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At least 37 records · Page 2

Study of application of ERTS-A imagery to fracture-related mine safety hazards in the coal mining industry

The author has identified the following significant results. The Mined Land Inventory map of Pike, Gibson, and Warrick Counties, Indiana, prepared from ERTS-1 imagery, was included in the 1973 Annual Report of the President's Council on Environmental Quality as an example of ERTS applications to mined lands. Increasing numbers of inquiries have been received from coal producing states and coal companies interested in the Indiana Program.

Wier, C. E.

Application of ERTS-1 imagery to fracture related mine safety hazards in the coal mining industry

The author has identified the following significant results. New fracture detail of Indiana has been observed and mapped from ERTS-1 imagery. Studies so far indicate a close relationship between the directions of fracture traces mapped from the imagery, fractures measured on bedrock outcrops, and fractures measured in the underground mines. First hand observations and discussions with underground mine operators indicate good correlation of mine hazard maps prepared from ERTS-1/aircraft imagery and actual roof falls. The inventory of refuse piles/slurry ponds of the coal field of Indiana has identified over 225 such sites from past mining operations. These data will serve the State Legislature in making tax decisions on coal mining which take on increased importance because of the energy crisis.

Wier, C. E.

Application of EREP imagery to fracture-related mine safety hazards and environmental problems in mining

The author has identified the following significant results. All Skylab 2 imagery received to date has been analyzed manually and data related to fracture analysis and mined land inventories has been summarized on map-overlays. A comparison of the relative utility of the Skylab image products for fracture detection, soil tone/vegetation contrast mapping, and mined land mapping has been completed. Numerous fracture traces were detected on both color and black and white transparencies. Unique fracture trace data which will contribute to the investigator's mining hazards analysis were noted on the EREP imagery; these data could not be detected on ERTS-1 imagery or high altitude aircraft color infrared photography. Stream segments controlled by fractures or joint systems could be identified in more detail than with ERTS-1 imagery of comparable scale. ERTS-1 mine hazards products will be modified to demonstrate the value of this additional data. Skylab images were used successfully to update a mined land map of Indiana made in 1972. Changes in mined area as small as two acres can be identified. As the Energy Crisis increases the demand for coal, such demonstrations of the application of Skylab data to coal resources will take on new importance.

Wier, C. E.

Study of application of ERTS-A imagery to fracture-related mine safety hazards in the coal mining industry

The author has identified the following significant results. The mine refuse inventory maps were prepared in response to a need by both the State and the coal industry. The lack of information on the scope of the problem handicapped all people concerned in drafting realistic legislation for a severance tax on coal production to raise funds for restoration of refuse sites. The inventory was conducted rapidly and economically, and demonstrated the benefits which can be derived through remote sensing methods.

Wier, C. E.

Application of EREP imagery to fracture-related mine safety hazards in coal mining and mining-environmental problems in Indiana

The author has identified the following significant results. This investigation evaluated the applicability of a variety of sensor types, formats, and resolution capabilities to the study of both fuel and nonfuel mined lands. The image reinforcement provided by stereo viewing of the EREP images proved useful for identifying lineaments and for mined lands mapping. Skylab S190B color and color infrared transparencies were the most useful EREP imagery. New information on lineament and fracture patterns in the bedrock of Indiana and Illinois extracted from analysis of the Skylab imagery has contributed to furthering the geological understanding of this portion of the Illinois basin.

Wier, C. E.

Safety hazard of aircraft icing

The problem of aircraft icing is reported as well as the type of aircraft affected, the pilots involved, and an identification of the areas where reduction in icing accidents are readily accomplished.

Mclean, J. C., Jr.

Safety hazards associated with the charging of lithium/sulfur dioxide cells

A continuing research program to assess the responses of spirally wound, lithium/sulfur dioxide cells to charging as functions of charging current, temperature, and cell condition prior to charging is described. Partially discharged cells that are charged at currents greater than one ampere explode with the time to explosion inversely proportional to the charging current. Cells charged at currents of less than one ampere may fail in one of several modes. The data allows an empirical prediction of when certain cells will fail given a constant charging current.

Frank, H.

Bibliography on aircraft fire hazards and safety. Volume 1: Hazards. Part 1: Key numbers 1 to 817

Ignition temperatures of n-hexane, n-octane, n-decane, JP-6 jet fuel, and aircraft engine oil MIL-7-7808 (0-60-18) were determined in air using heated Pyrex cylinders and Nichrome wires, rods, or tubes. Ignition temperature varied little with fuel-air ratio, but increased as the size of the heat source was decreased. Expressions are given which define the variation of the hot surface ignition temperatures of these combustibles with the radius and the surface area of the heat source. The expressions are applicable to stagnant or low velocity flow conditions (less than 0.2 in./sec.). In addition, the hot gas ignition temperatures of the combustible vapor-air mixtures were determined with jets of hot air. These ignition temperatures also varied little with fuel-air ratio and increased as the diameter of the heat sources was decreased.

Pelouch, J. J., Jr.

