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At least 37 records · Page 2

Assessing quality in cardiac surgery: why this is necessary in the twenty-first century

The cost and high-profile nature of coronary surgery means that this is an area of close public scrutiny. As much pioneering work in data collection and risk analyses has been carried out by cardiac surgeons, substantial information exists and the correct interpretation of that data is identified as an important issue. This paper considers the background and history of risk-adjustment in cardiac surgery, the uses of quality data, examines the observed/expected mortality ratio and looks at issues such as cost and reactions to outliers. The conclusion of the study is that the continuation of accurate data collection by the whole operative team and a strong commitment to constantly improving quality is crucial to its meaningful application.

Review↗

Path Toward a Unifid Geometry for Radiation Transport

The Direct Accelerated Geometry for Radiation Analysis and Design (DAGRAD) element of the RadWorks Project under Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) within the Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) of NASA will enable new designs and concepts of operation for radiation risk assessment, mitigation and protection. This element is designed to produce a solution that will allow NASA to calculate the transport of space radiation through complex computer-aided design (CAD) models using the state-of-the-art analytic and Monte Carlo radiation transport codes. Due to the inherent hazard of astronaut and spacecraft exposure to ionizing radiation in low-Earth orbit (LEO) or in deep space, risk analyses must be performed for all crew vehicles and habitats. Incorporating these analyses into the design process can minimize the mass needed solely for radiation protection. Transport of the radiation fields as they pass through shielding and body materials can be simulated using Monte Carlo techniques or described by the Boltzmann equation, which is obtained by balancing changes in particle fluxes as they traverse a small volume of material with the gains and losses caused by atomic and nuclear collisions. Deterministic codes that solve the Boltzmann transport equation, such as HZETRN [high charge and energy transport code developed by NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC)], are generally computationally faster than Monte Carlo codes such as FLUKA, GEANT4, MCNP(X) or PHITS; however, they are currently limited to transport in one dimension, which poorly represents the secondary light ion and neutron radiation fields. NASA currently uses HZETRN space radiation transport software, both because it is computationally efficient and because proven methods have been developed for using this software to analyze complex geometries. Although Monte Carlo codes describe the relevant physics in a fully three-dimensional manner, their computational costs have thus far prevented their widespread use for analysis of complex CAD models, leading to the creation and maintenance of toolkit-specific simplistic geometry models. The work presented here builds on the Direct Accelerated Geometry Monte Carlo (DAGMC) toolkit developed for use with the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code. The workflow for achieving radiation transport on CAD models using MCNP and FLUKA has been demonstrated and the results of analyses on realistic spacecraft/habitats will be presented. Future work is planned that will further automate this process and enable the use of multiple radiation transport codes on identical geometry models imported from CAD. This effort will enhance the modeling tools used by NASA to accurately evaluate the astronaut space radiation risk and accurately determine the protection provided by as-designed exploration mission vehicles and habitats

Lee, Kerry↗

Development of the J-2X Engine for the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle: Building on the Apollo Program for Lunar Return Missions

The United States (U.S.) Vision for Space Exploration has directed NASA to develop two new launch vehicles for sending humans to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In January 2006, NASA streamlined its hardware development approach for replacing the Space Shuttle after it is retired in 2010. Benefits of this approach include reduced programmatic and technical risks and the potential to return to the Moon by 2020, by developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) propulsion elements now, with full extensibility to future Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) lunar systems. The Constellation Program selected the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne J-2X engine to power the Ares I Upper Stage Element and the Ares V Earth Departure Stage. This decision was reached during the Exploration Systems Architecture Study and confirmed after the Exploration Launch Projects Office performed a variety of risk analyses, commonality assessments, and trade studies. This paper narrates the evolution of that decision; describes the performance capabilities expected of the J-2X design, including potential commonality challenges and opportunities between the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles; and provides a current status of J-2X design, development, and hardware testing activities. This paper also explains how the J-2X engine effort mitigates risk by testing existing engine hardware and designs; building on the Apollo Program (1961 to 1975), the Space Shuttle Program (1972 to 2010); and consulting with Apollo-era experts to derive other lessons lived to deliver a human-rated engine that is on an aggressive development schedule, with its first demonstration flight in 2012.

