain knowledge can be incompatible with the independent verification and validation (IV&V) process, the aim of which is to discover unforeseen issues. To address these challenges, we apply an accelerated validation method called adaptive stress testing (AST) to find the most likely sNMAC scenarios without reliance on system introspection. AST uses reinforcement learning to adapt the search towards the most promising areas of the search space as it progresses. We use a state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning algorithm, proximate policy optimization, to more efficiently search the large and continuous state space. We find that this approach significantly improves the performance of AST compared to a prior approach based on Monte Carlo tree search. We perform experiments using AST to find sNMAC events under various encounter configurations, varying parameters pertaining to dynamics and coordination. Our experiments show AST to be very effective at finding sNMAC scenarios. We summarize our findings, presenting high-level categories of discovered sNMACs and specific examples of encounters in each category.

aircraft collision avoidance↗

Limitations on the Use of Eye-Tracking Data to Understand Operator Awareness

Safety events in commercial aviation have implicated failures of attention and awareness, and the need for improved attention and awareness has pushed trainers toward eye-tracking systems as a primary tool for evaluating monitoring performance. Further, in the last 15 years, eye-tracking technology has become easier to acquire and use in operationally realistic settings. Although we believe that eye-tracking can be a useful evaluation tool, this paper describes basic limitations on relying on eye-tracking as the sole means for evaluating attention and awareness. A set of other measures are offered that can better identify where performance breakdowns occur.

aviation↗

NASA C3RS: Communication Works For Those Who Work At It!

The objective of the study is to learn about Communication Breakdown related to safety events reported to the Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS). Studying the reported close calls can yield information about communication breakdowns that may be present in the railroad operations.

Confidential Close Call Reporting System↗

Building a Strong Culture That Produces Sustainable Performance - 13444

Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS) has been involved with culture improvement for a number of years which has included co-chairing the industry effort to develop the EFCOG safety culture guidance documents [1, 2], and integration of this guidance into organizational processes and behavior expectations, described in more detail below. As various organizational cultural assessments have been periodically performed, and subsequent actions implemented to address improvement opportunities, organizational performance has shown improvement. Culture improvement is evident in the company's industrial safety statistics, event rates, safety culture survey results, employee morale, productivity, leadership effectiveness, and employee engagement. There does appear to be a relationship between striving to demonstrate behaviors consistent with excellent safety culture and good organizational performance over the past couple of years at WRPS. As performance continues to be evaluated, an improvement opportunity was identified to further enhance performance through field oriented behavioral/cultural improvement activities. WRPS recently conducted a three month effort to improve consistent implementation of management expectations by increasing management field presence with a focus on interacting real-time with workers and first line supervisors, and changing behaviors as appropriate. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Failure Considering Safety and Security Initiating Events

In order to quantify the probable risk associated with a safety system, nuclear safety risk evaluation process is applied which is generally performed in three steps. The first step is to calculate the damage frequency of a critical system. This step is followed by the radioactive source term estimation due to the potential system damage. The final step is the assessment of off-site consequences. The safety risk formula is shown by Eq. (1). P{sub F} is the probability of safety system failure (the probability used describes a random, independent event), and C is the consequence value. R{sub SAF} = P{sub F} * C (1) The security risk associated with an attack on critical infrastructure and/or special nuclear materials theft is usually evaluated using three- term risk equation (probability of attack, probability of adversary success, and consequence). A security threat and the related initiating events are not considered in a pure safety risk analysis. The vulnerability of the physical protection system is performed independently even though the consequence resulting from a security initiating event can be similar to a safety related initiating event and thus gets double counted. The security risk can be calculated using Eq. (2) R{sub SEC} = P{sub A} * P{sub S} * C (2) PA is the probability of attack, P{sub S} is the probability of adversary success (P{sub S} = 1 - P{sub I} P{sub N}). P{sub I} being the probability of interruption which accounts for the probabilities of detection of all timely detection elements along an adversary path. PN being the probability of neutralization: the result of engagement of the response force with the adversaries after the interruption has occurred. C is the consequence magnitude from a successful attack. The two security probabilities do not describe random, independent events. As a result, because of the differences in the randomness and independence of the respective safety and security probabilities, the safety and the security risks are currently calculated separately. The consequence term in nuclear safety and security risk evaluation have the same definition. An effort is made here to study the effect on the overall risk by considering security initiating events along with the subsequent failure of the intermediate safety element. The target selected is a spent fuel storage pool for analyzing the public risk arising from the interplay between nuclear security and safety initiating events. EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) model is used to calculate the probability of interruption related to a security system that leads to the calculation of the security initiating event frequency. Further progression of this initiating security event to a top event is analyzed using a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) tool, SAPHIRE (version 8) to obtain a joint pool damage frequency. For the progression of events leading to a top event, the failure of the intermediate safety elements is assumed to be external random events such as heavy load drop and fire events. The objectives of this study is to (1) determine the double accounting of frequency of failure, risk and allocated resources in the scenario of a non-random security initiating event leading to a safety random event chain (2) compare the damage frequency from pure security with the frequency of combined security-safety failure event and pure safety failure events. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Can a radiological event impact a criticality safety program: Lessons learned at WIPP - 14350