Run Time Assurance for Electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing Aircraft

NASA is conducting research to demonstrate and evaluate the application of Run Time Assurance (RTA) as a means to assure safety in Electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) aircraft with highly automated or autonomous flight capability supervised by a single onboard pilot. The work described in this report demonstrates an application of RTA and examines the implications for design and analysis of aircraft functions and systems; aircraft safety hazards; safety assurance; development assurance; and pilot tasks and performance. This research effort also seeks to assess the efficacy of the combined application of traditional Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) and the more modern System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) techniques to perform hazard analyses on aircraft with complex automated and autonomous systems and an onboard pilot. During the research effort we developed architectural designs of two alternate eVTOL aircraft, generally following the process characterized in the SAE standards ARP4754 and ARP4761. The design has focused on the control architectures of these aircraft, which are identical except that one incorporates RTA techniques to reduce the criticality of some key software components. Artifacts of this process include a taxonomy of aircraft-level functions, aircraft-level architecture diagrams, aircraft-level functional hazard assessments (AFHA), function allocations onto aircraft systems and subsystems, functional block diagrams for a select set of control-related functions, and system-level functional hazard assessments (SFHA) for those functions. This project has highlighted the notion that DAL D is something of a sweet spot for low-confidence controllers in an RTA-based design. Among the many activities described in DO-178C, the activities related to requirement verifiability, algorithmic accuracy, and test coverage can be the most challenging for the kinds of advanced control techniques that may be desirable in novel UAM designs, such as adaptive control, machine-learning, artificial intelligence, numerical search, and Monte Carlo based algorithms. Moreover, the standard requires that development teams demonstrate that errors leading to unacceptable failure conditions have been removed from the software. The RTA architecture, which cordons off the low-confidence function, makes it much easier to show this for these kinds of algorithms. With regard to the use of STPA and FHA as complementary hazard analysis techniques, our research effort led us to the conclusion that STPA should be used to derive requirements for hardware and software systems and/or components. Also, STPA is a natural complement to other processes in ARP4754A involving design studies and iteration.

Run-time assurance

Operational range safety.

Hazards in sounding rocket assembly and launch operations and safety techniques at NASA Wallops station noting storage, explosive control, ground safety, etc

ROCKET FIRING

Lunar mission safety and rescue: Hazards analysis and safety requirements

The results are presented of the hazards analysis which was concerned only with hazards to personnel and not with loss of equipment or property. Hazards characterization includes the definition of a hazard, the hazard levels, and the hazard groups. The analysis methodology is described in detail. The methodology was used to prepare the top level functional flow diagrams, to perform the first level hazards assessment, and to develop a list of conditions and situations requiring individual hazard studies. The 39 individual hazard study results are presented in total.

Source record

International Space Station (ISS) Plasma Contactor Unit (PCU) Utilization Plan Assessment Update

The International Space Station (ISS) vehicle undergoes spacecraft charging as it interacts with Earth's ionosphere and magnetic field. The interaction can result in a large potential difference developing between the ISS metal chassis and the local ionosphere plasma environment. If an astronaut conducting extravehicular activities (EVA) is exposed to the potential difference, then a possible electrical shock hazard arises. The control of this hazard was addressed by a number of documents within the ISS Program (ISSP) including Catastrophic Safety Hazard for Astronauts on EVA (ISS-EVA-312-4A_revE). The safety hazard identified the risk for an astronaut to experience an electrical shock in the event an arc was generated on an extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) surface. A catastrophic safety hazard, by the ISS requirements, necessitates mitigation by a two-fault tolerant system of hazard controls. Traditionally, the plasma contactor units (PCUs) on the ISS have been used to limit the charging and serve as a "ground strap" between the ISS structure and the surrounding ionospheric plasma. In 2009, a previous NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) team evaluated the PCU utilization plan (NESC Request #07-054-E) with the objective to assess whether leaving PCUs off during non-EVA time periods presented risk to the ISS through assembly completion. For this study, in situ measurements of ISS charging, covering the installation of three of the four photovoltaic arrays, and laboratory testing results provided key data to underpin the assessment. The conclusion stated, "there appears to be no significant risk of damage to critical equipment nor excessive ISS thermal coating damage as a result of eliminating PCU operations during non- EVA times." In 2013, the ISSP was presented with recommendations from Boeing Space Environments for the "Conditional" Marginalization of Plasma Hazard. These recommendations include a plan that would keep the PCUs off during EVAs when the space environment forecast input to the ISS charging model indicates floating potentials (FP) within specified limits. These recommendations were based on the persistence of conditions in the space environment due to the current low solar cycle and belief in the accuracy and completeness of the ISS charging model. Subsequently, a Noncompliance Report (NCR), ISS-NCR-232G, Lack of Two-fault Tolerance to EVA Crew Shock in the Low Earth Orbit Plasma Environment, was signed in September 2013 specifying new guidelines for the use of shock hazard controls based on a forecast of the space environment from ISS plasma measurements taken prior to the EVA [ISS-EVA-312-AC, 2012]. This NESC assessment re-evaluates EVA charging hazards through a process that is based on over 14 years of ISS operations, charging measurements, laboratory tests, EMU studies and modifications, and safety reports. The assessment seeks an objective review of the plasma charging hazards associated with EVA operations to determine if any of the present hazard controls can safely change the PCU utilization plan to allow more flexibility in ISS operations during EVA preparation and execution.

Hernandez-Pellerano, Amri

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie

Preliminary Assessment of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) Roadmap Applications

A set of five developmental steps building from the NASA TASAR (Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests) concept are described, each providing incrementally more efficiency and capacity benefits to airspace system users and service providers, culminating in a Full Airborne Trajectory Management capability. For each of these steps, the incremental Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements are identified for later use in future formal safety assessments intended to lead to certification and operational approval of the equipment and the associated procedures. Two established safety assessment methodologies that are compliant with the FAA's Safety Management System were used leading to Failure Effects Classifications (FEC) for each of the steps. The most likely FEC for the first three steps, Basic TASAR, Digital TASAR, and 4D TASAR, is "No effect". For step four, Strategic Airborne Trajectory Management, the likely FEC is "Minor". For Full Airborne Trajectory Management (Step 5), the most likely FEC is "Major".

Cotton, William B.