Greene, William D.↗

Development of the J-2X Engine for the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle: Building on the Apollo Program for Lunar Return Missions

The United States (U.S.) Vision for Space Exploration has directed NASA to develop two new launch vehicles for sending humans to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In January 2006, NASA streamlined its hardware development approach for replacing the Space Shuttle after it is retired in 2010. Benefits of this approach include reduced programmatic and technical risks and the potential to return to the Moon by 2020 by developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) propulsion elements now, with full extensibility to future Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) lunar systems. The Constellation Program selected the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne J-2X engine to power the Ares I Upper Stage Element and the Ares V Earth Departure Stage (EDS). This decision was reached during the Exploration Systems Architecture Study and confirmed after the Exploration Launch Projects Office performed a variety of risk analyses, commonality assessments, and trade studies. This paper narrates the evolution of that decision; describes the performance capabilities expected of the J-2X design, including potential commonality challenges and opportunities between the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles; and provides a current status of J-2X design, development, and hardware testing activities. This paper also explains how the J-2X engine effort mitigates risk by testing existing engine hardware and designs; building on the Apollo Program (1961 to 1975), the Space Shuttle Program (1972 to 2010); and consulting with Apollo era experts to derive other lessons learned to deliver a human-rated engine that is on an aggressive development schedule, with its first demonstration flight in 2012.

Greene, WIlliam↗

Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) Analysis of NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) Flight Termination System and Power Supply

In order to perform public risk analyses for vehicles containing Flight Termination Systems (FTS), it is necessary for the analyst to know the reliability of each of the components of the FTS. These systems are typically divided into two segments; a transmitter system and associated equipment, typically in a ground station or on a support aircraft, and a receiver system and associated equipment on the target vehicle. This analysis attempts to analyze the reliability of the NASA DFRC flight termination system ground transmitter segment for use in the larger risk analysis and to compare the results against two established Department of Defense availability standards for such equipment.

Morehouse, Dennis V.↗

Development of the J-2X Engine for the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle: Building on the Apollo Program for Lunar Return Missions

The United States (U.S.) Vision for Space Exploration directs NASA to develop two new launch vehicles for sending humans to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In January 2006, NASA streamlined its hardware development approach for replacing the Space Shuttle after it is retired in 2010. Benefits of this approach include reduced programmatic and technical risks and the potential to return to the Moon by 2020, by developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) propulsion elements now, with full extensibility to future Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) lunar systems. This decision was reached after the Exploration Launch Projects Office performed a variety of risk analyses, commonality assessments, and trade studies. The Constellation Program selected the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne J-2X engine to power the Ares I Upper Stage Element and the Ares V Earth Departure Stage. This paper narrates the evolution of that decision; describes the performance capabilities expected of the J-2X design, including potential commonality challenges and opportunities between the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles; and provides a current status of J-2X design, development, and hardware testing activities. This paper also explains how the J-2X engine effort mitigates risk by building on the Apollo Program and other lessons lived to deliver a human-rated engine that is on an aggressive development schedule, with its first demonstration flight in 2012.