Any accident at a nuclear facility impacts all departments involved in the operation of the facility. The radiological release that occurred on February 14, 2014 has halted all waste disposal operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and has resulted in detailed reviews of all safety management programs. This paper describes the initial reactions to the event, criticality issues with recovery operations, corrective actions for the criticality safety program from independent reviews, and the importance of configuration management to criticality safety. The nature, location, and timing of the event resulted in significant delays in determining the cause of the event. During this time multiple theories on the initiator of the event were postulated including and inadvertent criticality event. However, the timing of the event, average fissile gram equivalent (FGE) loading of waste containers compared to analyzed FGE loads, and isotopic analysis of fixed air samples taken during the event proved it was not an inadvertent criticality event. Recovery activities such as replacing contaminated high efficiency particulate (HEPA), filters and disposing of site generated waste have also been reviewed to prevent criticality safety issues. Post event corrective actions in all departments have impacted how future operations at WIPP will be conducted, including corrective actions for the criticality safety program. The event has also proven the importance of configuration management and the effect a change can have on a process. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Functions and Features, Events and Processes for the E-Area Performance Assessment

The DOE Technical Standard, “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation,” (DOE 2017) recommends the use of safety functions and features, events and processes (FEPs) to support development of conceptual models and identification of scenarios to be considered in a performance assessment (PA). The FEP process provides a means to describe how a PA considers and addresses the factors that could influence the performance of key barriers. Understanding the roles of barriers in terms of limiting migration helps to focus on how changes in the system could lead to a situation where those roles cannot be fulfilled and there is the potential for compromised performance. The FEPs screening and review process was used to identify FEPs that are relevant for the EArea Low-Level Waste Facility (LLWF) and specifically those FEPs that could have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of a given safety function. For this PA, a default list of FEPs developed at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2004) and an approach implemented for PAs at the Hanford and Idaho sites (Mehta et al. 2016, DOE-ID 2019) are used to identify processes and events that could influence the effectiveness of a given safety function for the E-Area LLWF (e.g., subsidence can impact the safety function of the cover system and lead to increased infiltration). The Hanford and Idaho PAs represent two of the most recent applications of this approach. The PA evaluates the potential impacts of changes in performance of different features of the system and demonstrates that the safety functions represent multiple and redundant barriers. Barrier analyses, assuming a safety function is not present, also test the robustness of the system in the event of the loss of one or more safety functions. Such evaluations also support a qualitative illustration of the concept of defense in depth. The safety concept for closure of the E-Area LLWF (generically referred to as “E-Area”) encompasses a variety of different features (i.e., administrative controls, natural site features, and engineered barriers) that reduce the potential impacts on human health and the environment from the residual waste that will remain after closure. These features can be represented as a collection of safety functions acting independently and as a system to provide for overall safety. In some applications, there have been attempts to assign numerical expectations to specific safety functions, but that is not the intent in this case. The concept of safety functions is used more qualitatively in two ways for this PA: 1. To illustrate the robustness of the E-Area design, operational practices and closure approach by documenting features that are and are not credited in different modeling cases. 2. To identify the roles of the different features and potential processes and events that could compromise the performance of safety features and need to be considered when developing the modeling approach. This report addresses both safety functions and FEPs for the E-Area PA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