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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1993

Risk management for the Space Exploration Initiative

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a quantitative engineering process that provides the analytic structure and decision-making framework for total programmatic risk management. Ideally, it is initiated in the conceptual design phase and used throughout the program life cycle. Although PRA was developed for assessment of safety, reliability, and availability risk, it has far greater application. Throughout the design phase, PRA can guide trade-off studies among system performance, safety, reliability, cost, and schedule. These studies are based on the assessment of the risk of meeting each parameter goal, with full consideration of the uncertainties. Quantitative trade-off studies are essential, but without full identification, propagation, and display of uncertainties, poor decisions may result. PRA also can focus attention on risk drivers in situations where risk is too high. For example, if safety risk is unacceptable, the PRA prioritizes the risk contributors to guide the use of resources for risk mitigation. PRA is used in the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) Program. To meet the stringent requirements of the SEI mission, within strict budgetary constraints, the PRA structure supports informed and traceable decision-making. This paper briefly describes the SEI PRA process.

Buchbinder, Ben↗
NASA NTRS2004

An Introduction to Flight Software Development: FSW Today, FSW 2010

Experience and knowledge gained from ongoing maintenance of Space Shuttle Flight Software and new development projects including Cockpit Avionics Upgrade are applied to projected needs of the National Space Exploration Vision through Spiral 2. Lessons learned from these current activities are applied to create a sustainable, reliable model for development of critical software to support Project Constellation. This presentation introduces the technologies, methodologies, and infrastructure needed to produce and sustain high quality software. It will propose what is needed to support a Vision for Space Exploration that places demands on the innovation and productivity needed to support future space exploration. The technologies in use today within FSW development include tools that provide requirements tracking, integrated change management, modeling and simulation software. Specific challenges that have been met include the introduction and integration of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) Real Time Operating System for critical functions. Though technology prediction has proved to be imprecise, Project Constellation requirements will need continued integration of new technology with evolving methodologies and changing project infrastructure. Targets for continued technology investment are integrated health monitoring and management, self healing software, standard payload interfaces, autonomous operation, and improvements in training. Emulation of the target hardware will also allow significant streamlining of development and testing. The methodologies in use today for FSW development are object oriented UML design, iterative development using independent components, as well as rapid prototyping . In addition, Lean Six Sigma and CMMI play a critical role in the quality and efficiency of the workforce processes. Over the next six years, we expect these methodologies to merge with other improvements into a consolidated office culture with all processes being guided by automated office assistants. The infrastructure in use today includes strict software development and configuration management procedures, including strong control of resource management and critical skills coverage. This will evolve to a fully integrated staff organization with efficient and effective communication throughout all levels guided by a Mission-Systems Architecture framework with focus on risk management and attention toward inevitable product obsolescence. This infrastructure of computing equipment, software and processes will itself be subject to technological change and need for management of change and improvement,

