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21 records · Page 2

Lifetime extension drop-test of real-world corroded 5 Quart Hagan nuclear material storage container

A 5Qt Hagan container with a 20-year history of nuclear material storage was challenged with three successive drop tests at a height of 3.7 meters. The total mass of the test package was 12.1 kg. The 1st and 2nd drop tests (center of gravity over the container bottom corner but 180 degrees apart on the container bottom face) passed the pre- and post- impact helium leak criterion at less than 1.00E-6 atm-cc/sec (ambient cubic centimeters per second). The 3rd and final test (center of gravity over top corner) failed with a post-impact gross leak of 1.1E-1 atmcc/sec. The RRFMC (Respirable Release Fraction Measurement Chamber) is a drop tower test system that is critical for the sustainability of the SAVY-4000™ series and Hagan-type (NFT Inc. Golden CO) nuclear material storage containers. These are the primary in-use nuclear material storage container types at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA-55 facility. Results are presented to expand the technical knowledge basis for container lifetime, regarding actual exposure to corrosive gas species on the container inner surfaces. The primary source of general corrosion throughout the container is gaseous hydrogen chloride (HCl). This gas is generated by the degradation of the polyvinylchloride (PVC) bag-out bag. Additionally, in most cases, the nuclear material itself also releases HCl gas (due to residual chemical components associated with the material formation). The RRFMC drop tower gives the end-user the ability record and analyze high-speed video and photography and if needed aerosol mass release measurements. In this report the principal issue is the physical deformation of the 5Qt Hagan container. There were no mass release experiments of test aerosol mass in the present study.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Reducing the Risk of Airborne Contamination through Intelligent Container Surveillance

DOE Manual 441.1-1 provides a set of performance criteria that nuclear material storage containers must achieve to provide protection to the worker, public, and environment. At Los Alamos National Laboratory, the SAVY-4000 is the container of choice for nuclear material storage, meeting all Manual requirements. At the outset, polymer components of the SAVY 4000 were considered to be life-limiting components due to their performance degradation resulting from radiation exposure. However, recent annual surveillance results revealed another life-limiting phenomenon for the container: a deterioration of the package integrity through corrosion of the stainless steel components, primarily the body. Container surveillance remains the choice method of observing, measuring, and tracking container health in service.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Improving Non-Destructive Detection Technology Through SAVY Feature Detection

Surveillance of special nuclear material (SNM) storage containers is required by the DOE to assess their integrity across the Complex. This work aims to improve the task of container inspections by leveraging automation through machine learning (ML) tools to reduce the human-intensive effort and expert-level knowledge needed to assess container status. A field-deployable, non-destructive technology was designed using off-the-shelf components to collect multiple images from different perspectives of containers in storage to detect both spatial features of interest and anomalies of concern. Nine ML models were generated using unique training datasets and parameters. Learned features include SAVY surface regions including the body side wall, collar, lid, filter, and printed/etched information. Average Precision (AP) is used to calculate detection performance when both viewing previously seen environments and previously unseen environments. The application of image transformations and resolution scaling while training greatly improved the detection performance in unseen environments, and significantly increasing the number of computation iterations improved detection performance on previously seen environments. Additional capabilities were developed including the novel detection of procedural non-compliance and the ability to localize anomalies relative to SAVY surface features.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