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30 records · Page 2

Laser Confocal Microscopy Uncertainty Quantification Study

At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Storage Safety and Engineering (SSE) team completes annual surveillance on a subset of in-use interim nuclear material storage containers in fulfilment of requirements outlined in DOE Manual M 441.1-1. The containers are selected through several methods, such as subject matter expert judgement, random selection, and trending items. Following these selections, the SSE team has the capacity to complete surveillance on 15-20 containers each fiscal year, composed of a combination of SAVY-4000 and Hagan storage containers. Through previous work, the stainless-steel components of the containers have been identified as life limiting components, with an emphasis on the thin-walled bodies. The team is focused on understanding the extent of general and pitting corrosion, due to observations of extensive corrosion from stored contents and bag-out-bag degradation. Quantifying corrosion effects on the thin-walled stainless steel container bodies, and understanding potential impacts to the respective design release rates and design qualification release rates is paramount to the team. To date, destructive examination (DE) has proven to be the most insightful method for developing an understanding on the extent of corrosion on used containers. To standardize this process, the SSE team developed a destructive examination guide for analyzing stainless steel components of the containers. Corroded containers of interest are identified during surveillance activities and set aside for sectioning and characterization. Following sectioning, a major step in the DE workflow is the utilization of laser confocal microscopy for scanning corroded samples of interest and extracting data on pits, such as count, depth, and equivalent diameter. Adhering to the techniques outlined in the DE guide, analysis has been completed on two Hagans and one SAVY-4000 container, with the maximum pit depth recorded as 139.1 ± 22.82 μm on a 17.5 year old Hagan. The findings from the completed destructive examinations will be utilized to support lifetime extension efforts of the SAVY-4000 as the team can better estimate corrosion rates and effects over time based on stored contents and age. Due to the implications of observing extreme pit depths that approach the nominal container body thickness of .0299 inches (0.759 mm) or minimum container thickness of 0.236” (0.6 mm), high confidence in the LCM measurements is desired. Through testing outlined in, it was concluded that the total error ascribed to the 20x objective when conducting large image mapping on the Keyence VK-X3050 laser confocal microscope (LCM) relative to a 50x objective (reference) is 16.4% (± 8.73%). For shallow features on the order of pristine SAVY surface defects (i.e. 5 μm), this uncertainty is appropriate. However, this conservative estimate of total error poses a fundamental concern for pit depths that approach the thickness of the measured samples. That is, with the measurement uncertainty currently employed on all measurements, the LCM would be unable to resolve if a pit with a depth of 515 μm is through wall. Standard step height samples were procured and used in the present study to assess the resolution and repeatability of height measurements. Understanding the resolution and repeatability of height measurements was the first focus of the team as it relates directly to pit depth, which is of primary concern. Calibration gratings were procured to evaluate the resolution and repeatability of measurements in the X and Y axes of the LCM stage. The results of the depth uncertainty study were conducted first and presented in the subsequent sections. The planar uncertainty study is appended to the depth study with conclusions from both summarized at the end of the report.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

SAVY O-ring characterization for lifetime extension

Los Alamos National Laboratory and Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. developed the SAVY-4000 nuclear material storage container, named after the designers Stone, Anderson, Viers, and Yarbro. The SAVY 4000 meets the requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) M 441.1-1,2 Nuclear Material Packaging Manual, to protect workers who handle nuclear materials against radiation exposures resulting from the leakage of stored materials. The SAVY-4000 is an innovative and creative design: it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without using torque wrenches and instead only a tire iron or equivalent prying tool; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates at 200 ACCM rated flow; and prevents the release of stored materials upon a 12- foot drop.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Proposal for a Hagan Container Surveillance Plan

This white paper proposes a Hagan-specific surveillance plan. Currently, Hagan containers are examined on an ad hoc basis as part of the SAVY-4000 surveillance plan. Given the size, aging horizon, and unique potential failure mechanisms of the Hagan population, the authors believe there is a need to have a Hagan-specific surveillance plan.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Pressurizing Hagan and SAVY containers to 30-psig (air) to measure the release of analytical cerium oxide test powder

In response to an ESS surrounding the storage of sealed sources at TA-55, personnel from RP-SVS (Radiation Protection Services) and ORI-2 (Operational Readiness & Execution) were approached by ES-55 (Facility System Engineering) to provide technical testing of known nuclear material storage containers. Testing criteria were determined by SB-PF (Safety Basis for Plutonium Facilities). Tests were conducted in conjunction with multiple related projects at the Aerosol Sciences Laboratory (TA-03-0130-0103). An experimental system was quickly developed to deliver a pressure pulse (30-psig) that mimics a sealed source burst scenario. A series of twelve tests was conducted. Six tests were done with two different 5QT SAVY-4000 containers, where each SAVY filter-lid combination was subjected to three successive test insults. Three tests were done with a (0.375" diameter filter) 8Q.T Hagan container, and three tests with a (0.625" diameter filter) 8QT Hagan container. An unused, fresh container filter was used for each tested Hagan container, each receiving only one test insult per filter. Cerium oxide (CeO 2 ) powder was loaded (100 grams per test) into a nozzle in the tested Hagan and SAVY containers, and the nozzle was hard-plumbed to a ball valve and a pressure source. This system was installed into the Los Alamos RRFMC (Respirable Release Measurement Chamber), which is an integrated multipurpose aerosol wind tunnel that satisfies NQA-1 subpart 2.4 for R&D work. The ball valve was fitted with a mechanical linkage for operation from outside the wind tunnel. An aerodynamic particle sizer counted the particle concentrations and size distributions of released aerosol. Respirable aerosol released during the tests was measured and a correction factor for wind tunnel flowrate and internal duct deposition was applied.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Investigation of Luminescent Ceria as a Plutonium Oxide Simulant. Final Report