Gouvela, John↗
NASA NTRS2007

Automated Target Planning for FUSE Using the SOVA Algorithm

The SOVA algorithm was originally developed under the Resilient Systems and Operations Project of the Engineering for Complex Systems Program from NASA s Aerospace Technology Enterprise as a conceptual framework to support real-time autonomous system mission and contingency management. The algorithm and its software implementation were formulated for generic application to autonomous flight vehicle systems, and its efficacy was demonstrated by simulation within the problem domain of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle autonomous flight management. The approach itself is based upon the precept that autonomous decision making for a very complex system can be made tractable by distillation of the system state to a manageable set of strategic objectives (e.g. maintain power margin, maintain mission timeline, and et cetera), which if attended to, will result in a favorable outcome. From any given starting point, the attainability of the end-states resulting from a set of candidate decisions is assessed by propagating a system model forward in time while qualitatively mapping simulated states into margins on strategic objectives using fuzzy inference systems. The expected return value of each candidate decision is evaluated as the product of the assigned value of the end-state with the assessed attainability of the end-state. The candidate decision yielding the highest expected return value is selected for implementation; thus, the approach provides a software framework for intelligent autonomous risk management. The name adopted for the technique incorporates its essential elements: Strategic Objective Valuation and Attainability (SOVA). Maximum value of the approach is realized for systems where human intervention is unavailable in the timeframe within which critical control decisions must be made. The Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer (FUSE) satellite, launched in 1999, has been collecting science data for eight years.[1] At its beginning of life, FUSE had six gyros in two IRUs and four reaction wheels. Over time through various failures, the satellite has been left with one reaction wheel on the vehicle skew axis and two gyros. To remain operational, a control scheme has been implemented using the magnetic torque rods and the remaining momentum wheel.[2] As a consequence, there are attitude regions where there is insufficient torque authority to overcome environmental disturbances (e.g. gravity gradient torques). The situation is further complicated by the fact that these attitude regions shift inertially with time as the spacecraft moves through earth s magnetic field during the course of its orbit. Under these conditions, the burden of planning targets and target-to-target slew maneuvers has increased significantly since the beginning of the mission.[3] Individual targets must be selected so that the magnetic field remains roughly aligned with the skew wheel axis to provide enough control authority to the other two orthogonal axes. If the field moves too far away from the skew axis, the lack of control authority allows environmental torques to pull the satellite away from the target and can potentially cause it to tumble. Slew maneuver planning must factor the stability of targets at the beginning and end, and the torque authority at all points along the slew. Due to the time varying magnetic field geometry relative to any two inertial targets, small modifications in slew maneuver timing can make large differences in the achievability of a maneuver.

Heatwole, Scott↗
NASA NTRS2010

From Process to Product: Your Risk Process at Work

The Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) and Human Research Program (HRP) at the NASA/Johnson Space Center work together to address and manage the human health and performance risks associated with human space flight. This includes all human system requirements before, during, and after space flight, providing for research, and managing the risk of adverse long-term health outcomes for the crew. We previously described the framework and processes developed for identifying and managing these human system risks. The focus of this panel is to demonstrate how the implementation of the framework and associated processes has provided guidance in the management and communication of human system risks. The risks of early onset osteoporosis, CO2 exposure, and intracranial hypertension in particular have all benefitted from the processes developed for human system risk management. Moreover, we are continuing to develop capabilities, particularly in the area of information architecture, which will also be described. We are working to create a system whereby all risks and associated actions can be tracked and related to one another electronically. Such a system will enhance the management and communication capabilities for the human system risks, thereby increasing the benefit to researchers and flight surgeons.

Kundrot, Craig E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

...And the Beats Keep Runnin Runnin (In Space)

Introduction: This case series describes the medical clearance of NASA astronauts after diagnosis of atrial fibrillation seeking to fly to the International Space Station (ISS). BACKGROUND: Atrial fibrillation is the most common sustained arrhythmia with increasing incidence with age and is associated with increased lifetime risk of stroke. Treatment may consist of pharmacologic rate control and anticoagulation. Although it is not yet known how spaceflight modifies risk of cardioembolic event or adverse treatment effects, these can have significant impact on mission and crew health for spaceflight and granting a medical waiver for flight is a complex, case-by-case consideration. Case Presentation: We reviewed all records of waivers granted by NASA for atrial fibrillation and flutter, and identified 6 cases (4 short-duration [<18 days] and 2 long-duration missions [>60 days]) where waiver was granted with subsequent spaceflight. DISCUSSION: NASA has approved astronauts with a history of atrial fibrillation or flutter for flight following an appropriate medical evaluation. With the high prevalence of atrial fibrillation in the general population, we anticipate that consideration of medical waiver will become increasingly common as commercial spaceflight grows. These cases provide a potential framework for risk assessment and management of this population, to balance potential risk modification inherent in the microgravity environment against implications to crew performance, mission success, and personal health of spaceflight participants

Space Medicine↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk-Informed Safety Assurance and Probabilistic Assessment of Mission-Critical Software-Intensive Systems