Snoddy, Jim↗

Overview of Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Analysis Process for Mars Sample Return Earth Entry System

Introduction: Micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk analyses for the Mars Sample Return (MSR) Earth Entry System (EES) have been significantly more rigorous than previously flown missions because of its categorization as a Class V restricted return mission. This means the returned samples present significant concern for biogenic contamination. These analyses seek to determine if a micrometeoroid or orbital debris strike would result in loss of containment assurance and are summarized in the flowchart in Fig. 1. Methodology: The mission is considered in two MMOD phases: a pre-release phase where the EES is protected by a Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) and a post-release phase called “free-flight” where the EES is exposed directly to the MMOD environment. These phases correspond to interplanetary cruise and imminent re-entry, respectively. To inform the MMPS design, a 30-shot high velocity impact testing (HVIT) series on candidate configurations at NASA White Sands Test Facility was completed in the summer of 2022. Sample post-shot images are shown in Fig 2 [1]. These data are used to baseline the MMPS design and to tune the hydrocode simulations. ALE3D, CTH, and SPHC are the hydrocodes that simulate physics of high-speed impacts [2]. Results generated with these populate a penetration depth versus energy space beyond the testable velocity regime of HVIT (~7 km/s). The penetration depth versus energy space data are used to define a critical projectile diameter function called a Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE), where the projectile “criticality” is determined by zone dependent failure criteria defined a-priori [3]. For example, the nose of the heatshield has a failure criterion of 50% TPS penetration, assigned because the landing loads are concentrated on that region and no substructure damage is permitted. The BLEs for each vehicle material zone are input into the BUMPER 3 code, along with the vehicle surface mesh and the corresponding space environment model, to calculate a probability of penetration or number of penetrations. The environment models, MEM3 for MM and ORDEM 3.2 for OD, simulate the meteoroid environment from 0.2 to 2 au based on the Grün flux equation, and the debris environment up to 40,000 km altitude from Earth surface, respectively [4,5]. Presentation Focus: The presentation or poster will present the results to-date focusing on the full risk analysis process flow seen in Fig. 1. Details on the derivation of the failure criteria will be discussed, along with HVIT results and how these influenced the MMPS configuration baseline decision. Further, results of hydrocode simulations will be presented and the tuning to HVIT outputs will be described. Finally, the strategies that direct the BLE formulation will be reviewed, specifically, for the EES elements that are most exposed to the MMOD environment.

mmod↗

Orbit Transfer Vehicle Engine Study. Phase A, extension 1: Study plan update

The updated study plan for the Space Transportation System orbit transfer vehicle (OTV) engine study is presented. The study program consists of engine system, programmatic, cost, and risk analyses of OTV engine concepts. Detailed task descriptions for the advanced expander cycle engine optimization, alternate low thrust capability, and safety, reliability, and cost comparisons are given.

Mellish, J. A.↗

Safety status of space radioisotope and reactor power sources

The current overall safety criterion for both radioisotope and reactor power sources is containment or immobilization in the case of a reentry accident. In addition, reactors are designed to remain subcritical under conditions of land impact or water immersion. A very extensive safety test and analysis program was completed on the radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) in use on the Galileo spacecraft and planned for use on the Ulysses spacecraft. The results of this work show that the RTGs will pose little or no risk for any credible accident. The SP-100 space nuclear reactor program has begun addressing its safety criteria, and the design is planned to be such as to ensure meeting the various safety criteria. Preliminary mission risk analyses on SP-100 show the expected value population dose from postulated accidents on the reference mission to be very small. It is concluded that the current US nuclear power sources are the safest flown.

Bennett, Gary L.↗

Space Shuttle critical function audit

A large fault-tolerance model of the main propulsion system of the US space shuttle has been developed. This model is being used to identify single components and pairs of components that will cause loss of shuttle critical functions. In addition, this model is the basis for risk quantification of the shuttle. The process used to develop and analyze the model is digraph matrix analysis (DMA). The DMA modeling and analysis process is accessed via a graphics-based computer user interface. This interface provides coupled display of the integrated system schematics, the digraph models, the component database, and the results of the fault tolerance and risk analyses.