Plutonium oxide powders from various production lines at Los Alamos National Laboratory are stored and transported in specially designed “SAVY-4000”, “Hagan”, or other containment systems. Cerium oxide powder has been used as a less-hazardous simulant powder for testing accidental release from these containers under various operational scenarios. This work investigates the development and use of fluorescent cerium oxide powders as a more easily detectable, and potentially quantifiable, simulant powder for plutonium oxide container systems

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

2021 Hagan Container Surveillance Plan

Prior to 2021, Hagan containers were examined on an ad hoc basis as part of the SAVY-4000 surveillance plan. Given the size, aging horizon, and unique potential failure mechanisms of the Hagan population, the authors identified the need for Hagan-specific surveillance (Kelly, et al., 2020) and have developed this surveillance plan to meet that need.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Corrosion Testing Proposal -1: Assessment of the Corrosion of Stainless Steel Subjected to an Aqueous Solution of Hydrochloric Acid

This corrosion-test proposal outlines the methods to promote rapid pitting corrosion on various pitting resistant stainless steels under controlled conditions. This study can be performed in-whole or in- part as the Corrosion Working Group (CWG) leadership of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) deems pertinent. This proposal is in response to CWG’s need to understand the mechanisms and the possible detrimental failure of the 316L SAVY (an acronym that represents the first initial of the four co-developers, Stone, Anderson, Veirs, Yarbro) 4000 container design currently in service. This detrimental failure evolved from a question that the CWG arrived to by consensus as “What is the critical pit depth that would comprise the design wall-strength of the SAVY-4000?”

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

L4-3 Developing DOE M441.1-1 Compliant Container Components: Filter Cup Experimental Fixture Test Data Verification

This document serves to provide technical documentation and justification for using the Filter Cup Experimental Fixture (FCEP) for filter efficiency and pressure drop testing in the Enhanced Filter Test System (EFTS). This document assumes that the reader has prior knowledge related to both of these systems, as well as the SAVY-4000® nuclear material container series filter technology.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Lifetime extension drop-test of real-world corroded 5 Quart Hagan nuclear material storage container

A 5Qt Hagan container with a 20-year history of nuclear material storage was challenged with three successive drop tests at a height of 3.7 meters. The total mass of the test package was 12.1 kg. The 1st and 2nd drop tests (center of gravity over the container bottom corner but 180 degrees apart on the container bottom face) passed the pre- and post- impact helium leak criterion at less than 1.00E-6 atm-cc/sec (ambient cubic centimeters per second). The 3rd and final test (center of gravity over top corner) failed with a post-impact gross leak of 1.1E-1 atmcc/sec. The RRFMC (Respirable Release Fraction Measurement Chamber) is a drop tower test system that is critical for the sustainability of the SAVY-4000™ series and Hagan-type (NFT Inc. Golden CO) nuclear material storage containers. These are the primary in-use nuclear material storage container types at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA-55 facility. Results are presented to expand the technical knowledge basis for container lifetime, regarding actual exposure to corrosive gas species on the container inner surfaces. The primary source of general corrosion throughout the container is gaseous hydrogen chloride (HCl). This gas is generated by the degradation of the polyvinylchloride (PVC) bag-out bag. Additionally, in most cases, the nuclear material itself also releases HCl gas (due to residual chemical components associated with the material formation). The RRFMC drop tower gives the end-user the ability record and analyze high-speed video and photography and if needed aerosol mass release measurements. In this report the principal issue is the physical deformation of the 5Qt Hagan container. There were no mass release experiments of test aerosol mass in the present study.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Reducing the Risk of Airborne Contamination through Intelligent Container Surveillance

DOE Manual 441.1-1 provides a set of performance criteria that nuclear material storage containers must achieve to provide protection to the worker, public, and environment. At Los Alamos National Laboratory, the SAVY-4000 is the container of choice for nuclear material storage, meeting all Manual requirements. At the outset, polymer components of the SAVY 4000 were considered to be life-limiting components due to their performance degradation resulting from radiation exposure. However, recent annual surveillance results revealed another life-limiting phenomenon for the container: a deterioration of the package integrity through corrosion of the stainless steel components, primarily the body. Container surveillance remains the choice method of observing, measuring, and tracking container health in service.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Improving Non-Destructive Detection Technology Through SAVY Feature Detection

Surveillance of special nuclear material (SNM) storage containers is required by the DOE to assess their integrity across the Complex. This work aims to improve the task of container inspections by leveraging automation through machine learning (ML) tools to reduce the human-intensive effort and expert-level knowledge needed to assess container status. A field-deployable, non-destructive technology was designed using off-the-shelf components to collect multiple images from different perspectives of containers in storage to detect both spatial features of interest and anomalies of concern. Nine ML models were generated using unique training datasets and parameters. Learned features include SAVY surface regions including the body side wall, collar, lid, filter, and printed/etched information. Average Precision (AP) is used to calculate detection performance when both viewing previously seen environments and previously unseen environments. The application of image transformations and resolution scaling while training greatly improved the detection performance in unseen environments, and significantly increasing the number of computation iterations improved detection performance on previously seen environments. Additional capabilities were developed including the novel detection of procedural non-compliance and the ability to localize anomalies relative to SAVY surface features.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