This report validates and documents the detailed features and practical application of the framework for software intensive digital systems risk assessment and risk-informed safety assurance presented in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and Practitioner. This framework, called herein the "Context-based Software Risk Model" (CSRM), enables the assessment of the contribution of software and software-intensive digital systems to overall system risk, in a manner which is entirely compatible and integrated with the format of a "standard" Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as currently documented and applied for NASA missions and applications. The CSRM also provides a risk-informed path and criteria for conducting organized and systematic digital system and software testing so that, within this risk-informed paradigm, the achievement of a quantitatively defined level of safety and mission success assurance may be targeted and demonstrated. The framework is based on the concept of context-dependent software risk scenarios and on the modeling of such scenarios via the use of traditional PRA techniques - i.e., event trees and fault trees - in combination with more advanced modeling devices such as the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) or other dynamic logic-modeling representations. The scenarios can be synthesized and quantified in a conditional logic and probabilistic formulation. The application of the CSRM method documented in this report refers to the MiniAERCam system designed and developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center.

Guarro, Sergio B.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shooting the Moon

This story is about an unlikely NASA mission to the Moon. It was unlikely because it was started with far too little time and too-little money to complete. It was unlikely because it was able to take chances to accept risk of failure. It was unlikely because it was searching for the unthinkable: water-ice on the moon... Figure 1-1: LCROSS Mission. The mission of the Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) was to investigate the possibility of water ice in craters on the Moon s poles. This is certainly an interesting scientific topic in itself, but I intend to focus on the compelling experience of managing the LCROSS Project in the context of this storied Agency. Perhaps most interesting are the implications this story has for managing any development effort, lunar or not, and working a balance to achieve success. NASA is by design a risk-taking agency within the US Government. It could be argued that NASA s purpose in the aerospace community is to take on the really big challenges that either the corporate world can t afford, are not yet profitable endeavors, or are just too risky for private corporations to entertain. However, expectations of the Agency have evolved. A combination of grim human tragedies and some very public cost and schedule overruns have challenged the public s and Congress s tolerance for risk-taking within the Agency. NASA, which is supposed to be in the business of taking risks to do bold, difficult things, has become less and less able to do so within its cost framework. Yet effectively replacing prudent risk management with attempts to "risk-eliminate" is completely unaffordable. So where does risk-taking fit within the Agency, or within private/corporate organizations for that matter? Where astronauts play there is clearly concern about risk. When an organization puts humans in harm s way, it is understandably going to take extra effort to assure nobody gets hurt. Doing so, of course, costs money - a lot of money to pay for labor and hardware which is attempting to assure nothing will go wrong. Sophisticated designs, with doubly- or triply-redundant systems, extensive testing to verify those systems, and numerous engineering test units built to learn and evolve a hardware design, all drive the cost and time required to implement. Human spaceflight is an expensive business because of the exceptional system complexity and levels of assurance required for human space travel. What about missions that do not involve human spaceflight? What about missions whose potential failure will not take a human life, whose costs are small and whose urgency and importance are limited by design? A portfolio consisting of this type of mission can be designed to be risk tolerant, not requiring large expenditures to guarantee against failure. With the money saved, the number of missions that can be executed within the portfolio grows, or the total cost of the portfolio can be reduced. The NASA LCROSS mission is a pathfinder example of a low-cost, quick turn-around mission which struck a balance on mission risk, while accomplishing big objectives, like defining how we understand the Moon.

Andrews, Daniel R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Testing a Run-Time Assurance Framework Coupled with Integrated Risk Mitigation Capabilities for Autonomous Urban UAS Flights

The In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) Concept of Operations (ConOps) envisions new capabilities to monitor, assess, and mitigate flight safety risks. Systems will be tailored to mission type, vehicle/equipage type, operational environment, and safety risk tolerance. Within an IASMS framework, several capabilities may be implemented spanning three operational phases (pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight/off-line); and consisting of lower level functions and information services which may reside onboard the aircraft, on third-party server(s), and/or on ground/operator station(s). Each capability will be designed to produce and disseminate safety-relevant information; perform detection, diagnosis, and prediction of unsafe situations; and/or execute mitigation actions when hazardous events warrant such changes. This paper focuses on recent testing of airborne capabilities that demonstrate inflight aspects of the overarching concept for autonomous unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations in urban environments. A flight test architecture is described that applies run-time assurance principles (e.g., executes independent of the unassured autopilot), real-time risk assessment, and a technique to execute contingencies if necessary either automatically or via pilot intervention. Several tests using small UAS were conducted to verify the assured in-flight risk mitigation capability. The paper draws significantly from a larger NASA technical report and recent prior conference papers, providing additional details. Data is analyzed for two representative flights to illustrate the performance for various sequential and simultaneous hazards used during testing. During each automated flight, several hazards are encountered at various points along the flight path. At each point, the hazard is mitigated by the system, with the vehicle then continuing to subsequent points. The paper concludes with lessons-learned regarding relevant aspects of the overarching IASMS concept and how it may be updated and further advanced in the future.