Sacks, Ivan J.↗

Universal first-order reliability concept applied to semistatic structures

A reliability design concept was developed for semistatic structures which combines the prevailing deterministic method with the first-order reliability method. The proposed method surmounts deterministic deficiencies in providing uniformly reliable structures and improved safety audits. It supports risk analyses and reliability selection criterion. The method provides a reliability design factor derived from the reliability criterion which is analogous to the current safety factor for sizing structures and verifying reliability response. The universal first-order reliability method should also be applicable for air and surface vehicles semistatic structures.

Verderaime, V.↗

Investigation of Natural and Man-Made Radiation Effects on Crews on Long Duration Space Missions

Over the past several years, NASA has studied a variety of mission scenarios designed to establish a permanent human presence on the surface of Mars. Nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) is one of the possible elements in this program. During the initial stages of vehicle design work, careful consideration must be given to not only the shielding requirements of natural space radiation, but to the shielding and configuration requirements of the on-board reactors. In this work, the radiation transport code MCNP has been used to make initial estimates of crew exposures to reactor radiation fields for a specific manned NEP vehicle design. In this design, three 25 MW(sub th), scaled SP-100-class reactors are shielded by three identical shields. Each shield has layers of beryllium, tungsten, and lithium hydride between the reactor and the crew compartment. Separate calculations are made of both the exiting neutron and gamma fluxes from the reactors during beginning-of-life, full-power operation. This data is then used as the source terms for particle transport in MCNP. The total gamma and neutron fluxes exiting the reactor shields are recorded and separate transport calculations are then performed for a 10 g/sq cm crew compartment aluminum thickness. Estimates of crew exposures have been assessed for various thicknesses of the shield tungsten and lithium hydride layers. A minimal tungsten thickness of 20 cm is required to shield the reactor photons below the 0.05 Sv/y man-made radiation limit. In addition to a 20-cm thick tungsten layer, a 40-cm thick lithium hydride layer is required to shield the reactor neutrons below the annual limit. If the tungsten layer is 30-cm thick, the lithium hydride layer should be at least 30-cm thick. These estimates do not take into account the photons generated by neutron interactions inside the shield because the MCNP neutron cross sections did not allow reliable estimates of photon production in these materials. These results, along with natural space radiation shielding estimates calculated by NASA Langley Research Center, have been used to provide preliminary input data into a new Macintosh-based software tool. A skeletal version of this tool being developed will allow rapid radiation exposure and risk analyses to be performed on a variety of Lunar and Mars missions utilizing nuclear-powered vehicles.

Bolch, Wesley E.↗

Characterization of the Space Shuttle Ascent Debris using CFD Methods

After video analysis of space shuttle flight STS-107's ascent showed that an object shed from the bipod-ramp region impacted the left wing, a transport analysis was initiated to determine a credible flight path and impact velocity for the piece of debris. This debris transport analysis was performed both during orbit, and after the subsequent re-entry accident. The analysis provided an accurate prediction of the velocity a large piece of foam bipod ramp would have as it impacted the wing leading edge. This prediction was corroborated by video analysis and fully-coupled CFD/six degree of freedom (DOF) simulations. While the prediction of impact velocity was accurate enough to predict critical damage in this case, one of the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) for return-to-flight (RTF) was to analyze the complete debris environment experienced by the shuttle stack on ascent. This includes categorizing all possible debris sources, their probable geometric and aerodynamic characteristics, and their potential for damage. This paper is chiefly concerned with predicting the aerodynamic characteristics of a variety of potential debris sources (insulating foam and cork, nose-cone ablator, ice, ...) for the shuttle ascent configuration using CFD methods. These aerodynamic characteristics are used in the debris transport analysis to predict flight path, impact velocity and angle, and provide statistical variation to perform risk analyses where appropriate. The debris aerodynamic characteristics are difficult to determine using traditional methods, such as static or dynamic test data, due to the scaling requirements of simulating a typical debris event. The use of CFD methods has been a critical element for building confidence in the accuracy of the debris transport code by bridging the gap between existing aerodynamic data and the dynamics of full-scale, in-flight events.