population activity↗
NASA NTRS2009

Integrated Risk and Knowledge Management Program -- IRKM-P

The NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) IRKM-P tightly couples risk management and knowledge management processes and tools to produce an effective "modern" work environment. IRKM-P objectives include: (1) to learn lessons from past and current programs (Apollo, Space Shuttle, and the International Space Station); (2) to generate and share new engineering design, operations, and management best practices through preexisting Continuous Risk Management (CRM) procedures and knowledge-management practices; and (3) to infuse those lessons and best practices into current activities. The conceptual framework of the IRKM-P is based on the assumption that risks highlight potential knowledge gaps that might be mitigated through one or more knowledge management practices or artifacts. These same risks also serve as cues for collection of knowledge particularly, knowledge of technical or programmatic challenges that might recur.

Lengyel, David M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Human Factors Throughout the Life Cycle: Lessons Learned from the Shuttle Program

With the ending of the Space Shuttle Program, it is critical that we not forget the Human Factors lessons we have learned over the years. At every phase of the life cycle, from manufacturing, processing and integrating vehicle and payload, to launch, flight operations, mission control and landing, hundreds of teams have worked together to achieve mission success in one of the most complex, high-risk socio-technical enterprises ever designed. Just as there was great diversity in the types of operations performed at every stage, there was a myriad of human factors that could further complicate these human systems. A single mishap or close call could point to issues at the individual level (perceptual or workload limitations, training, fatigue, human error susceptibilities), the task level (design of tools, procedures and aspects of the workplace), as well as the organizational level (appropriate resources, safety policies, information access and communication channels). While we have often had to learn through human mistakes and technological failures, we have also begun to understand how to design human systems in which individuals can excel, where tasks and procedures are not only safe but efficient, and how organizations can foster a proactive approach to managing risk and supporting human enterprises. Panelists will talk about their experiences as they relate human factors to a particular phase of the shuttle life cycle. They will conclude with a framework for tying together human factors lessons-learned into system-level risk management strategies.

human factors↗
NASA NTRS2016

Organizational Risk and Opportunity Management: Concepts and Processes for NASA's Consideration

The focus of this report is on the development of a framework and overall approach that serves the interests of nonprofit and Government organizations like NASA that focus on developing and/or applying new technology (henceforth referred to as organizations like NASA). These interests tend to place emphasis on performing services and achieving scientific and technical gains more than on achieving financial investment goals, which is the province of commercial enterprises. In addition, the objectives of organizations like NASA extend to institutional development and maintenance, financial health, legal and reputational protection, education and partnerships, and mandated milestone achievements. This report discusses the philosophical underpinnings of OROM for organizations like NASA, the integration of OROM with existing management processes, and the nature of the activities that are performed to implement OROM within this context. The proposed framework includes a set of core principles that would be essential to any successful OROM approach, along with some features that are currently under development and are continuing to evolve. The report is intended to foster discussion of OROM at NASA in order to reach a consensus on the optimum approach for the agency.

Risk↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team knowledge capture forums.. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned in safety framework and concepts.

System Safety↗
NASA NTRS1986

A risk management approach to CAIS development

The proposed DoD standard Common APSE Interface Set (CAIS) was developed as a framework set of interfaces that will support the transportability and interoperability of tools in the support environments of the future. While the current CAIS version is a promising start toward fulfilling those goals and current prototypes provide adequate testbeds for investigations in support of completing specifications for a full CAIS, there are many reasons why the proposed CAIS might fail to become a usable product and the foundation of next-generation (1990'S) project support environments such as NASA's Space Station software support environment. The most critical threats to the viability and acceptance of the CAIS include performance issues (especially in piggybacked implementations), transportability, and security requirements. To make the situation worse, the solution to some of these threats appears to be at conflict with the solutions to others.

Hart, Hal↗
NASA NTRS2011

DCS: A Case Study of Identification of Knowledge and Disposition Gaps Using Principles of Continuous Risk Management

The Human Research Program (HRP) is formulated around the program architecture of Evidence-Risk-Gap-Task-Deliverable. Review of accumulated evidence forms the basis for identification of high priority risks to human health and performance in space exploration. Gaps in knowledge or disposition are identified for each risk, and a portfolio of research tasks is developed to fill them. Deliverables from the tasks inform the evidence base with the ultimate goal of defining the level of risk and reducing it to an acceptable level. A comprehensive framework for gap identification, focus, and metrics has been developed based on principles of continuous risk management and clinical care. Research towards knowledge gaps improves understanding of the likelihood, consequence or timeframe of the risk. Disposition gaps include development of standards or requirements for risk acceptance, development of countermeasures or technology to mitigate the risk, and yearly technology assessment related to watching developments related to the risk. Standard concepts from clinical care: prevention, diagnosis, treatment, monitoring, rehabilitation, and surveillance, can be used to focus gaps dealing with risk mitigation. The research plan for the new HRP Risk of Decompression Sickness (DCS) used the framework to identify one disposition gap related to establishment of a DCS standard for acceptable risk, two knowledge gaps related to DCS phenomenon and mission attributes, and three mitigation gaps focused on prediction, prevention, and new technology watch. These gaps were organized in this manner primarily based on target for closure and ease of organizing interim metrics so that gap status could be quantified. Additional considerations for the knowledge gaps were that one was highly design reference mission specific and the other gap was focused on DCS phenomenon.

Norcross, Jason↗
NASA NTRS2017

Real-Time Prediction of Safety Margins in the National Airspace

Underlying all operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) is the concept of safety. Safety, as defined by acceptable levels of risk, is to be maintained at all times. The real-time safety monitoring (RTSM) framework is under development to provide an automated system to quantify safety in the NAS, estimate the current level of safety, and predict the future evolution of safety and the occurrence of events that pose an increased risk to flights so that these occurrences can be managed strategically rather than mitigated reactively. This paper presents the mathematical framework, the models, and the monitoring and prediction algorithms used to achieve this. RTSM computes safety as expressed through a set of safety margins based on user-defined safety metrics, thresolds, and events. Sources of uncertainty are modeled and propagated through the predictions in order to compute the probabilistic evolution of safety and the probability of events that introduce increased risk to operations. A prototype implementation is discussed and results demonstrating feasibility are presented. The results highlight the kinds of predictions that can be computed and the fidelity that is currently achieved.

national airspace system↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Future of Safety Management

As the pace of aviation evolution accelerates, our approach to safety and risk management needs to evolve to cover expanded current day operations as well as participants not traditionally included in the airspace. To assure safety of an increasingly complex aviation system it is essential to leverage new processes and techniques that can more quickly identify and respond to emerging risks. The concept of an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) presents an advanced SMS framework designed to enable integrated safety management and assurance. To assure safety of future aviation operations and technologies, advanced SMS concepts must be designed such that they can evolve to keep pace as aviation continues to change and as new safety and risk management tools and techniques emerge.

safety↗
NASA NTRS2019

Supply Chain Research and Analysis: Illuminating Risks in Complex Systems

Framing the strategic challenge posed by the interconnected, multitiered supply chains of mission projects managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. Discussing conditions and risks which can disrupt or threaten the availability, production and delivery of products and services for complex space systems. Utilizing a holistic analytical framework, business intelligence techniques, an integrated information system platform and analytics to produce insight into suppliers / supply chains and associated risks. Advancing supply chain risk management capabilities to support the successful performance of space missions.

supply chain risk management↗