Murman, Scott M.↗

Difficult Decisions Made Easier

NASA missions are extremely complex and prone to sudden, catastrophic failure if equipment falters or if an unforeseen event occurs. For these reasons, NASA trains to expect the unexpected. It tests its equipment and systems in extreme conditions, and it develops risk-analysis tests to foresee any possible problems. The Space Agency recently worked with an industry partner to develop reliability analysis software capable of modeling complex, highly dynamic systems, taking into account variations in input parameters and the evolution of the system over the course of a mission. The goal of this research was multifold. It included performance and risk analyses of complex, multiphase missions, like the insertion of the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter; reliability analyses of systems with redundant and/or repairable components; optimization analyses of system configurations with respect to cost and reliability; and sensitivity analyses to identify optimal areas for uncertainty reduction or performance enhancement.

Source record↗

Mars Earth Return Vehicle (MERV) Propulsion Options

The COMPASS Team was tasked with the design of a Mars Sample Return Vehicle. The current Mars sample return mission is a joint National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and European Space Agency (ESA) mission, with ESA contributing the launch vehicle for the Mars Sample Return Vehicle. The COMPASS Team ran a series of design trades for this Mars sample return vehicle. Four design options were investigated: Chemical Return /solar electric propulsion (SEP) stage outbound, all-SEP, all chemical and chemical with aerobraking. The all-SEP and Chemical with aerobraking were deemed the best choices for comparison. SEP can eliminate both the Earth flyby and the aerobraking maneuver (both considered high risk by the Mars Sample Return Project) required by the chemical propulsion option but also require long low thrust spiral times. However this is offset somewhat by the chemical/aerobrake missions use of an Earth flyby and aerobraking which also take many months. Cost and risk analyses are used to further differentiate the all-SEP and Chemical/Aerobrake options.

Oleson, Steven R.↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗

Meteoroid Flux from Lunar Impact Monitoring

The flux of kilogram-sized meteoroids has been determined from the first 5 years of observations by NASA's Lunar Impact Monitoring Program (Suggs et al. 2014). Telescopic video observations of 126 impact flashes observed during photometric conditions were calibrated and the flux of meteoroids to a limiting mass of 30 g was determined to be 6.14 x 10(exp -10) m(exp -2) yr(exp -1) at the Moon, in agreement with the Grun et al. (1985) model value of 7.5 x 10(exp -10) m(exp -2) yr(exp -1). After accounting for gravitational focusing effects, the flux at the Earth to a limiting impact energy of 3.0 x10(exp -6) kilotons of TNT (1.3 x 10(exp 7) J) was determined to be consistent with the results in Brown et al. (2002). Approximately 62% of the impact flashes were correlated with major meteor showers as cataloged in visual/optical meteor shower databases. These flux measurements, coupled with cratering and ejecta models, can be used to develop impact ejecta engineering environments for use in lunar surface spacecraft design and risk analyses.

Suggs, Robert↗

Cassini Ring Plane Crossings: Hypervelocity Impact Risks to Sun Sensor Assemblies

For both F/G and D-ring crossings: Probability of a penetration damage of the SSH (Sun Sensor Head) window glass is very low; Optical attenuation due to craters on the surface of the window glass caused by direct HVI (Hyper-Velocity Impact) by dust particle is estimated to be less than 1 percent; Optical attenuation due to secondary debris cloud generated by the disintegrated ring dust particles is estimated to be less than 1 percent. To better manage the Sun sensor damage risk during selected proximal orbit crossings, it is highly desirable to follow the contingency procedures mentioned in Section VII of the paper: Details of this contingency procedure are given in the paper entitled "Cassini Operational Sun Sensor Risk Management During Proximal Orbit Saturn Ring Plane Crossings" authored by David M. Bates. Based on results of risk analyses documented in this work and contingency planning work described in the paper mentioned above, we judge that the proximal orbit campaign will be safe from the viewpoint of dust HVI hazard.

dust particles↗